The third paper in the new Atlantic Council Sudan Task Force series, “Sudan: Soft Power, Cultural Engagement, and National Security” examines the importance of people-to-people engagement and its relevance to broader US strategic aims in Sudan.
More than two decades of isolation have succeeded in funneling Sudan’s best and brightest to seek higher education and post-graduate employment in locations other than the West. The United States has lost valuable ground to other actors, ranging from the benign to the malicious, who are influencing Sudan’s youth and wider population in ways that almost certainly will not serve US interests.
The second paper in the new Atlantic Council Sudan Task Force series, “Sudan: Prospects for Economic Re-engagement” examines the possibility of a new era of US economic cooperation with Sudan, including an opportunity for the United States to push for desperately needed economic reforms as part of wider US bilateral engagements efforts.
Authored by Dr. Jeffrey Herbst in collaboration with the Council’s Sudan Task Force, the issue brief describes the political economy of Sudan, which shapes Khartoum’s priorities and affects how it will respond to demands for economic reform.
The first paper in the new Atlantic Council Sudan Task Force series, “Sudan: Politics, Engagement, and Reform” examines the political landscape in the country in the wake of renewed bilateral engagement, addressing questions of governance, inclusion, and reform.
Co-authored by Ambassador Johnnie Carson and Zach Vertin in collaboration with the Council’s Sudan Task Force, the issue brief offers recommendations for continued progress toward democratic transformation in Sudan, in both the medium and long terms.
“The Russians and other purveyors of disinformation will constantly improve their tactics; our counter-tactics therefore cannot be static,” write Ambassador Daniel Fried and Dr. Alina Polyakova in Democratic Defense Against Disinformation, a new publication by the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. This report is part of the broader transatlantic effort to identify democratic solutions for countering disinformation in the short term and building societal resistance to it in the long term.
Over the past ten years, Chinese companies and policy banks have steadily invested and lent hundreds of billions of dollars in Latin America's oil and gas sector. China's leaders have been pressured to secure energy resources because of stagnating domestic oil production coupled with rapid growth in consumption. Latin America's growing proven oil reserves have made it an attractive partner for China. The rise in capital flowing from China to the energy sector in Latin America, plus the lack of transparency around the deals however, has led to a rise in myths about the true motivation behind China's intentions. This report seeks to uncover the facts of Chinese investment and lending deals in the Latin American energy sector, explains what is reality and what are myths, and provides pointed recommendations of how all parties can help shape a better energy cooperation.
New US sanctions on Russia now being implemented by the administration were imposed in August 2017and included additional sanctions on the energy sector. This new legislation both tightens earlier sanctions and includes sanctions against entities supporting or investing in Russia's oil and gas pipeline networks. The sanctions were intended to delay and hamper Russia's ability to develop various energy projects, but Russia recently reached noteworthy levels of oil production and gas exports. In his new report, "Impact of Sanctions on Russia's Energy Sector," Global Energy Center Non-Resident Senior Fellow Bud Coote addresses the impact of US and European Union sanctions on Russia's energy sector, Moscow's strategy and actions to deal with energy-related sanctions, and some of the geopolitical and other implications of Russia's ability to cope with these sanctions. Coote's analysis highlights how Moscow has managed to successfully pursue its energy goals, despite the broader negative impact of sanctions on other areas of the Russian economy.
The maritime domain is increasingly a priority for NATO as the alliance seeks to bolster its defense and deterrence posture in Europe’s north and east. Much work remains to be done in terms of NATO’s maritime posture and the maritime capabilities and capacities of its members. The maritime domain presents a unique challenge for NATO’s Baltic members, as they are frontline states in the new contest between NATO and a revanchist Russia. This issue brief lays out the particular challenges for the Baltic States in the maritime domain in the Baltic Sea region, and how Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuanian can build more effective maritime defense in concert with NATO and the United States.
The buildup and threatening exercise of Russian conventional forces has been an important component of Russia’s multifaceted anti-Western campaign. NATO has the inherent capacity to deter, or if necessary prevail in, a conventional conflict. Its forces, however, while large, are currently neither adequately ready nor oriented to ensure that such deterrence is fully credible or that a warfighting campaign could be promptly successful. This report proposes that NATO should enhance its deterrent and warfighting posture in Europe by adopting at the 2018 NATO Summit the strategy of “Effective Deterrence by Prompt Reinforcement,” specifically in reference to Russian activities that have increased the conventional challenge to the Alliance. Key components of the strategy include a readiness initiative, enhanced intelligence, rapid decision-making, prompt reinforcement by United States and European ground and air forces, expanded maritime capabilities, integration of highly capable cyber nations’ capacities, and establishment of an integrated plan for the multi-domain defense of Europe.
This report analyzes four country-level case studies to examine the factors that have shaped countries’ ability to react to a sudden influx of asylum seekers or refugees, and demonstrates a spectrum of success in integration. The paper looks at three Arab countries—Lebanon, Tunisia, and Egypt—that have hosted large numbers of asylum seekers and refugees, particularly since 2011, and Germany, which willingly took on one million Syrian asylum seekers and refugees starting in 2015. Germany stands out in contrast to the other countries in this report for several reasons: it is neither in the Middle East nor bordering or near a conflict zone, it has a robust economy and sophisticated legal system for integrating refugees, and, foremost among its European neighbors, it willingly accepted the refugees, whereas others took them in largely involuntarily.