A publication of the
ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Contributors include: President Barack Obama | James L. Jones
Chuck Hagel | Horst Teltschik | Condoleezza Rice | Zbigniew Brzezinski
Helmut Kohl | Colin Powell | Frederick Forsyth | Brent Scowcroft

Freedom's Challenge

Marking the 20th Anniversary of the Fall of the Berlin Wall

Responsible Leadership in a Globalized World

The fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, not only led to the unification of Germany, thus ending decades of division and immeasurable human suffering; it also ended the division of Europe and changed the world.

Today, twenty years after this event, we are in a position to gauge which distance we have covered since. We are able to observe that in spite of continuing problems and justified as well as unjustified complaints, the unification of Germany and Europe has been crowned with success.

It is being emphasized again and again, and rightly so, that it was the people in the former GDR that started the peaceful revolution. The Kohl/Genscher government recognized – and seized – the opportunity for unification. But without the support of the United States of America and our European neighbors, the process would have failed. The United States has not only been a guarantor of our security during the post-war decades, it has also been the most important ally on the road to German unification.

During my six years as German Ambassador in Washington, I also sensed that Germany's role vis-à-vis the United States has changed. The special relationship has developed into something more like a partnership, which is also characterized by national interests. Particularly in recent years, there have been differences in opinion on important issues, but the shared interests continue to predominate. It is important that, in the future, we do not forget what binds us together and that we define our common interests and responsibilities. The deepening of personal relations between young Germans and Americans in particular should be dear to our hearts.

For this reason the BMW Foundation accounts the transatlantic relationship as a focus of its activity. The Transatlantic Forum for example is the "veteran" of the BMW Foundation's Young Leaders Forums. The aim of these Young Leaders Forums is to establish a network, beyond the Forums discussions, between young leaders from various countries. Responsible Leadership in a Globalized World the BMW Foundation, with its goals and projects, also encourages leaders worldwide to take into account the greater common good in their professional and personal activities.

Jürgen Chrobog, State Secretary (ret.)
Former German Ambassador to the United States
Chairman of the Board of Directors,
BMW Stiftung Herbert Quandt

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

I am honored to join all those recognizing the 60th year of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Atlantic Council's *Freedom's Challenge: NATO at 60 – Commemorating 20 Years of the Fall of the Berlin Wall* provides us with an opportunity to reflect upon the events that transpired 20 years ago, when the people of Central and Eastern Europe freed themselves from tyranny and oppression.

The year 1989 was pivotal in the 20th century and in world history. Poland held a historic parliamentary election that ended communist rule. Hungary boldly cut the barbed wire fence separating it from Austria, drawing back the Iron Curtain. Germans from both sides of the Berlin Wall breached the barrier that divided them and began the process of reuniting their country. And, with the Velvet Revolution in the then-Czechoslovakia, Central and Eastern Europeans chose freedom over oppression, liberty over captivity, and hope over despair.

I am proud of the role the United States played in 1989 and in the years that followed. Today, Central and Eastern Europe are firmly anchored in the Euro-Atlantic institutions of NATO and the European Union. Our countries are bound together by our shared commitment to human dignity and freedom, and by the security pledges that lie at the core of the Atlantic Alliance.

The lessons of 1989 are clear: democracy will ultimately triumph over authoritarianism, and ordinary people can be powerful agents for change. I congratulate the leaders and citizens who inspired and participated in the revolutions of 1989. We honor their courage and continue to draw strength from their example as we, in concert with our allies and partners, advance the causes of justice and liberty around the world.

On this occasion, America reaffirms its enduring commitment to our shared vision of a peaceful Europe, whole and free.



BARACK OBAMA
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

The Triumph of Freedom

By former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

2009 is a special year for anniversaries. We celebrate the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989. Inextricably linked to this, we also celebrate the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany on May 23, 1949, and of NATO on April 4, 1949.

The Berlin Wall had not only torn families apart for 28 years, but had in fact also divided a city and a country into two parts. The Wall was also the very symbol of the Cold War. It stood for the division of the world into a "free" and an "unfree" part. The Wall eventually fell absolutely peacefully, without a shot being fired, without blood being shed. It was like a miracle. The peaceful protests of the people in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had been building up for months and eventually became unstoppable. The GDR state in which injustice had prevailed collapsed in 1989/90, not least due to the people's hunger for freedom.

The Wall eventually fell absolutely peacefully

After the fall of the Wall, less than a year passed before we achieved the reunification of Germany, in peace and freedom, with God's help and with the approval of our partners and allies in the world. On October 3, 1990, we celebrated the Day of German Unity. It was the triumph of freedom. At the same time, it was final confirmation of Chancellor Adenauer's policy of aligning the Federal Republic to the West under the proviso of ultimate reunification, a goal we resolutely pursued over the years. When reunification came into reach in 1989/90, it was abundantly clear to me, as it had been to Konrad Adenauer in the early years of our young democracy, that a reunited Germany had to be a member of NATO. Reunification with the price tag of Germany leaving NATO would not have been possible with me. Our partners and neighbors were well aware of this.

For us, the crucial allies on this journey were the Americans and President George Bush. My friend George Bush was a godsend for us Germans and for me, personally. We trusted each other and shared the same fundamental belief in freedom. Although quite different on the German question, the situation regarding trust was very similar with Mikhail Gorbachev.

Well aware of the steadfastness of the West, which was particularly evident in NATO's Double-Track Decision, Gorbachev set the course for the opening of the Eastern bloc with *glasnost* and *perestroika* and followed a peaceful route, displaying great courage throughout the whole process.

The years 1989/90 changed the world. We should never forget that everything could have turned out very differently. That is why the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Wall is above all a day of great joy and thanksgiving for the free world from which we can draw motivation and commitment for the future.

Helmut Kohl was Chancellor of West Germany from 1982 to 1990, and of reunified Germany from 1990 to 1998.



Commemorating the Fall of the Wall

By former U.S. President George H.W. Bush

I am delighted to join the Atlantic Council in commemorating the 60th anniversary of NATO and the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall.

The fall of the Wall was first and foremost a testament to the spirit of the German people. As I said in 1990, the fall of that "stark and searing symbol of conflict and cold war" was "proof that no wall is ever strong enough to strangle the human spirit, that no wall can ever crush a nation's soul." It was also a historic moment for the United States and the entire Atlantic Alliance, which had remained steadfast for more than 40 years in support of a free Germany, resolutely working toward a world without the Wall.

The international scene has changed enormously in the last two decades, in large measure because there is no more superpower confrontation. That is the enduring historical legacy of the fall of the Wall: it set in motion those events that would lead to the reunification of Germany less than one year later – a day that marks, in my mind, the day the Cold War ended.

The events of 1989 began a new era in the history of Germany, Europe, the Atlantic Alliance, and indeed, the entire world. To be sure, new challenges and responsibilities have emerged. But from my vantage point – as someone who lived through 45 years of East-West conflict – this remains, as I



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7876

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 3, 1990, 9:56 - 9:59 a.m.
The Oval Office

The President: Helmut! I am sitting in a meeting with members of our Congress and am calling at the end of this historic day to wish you well.

Chancellor Kohl: Things are going very, very well. I am in Berlin. There were one million people here last night at the very spot where the Wall used to stand -- and where President Reagan called on Mr. Gorbachev to open this gate. Words can't describe the feeling. The weather is very nice and warm, fortunately. There were large crowds of young people. Eighty percent were under thirty. It was fantastic.

A short time ago there was enormous applause when our President said that our gratitude was owed especially to our Allied friends and above all our American friends. I share that view. When the parliamentary declaration is made, it will say that all American Presidents from Harry Truman all the way up to our friend George Bush made this possible. I would like to thank you again for all your support for us.

The President: It was covered widely on American television. America is proud to have stood with you through these negotiations, and we identify with the hopes of the German people. I have to run to another meeting, but I wanted you to know what pride we have in standing by the German people.

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much.

The President: Good-bye, my friend.

Chancellor Kohl: Tell your Congressmen good wishes and thanks.

-- End of Conversation --

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A united Germany has taken its place as a force for peace and stability in world affairs

said at the time of German reunification, "a new world of hope." It is a world that is all the more hopeful because over the last two decades, a united Germany has taken its place as a force for peace and stability in world affairs, NATO has renewed its purpose, and the members of the Atlantic Alliance have become even more vital partners in leadership.

As we celebrate this year's historic anniversaries and look forward to a shared future of hope and promise, may God continue to bless the people of Germany and the entire trans-Atlantic Community.

George H.W. Bush was U.S. President from 1989 to 1993.

Challenging the Status Quo

By former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher

As the world celebrates 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall it is right that we should reflect on the impact of those momentous months.

In the two decades which have passed, there has been a tendency to diminish the importance of the Cold War. We have since learned how fragile the economic, political and military structures in the Soviet Union really were. But it would be wrong to lose sight of the dangers which mankind faced during the era of Mutually Assured Destruction. Nor must we downplay the bravery of those who resisted oppression. No ideology has been responsible for more deaths than communism and it required tremendous moral and physical courage to defy its deadly grip.

By the late 1970s it had almost come to be accepted that the world was locked into an unbreakable armed stand-off. But with the coming of Ronald Reagan to the White House, all that was to be transformed. President Reagan was not prepared to accept the status quo. He believed that the West could win both the battle of ideas and the battle of resources, and with the support of other leaders, he was determined to loosen communism's hold. And by the mid-1980s, as the effects of his determined stance began to expose the frailty of Soviet power, communism itself found someone from within who was prepared to doubt its orthodoxy and to promote change: Mikhail Gorbachev.

Twenty years on, the world has changed, mostly for the better. Millions of people who once struggled under the oppression of communism live freer, more prosperous and happier lives. We have not created utopia: but then only communism thought that mankind could. There are still hardships. There are still dangers. But it is a world where more people are taking more decisions about their own lives than ever in our history. And that is something for us all to celebrate.

Baroness Margaret Thatcher was British Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990.

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A Valued Partnership

By Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, President of the Republic of Liberia

We recall two decades ago the shouts that went forth in celebration when the Berlin Wall came down. The burst of energy was intense and the German people's feeling of exhilaration infectious as images flashed across television screens around the world of a shattered barrier separating a people yearning for freedom and unity.

Many still burdened under the yoke of dictatorship and tyranny shared vicariously the invigorating air of liberation being savored by the German people. For decades the Berlin Wall stood as an impregnable fortress against the forces of free expression, free choice and free association. An artificial fortress cannot endure forever against the tide of freedom and the collective will of a determined people.

I congratulate the determined German people for all that they have fought for and all that they have achieved in building a unified country with institutions that protect and nurture your democracy and your liberty.

My colleague Chancellor Angela Merkel, whom I also call friend and sister, addressed the American Congress recently. She and the German people, too, know well of the powerful support from the United States and from the American people throughout the dark days of the Cold War.

I congratulate as well the American people for all that they have done to support freedom throughout the world, for all that they have done to support those fighting for freedom, and for all that they continue to do in the pursuit of freedom.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, whom I also call friend and sister, deserves recognition for her lifelong support of those seeking to bring democracy and freedom, peace and prosperity to their communities and their countries.

In particular, I honor Secretary Clinton's passionate commitment to women and their fight for equality and liberty. We will continue to work together to ensure that girls have access to education – and market women to economic opportunities. I profoundly share Secretary Clinton's views that rape can never be a tool of war, that those who commit such crimes be brought to justice, and that the women who suffer be given care and comfort. We know that women helped rebuild Berlin after World War II. We know that all across Africa women are rebuilding communities torn apart by conflict. These women deserve our support as among the 21st century's fighters for freedom.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt spoke in 1941 of the imperative of the four freedoms, which we all know: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. I am proud to have been a recipient of an award by the Roosevelt Institute for strong advocacy for freedom of speech. These very freedoms are as precious to us today as then. Alas, many proud and hard working people across Africa are not able to speak or worship freely. They go to sleep hungry or sick, and live in fear for their lives or the lives of their children. We continue our commitment to bring these freedoms to our people. Liberians, young and old, share the government's commitments to work, to be honest, to unite, to reconcile and to rebuild. One important challenge for us is to create the institutions that will stand the test of time – as Germany has done – institutions that will be the hallmark of democracy for my grandchildren's grandchildren.

I have already said in Washington and repeat here: I have heard some argue that the policy of your great Presidents – Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt,

"This battle is far from over"

Harry S. Truman, John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan – the policy of promoting democracy abroad, was relevant in its contemporary context, but no longer retains a place in the 21st century. But I am here as living proof to tell you that if the U.S. were to lose its will and go quiet on issues of liberty and human rights, that this would shake the foundations of democracy around world.

I know that all of you know that this battle is far from over. But Liberia is proud to be part of the trans-Atlantic community, which honors those sacrifices by freedom-loving peoples all over the world. The people of Liberia – and the people of Africa – know that it is in partnership with friends and allies who share these important values that we will continue to work until all of our children enjoy the blessings of peace and prosperity, of freedom and democracy.

Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has been President of the Republic of Liberia since 2005.

Lessons Learned

By Václav Havel, former President of the Czech Republic

Judging by the number of invitations, interviews and debates, there is great interest in the 20th anniversary of the historic social changes, and this interest, in my opinion, is amplified by the fact that the atmosphere in the world at the current time is a far cry from the euphoria we experienced in those days.

But even at that time it was evident that the enthusiasm could not last long and we were at pains to transform it rapidly into a functioning democracy and the rule of law. In spite of the fact that we too were confronted with the rule of all revolutions – i.e. what one doesn't manage to achieve in the first weeks and months will never be achieved – we did manage to lay the foundations for civic freedoms, democracy and the rule of law. We have a developing civil society, we have free media, free elections, a functioning judiciary, and we alone are responsible for all the things we don't like. We are members of all the respected international institutions, in particular, NATO and the European Union.

I would be amazed if, from time to time, someone in the West did not regret the eastward expansion of those organizations. However, I would like to assure everyone that if the Euro-Atlantic zone had not opened up to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, we would probably be in a much more complicated and disadvantageous situation and exposed to graver dangers.

Following the fall of totalitarianism and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the new democracies represented a politically fragile space that needed to be filled rapidly. And had the post-communist countries not been drawn into trans-Atlantic ties and the process of European unification, the nationalisms that were never far away in this part of Europe could now hold sway here. That all represented an enormous contribution to us by the West.

And what do we have that could benefit the West? Our first-hand experience of a totalitarian regime, of its subtle methods of manipulation, and of the fear it engenders and which pervades society.

No one on this planet can say that totalitarianism does not concern them, no one can be sure they will not succumb to it, no society is entirely immune to it. At a time of globalization, at a time when everyone and everything is interlinked, scope for the spread of demagogy is actually even more of a risk than ever. And the more sophisticated it is, the more difficult it is to identify in time. And so even minor concessions – albeit made with good intentions, maybe – can have grave consequences in the future. And Central and Eastern Europe in particular have valuable experience of the phenomena of totalitarianism and demagogy.

Initially, a small section of society fell prey to Nazism and communism, but it turned out to be sufficient for society as a whole to succumb to eventually. Both Nazism and communism were unprecedented in history and there was no previous experience of what their ideologies could give rise to. So one cannot rule out the possibility that if humanity was imperiled by a new totalitarianism, one that was unlike the two previous ones, it might be scarcely recognizable as one at first and even appear attractive to some, but its consequences could be unforeseeable.

Nevertheless, I firmly believe that thanks to the common endeavors of us all, the values we share will never again be imperiled, but, on the contrary, will be enhanced and proliferate.

Václav Havel was President of Czechoslovakia from 1989 to 1993, and of the Czech Republic from 1993 to 2003.

"No one on this planet can say that totalitarianism does not concern them"

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Editor's Introduction

Frederick Kempe, President & CEO, the Atlantic Council of the United States

History has never seen a more powerful symbol for an era than that provided by the Berlin Wall during the Cold War.

Communist forces did more than split a city on August 13, 1961. They divided the world. Berlin, with a population then of 3.3 million people, was Europe's largest metropolis between Paris and Moscow, so the physical act of closing its border was remarkable. The political significance of constructing a 96-mile, concrete edifice between the world's two competing systems – adorned with angry strands of barbed wire and protected by guard towers, attack dogs and border police with shoot-to-kill orders – was staggering.

Many of the contributions in the pages that follow address the many factors that brought down the Wall some 28 years later. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell reflects on the crucial leadership of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. Former National Security Advisors Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft speak respectively of the decisive roles of the Polish Pope John Paul II and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Others investigate the role of matters ranging from military containment to cultural invasion.

Most important, however, is how our prominent contributors connect the dots between the past and the future. General James L. Jones, President Obama's National Security Advisor, speaks about the need to confront a world of new national security challenges that are more complex and dangerous than those of the Cold War. He warns that NATO must fundamentally reform itself to address new threats or it will become "a testimony to the past but not much else."

We at the Atlantic Council accept freedom's challenge, and that is why we have as our mission the renewal of the Atlantic Community for 21st-century global challenges. It is also why we introduced, in conjunction with this publication, the Atlantic Council Freedom Awards. Presented on November 8 in Berlin at the Hotel Adlon, recipients included U.S. Senator Hillary Clinton on behalf of the American people, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle on behalf of the German people, Berlin Mayor Klaus Wowereit on behalf of Berliners, and Admiral James Stavridis, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, on behalf of NATO soldiers. We also recognized Poland's Lech Walesa and the Czech Republic's Vaclav Havel, perhaps the period's most prominent heroes, who represent millions of others.

"The year 1989 was pivotal in the 20th century and world history," President Obama writes in these pages. "The lessons of 1989 are clear: democracy will ultimately triumph over authoritarianism and ordinary people can be powerful agents for change."

Our task at the Atlantic Council is to help ensure that the legacy of that historic year is carried forward across Europe and for the world. It is in that vein that we congratulate this year's Freedom Awards winners and thank the contributors to *Freedom's Challenge*.

Frederick Kempe is President and CEO of the Atlantic Council of the United States. If you would like to comment on this editor's note, on the Freedom Awards or on any part of this publication, please contact him at fkempe@acus.org.

Dawn of a New Era

When the Wall fell, a new division was drawn. While most people celebrated freedom, some opposed the reunification on historical grounds. By **Peter Schneider**

Citizens from East and West Berlin are united

Cataclysmic historic events are not usually announced during press conferences – with the exception of November 9, 1989. You would have to search for a long time in the annals of recent German history, however, to find such bizarre and clumsy handling of a sensational announcement such as the opening of the Berlin Wall 20 years ago.

Günter Schabowski, a member of the Politburo of the East German Communist Party (SED), read out the resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic at an international press conference. Nobody bothered to take notes when he announced the first three items of the communiqué. Item four, however, which Schabowski also read out in his unemotional and now internationally famous faltering manner, included an extraordinary sentence: "Applications for travel abroad by private individuals can now be made without the previously existing requirements [of demonstrating a need to travel or providing familial relationships]. Permission would be granted at short notice. Permanent exit can take place via all border crossings from the GDR to the FRG and West Berlin, respectively."

Schabowski declared afterwards that this note had only just been slipped to him. The attending journalists at first believed they had misheard what had been said. It was an Italian colleague who first recovered his poise. Replying to his enquiry, Schabowski declared, in the manner of a slightly bemused professor, that according to his understanding this would take "immediate, instantaneous" effect.

The world's memory of this final recorded appearance of the SED government chronicles, in a genuinely satirical manner, the alienation between party and people. Even the most positive message for decades, the announcement of freedom of travel, and the release of GDR citizens from the communist peoples' prison, ended up being a bureaucratic performance. The party, of course, had hoped to win over the GDR citizens by opening up the sanctum, the "antifascist protective barrier." No doubt, the Berlin

Wall was opened for the same reason that it was built 28 years previously: to keep the citizens inside the country. We all know how this experiment turned out. It ended with the collapse of the dictatorship of old men – not only in the GDR, but also in the Soviet Union and its satellite states.

On the day of the fall of the Berlin Wall I found myself in Dartmouth, New Hampshire, about as conceivably far away as possible from the once-in-a-century event. However, I had declared in the *New York Times Magazine* of June 1989, in an article titled "If the wall came tumbling down," that the fall of the Berlin Wall was "quite possible." ("Ironically," I modified in the subtitle, "the two Germanys would lose the only thing still unifying them.") But my prophetic mood wasn't enough to make me sit down by the Berlin Wall, wait for my prophecy to come true or resist the temptation of being called to the U.S. In my office, in the German department, I was busy revising the *New York Times* article for the *Nouvel Observateur* when a colleague stuck his head into my office and asked, "Have you already heard? The Berlin Wall is open. Trabis are driving up and down Kurfürstendamm."

How do you react to the news of a surprising event, which you yourself predicted? Utter surprise. First I laughed disbelievingly, asked almost angrily for him to repeat what he said, then was overwhelmed first with joy, then again disbelief until eventually I blurted out as millions of Germans did on that day "Incredible." I have to admit that amid a torrent of emotions I also rather selfishly wondered why they couldn't have waited with the opening of the Berlin Wall until after my article had appeared in *Nouvel Observateur*.

The following day I enjoyed the sensation of being greeted in the college corridors over and over again with raised thumbs and the word "congratulations." People I knew and didn't know patted me approvingly on the back, as though I had personally given the order to bring the wall down. Suddenly it felt good to be a German in the U.S. As quickly as I could, I packed up my things in Dartmouth, traveled back to Berlin and asked everyone I met how they had experienced the first days after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Many stories and images have imprinted themselves in my memory. There was the woman from East Berlin who arrived at the suddenly open border checkpoint, in her nightshirt and slippers, who looked confusedly at the ground and asked the border official: "Where is the border? Am I in the West now?" When the official confirmed that she was, she walked two more steps westward, and then calmly turned round and started back for home. A nursery teacher from West Berlin

told me about eight young people who squeezed out of a Trabi outside her nursery. They frightened the life out of some youngsters from the West by hugging them and dancing with them in the streets. A Turkish woman from the Akarsa health center was running to the Wall together with 100 other Turkish women on November 10. They all cheered and greeted the Germans who came over in their stone-washed jeans. But one of them said: "Crikey, the men are all so ugly!" Also unforgettable is the conscientious library user from East Berlin who, shortly before the erection of the Wall, had borrowed a book from the American Memorial Library. After 28 years he had nothing more urgent to do than to return it.

The standard Hollywood image of the blond, uniform-wearing German who clicks his heels and screams "At your command, Senior Storm Unit Leader," was replaced overnight by a new image: the jubilant, celebrating, exuberant German, who infected the whole world with his high spirits.

As the Berlin Wall fell, it became even more of a worldwide icon, a powerful symbol for the suppression of freedom, the very antithesis of the Statue of Liberty. That's exactly the reason why millions of people in distant countries applauded when this monstrosity suddenly lost its power following that stumbling announcement.

In retrospect, the path from the building of the Wall to reunification appears short and inevitable – the accession of the GDR to the FGR was implemented on October 3, 1990. In reality this reunification was a miracle that had not appeared in any political probability calculations. In fact, the Germans owe their reunification to the interplay between half a population and four men: half the population was the people of the GDR, the four men were Mikhail Gorbachev, George W. Bush, Helmut Kohl and Hans-Dietrich Genscher. The only woman governing in Europe at the time, Margaret Thatcher, made no secret of the fact that she simply detested the idea of reunification of the two German states. Her French and Italian colleagues expressed themselves rather more diplomatically, and confirmed half-heartedly the right to self-determination, but did everything behind this rhetorical backdrop to undermine the threatening Greater Germany. *Honi soit qui mal y pense* – the Germans had given their neighbors enough reasons for apprehension during the two world wars.

Admittedly, at this point, one has to acknowledge a surprising dissent between governments and governed people, which is usually overlooked. The people of Western Europe revealed in several opinion polls that the majority agreed with their German neighbors' reunification or – as in Poland's case – an impressive majority. As the wind of change blew in, the Western European governments and the intellectuals stared with alarm towards

The glass dome of the German parliament building, the Reichstag, in Berlin

The architect Sir Norman Foster has metaphorically taken the weight off the dreary Reichstag with his glass dome

the past, while the people were curious and were looking forward.

In Germany things were similar but more complicated. While the leaders of the West German government were working energetically towards a swift reunification, the voters remained divided. As is generally known, there was not a single demonstration in favor of reunification in West Germany. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) and their leader Oskar Lafontaine were warning of the enormous costs of reunification and were slamming on the brakes. Günter Grass was also apprehensive about the Germans and their "clamor for reunification." He created a stir when he proposed in an essay that the Germans should wave their right of self-determination.

The "New Forum," a grouping that had emanated from civil rights movements in the GDR, also postulated in favor of two German states; reunification was not on the agenda. Leading intellectuals in the GDR, among them Christa Wolf, Volker Braun and Stefan Heym, composed an appeal, "For our country." Therein they warned of the "selling out of our material and moral values" and called on the citizens of the GDR to develop a "socialist alternative to the FGR." The comment of an old worker became famous at the time: "First I got to know National Socialism," he said, "then the real existing Socialism in the GDR. I won't survive a third Socialism."

It was the people of the GDR who forced through reunification. The intellectuals on both sides of the fallen Wall loved and idolized the people, as long as they chanted, "We are the people" on their Monday demonstrations starting in Leipzig. They reacted with horror or scorn when the same people cheered the visiting Helmut Kohl in spring 1990, shouting "We are one nation," and threatening, "If the German D-Mark doesn't come to us, we will come to the German D-Mark."

If the Germans had listened to the intellectuals, reunification would never have happened. The East Germans seized the opportunity for reunification with the same instinct of people who have experienced an economy of scarcity: grab the opportunity as soon as an offer is in the shop window – tomorrow the bananas and the oranges might be sold out. In fact, just six months after reunification, i.e. after the fall of Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991, Helmut Kohl wouldn't have had anyone to negotiate with.

Until the fall of the Wall, Berlin was the only German city in which you could sense and see that there was an unfinished chapter of German post-war history called "Germany divided". Today Berlin is the only city in Germany where reunification really has happened. If you go for a walk in the rediscovered Berlin Mitte or in Friedrichshain, you can't distinguish between younger passers-by, either by their dress or their accents, let alone by their way of thinking. It is impossible to assign them to either East or West. You meet a new species: Berliners who are proud of their city but in a laid-back way. Those who, like myself, knew Berlin from the 1960s can hardly comprehend the transformation. Roofs and lofts have been spruced up, beach cafés have sprouted along the canals, with sand under the deck chairs; and Prenzlauer Berg, formerly a hangout for the arty Bohemian crowd in East Berlin, has become the district with the most children in Europe. The architect Sir Norman Foster has metaphorically taken the weight off the dreary Reichstag with his glass dome and heralded a Berlin era of lightness.

The locals, with their quick-wittedness, tolerance and will to survive, have remained throughout all these changes; and many old walls with their crumbling plasterwork and their bullet holes from World War II have also remained – despite the many new buildings and restoration. And another "icon" has been preserved, too: the passer-by who stands swearing at the pavement as he scrapes the dog's mess off the sole of his shoe. I only used to tolerate life in Berlin by going away for a while – to Italy or the United States. But when I had gone for a few weeks, I used to reminisce about Berlin, comparing her to a difficult mother who time and time again repulsed me with her preciousness, her lack of style, her abrasiveness and her bouts of depression. But there was never any doubt that Berlin was my home.

Today there is no more reason to leave Berlin – apart from the grey sky in November.

***Peter Schneider is a journalist and author of* The Wall Jumper.**

Poland's Path to NATO

Adam Michnik looks at the revolutions that brought about the fall of communism

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was defined by Soviet propaganda as an instrument of imperialist aggression against the camp of socialist states. For us, it was a blessed instrument. For us it was a community of democratic countries based on an anti-fascist philosophy with an aim to safeguard the democratic world against the expansion of communist totalitarianism.

When I speak about "us" I have in mind the people who lived behind the Iron Curtain, condemned to Soviet domination by the agreement made at the Yalta Conference. We were the "younger brother" of the great Soviet Union, which was striving for imperial world domination.

It was the world of the Cold War, which at times became hot – for example in Korea, or later in Vietnam. It was not, however, a world that could be divided simply into black and white, good and bad. The expansion of Soviet totalitarianism was accompanied by an anti-colonial revolution and the great attractiveness of Marxist ideology, which promised freedom, equality and justice.

The political map of the time gave some people hope, while it produced anxiety in others. An increasing proportion of the map was turning red, especially after the communist revolution in China.

People gather around a fallen statue of Soviet leader Josef Stalin in front of the National Theater in Budapest, Hungary, October 24, 1956

Above: French author Jean-Paul Sartre holds a press conference on May 19, 1967 to discuss the sentences pronounced earlier that month in Stockholm by Lord Bertrand Russell's War Crimes Tribunal on Vietnam

At the same time, it was a period of blindness among many eminent intellectuals and artists from the West. Criticizing the Soviet Union was not fashionable, nor was it in good taste. Jean-Paul Sartre did not want to take hope away from workers in Billancourt, but in doing so he took away the hope of workers from Laba to Vladivostok. Sartre did not want to accept the fact that the last colonial empire was in fact the Soviet Union. The Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians certainly felt the full brunt of it, as did the Ukrainians.

Poland was one of the countries without sovereignty. The oppression in Poland was not as brutal as it was in countries that were hitched onto the Soviet Union. Poland was also not a garrison country like the German Democratic Republic (GDR); the Poles were not Russified like the Ukrainians or Belarusians, but brutal censorship, mass repressions and discrimination of cultural elites were the norm during the Stalinist years. After Stalin's death, the harshness of the regime softened, but the

Opposite: Pope John Paul II, Poland, June 1979

Below: Helsinki, Finland, August 1, 1975, where 35 Heads of State signed the European Treaty for Security. From left: Erich Honecker, East Germany's First Secretary; U.S. President Ford; Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky; Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans; Bulgarian Prime Minister Todor Zhivkov; Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau

softening had its limitations. Revolts were bloodily suppressed, like in Berlin in 1953 or Budapest in 1956. In 1968, attempts to give the governing Communist Party in Czechoslovakia a human face were quashed by military force.

All these revolts were accompanied by silence from the West. The Atlantic Pact protected Western Europe, but we the citizens of the worse part of Europe were left to ourselves, thereby extinguishing all hope. The feeling of being abandoned by the West was an enduring syndrome and forced us to adapt to the new reality. Rebellion was a crazy idea and Soviet policy seemed triumphant. The Helsinki conference (1975) gave the final seal on the decisions made at Yalta, where it was decided that the countries of Central Europe would remain in the Soviet sphere of influence but would be able to decide their own internal policy. Yalta gave the promise, therefore, of being a Finlandization rather than a Sovietization of Central Europe.

Helsinki was a return to the language of Yalta and a so-called "third basket" was added regarding civil liberties, the adoption of which Soviet diplomacy regarded as trying to fit a square peg in a round hole. Luckily, the elite that formed the opposition in the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary were of a different opinion. The ideology of human rights became the core of the emerging democratic opposition.

This was helped by the Eastern policy (*Ostpolitik*) of Willy Brandt, the leader of the German Social Democratic Party. By improving relations with Moscow and Warsaw, Brandt destroyed the radical anti-German rhetoric, which was the only effective way to integrate the communist regime with an anti-communist society. It had been easy to convince Poles, who well remembered Nazi brutality in Poland, that Germany remained a threat – a bomb that could explode at any moment. Anyone who criticized the communist government could be accused of supporting German revisionist policy. The fact that successive German governments refused to recognize the Polish border on the rivers Oder and Neisse made it all the easier.

Brandt's policy, and also the decisions made at the Helsinki Conference, coincided paradoxically with a new wave of democratic movements in Central and Eastern Europe. Voices started to come out of Russia from great scholars such as Sakharov and writers like Solzhenitsyn, while Ukraine and Lithuania started to talk of national freedoms. In Poland, the Workers' Defence Committee was established, and in Czechoslovakia the Charter 77 movement started. President Carter announced that human rights were central to his policy, and in 1978 a cardinal from Kraków, Karol Wojtyła, became Pope. The world had changed.

The policy of détente had two faces; the first face was Nixon's Realpolitik, namely treating the world as it was within the borders that existed. The second face of the policy was détente with a human face. This was the policy of Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

In August 1980, a wave of strikes spread through Poland, which in consequence led to the establishment of the Solidarity trade union by people from the democratic opposition, which was in actual fact a national confederation for Polish freedom. The communist dictatorship, which liked to call itself the dictatorship of the proletariat, lost its legitimacy through a proletarian revolt. It was the greatest moral and political defeat that the communist dictatorship had suffered. The communist authorities answered this defeat with the only weapon they had – military force.

U.S. President Ronald Reagan said at the time the famous words "empire of evil." For us Poles, those words were much more pleasing than they were for many Americans. For us, the military crackdown on Solidarity highlighted the Manichaean

division of the world into good and evil. Thinking in Manichaean terms, we were not in the right, but the main objective was to survive at all costs. The words of the U.S. President were a sign of support and hope, as was the presence of NATO, which stood behind the words.

Of course, most important for us were the words of John Paul II, who did not doubt for a moment the sense of our struggle. Two convictions supported us unceasingly: the conviction about the economic failure of the communist system, and also the conviction that, thanks to the existence of NATO, there exists a better, free world. In this way, we managed to hold out until Gorbachev's *perestroika*.

Today people argue about why communism fell. In the Vatican they say that it was a result of the policy of John Paul II – and they are right. In Washington they say it was a result of the policy of U.S. presidents Carter and Reagan – and they are also right. In Germany they say it was the result of the sage *Ostpolitik* of Willy Brandt – and they're also not mistaken. In Moscow they say, quite rightly, that the road to the fall of communism was opened by Gorbachev's *perestroika* – and they are even more correct. In Kabul they assign the fall to the valiant anti-Soviet fighters – and they are not making a mistake. We in Poland are convinced that the Polish rebellions, Polish ongoing defiance and Polish Solidarity had a deciding significance.

Gorbachev opened an area for freedom, which was filled by the Polish compromise of the Round Table and the decision of the Hungarian government to open its western border. However, the will of the nation had a deciding significance, and in the case of the Berlin Wall it was the East German nation. It was these people who, small in numbers and marginalized at the beginning, were able to cause a rebellion and bring down the wall. 1989 was a year of miracles in which the whole political map of Europe changed. At the time, Poland had three neighbors: the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and the GDR. Today, none of those countries exist.

In the new geopolitical reality, Poland chose the path to NATO and the European Union. It was the correct decision and none of us regret it. We had a sense that our place was in the world of countries with civil liberties and a market economy. I am convinced that we showed ourselves to be loyal allies in difficult moments: at the time of the conflict in Kosovo and after September 11, 2001.

Today, NATO is standing at a crossroads after being divided by a conflict between the United States and the European allies. Our conviction was to try to ease this conflict. We believed that a strong Europe was necessary as a pillar of the Euro-Atlantic alliance and not an opponent of the United States. We still believe this today. Ideological anti-Americanism seems to us to be harmful nonsense. However, we believe that the U.S. policy should be to look for friends among the states of Europe and not treat them as yes-men. The Alliance should not be directed against Russia; it should be a continual warning against the imperial and expansionist trend appearing in Russian policy.

Our world is full of worrying and turbulent events. The end of history did not happen and shall not happen as long as human civilization exists. While history is the permanent struggle of the spirit of freedom against the world of enslavement, the world of enslavement is made up of systems, ideologies and totalitarian methods; it is dictatorship, fundamentalism, chauvinism, populism as an article of faith and terrorism as a method of action. These threats should be faced head-on. This is the reason for the military presence of NATO in Afghanistan.

NATO is needed today because there are still many enemies of freedom.

***Adam Michnik was one of the leaders of Solidarity and the founding Editor of* Gazeta Wyborcza.**

INTERVIEW

Frederick Kempe interviews **Brent Scowcroft**, National Security Advisor to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush, and Chairman of the Atlantic Council International Advisory Board

When the Berlin Wall fell 20 years ago, you were a central player as National Security Advisor to President George H.W. Bush. Looking back, who or what would you say won the Cold War?
The Cold War ended when it did principally because of the personality of Mikhail Gorbachev. If, instead of Gorbachev, the Politburo had chosen another hardliner, the Cold War would not have ended in 1989. The Soviet system wasn't working, but another figure like [former Soviet leader Leonid] Brezhnev would have kept it going for a while.

What was it about Gorbachev that provided the key?
His personality. He saw the political and economic liberalization that was going on in Poland and Hungary as being run by mini-Gorbachevs who were doing what he was trying to accomplish in the Soviet Union. So he supported, by-and-large, or acquiesced in what was going on in Eastern Europe – until the Wall came down, and then he got scared.

What we were seeing was another of the recurrent surges in Eastern Europe that the Soviets had cracked down on before, in Berlin 1953, Hungary 1956 and Prague 1968. But, unlike previous leaders, he saw the changes in Eastern Europe as helping him in what he was trying to achieve in the Soviet Union. Communist Party officials were resisting his reforms, so he threatened the party by saying, "I'm going to have party elections if you guys won't shape up and do what I want. I'll run people against you in the party."

But he was not a democrat, and he was not trying to dismantle the Soviet Union. He was trying to make it more efficient because it was badly run down. What he started was a program of reforms to improve productivity by addressing issues such as absenteeism, corruption and alcoholism. He also cut back on brutality and repression. But what he was doing – and he did not realize it – was dismantling the whole apparatus.

You say that Gorbachev didn't recognize what he was unleashing. How about you? Did you have a sense at the time that history was unfolding?
Yes, we did. When we came into office, a lot of people were saying, "The Cold War is over." I and the President, however, felt that it was not over because the heart of the Cold War really was the division of Europe. And Soviet troops were still everywhere in Eastern Europe. The rhetoric had changed dramatically. Gorbachev was saying things we liked to hear, but nothing had fundamentally changed. And so we decided the key was really to get Russian troops out of Eastern Europe.

How did you go about doing that?
We altered the strategy toward Eastern Europe. We had focused previously on arms control with the Soviets, but that became less of a priority. We had also favored the Soviet's satellite states that had made the most trouble for the Soviet Union, but we shifted our emphasis to promoting the countries that were leading the liberalization measures.

That means we reversed our support for Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania. He was a dyed-in-the-wool communist, but he was a pain in the neck for the Russians with his independent foreign policy. So, Ceausescu went to the bottom of our list and those that got greater support were Poland and Hungary. We wanted to encourage those liberalization movements at a pace and in a way that would not be so fast that the Soviet Communist party leadership would react, either to repress those countries or overthrow Gorbachev because he was losing control.

President George H.W. Bush, accompanied by National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, right, arrives back at the White House August 19, 1991, having interrupted his vacation following the overthrow of Soviet President Gorbachev



How did you do that?
It wasn't easy. No one knew what would be exactly the right pace of change. One of the things that frightened me in the summer of 1989, when President Bush went to Poland and Hungary, was that in Poland, in particular, there could be big demonstrations supporting him. That could panic the Russians and lead to a crack down. So I argued that we should have no big public events. That became the general strategy – not to provoke the Soviets.

Was it your aim to end the Soviet empire?
The aim was to liberate Eastern Europe – to get Soviet troops out of Eastern Europe. We thought that would really mark the end of the Cold War. It was not to destroy the Soviet Union. Did we think they were having some troubles? Yes. Were there things being written, intelligence information that said [Soviet collapse] might happen? Yes, but that was not our goal. It was rather to bring the Cold War to an end by getting their soldiers out of Eastern Europe.

Aren't you giving Gorbachev too much credit? What about the West's own strengths as the reason for Cold War victory? What about NATO? How does all this factor in?
Of course, all of that made it possible, but Gorbachev was the enabler. Even more than Gorbachev it was [Foreign Minister Eduard] Shevardnadze. He was the one who really encouraged Gorbachev in these policies. It was clear when Shevardnadze quit [in December 1990] that Gorbachev became a somewhat different person. He became much more resistant, much more reluctant to go down the path we wanted him to go.

You give individuals a great deal of credit in shaping historical outcomes. Historians have argued for some time between the role of individuals and underlying forces. Yet this was a time of decisive individuals – Reagan, Bush, the Pope, Walesa, Havel, Kohl, Gorbachev.
That is why I emphasize Gorbachev, because he was a curious amalgam. He was intelligent, very cerebral and I would say rather indecisive. And that stood in our stead. For example, Helmut Kohl and George Bush were the only ones that wanted German reunification. The Russians didn't; the French didn't; the British didn't. Had Gorbachev been a different kind of a person he might have mobilized the British and French with him

INTERVIEW
BRENT SCOWCROFT

President George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft

"We focused on a Europe 'whole and free.'"

and together they probably could have kept German unification from happening. He didn't do that.

Why did Gorbachev accept German unification?
He didn't have a better alternative. He didn't like it, but he didn't know what to do. I think he realized the notion of a divided or neutral Germany between the East and the West would mean a Europe that would not be stable.

When was it clear to you that he could accept German unification?
The issue of unification was all tied up with the issue of whether a united Germany would remain in NATO. We had a meeting in May 1990 in Washington. We were not able to get him to talk about reunification and NATO. He just wouldn't do it. We were getting nowhere in the meeting, and then Bush said, "Do you agree that the Helsinki Accords give the right to all members to join or not join any alliance, any group?" And he said "Yes." Well, his colleagues just about collapsed. They started remonstrating with him and they went off into the corner of the room to sort it out.

He had said too much.
When they came back and sat down, Gorbachev tried to backtrack. Gorbachev said, "This is a complicated question; we need to think about it; we need to plan it; let's turn it over to our foreign ministers." Shevardnadze said, "Nothing doing, this is something that has to be done by the heads of state." So that was sort of where we left it, but we had broken the dam and Gorbachev had admitted that, yes, it was the right of the Germans to decide whether or not to stay in NATO.

That was the moment at which you believe Gorbachev accepted German unification? He didn't try to roll it back after that?
That was more about Germany in NATO. Unification was more or less settled by the East German elections in March. We didn't press it too hard in the joint communiqué after the meeting. We put some flowery language in, but not that. He was going to meet with Kohl in June. We told Kohl all this. And, sure enough, when he met with Kohl, Gorbachev said yes to Germany in NATO and thus to unification.

You talked about how Bush and Kohl were the only ones who really wanted unification. You were skeptical as well?
I was skeptical only because I thought we had so much on our plate – with what was going on in Poland, in Hungary and with the exodus of refugees from East Germany. I thought we ought to delay the controversial issue of German unification as long as we could because we didn't know what would happen there and whether the Kremlin would respond negatively. Even the Germans were divided about whether or when it should happen. But in December 1989, Kohl and Bush had dinner together the day before a NATO meeting. Kohl outlined his notion for unification. It was a slower timetable than actually happened, but Bush just said, "Go for it." For me, it was a *fait accompli* from that time on.

Did you feel pressure from Thatcher and Mitterrand against it?
Thatcher was quite open. People credit Mitterrand, but I think it was Thatcher who said, "I like Germany so much I think there ought to be two of them." They were not sympathetic, they were reluctant, but they didn't actually stand in the way. The momentum within Germany was so powerful it sort of swept everybody else along.

President Bush was criticized for having responded to the Berlin Wall's fall in a muted manner when it occurred. No "Mission Accomplished" banners.
Yes. It was a tumultuous day in Berlin, but just an ordinary day in the White House. The East Germans had announced the wall between the two Germanys would open, but it was unclear whether that would include the Berlin section. Crowds pressed against the Berlin border crossings and the guards did not resist. I had gone to the President to explain this and tell him that the picture was still very confused. We still were unclear whether they would crack down, or whether they wouldn't crack down. [White House Spokesman] Marlin Fitzwater came in and said, "You've got to say something to the press." Well, the President said, "I don't want to give a press conference; I don't have anything to say because we don't know what's going on!" And so we compromised by inviting a small press contingent to the Oval Office, and they gathered around the President's desk. [Journalist] Lesley Stahl was standing right next to the desk, and she said something like, "Mr. President, you don't seem very elated; I would think you'd be dancing." And he says, "I'm not an emotional kind of guy" – or something like that. What we were really afraid of is that this could be one of those events that would force the conservatives in Russia to crack down, like Hungary of 1956.

So playing it down was intentional?
Yes. The worst thing, we thought, would be for the President to gloat that we'd won, because what we wanted was for this momentum to keep going. I think the President behaved admirably. Many people advocated that the President ought to be going to Berlin to dance on the Wall. But I think the President strategically had exactly the right approach. What he kept trying to say was, "Look, nobody won or lost here; we both won with the end of the Cold War."

What was the mood in the White House? How were you trying to steer things?
It was a very heady mood, but one also of nervousness and apprehension because we were trying to keep this thing at a pace that could continue without a crackdown. There were internal differences on how fast we ought to be pushing things, based on differing assessments of the perils versus the opportunities.

A different Dick Cheney (than when it came to Iraq)?
A different Dick Cheney – a very different Dick Cheney.

The issue that still haunts us regards what we had agreed to in terms of restricting NATO troop deployment in the former Soviet bloc. What did you agree to at the time?
What we promised when it was clear that a unified Germany would be free to come into NATO was that we would not station NATO troops in the East German part of a unified Germany. Subsequently, the Russians argued that we said that we wouldn't station NATO anywhere east. Well, my recollection is that applied only to Germany, because we had no notion of expanding NATO at that time. That wasn't on the horizon, let alone the agenda.

There were differences in the German government about how to execute unification and whether a unified Germany should be within NATO. Could you characterize what the differences were between German National Security Adviser Horst Teltschik and Hans-Dietrich Genscher – and how this played out at that time?
Well, Horst Teltschik was my interlocutor and was aligned with Helmut Kohl. We talked frequently, once a week or more. Jim Baker's interlocutor was Genscher. And Genscher had a somewhat different perspective on unification. His notion, as I recall, was that of an East Germany and a West Germany that would be something of a confederation; semi-joined countries united by the parties he thought would probably win the elections in both countries, and those were the Socialists because they were a natural majority over East and West Germany.

The Communists were not likely to win, but he never thought that the Christian Democrats would win. There was a lot of to-and-fro in the German government and with us.

Genscher expressed this notion directly with us?
Oh, yes. Genscher came here and met with us, I believe in a meeting preparing for Gorbachev's visit in May. As I recall, there were still some differences of opinion on just where we ought to go. But the President's mind was made up at this time. And so was Kohl's.

Why was it so important to have a reunified Germany in NATO? Why did Helmut Kohl want it so much?
Well, there was still a lot of debate about Germany. They had started two world wars. What do you do with Germany? A neutral Germany in the heart of Europe had the potential of being a vicious nuisance, to say the least. And I think even the British and the French realized that. My sense is Gorbachev realized that as well. What do you do with a unified Germany? You can't keep Germany separated, based on the rush of events in early 1990. So the safest thing to do is anchor them in an alliance where they're bound.

What you're saying is that Genscher was prepared to preemptively negotiate away what Gorbachev actually wasn't demanding in negotiations?
Well, Gorbachev wasn't demanding anything. Gorbachev was just trying to hang on to his hat at this time. Things in East Germany were moving very rapidly, and it was almost a matter of chasing after events.

What was your impression of Helmut Kohl during this period?
Kohl was a fascinating individual. He was a student of military leaders and leadership. Whenever we had free time he would ask me what I thought of one military leader or another, going back as far as our Civil War. He once came a day early on a trip to Washington so that I could take him through Arlington cemetery and visit some of the graves. Well, the day he came turned out to be above 90 degrees, but he insisted on walking among the graves and not driving. Here's Kohl, this large man, sweating profusely, walking through Arlington with me, fearing he was about to pass out.

How would you judge his role in history?
He was an uncanny natural leader. He understood what he had to do was to tame Germany and embed it so thoroughly in Europe that the old impulses would disappear. And so he visibly accepted French leadership in Europe and signed on to the French as a loyal, almost subordinate, partner even as Germany unified. And I think that was a crucial development in Europe at the time.

When did the Cold War end in your mind?
Well, there are two logical dates. I think probably the most logical, in terms of what I've laid out and what our strategy was, is that it ended with the unification of Germany in October 1990. One can also argue, and I think fairly persuasively, that it ended earlier than that, when we and Moscow jointly denounced the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. It depends how you look at it.

Do you regret anything in the aftermath of this period?
I'm sorry that because we were fixed on near-term goals that we didn't think hard enough about how NATO had to change going forward. We focused on a "Europe whole and free," but what did that mean? What did it mean to NATO to have the reason for the alliance, the glue that held it together, disappear? We never faced up to that.

What should we have done instead?
We should have asked ourselves, What are we trying to do? What are we trying to do with Russia fundamentally? What is NATO for? We are still struggling with that question. For example, what does Albania bring to NATO? You can say well, it helps us democratize Albania, but is that the job of NATO?

What do you think today's NATO is for?
Well, that's a very good question. We need to decide that. We wanted to anchor Eastern Europe as closely to Western Europe as possible. Now, to me, the obvious way to do that is the European Union, but the Europeans didn't want to move that fast. So we pushed the expansion of NATO on the West Europeans, and they were so happy not to have us hector them about EU expansion that they went along with it.

Do you feel you were right in your opposition to NATO enlargement?
I remember being surprised at the Russians acquiescing to NATO expansion. They complained, but they acquiesced. And I think I underestimated what it was really doing to Russian attitudes. I think we all did. We were humiliating Russia, not intentionally, but nevertheless that was the net result.

Brent Scowcroft was National Security Advisor to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush, and is Chairman of the Atlantic Council International Advisory Board. He was interviewed by Frederick Kempe, President and CEO of the Atlantic Council of the United States.

A message from the Government of Georgia

The fall of the Berlin Wall transformed my own life and that of my country, and I am honored to help commemorate it. On November 9th, 1989, the values of the Atlantic Alliance triumphed over tyranny. It was a moment that captured all our hearts and that liberated the souls of all those who lived behind the Iron Curtain. It was a day we longed for but feared would never come, and it triggered a chain of events that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the liberation of all those countries under the Communist yoke. It was this triumph of the Alliance, and its ability to bring freedom to those who had been long repressed, that has helped guide the people of Georgia over the past 20 years and that has forged our irreversible commitment to NATO.

The fall of the Berlin Wall was certainly a symbol of NATO's victory over Communist tyranny. What made the moment even more powerful was the fact that the Wall was brought down peacefully by ordinary people, who thus reunited our European continent. But it is worth recalling that, even after the Wall fell, freedom took a long time to reach many of us in Eastern Europe. NATO's greatest triumph, in my view, has been its renewed relevance after the Cold War. The Alliance has shown great flexibility in reinventing itself to spread the values of freedom and democracy in the East and welcome new members.

Today, NATO faces new challenges, in particular in Afghanistan. Success there for the Alliance will give Afghans the chance to live free of violence and persecution, while allowing the international community to address the scourges of terrorism and drug trafficking. The mission in Afghanistan is critical for the Alliance in another way as well: it will help prove that NATO's enduring values remain relevant in the unstable world of the 21st century. This is why Georgia is proud to play a full part in the mission, providing all the support we can now and in the future.

While Georgia is not yet a full NATO member, we are on the road to membership and are working our hardest to meet the criteria. Since the 2003 Rose Revolution, we have strived to replace a deeply corrupt, failing state with a modern, responsible one allied to the West—a state run to European standards and committed to liberal democracy, free-market principles, and peaceful relations with our neighbours. Our goal of membership in both the European Union and NATO acts as a beacon for the Georgian people.

Georgia's aspiration of full integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions has faced challenges—none greater than last summer's invasion of my country by Russia. This premeditated, pre-planned invasion had many goals, but no doubt its principal purpose was to derail our path to the West and to bring us under the Russian yoke. Today, 20 percent of my country remains under occupation; 130,000 Georgians were forced to flee their homes, including tens of thousands ethnically cleansed from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and 30,000 remain unable to return. These innocent victims, while quickly placed in temporary accommodation, long to return to their homes—as do the 500 000 Georgians who remain refugees and IDPs from the conflicts in the 1990s. After the invasion, the people of Georgia redoubled their commitment to Western integration, rebuilt the infrastructure damaged in the war, and remained resilient through the economic crisis. During this dark hour, our spirits were lifted by our commitment to the West and by the resolve of our friends to stand by our side.

The challenges we face today in Georgia echo those that much of Europe faced a generation ago. As Vaclav Havel and other leading voices of Europe's conscience declared last month, Europe is today divided by a new wall, built by an outside force—a wall that runs through the middle of Georgia. It is a wall that cuts off one fifth of our territory, a wall that once again divides Europe from itself, creating new lines of repression and fear—artificial dividing lines inside the internationally recognized borders of a European nation. So the vital project at the heart of the Alliance—to help create a Europe whole and free—remains urgent and necessary.

My Government's response to the challenges we face is that we must accelerate reforms—in our defence structures, certainly, but especially in our democratic institutions. The assistance of the Alliance has been invaluable on both of these fronts. Our friends in NATO have helped guide my Government in setting an ambitious set of reform goals, including the establishment of a Constitutional reform commission; the imminent negotiation and implementation of a revised electoral code that will meet the highest European standards; the direct election of mayors next May; a reduction in the powers for the President, with a commensurate increase in those for Parliament; stronger sanctions against officials trying to influence judges; and a public television broadcasting board with equal representation of governing and opposition parties. These measures confirm Georgia's deep commitment to democracy and eventual NATO membership.

Georgia has been an integral part of Europe for nearly three millennia. While the Soviet era isolated my country from Europe, our people never gave up our European identity and values. Today, as we strive to reunite Georgia with its rightful place in the broader community of European nations, we understand that our geographic position gives us a special responsibility. We are committed to contributing to the common agenda of our allies, including energy security and NATO around thw world. When the Berlin Wall collapsed, no one could have imagined how far democracy would spread and how quickly. NATO was essential to this transformation. Together, and through this great Alliance, we can re-enforce those values in my country and beyond.

By President Mikheil Saakashvili

INTERVIEW

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, former West German Foreign Minister, talks to David Marsh about the 10-point plan and European monetary unification

Never far away from the action over German unification was the triumphantly effective figure of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the veteran West German Foreign Minister. Born in Saxony, Genscher never lost sight of the essential geopolitical reasons for the division of Germany. Now an avuncular 82-year-old, he remains one of Germany's most persuasive pro-European orators. In the weeks before the German parliamentary elections on September 27, Genscher tirelessly joined in the campaign for his liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP). And when later that evening Guido Westerwelle, the FDP leader, celebrated his party's return to the Berlin coalition government with an increased share of the votes, Genscher was at his side before the TV cameras to beam with delight at the victory.

In 1989-90, like Helmut Kohl, François Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher, Genscher realized that the weakness of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev presented Germany with an opportunity for unification that might have proved short-lived. The anxieties of Mitterrand and Thatcher partly stemmed from concern that opposition to German unity within the Soviet military establishment might lead to Gorbachev's replacement by a general. Kohl and Genscher had an equal and opposite motivation: they were worried that Gorbachev might be dislodged before unification, and the door would close.

As coalition party leaders, Kohl and Genscher were rivals as well as allies. One of the reasons for Kohl's frequent abruptness over unity, greatly unnerving London and Paris, was that he was trying to keep decisions secret from the Free Democrats – for fear that, otherwise, they would steal an electoral advantage.

A sign of this rivalry came when Genscher stoked up the campaign for a single currency in 1987-88 – well before German unification – at a time when it was gaining popularity among the FDP's clientele in banking and industry, but still attracted scepticism from Kohl and his Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg.

Another, still more potent indication was that Genscher was not told of Kohl's 10-point plan on German unity announced on November 28, 1989. He then went to Paris to explain the document to an enraged President Mitterrand, who had also not been forewarned. Looking back, Genscher says, "I was very critical of this [the 10-point plan]. Not enough thought went into it. There was no mention of Germany's adhesion to the NATO Alliance and the European Community, no mention of the Oder-Neisse line. And Helmut Kohl's proposal of a possible confederation was a repeat of various plans put forward by the East in the past. In fact, what was happening was a bottom-up push for unity between the two Germanys, stemming from the ordinary people in East Germany, and this really was the driving force of events."

Recalling his trips during the reunification saga to the capitals of the war-time allied powers, Genscher says, "I went to the U.S. first, where President Bush assured me that the U.S. was in favor of reunification without any hesitation. Then I went to London to see Mrs Thatcher. She was more calm than I might have feared, because the Americans had told her already of their position, and also because [Foreign Secretary] Douglas Hurd probably prevented her from saying an outright "no."

German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (right) and West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher before the second day of the European Community Summit in Maastricht, Netherlands, December 10, 1991

"Mitterrand showed concern in 1989 about a possible drift towards German neutralism"

"After the U.K., I went to Paris. The President explained that reestablishment of German unity was a historical necessity and France would be on the side of Germany. Then Mitterrand asked me: "What will Germany do with its new unity? Will it carry on with its European policies or will it seek to go down old paths?" I was about to answer, when Mitterrand added a further thought: that even if Germany did decide to travel down the old paths again, France would not oppose unification, but would seek to reestablish its old alliances. I answered, speaking not only for myself and my party, but also for the Chancellor, the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party, that West Germany's European policies would be an unchangeable element of the future strategy of united Germany."

Recalling France's motivations on European policies, Genscher says, "Mitterrand showed concern in 1989 about a possible drift towards German neutralism. This was the reason why he was eager to press forward with steps towards greater integration into western Europe."

Genscher shows sensitivity about French views: "If Mitterrand spoke [in the late 1980s] about the D-Mark being like the Germans' nuclear weapon, this was not entirely wrong. The Bundesbank was without doubt the dominant bank in Europe. From a French point of view, also from the perspective of other countries which had to follow the German interest rate movements, this was a difficult position to live with. It was also not completely satisfactory for the Germans. Although the Germans set the interest rate for the rest of Europe, they had no influence on decisions over whether other countries might devalue their currencies. This was a critical point, since this was the issue that could damage German export interests."

Genscher also realized U.S. suspicions about the move to a single currency. "There was a feeling of concern in Washington about the progress towards the euro. The new currency would naturally be a rival for the dollar."

Genscher was implacable on the independence of the new European Central Bank. "This was partly a political consideration. Otherwise the West Germans would not be in favor. But above all, there was a sound economic reason for an independent central bank – as the German economic track record had shown since the 1950s.

"I was under no illusion as to the depth of the possible French resistance on [central banking independence]... Finally it was Mitterrand who saw the granting of independence to the new central bank as a step forward in European integration, reflecting France's own interest in transferring monetary power to the European Central Bank."

Now, with the euro nearly 11 years old, Genscher believes European monetary unification (EMU) is on the right track – but other members will have to take the Germans' lead. "Germany has also sometimes been slow to face up to the challenges of globalization. Finally, it has been our export orientation that has made the difference in forcing the Germans to change policies. I believe that facts will push the other EMU members in the same direction as Germany."

Hans-Dietrich Genscher was the West German Foreign Minister from 1974-1992.

The Night The Wall Went Up

Frederick Kempe, in an excerpt from his forthcoming book, tells the story of how the Wall came into being

Wednesday, August 9, 1961
Communist Party headquarters, East Berlin

Like a veteran stage producer preparing for the performance of a lifetime, Walter Ulbricht rehearsed every scene time and again in the last crucial hours before his August 13 curtain call. His drama, code-named "Operation Rose," would play for one night only. He would have no second chance to get it right.

No detail was too small for Ulbricht's attention or that of Erich Honecker, the Central Committee's chief for security matters. At age 48, Honecker had two unique qualities: unquestioned loyalty and unmatched organizational talents.

Did they have sufficient barbed wire to wrap around West Berlin's entire, 96-mile (155km) circumference? To avoid suspicion, Ulbricht's team had distributed the barbed wire orders among a number of East German purchasers, who in turn had negotiated with several different manufacturers in both Great Britain and West Germany. Despite such unprecedented activity, Ulbricht was satisfied that Western intelligence thus far had failed to sound an alert.

Ulbricht's men and their Soviet advisors had mapped every meter of the 27 miles (47km) of border that ran through the city center between West and East Berlin and the remaining 69 miles (108km) between West Berlin and the East German countryside. They knew precisely what sort of peculiarity might face them on each street and at each crossing.

Dozens of trucks already had transported hundreds of concrete uprights secretly from Eisenhüttenstadt, an industrial town on the Oder River near the Polish border, to a stockpile at a police barracks in the Berlin district of Pankow and several other locations. Several hundred East German police from outside Berlin had assembled at the vast State Security Directorate compound at Hohenschönhausen on Berlin's outskirts.

Ulbricht was just as precise in his choice of army and police units that would be involved. Absolute loyalty was required as their first task, beginning at 1:30 a.m., would be to form a human wall around West Berlin to stop any spontaneous escape attempts or other individual acts of resistance until construction brigades could put up the first physical barriers. Thus he would use only the most trusted, elite members of factory fighting units, border police, reserve police, as well as police school cadets.

Regular army soldiers would form the second line of defense and would, in an emergency, move up to fill in any breaches in the forward line. The mighty, fail-safe power of Soviet military would stand back in a third ring, which would only advance if allied forces disrupted the operation. Ulbricht's team would distribute ammunition using the same conceptual precision, providing sufficient quantities to hold the line, but distributed in a manner designed to avoid a reckless shooting that could trigger war.

Police and military units would have 30 minutes to close the border from the moment they received their orders at one in the morning, at which point all East Berlin street lights would be doused so as to better conceal their handiwork. Honecker's forces would then have a further 180 minutes to put up barriers around the city, including the complete

Right: Guarding the border crossing station, Teltow, East Berlin, August 3, 1961

August 13, 1961, Berlin: An East Berlin policeman stands guard at Potsdamer Platz as communist police threaten to shoot angry crowds of anti-communists demanding that their escape route to West Berlin be reopened

closure of 68 of the current 81 total crossing points to West Berlin. That would leave only a manageable 13 checkpoints for East German police to monitor once the dust settled.

At precisely 1:30 a.m., East German authorities would shut down all public transport. They would prevent trains coming from the West from unloading passengers at Friedrichstrasse, the main East-West station. At key crossings that would never reopen, teams equipped with special tools would split train tracks. If all went well, the whole job would be done by 6:00 a.m.

Ulbricht cleared the final language for the official statement that he would circulate in the early hours of August 13 to all corners of East Germany and throughout the world. He would blame his action on the West German government's "systematic plans for a civil war" that were being executed by "revenge-seeking and militaristic forces." The statement said the "sole purpose" of the border closing was providing security to East Germans.

Straussberg, East Germany, People's Army Headquarters
8:00 p.m., August 12

At midnight on the dot, Honecker rang army headquarters and issued the order to begin.

This sent into action some 3,150 soldiers of the 8th Motorized Artillery

Erich Honecker had quite literally caught Berlin sleeping

Division on East Berlin from Schwerin with 100 battle tanks and 120 armored personnel carriers. It dispatched a further 4,200 troops of the 1st Motorized Division from their barracks in Potsdam beside the city with their 140 tanks and 200 personnel carriers to guard the outer ring around West Berlin. They would form the second ring of defense behind the border front lines, which would be made up of 10,000 men from units of the East Berlin Volkspolizei, the 1st Brigade of the Readiness Police and the Berlin Security Command.

In all, some 8,200 People's Police, 3,700 members of the mobile police, reinforced with 12,000 factory fighting group men and 4,500 State Security forces would move into action in the hours ahead. They would be supported by a further 40,000 soldiers around the country in case unrest spread in response to their action.

It was a cool and clear night – perfect for the purpose.

West Berlin, the French sector
1:50 a.m., August 13

Just 20 minutes after the operation began, West Berlin Police Sergeant Hans Peters saw the blazing headlights of a half dozen East German army trucks as they rolled down the road he was patrolling, Streilitzer Strasse. It was a street that, like 193 others, crossed the previously unmarked boundary between two Berlins.

The trucks stopped at what looked to him to be less than a soccer field away. Two squads of a half dozen soldiers each sprawled and squatted on the sidewalks facing west, pointing their machine guns on their tripods in his direction. They had no intention of invading the West – wanting only to set up a deterrent line. Behind them, two other squads carried barbed wire. With their backs covered by other soldiers, they began to uncoil the strands and hang them from wooden saw horses they had placed across the street. They put up a cordon safely within the Soviet zone, behind an invisible demarcation line.

Peters, from a nearby telephone booth, alerted his superiors to what he had witnessed: brown-uniformed border police, who looked baby-faced and young to him, were now posted behind their strands of barbed wire.

They now had turned their guns, which initially had pointed west while putting the border in place, to the east for the real purpose of containing their own people.

West Berlin, U.S. military headquarters, Clayallee
Morning, August 13

General Watson, the American commandant in Berlin, felt hamstrung by his reporting lines and instructions. He also doubted his own judgment, having been in Berlin just three months.

For weeks, his instructions from the Pentagon had more often than not included warnings that he should allow himself to be provoked into military action.

So through the night of August 13 he did what seemed appropriate from all the messages he had been getting before that crucial evening, which were above all not to be provoked into any action he might regret later or could escalate into violent conflict. He wasn't proud of it, but Watson played it safe and did nothing.

Watson's approach was only reinforced at 7:30 a.m. when he learned that four Soviet divisions had moved out of their usual garrison areas in East Germany and had surrounded Berlin.

It was an elaborately and perfectly organized operation, about which U.S. military intelligence had reported nothing in advance. What it meant to Watson was that Soviet troops were primed to pounce in such numbers that they would overwhelm his paltry force if it dared respond.

The Commander of the Russian troops in East Germany, Marshal Ivan Konev, had won. He knew that under the four-power agreement that U.S. and other allied troops had every right to knock down the barriers the East Germans had put up as an impediment to free access put up by units who had no right to operate in the city.

His job had been to relay to the allies beyond all doubt, and particularly to the U.S., the unacceptable cost of taking such a course. His method: ringing the city on a very obvious military alert. And just in case the U.S. missed that, Khrushchev had put Soviet rocket forces on full alert throughout Eastern Europe in a manner calculated to attract Western notice.

There was much work yet to be done to make the closure permanent, but opening night could not have been executed more perfectly. Not an allied soldier had challenged the operation. Only very few East German citizens had disrupted the night's work.

Erich Honecker had quite literally caught Berlin sleeping.

An excerpt from* BERLIN 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and The Most Dangerous Place on Earth*, by Frederick Kempe (to be published in 2010 by G.P. Putnam's Sons.)

The Wall... Always the Wall

Frederick Forsyth's Cold War Berlin

I do not recall the exact day but it was surely in early August 1963 that Harold King, the iconic Bureau Chief of Reuters' bureau in Paris called me in, and he was not best pleased. I thought it was I who had invoked his impressive ire, but it was news from London.

"The buggers want to offer you Berlin," he growled. It was flattering that he should not want me to leave after only 18 months in crisis-torn Paris, but West Berlin was an unmissable chance. It had a staff of four under the veteran German Alfred Kluehs. It would be good to work under him, I ventured.

"Not West Berlin, idiot," grumped the Paris Chief. "East Germany."

My heart did one of those chicane swerves. It was a one-man bureau, so that meant Bureau Chief. I was still just 24. The parish east of the Iron Curtain comprised East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. It was huge and, apart from its three national armies, contained three Soviet army groups.

All three countries had harsh regimes, vicious secret police apparats and about one Western correspondent – the Reuters man. But the core was East Berlin, glowering and snarling behind the recently erected Berlin Wall. This was the absolute height of the Cold War, nine months after the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the general agreement was that if World War Three and mutual wipe-out ever came, Berlin would probably be the spark.

Forty-six years later a word of explanation is in order. After 1945 the Reich was divided into four zones: American, British, French and Russian, between the east and the west the Iron Curtain went up. But Berlin, set 110 miles inside East Germany, was subject to a different treaty and though divided into four sectors, was decreed an open city. For East Germany that was virtually a death sentence.

West Germany shrewdly decreed that while she would refuse the validity of East German degrees in politics, philosophy, history etc (communist propaganda) she would accept degrees in maths, physics, chemistry, engineering and so forth. Between 1945 and 1961, tens of thousands of young East Germans waited until they graduated, then grabbed a bag, took the train to East Berlin and simply walked into the West. Once in West Berlin they would be flown down the air corridor to a new life and career in the West.

East Germany had been industrially and comprehensively raped by the USSR with most of her assets put on trains heading east. Now the cream of her youth was simply draining away towards the West.

Finally, in August 1961, working 24 hours a day and with Soviet agreement, they put up the Wall and closed the last aperture.

The reaction of the West was volcanic. Everyone knew why they had to do it, but that was not the point. The Wall broke every treaty on the city of Berlin. NATO led the charge. Every embassy was closed, every diplomat and trade delegation withdrawn. And that meant foreign correspondents. All the East German press people in the

Left: Frederick Forsyth c.1970

Right: A still from the film of Frederick Forsyth's *The Fourth Protocol* (1987), starring Michael Caine and Pierce Brosnan

West were expelled, including the ADN (East German News Agency) woman in the Reuters building in Fleet Street.

But the East German Politburo made one exception. They might pump out bilge to their own people but they wanted to know what was really going on in the world, so, without any quid pro quo, one Western reporter was allowed to stay. The Reuters man. Thus, after a fortnight of intensive briefing in London, I sat on a sultry September night staring down from the elevated rail line as the Paris-Warsaw train eased out of West Berlin and trundled into the East. And then I looked down on the Wall.

Some think it was a straight line. Not at all. It switched and swerved from the city limits on the north side across the divided city to the south. But always in sharp angles, never a soothing curve. Back then many abandoned apartment blocks still stood on the east side, very close to the Wall. They were compulsorily abandoned, with west-facing windows bricked up, later to be demolished to create an open killing ground. But then the demolitions were not finished. These were the buildings from which desperate heroes tried to jump to freedom only to die on the wire, in the minefields or under machine-gun fire.

Seen from above there was a dark city and a blazing city and between them the brilliantly illuminated, snaking Wall. And the train rumbled into East Berlin's main station.

I was met by my predecessor, Jack Altman. He had taken a year of it; the bugging, the watching, the eavesdropping, the following, the knowledge that everyone he talked to would be interrogated. It had got to him. He was stressed out, hyper-tense. I shared the office/apartment with him for three days, then he was gone, still seeing Stasi (secret police) agents behind every kiosk.

I determined I was not going down that road and, although bi-lingual in German and with adequate Russian, I affected with officialdom a cheerful, Bertie Wooster ineptitude and a strangled accent. Even the leather-coated Stasis I made a point of greeting loudly across the street with unquenchable good humor. It drove them potty. But... you wish to know about the Wall. Let me recall three incidents.

As a foreigner, my crossing point into West Berlin was the famous Checkpoint Charlie. Those who recall the opening scenes of the Richard Burton film *The Spy Who Came In From The Cold* may wonder if it was really like that. Yes, on a bitter winter night under the arcs, it was just like that. Menacing.

On November 22, 1963, I was dining in West Berlin with a glorious girl when

That evening, wondering if one would see the dawn, is one I will not forget

Chorus girls at an East Berlin nightclub

the muzak stopped and a grim voice said in German: "*Achtung, achtung. Hier ist eine Meldung. President Kennedy ist erschossen.*" ("Attention, attention. Here is an announcement: President Kennedy has been shot and killed.")

At first nothing happened. There was a jolt in the babble as if someone had said something particularly silly. Kennedy was a demi-god in West Berlin. He had visited in June. He had guaranteed their protection. He had said he was a Berliner. Then the message was repeated.

Chaos. Pandemonium. Hysteria. Women screaming, men swearing in a continuous torrent of oaths. I threw a fistful of D-Marks on the table, asked the girl to settle up (not that anyone was going to worry about asking for the bill) and ran for my office car by the kerb. It was an East German car, a Wartburg, often daubed with insults by West Berliners who presumed I must be a high-ranking communist to have permission to come over.

Checkpoint Charlie was like the *Marie Celeste*. The GIs, stunned, stared out of their booth but did not emerge. The East Berlin barrier swung up eventually and I reported to the Custom shed. Never had I, nor did I since, see those arrogant young guards, chosen for their fanaticism, so utterly terrified.

Even back then, before email, texting, or any knowledge of cyberspace, you could not block out the radio waves. They all listened. They all knew. They begged me to assure them there would not be war. And this was before we learned that Lee Harvey Oswald was a communist, had defected to the USSR and been sent back. When that came through, even the Foreign Ministry begged me to tell the West it was not their fault. That evening on the Wall, edging towards midnight, the only Westerner at the crossing, surrounded by near-hysterical border guards, wondering if one would see the dawn, is one I will not forget.

Harold King had trained me well. The training cut in. I raced back to the office and started to field the torrent of calls from equally terrified East German officialdom. I filed a story but I don't think it ever saw print. That night it was Dallas, Dallas, Dallas.

A month later, the East Berlin authorities relented in their complete ban on West Berliners entering East Berlin. Many of those who had fled were young, but Papa and Mutti had remained behind. For some reason Pankow (the government suburb) decided to let visitors in for Christmas reunions. It was supposed to be a propaganda triumph. Actually, it just underlined the brutality of the concrete monster that kept people apart.

The allocated crossing point was the Chausseestrasse crossing and at the appointed hour a huge seething mass of citizenry appeared on both sides. Both sets of authorities lost control. Young West Berliners were trying to find relatives while buffeted officials tried desperately to examine their passports. A hundred George Smileys could have slipped through and that had the Stasis in hysterics.

Wanting to get the feel of this mass of humanity, I hopped on a car bonnet, then the roof and from there to the top of the Wall. Then I walked down it to the edge of the crossing zone. I had a British sheepskin car coat (the temperature was 10 below) and a Finnish wolf fur hat. Very sexy. And very spooky, it seems.

Cameras began snapping unseen from east and west. I do not know how many agencies have a picture of me towering over the chaotic mass of humanity, pushing and shoving at the crossing point that afternoon, but it was a great story and, as I was the only one there, an exclusive for Reuters. Head Office sent me a congrats on the story and a warning, which I think came from MI6, not to play "silly buggers."

Eventually a squad of hysterical East German People's Police stormed up to grab me off the Wall. I came down, putting on my Bertie Wooster what-have-I-done-wrong act and they let me go. I went home and filed the story.

Not quite so funny was the occasion I nearly started World War Three. To this day I protest it was not entirely my fault.

For a young Westerner, private life was a social Sahara – even meeting and conversing with someone from the free world could mean, for an East Berliner, a snatch and interrogation by the Stasis. But there was one place that was usually lively late at night – the Opera Café.

So one night, April 24, 1964, at about one in the morning, I was driving home when, at a junction, I was stopped by a Russian soldier planted foursquare in the road, back to me, arms spread. As I watched, a massive column of Soviet military-might rolled past; guns, tanks, mechanized infantry bolt upright in their trucks... I spun round and tried another road. Same result; column after column of Soviet armor and I realized it was all heading straight for the Wall.

Twisting and turning down the blackened back streets I made it to my office, then typed and sent the story. I did not exaggerate; I did not explain because I had no explanation. I just reported what I had seen. Then I brewed a strong black coffee and sat by the window to wait for dawn.

All across Europe the ministry lights were going on. The British Foreign Secretary was dragged from his bed. In Washington, the Defense Secretary was whisked from a dinner in Georgetown. It took two hours and some frantic messages to Moscow to sort it out.

It was one week to May 1st and the silly bastards were rehearsing the May Day Parade. In the middle of the night. Without telling anyone. With the mystery explained a large number of bricks rained down on Reuters' man in East Berlin. Well, how was I to know? No one else did.

I left East Berlin that October after 13 months. Quietly, with my car parked by my office. Alone, walking with a single grip through Checkpoint Charlie. Once safely in the West I could fly out of Tempelhof to London.

The fact is, I had been having a torrid affair with a stunning East German girl. She explained she was the wife of a People's Army corporal, based in the garrison at faraway Cottbus on the Czech border. She was an amazing lover and rather mysterious.

She was immaculately dressed and after our almost-all-night love sessions at my place refused to be driven home, insisting on a taxi from the railway station. I wondered about the clothes, and the money for taxis. One day I spotted one of the drivers at the station whom I had seen at my door picking up Siggi. He said he had taken her to Pankow. That was a very upscale address, the Belgravia of East Berlin. On a corporal's salary?

It was in a bar in West Berlin that two buzz-cut Americans who screamed CIA slid over to offer me a drink. As we clinked they murmured that I had a certain nerve to be sleeping with the mistress of the East German Defense Minister.

It was not the minister I worried about as I drove back through the Wall. It was his political enemies who would love to arrange his downfall and a show trial for me. Time to go. A week later I walked through the Wall for the last time.

I saw its destruction in November 1989 on television. But I was there October 1, 1990, the formal reunification of the two cities and the two Germanys. I noted that a team of workmen was at Checkpoint Charlie – turning it into a tourist attraction. So I went to a *bierstube*, ordered half a liter of *Schultheiss* and raised it in their general direction. Cheers, it was a fascinating year behind the Wall.

***Frederick Forsyth is a best-selling author, whose works include* The Day of the Jackal *and* The Fourth Protocol.**

A Diplomatic Approach

David Marsh talks to **Douglas Hurd**, former British Foreign Secretary

The fall of the Berlin Wall reshaped the map of Europe in more ways than one. As well as ending the East-West divide and promoting the collapse of the Soviet Union, it accelerated the move to economic and monetary union (EMU) – part of a complicated quid pro quo between Paris and Bonn. As Michel Rocard, French Prime Minister from 1988 to 1991, put it, "[Francois] Mitterrand had to accept reunification more quickly than he thought likely, in the same way that [Helmut] Kohl had to accept monetary union more quickly than he had intended."

Britain and Germany did not see eye to eye on unification, particularly in the initial stages. This was not merely a question of the hostility of Margaret Thatcher, British Prime Minister up until 1990. In addition, there was a built-in institutional hurdle that reflected the U.K.'s opposition to EMU and general suspicions about "European" policies.

Patrick Salmon, chief historian of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), in a foreword to an authoritative FCO study of the political consequences of the fall of the Wall published in September 2009, writes tellingly: "The United Kingdom lacked leverage... There was nothing comparable with the close institutional and personal bonds underlying the Franco-German axis within the European Community."

The man who played a delicate role heading the FCO at the time of German unity was a "diplomat's diplomat," Douglas (now Lord) Hurd. Hurd joined the diplomatic service in 1952 and celebrates his 80th birthday in March 2010. He became a Conservative politician in the 1960s and took over as Foreign Secretary in late October 1989, just a fortnight before the Wall fell. Hurd's own conservative sensibilities, and his loyalty towards Thatcher, were put to the test as the unity process accelerated. Recognizing that the Prime Minister's implacability was straining London's ties not just with Bonn but also, still more importantly, with Washington, Hurd played an awkward hand with aplomb. He placed particular emphasis on his relationship with Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the West German Foreign Minister, who was not always taken into the confidence of Kohl on key issues, such as the Chancellor's 10-point plan for German unity announced without consultation on November 28, 1989.

When Hurd visited Chancellor Kohl for a 70-minute tête-à-tête on February 6, 1990, Kohl – sensing the Foreign Secretary was much more sympathetic to reunification than his political boss – suggested that Hurd become an alternative go-between for communication with London. Hurd

Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev (center) joins Foreign Ministers Roland Dumas of France (second left), Eduard Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union (third left), U.S. Secretary of State James Baker (behind Gorbachev), East German Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere (second right), West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (behind de Maiziere) and British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd (right) in Moscow after the signing of the treaty on German reunification

responded affably that "he would be happy to come for a quiet talk at any time if it could be useful," – sparkling a frosty rebuke from 10 Downing Street that the Prime Minister, not the Foreign Secretary, was "in charge."

Looking back after 20 years, Hurd recognizes that Thatcher's principal worry was that German unity would weaken Mikhail Gorbachev and thus destabilize the Soviet Union's passage to reform. But Thatcher's penchant for plain speaking on Germany was problematic.

"We couldn't be sure what she would say," says Hurd. "The danger was that she would separate us [the U.K.] from the U.S. and France and Germany, without having any influence on Gorbachev."

Kohl upset Thatcher, Hurd recalls, by "breaking a window and passing through it" on reunification. As a new Foreign Minister thrust into an intoxicating spell of diplomacy that ended the Cold War, Hurd says, "I didn't get anxious: it was all great fun." His diaries of the time are studded with references to how others found the experience less pleasurable. Of a notable summit meeting in Strasbourg in December 1989, Hurd wrote: "Kohl red and cross throughout – especially with MT." The Prime Minister, he recorded, was "unnecessarily abrasive – but less than usual."

Hurd, a student of human nature as well as a diplomat, says that Thatcher has since opined that, in similar circumstances, she would have behaved in the same way as Kohl. Hurd points out that the German Chancellor turned out to be "completely robust" on a key issue that particularly vexed the British – united Germany's NATO membership.

Contrary to expectations, Hurd notes, the German economy, instead of instantly benefiting from unity, experienced years of problems. The personal advice given to the Prime Minister, Hurd says, was that "the addition of 15 million highly disciplined Prussians and Saxons would give the German economy such a boost as to make it impregnable." The outcome, Hurd believes, confirmed the dictum of Britain's late 19th-century leader Lord Salisbury that prime ministers should ignore the advice of experts: "The clever people were completely wrong."

And what of Germany today? In 2009, the country is under the wing of Kohl's Christian Democrat successor Angela Merkel. "She is a sensible woman, a pastor's daughter. To have a protestant middle-class lady in charge of the most powerful country in Europe is about as good an outcome you could possibly have thought of."

Lord Douglas Hurd of Westwell was British Foreign Secretary from 1989 to 1995.

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A New Era of Globalization

Josef Ackermann reflects on the fall of the Wall

"The fall of the Berlin Wall... changed international affairs forever"

German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder (right) with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, ahead of their bilateral meeting at the Chancellery in Berlin, April 23, 2001

The fall of the Berlin Wall in the autumn of 1989 was an exceptional event in German and world history. As a German-speaking Swiss national living in Zurich at the time, I was deeply moved by the events. Freedom in East Germany and German reunification were breathtaking developments, which we had always hoped for, but did not really expect to happen in our lifetime. The political division of the world into the Soviet Bloc and the West had been firmly established.

Mikhail Gorbachev's *glasnost* and *perestroika* policies in the Soviet Union and the states it controlled, which actually set things in motion, came as a surprise to all of us. Gorbachev loosened the grip on the Soviet Bloc and that sealed the fate of the Honecker government. Mass protests against the government in East Germany, long considered too risky, initially called for political, economic and social reforms, but then for reunification. West Germany's Chancellor Helmut Kohl and East Germany's new government, strongly supported above all by the U.S. administration of President George H. W. Bush, showed great resolve and leadership. Reunification became reality with astonishing speed.

Fortunately, there was no outbreak of violence on November 9, 1989, the day the Berlin Wall was actually opened. The following day, many of the residents of East Berlin and citizens of the former German Democratic Republic crossed to West Berlin and celebrated their new-found freedom. Less than a year later, Germany was reunified.

The significance of these events can hardly be overestimated. Along with Germany's reunification and the economic reconstruction of the former East German states, the Soviet Union fell apart and Russia turned to embrace democracy and a market economy, with many countries in Eastern Europe following suit.

European integration progressed rapidly, and the euro was launched. The European Union was enlarged to comprise 27 member states. With trade between East and West blossoming, investment flowed eastwards, while wealth and democracy progressed significantly in the countries of the former Soviet Bloc. Some Eastern Europeans and East Germans moved westwards but, on balance, large-scale imbalances and risks were avoided. Since 1989, per capita income has substantially risen in all these countries, levels of prosperity have increased considerably, and most transition countries in Eastern Europe have become stable democracies. Germany is a different place today as well. East Germany has made substantial progress.

The fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transition to democracy and market economics in most Eastern European countries have changed international affairs forever. The former confrontational stance of heavily armed superpowers is now a thing of the past, having been replaced by more nuanced international relations. The rise of China, India and other big emerging market countries has sustainably changed the global interrelations of economic and political power.

Undisputedly a historical watershed, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked the start of a new era of globalization and geopolitics.

Josef Ackermann is Chairman of the Management Board and the Group Executive Committee, Deutsche Bank AG.

"Tear Down This Wall!"

Richard Burt reflects on the impact of Ronald Reagan's 1987 speech in Berlin

Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is tempting to view the Cold War confrontation over Berlin as pretty cut-and-dried: surrounded by a hostile East Germany and more than 300,000 Red Army soldiers, a democratic West Berlin was kept alive by politico-military commitments provided by West Germany's three principal allies: Britain, France and the United States.

By the mid-1980s, however, the reality was more complex. In both West Berlin and the Federal Republic, Germans were beginning to suffer from a certain degree of Cold War "battle fatigue." In West Germany, politicians in Bonn complained about the burden of hosting hundreds of thousands of allied troops and wondered how long Germany's division would drag on.

Leaders of the new Green Party (as well as some in other parties) suggested that there was an American-Soviet "conspiracy" to keep Germany divided. More moderate German leaders didn't accept this line, but increasingly argued that the early Cold War goal of German reunification – achieved through military strength and political unity with the West – was unrealistic.

Rather than reunification, it had become fashionable in West German political circles to talk about accepting the division of Germany, but then working to "overcome" it by seeking stronger political and economic ties with the East. Needless to say, this line of thinking was welcome in the economically uncompetitive German Democratic Republic (GDR), which was continually on the lookout for ways to extort hard currency and modern technology from the West.

These political currents were also felt in West Berlin, where the British, French and U.S. "occupation" presence were not only viewed by some as an anachronism, but also an impediment to closer ties to the GDR authorities.

Thus, it was against this political backdrop that, in 1987, Berlin prepared to celebrate its 750th anniversary. To the democratically elected Berlin Senate, the anniversary was an opportunity to raise the city's international profile. But for me and my British and French ambassadorial colleagues, the anniversary served an additional purpose: to underscore the allies' continuing commitment to freedom in West Berlin and the continuing relevance of the mission of reunification – of Berlin and Germany as a whole. As a result, we worked together with our home governments to gain approval for visits from Queen Elizabeth, François Mitterrand, and Ronald Reagan during the course of the year.

We all had high hopes for the Reagan visit. His earlier visit, in 1985, to the Federal Republic had been marred by the much-publicized Bitburg controversy, in which

Berlin provided the perfect backdrop for Reagan and his political philosophy

Right: U.S. President Ronald Reagan takes a hammer and chisel to the Berlin Wall on Potsdamer Platz in East Berlin, September 12, 1990

Below: U.S. President Ronald Reagan (right) and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (left) during Reagan's visit to the Berlin Wall, June 12, 1987

the White House learned, at the last minute, that the President would participate in a ceremony at a cemetery where Waffen SS troops were buried. But Berlin provided the perfect backdrop for Reagan and his political philosophy. Working closely with the excellent White House advance team, the U.S. Embassy in Bonn and the U.S. Mission in Berlin (led by the talented John Kornblum) produced a scenario that focused on a major presidential speech that would rival John F. Kennedy's "Ich bin ein Berliner" address in 1961.

The setting could not have been better. Standing before a crowd of several hundred thousand Berliners, and with the Berlin Wall and the Brandenburg Gate at his back, Reagan gave the speech of his career.

It was a beautiful June day and the crowd was in a good mood. He talked abut the human values that a free Berlin and a democratic Federal Republic symbolized, and then clearly connected with his audience when he described his hopes for making headway in East-West relations in his negotiations with the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. He then threw down the gauntlet, saying that if the Soviet leadership was really interested in ending the Cold War, it needed to demonstrate this through concrete action: "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!"

Standing with the Berlin Wall and the Brandenburg Gate at his back, Reagan gave the speech of his career

The speech was a big hit with his audience (and back home in the United States.) The reaction of the German political elite was more complicated. On the day of the speech, the Mayor of West Berlin, Eberhard Diepgen, wanted President Reagan's challenge to Gorbachev removed from the speech, on the grounds that it could "complicate" relations with East Berlin. Several West German politicians, meanwhile, saw Reagan's statement as merely political rhetoric.

In the longer term, however, the speech had a significant, strategic impact. As he had done so many times in the United States, Reagan went over the heads of the German political elite, and refurbished America's link with the people of Berlin and Germany as a whole, both East and West. As always, his message was clear and simple: the Wall was a human atrocity and the Russians bore ultimate responsibility for it.

West German views of Reagan and the "speech" began to change as they watched him achieve arms control and other agreements with Moscow, and as Gorbachev's reform process went forward. While many in Bonn had seen Reagan's "freedom agenda" as warmed-over Cold War rhetoric, they gradually began to understand that it resonated throughout Eastern Europe. It was this growing desire for self-determination that led Gorbachev, in 1989, to effectively renounce the Brezhnev Doctrine that, in turn, paved the way for the fall of the Wall and the GDR.

In the end, then, Gorbachev did help "tear" down the Berlin Wall and both he and Ronald Reagan deserve much of the credit.

Richard Burt served as U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany from 1985 to 1989 and is a Board Director of the Atlantic Council of the United States.

INTERVIEW

Frederick Kempe interviews **Zbigniew Brzezinski**, National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter and a member of the Atlantic Council International Advisory Board

Who and what won the Cold War?
It is an oversimplification to talk of victory, since no war in the real sense was involved. If one chooses to do so, then clearly freedom won. This was the greatest upheaval in favor of freedom, and a predominantly peaceful one, since 1848, so almost 150 years later. And it created an altogether new setting for scores of millions of people, depending on how far you want to count.

Certainly 200 million Central Europeans, or thereabouts, and a significant number of what used to be called "Soviet citizens" suddenly were living in countries of their own national identity, not in all cases democracies, but still more free of foreign domination than before. So freedom certainly won.

So who should we associate most with that cause?
I think it is fair to say that America led in terms of active support and led the Western alliance in that support. But it is also fair to say that the actual mechanics – the operational mechanics of mentoring this process, keeping it within bounds and making it possible – belong to Bush Sr. and Kohl in the first instance, and much more hesitantly to Thatcher and Mitterrand, who feared German unification. In the background of all of this, patronizing it, blessing it and somewhat inspiring it, was Pope John Paul II.

You were National Security Advisor in 1978. Polish Cardinal Karol Wojtyła was elected Pope John Paul II the same year. The Soviets, of course, thought you orchestrated this. What was your reaction and role at the time? And what role do you think the naming of a Polish Pope had on the Cold War?
I wish I had orchestrated it. I am certainly delighted that it happened without my orchestration. But it is true that the Politburo was exaggeratedly informed of my role by its intelligence services.

They believed you did it?
Yes, that is a fact. In fact, they had the whole scenario – namely that I got Cardinal Krol, the Polish-American, to organize the American episcopate. Then on that basis, the American episcopate allegedly conspired with the German episcopates. And the two episcopates then set in motion this election of Wojtyła.

What was your role?
My role was prayerful. (Laughter.) I think, nonetheless, there is no doubt that the choice of a Polish Pope absolutely transformed the political climate in Poland. All of the East European countries were restless and dissatisfied. But all of them were also intimidated after the Soviets put down the Hungarian revolution and the Czechoslovak Spring. There was fear and intimidation and also penetration of societies by agents, so that one never could quite trust one's neighbors.

The Pope's arrival in Poland showed that everyone was enthusiastic about what he symbolized and was prepared to endorse it openly. And the regime discovered that it was naked, in effect isolated. That transformed the nature of the political context and gave birth shortly thereafter to Solidarity. And what was Solidarity? It was a word that defined the new reality that there is national solidarity against a foreign-imposed regime that is anti-democratic.

And that contagion spread from Poland into the region, particularly Czechoslovakia and Hungary, thereby isolating East Germany. That precipitated the fall of the Wall, a night of particular gratification for me because back in 1963 I wrote a book entitled, *Alternative to Partition*. And the whole thesis of the book was: let us engage in peaceful engagement with

Pope John Paul II shakes hands with Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter (1983)

Central Europe, but leave East Germany out of it, thereby isolating East Germany by promoting change within the most vulnerable part of the Soviet Bloc. And eventually, it will lead to the collapse of the East German regime and to a new Europe, namely no longer partitioned.

Does it go too far to say that German unification wouldn't have happened, the Cold War wouldn't have ended, were it not for the Poles?
Well, there is no doubt that without what happened in Poland, we wouldn't have a situation in which the East German regime was isolated and unable to control its people, who were streaming through Hungary into the West and who were increasingly associating themselves with restlessness that was just immediately to the east of East Germany, namely in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. That is sheer geopolitics.

Eventually, the Soviet Bloc certainly would have collapsed anyway. But when and how and whether so peacefully, we will never know.

What was the role of Soviet failure in Afghanistan in the 1980s?
It demonstrated two things: the increasing lack of Soviet self-restraint and, at the same time, the limits of their military capability. They could not achieve what seemed to be initially a very easy and attainable victory.

What was the U.S.'s role in that Soviet failure?
Both the Carter and the Reagan administrations pursued exactly the same policy, except that the Reagan administration greatly increased the scale of the external assistance, as we were in office for just one year of the war. Both administrations made certain that this would not be a cost-free victory for the Soviets because it would be very destabilizing for the international system that you can invade and occupy another country, without any negative consequences for oneself.

As the Carter administration was in its final weeks in the 1980s, was there a danger of Soviet military invasion of Poland to end the Solidarity movement?
Absolutely. And we had very clear evidence to that effect from our own intelligence, from the deployment of Soviet forces around Poland, from the demands that the Soviets made of the Polish communist government.

That precipitated two developments, which unintentionally reinforced each other. The Polish communist regime, headed by Secretary Kania, strongly objected to Brezhnev about the so-called maneuvers to be held in Poland, saying that this could create a very volatile situation. And Carter, at the same time, sent a message via the hotline to Brezhnev saying that this could have the gravest consequences for the American-Soviet relationship, and while we do not intend ourselves to intervene in Polish affairs, we will take the gravest view of a Soviet intervention.

And that was done by an administration that was already engaged in supporting the resistance in Afghanistan. There is no way that the Soviets could take that lightly. For symbolic purposes, and also to convey a sense of urgency, it was sent by the hotline directly from the White House to the Kremlin.

Do you think you averted a Soviet invasion?
They were going to go in. We now have a lot of documentation regarding the plans and which troops were going to enter from where. I think one or two East German divisions were going to be used. Two or so Czech divisions were going to be used. The rest were going to be Soviet divisions, both from East Germany and from the territory of the then-existing Soviet Union. And the date was even set, which was the first week of December 1980.

Now, what specifically at that given moment made Brezhnev postpone, I do not know. But certainly our actions complicated his sense that he had freedom of action.

Beyond that, the nature of the sanctions adopted against the Soviet Union following the invasion of Afghanistan had to make the Soviets ask themselves, what is it that we might do if they invade Poland? They had to ask themselves that. And there is no doubt that they didn't like the sanctions that we adopted, including one particularly, which was very symbolic but painful: namely depriving them of the opportunity to match Hitler's 1936 Olympics with the 1980 Moscow Olympics, which we boycotted.

They also had to question the wisdom of the use of force with all of its unpredictable consequences one year after using force in Afghanistan without success.

In 1988, you were Co-Chairman of the Bush national security advisory task force. You formally endorsed Bush for President, a break with the Democratic Party. And you also published a book, *Grand Failure*, where you predicted the failure of Gorbachev's reforms. Why, as a Democrat, did you turn to the Republican Party and Bush at this critical time?
Because it was a critical time. There was very little evidence that [Democratic candidate Michael] Dukakis understood the strategic and geopolitical dimensions of the crisis in the Soviet Bloc, whereas Bush had a good grasp of it. And as events subsequently showed, he actually did play it masterfully. I very much doubt Dukakis would have been as skillful.

What was the role of individuals versus underlying trends?
It is almost a basic law that historical spontaneity operates through the movement of social forces and the surfacing of key catalytic individuals. That combination always arises. It is the interaction of these two dynamics that then results in transformation. Who would have thought that a simple and personally poor shipyard worker, Lech Walesa, and a "bohemian" playwright in Prague [Václav Havel] would emerge as the great symbols of an upheaval that destroyed an empire?

Who would have thought that a surprisingly sophisticated, intelligent and flexible son of a peasant in Southern Russia, Mikhail Gorbachev, would then acquire the skill and flexibility to enable him to set in motion belated, and ultimately unsuccessful, reforms in the Soviet Union that contributed to the collapse of the will to resist within the Soviet elite?

How would you define Gorbachev's role?
He was terribly important in legitimizing among the Soviet elite the progressive fragmentation of Soviet authority, historical self-confidence, sense of direction and will to resist, or even to persist.

At the time, the common thinking was that the Soviet Union was a permanent fixture of the international scene.
Well, I never thought that.

Did you foresee the collapse?
No. But ever since I was a graduate student, I was convinced that the Soviet empire was increasingly ahistorical in the sense that it really was an empire involving domination by one national identity over a set of other national identities. That one national

"...clearly freedom won"

identity was stronger and tougher, but not omnipotent. And over time, its will, its cohesion and its intelligence was sapped. And this is why the fall of the Soviet Union was so natural and so relatively bloodless – because it outlived its days.

Why did it collapse when it did?
Well, I can't tell you why precisely it happened then. It could have happened 10 years earlier if circumstances were different. And it could have happened 10 years later if circumstances were different. But it was a conjunction of all of these events that brought it to a head.

What did we do wrong after the Cold War's end?
I don't think we did many things wrong. I am not one of those who believes in psychotherapy as a base for interpreting international affairs. And geopolitical realities and historical forces are far more important than hurt Russian feelings or the feigning of hurt feelings. The Russians resent what happened because what happened deprived them of something very special, namely the last great empire in the world. They would like to have it back to the extent that it is possible.

The fact of the matter is, however, that there really wasn't any choice for the West except to include in Europe and in NATO those who would have liked to have been in it and were forcibly deprived of that opportunity and that right. There was no way of stopping that.

Also, if they had not been included out of some misguided psychotherapeutic theories regarding how to deal with the Russians, then we would have today not just Georgia already hit hard by military force, Ukraine continuously threatened, but we would have Estonia and other Baltic countries being subjected to barrages reminiscent of Hitler's claims that the Sudeten Germans needed protection. You would have the Poles beleaguered by the Russians like the Ukrainians or the Georgians already are.

And we would have probably mounting hostility between the East and the West, which fortunately is now significantly reduced and limited to a couple of specific issues, but which at the same time coexist with a lot of contacts, cooperation and joint responses to other problems. While it is not an ideal situation, it is far better than what would prevail if we had simply let Central Europe drift indecisively until such time as Russia was powerful enough to try to restore the status quo ante-1989.

How do we deal with Russia now?
We patiently try to work with the Russians while encouraging their accommodation to their new historical context. That is to say, they have to digest the fact that they, like the British or the French, or even more acutely the Germans or the Japanese, can no longer revert to an imperial past based on force. That reality is gone.

And, incidentally, we are learning that, too. Look at our relatively passive reaction to Soviet planes and tanks for Venezuela, to Nicaragua's recognition of Abkhazia or Ossetia and our growing indifference to communism and Russian ties in Cuba.

We are moving beyond our imperial era and I think that is all good. But if the Russians think they are going to gain anything by trying to recreate an empire, they will simply isolate themselves more. They will embroil themselves more. And they will become a massive national failure in a huge and potentially rich space, which is bordered in the West by 550 million West Europeans and Central Europeans, and, in the East, by a billion-and-a-half increasingly successful Chinese. It is a policy of national suicide.

And the last point to be added here: not a single one of the newly independent states wants to be part of Russia again, not a single one. So I think the course for Russia is self-evident. And we ought to facilitate it, but not feed their imperial aspirations. We must be prudently clear-cut as to what our vital interests are regarding, let's say, Ukraine and Georgia. And they are essentially that they remain independent, not necessarily members of NATO, maybe not even ready for quite a while to be members of the European Union. But they must be independent.

Is there any lesson from the Cold War for today?
One lesson is that the fall of the Wall and the events of those years were handled with sophistication by an engaged America working closely with the Germans, the British and the French. We need serious partners. This is why I am such a strong advocate of there being a European voice to which we are prepared to listen. But it is up to the Europeans to shape that voice. At the moment, we don't have that. We have a political vacuum in Europe.

Zbigniew Brzezinski was National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter and is a member of the Atlantic Council International Advisory Board. He was interviewed by Frederick Kempe, President and CEO of the Atlantic Council of the United States.

Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin (left) and U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski (right) play a game of chess at the Camp David Summit, Maryland, September 1978. Looking on are (center, left to right): Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz, Israeli General Efran Ponan, and Begin's Press Secretary Dan Patir



Germany's Revolution, Unification and America

The fall of the Berlin Wall, November 1989

J. D. Bindenagel, former U.S. Minister to the GDR, recalls the events of November 9

When George H.W. Bush took office in January 1989, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's "New Thinking" was taking hold in Poland and Hungary. The debate over whether the "German Question" could be resolved continued among politicians in the Federal Republic of Germany. No one expected German unification anytime soon. In fact, Chancellor Helmut Kohl did not expect it within his lifetime.

But it was in East Berlin where events unfurled at a breathtakingly fast pace and the promise of a different course began. The first change sought was the replacement of Erich Honecker under the slogan for renewal of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The 1990 Communist Party Congress seemed the most likely time for East Germany to join Gorbachev's *perestroika* and *glasnost* policies of economic restructuring and openness.

Change turned on the East German travel law. After 28 years of captivity – a life behind the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain – East Germans had had enough. They wanted, as President John F. Kennedy said, to feel that "free men everywhere would be proud to call themselves Berliners," to be free themselves. They wanted Gorbachev to heed President Ronald Reagan's call to "tear down this wall."

On May 4, the Hungarians cut the fence along the border that formed the Iron Curtain. Millions of East Germans took to the streets, seeking emigration through Hungary to the West. They were voting with their feet.

Three days later, the May 7 municipal elections were challenged as a fraud and demonstrations protesting them stirred up the opposition. On June 4 in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, the Chinese crushed the "counterrevolutionaries" and Honecker threatened to do the same in East Germany. Asylum-seeking East Germans stormed the West German embassies in Prague and Budapest; their release to the West feeding the fire of revolution. By October 9 the protests in Leipzig remained non-violent, but only with the intervention of Gwandhaus Orchestra Conductor Kurt Masur and the tolerance of the local communists. Honecker failed to crush the counterrevolutionaries and was ousted himself on October 18.

Days later, through the night of November 9, 1989, the world held its breath. Would the Soviets intervene to

Taking a hammer to the Wall, November 12, 1989

crush the German revolutionaries?

At the American Embassy in East Berlin, the Red Army's action or inaction, with a million soldiers stationed at the German-German border, would decide the future. Coupled with the all-seeing, all-knowing East German secret police, the Stasi, it was hard to see how freedom could trump military force. Yet history on this day would rewrite itself.

November 9 began calmly. Though Gorbachev had long ago departed Berlin after celebrating East Germany's 40 years, he left warning of the necessity for *glasnost* and *perestroika*: "Those who come too late will be punished by history." (*Wer zu spat kommt, den bestraft das Leben*.) That saying became another act of providence.

As the day was ending, the mayors of East and West Berlin, the Allied Military Commanders, East German spy-swapping and Honecker lawyer Wolfgang Vogel gathered at an Aspen Institute Berlin reception hosted by Director David Anderson. At the end of the reception, Vogel asked me for a ride to his car, which was parked in West Berlin. I was eager to hear his assessment of the East German reaction to the November 6 changes to the East German travel law; changes that had been rejected by thousands of demonstrators throughout the country.

In the interim, the wave of fleeing Germans was reaching tidal-wave proportions and fast approaching the mark for Soviet intervention of one million, as discussed by Secretary James Baker and Eduard Shevardnadze in Jackson Hole in September.

In August, Ambassador Barkley and I had visited Vogel at his modest home on Lake Schwerinsee. He told us that the Hungarians would very soon allow several hundred East Germans in Hungary to escape to the West. He also told us that in March the Hungarians had been the first Eastern Bloc state to sign the UN Convention on Refugees. Consequently, they informed East Germany that its fleeing citizens would be treated as refugees and to let them flee to the West. When on August 19, at a pan-European picnic in Hungary, some 600 East Germans fled into Austria, Moscow did not react.

At the end of the street near the checkpoint, dozens of Germans stood at the barrier shouting

The problem of fleeing East Germans still loomed large on November 9. What would Vogel tell me now?

As we drove towards West Berlin's heart at the Ku'Damm, Vogel told me that the GDR attorney's Kollegium had met on November 7-8 and proposed additional changes to the GDR travel law to allow for freer travel. Vogel thought the new changes, not yet announced, would satisfy East Germans' demand for more freedom of travel. I returned to the Embassy with this hot information.

When I arrived, I found a greatly excited political section. The East German government spokesman, Guenther Schabowski, had told the world that the Politburo had agreed to more changes in the travel law. East Germans could get visitor visas quickly for access to the West from their local "People's Police" and that the GDR would open a new

processing center to handle emigration cases immediately. The vagueness of the actual information about the process paved the path to wide interpretation – and inspired the revolution.

When NBC anchorman Tom Brokaw asked Schabowski if the ruling meant the Berlin Wall was open, Schabowski reportedly said: "Yes." The East Germans heard: "Travel to the West is possible immediately."

Tom Brokaw called Garrick Utley, editor at NBC in New York, and Utley approved the broadcast of the story. For the next hour and a half Brokaw told television viewers around the world that the Berlin Wall was open, though none of us on the ground had confirmed the story or knew how the East Germans planned to implement it.

The revolution was in full swing and spinning out of control. Embassy Political Counselor Jon Greenwald sent one embassy political officer, Heather Troutman, directly to Checkpoint Charlie and another, Imre Lipping, to the GDR press center to get the text of the statement. Meanwhile, the first East Germans approached the Berlin Wall at Checkpoint Charlie and attempted to cross without visas, only to be turned away by the guards and told to get visas from the local police. For now, it seemed that the guards could keep things under control.

Later, with Schabowski's speech text in hand, we translated and cabled it to Washington. I spoke to the White House Situation Room and State Department Operations Center to ensure they had the report and to update them on the latest developments. Then I called the American Minister in West Berlin, Harry Gilmore, and shared my view that the East Germans would first have to get their visas and then be able to head to West Berlin.

Arriving in the East Berlin suburb of Pankow at around 10:00 pm, I was surprised to find East German, plasticized-pressed wood Trabant automobiles seemingly abandoned near the Bornholmerstrasse Checkpoint that crossed over the S-Bahn train into West Berlin.

At the end of the street near the checkpoint, dozens of Germans stood at the barrier shouting at the guards defending the crossing. The barracks were filled with armed border police, fire hoses, like those used later at the Brandenburg Gate, were carefully laid out like venomous snakes, ready to repel any wall jumpers. Defense of the boarder meant shoot-to-kill.

Citizens stand in an open section of the Wall, November 10, 1989, East Berlin

Across from the checkpoint and safely in the West, a TV camera crew, its light illuminating the bridge that divided the Cold War world, awaited carnage.

I rushed through the last few blocks home and turned on the television to watch what the rest of the world was watching from the safety of their sofas. I called Ambassador Richard Barkley, Jon Greenwald, and Harry Gilmore.

The guards gave way. A wave of East Berliners streamed through the Bornholmerstrasse checkpoint. As their pictures flashed around the world on television, they shouted, "freedom!" The Berlin Wall was breached.

But I wondered, with a sinking feeling, did they have visas? What of the requirement? Who was in charge?

In the morning, following my third-grade daughter's routine van trip to school in West Berlin, I stopped at the Bornholmerstrasse Checkpoint. By now, masses of people had gathered at the gates, crossing from east to west, from west to east.

While I watched, Radio DDR Eins announced that visas would be required to travel from East to West starting at 8:00 am that morning, November 10. As panic spread, the crowd grew steadily larger, pressing against the gate. The fear of being shut in, of having missed the chance to see West Berlin before the GDR shut the gate, was palatable.

Shortly before 8:00 am, the visa requirement deadline was extended until noon. The noon deadline became Monday morning. At that point, the authority and legitimacy of the GDR passed from the Krenz government to the people, and to their demand for freedom.

That night led to free elections in East Germany on March 18, 1990 and German unification on October 3, 1990. That night, freedom won.

By November 9, 1989, East Germany's days were limited. Only the anticipated intervention by the Soviets would have prolonged its agony. Perhaps unintentionally, Gorbachev's *glasnost* and *perestroika* positioned him in a catch-22: either he would risk his policies by intervening militarily in East Germany, or he would lose the German Democratic Republic to a unified Germany.

My counterpart, the Deputy Ambassador, at the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin, Minister Dr. Igor F. Maximytschew later shed light on this conflict. It was he who waited to inform Moscow of the events on the ground in Berlin, which were then presented as a *fait accompli*. His reasons were clear: Soviet Ambassador Kotschemassow went to sleep after the Schabowski press conference; the Soviet Embassy had no further inside information because all of their GDR contacts went silent; to alert lower-level Soviet officials to a situation whose change of course depended upon military intervention was too risky; and intervention itself could have resulted in a Tiananmen Square solution. Furthermore and consequently, Maximytschew followed Gorbachev's instruction not to dramatize the situation and decided to inform Moscow in the morning.

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INTERVIEW

Frederick Kempe interviews Colin Powell, former U.S. Secretary of State

You were the chairman of the Joint Chiefs on the day that the Wall came tumbling down. What's your take on what brought the Cold War's end?
I credit the inadequacy, inefficiency and ultimately the failure of the Soviet Communist system of economics and governance. Beyond that, we executed a successful strategy of containment for all those years. It took a lot of people, over time to push the Soviet Union over the edge. We were blessed with wise leadership at a crucial moment. Ronald Reagan called the Soviets the "Evil Empire," but he was secure enough in who he was and in America's strength that he was willing to engage closely the leaders of that so-called Evil Empire.

You helped organize five summits between Gorbachev and Reagan. What was Reagan's approach to Gorbachev?
Reagan's greatest desire during that period was not to shove it in Gorbachev's face or to shove it in the Russians' face that they were failing, but to show them a better way. He was always saying, "Gosh, if I can only take Gorbachev out to California and show him the ranch. If only I could take Gorbachev to our auto plants in Detroit and show him what real industry looks like. If only I could show him our homes and our communities." Reagan was so proud of America. He thought he could make a more powerful point with the Soviet leadership by showing them our accomplishments in comparison to their own.

Don't forget that the Soviet Union and the U.S. were similar in their natural resources and population size. So it was the inadequacy of the system that was the Soviet Union's undoing, and Gorbachev recognized that inadequacy. He thought, "I can fix this," but he could not. I will always respect Gorbachev and consider him a friend and a major historic figure because he was there at the right time. But he had to be met by people like Reagan, Thatcher and Kohl.

How much credit should history give Reagan for ending the Cold War?
I give him a lot of credit. The Cold War's end was coming anyway, but it would not have happened when and how it did if Reagan had not been there at that time to work with Gorbachev and to help Gorbachev as he did. We were trying to help him save the Soviet Union. We weren't saying you have to give up the Soviet Union. We just said communism is a disaster.

That's an important distinction.
I'll never forget the last meeting that we had with Gorbachev at Governor's Island in December 1988. It was after the election, so George H.W. Bush was the President-elect and he joined Reagan for the meeting. We weren't looking for another summit with Gorbachev, but Gorbachev had come to speak to the United Nations and he wanted it.

Brent Scowcroft was there as the new National Security Advisor to replace me. It was mostly a chance for Gorbachev to say goodbye to Reagan and hello to President Bush. It was warm and friendly. The Russians had just announced the unilateral troop reduction at the U.N. an hour earlier, before Gorbachev got on a ferry to come over and see us. At one point President-elect Bush said to Gorbachev, "Well how do you think it's all going to turn out?" And Gorbachev looked

February 19, 1988, Washington, DC: President Reagan meets with Secretary of State George Schultz, in the Oval Office. Lt. Gen. Colin Powell, National Security Advisor, and White House Chief of Staff Howard Baker are also in attendance

"We were blessed with wise leadership at a crucial moment"

at him and said, "Not even Jesus Christ knows the answer to that."

Reagan must have loved that.
He smiled. I could almost hear my boss saying, silently to himself, "I told you he was a Christian! I told you!" Gorbachev then told us that when he took over in 1985, everybody said, "Wonderful! We need a revolution and they were all applauding. And then two years later in 1987, when I started to do things with *perestroika* and *glasnost* and things got more difficult, the applause died down a bit. And now it's 1989; the revolution is here and nobody is applauding. But still we're going to have a revolution." I found that very revealing, and I believed him.

You were one of the first to predict the Cold War's end.
I went back to the Army and was commander of all deployed forces in the United States. I gave a speech in May 1989, several months before the Wall fell in November, to all of the senior Army generals. Everything they had done for the previous 40 years rested on there being a Soviet Union. I told them, "The bear looks benign," and that we were "on our way to losing our best enemy." I told them that if we opened NATO tomorrow to new members, we would have several new applicants on our agenda within a week – Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, maybe Estonia, Latvia, Lithuanian, maybe even Ukraine."

Was Gorbachev naïve in thinking he could reform the system?
I would never call him naïve. He really believed in the Soviet Union. He thinks one of the greatest disasters that ever befell the Russian people was the collapse of the Soviet Union. He really thought he could save it. But it became clear over time that it was not sustainable. It was rotten, notwithstanding what our intelligence agencies were telling us about its economic and military strength. They had a lot of guns but they were busted on butter. And in the 20th century, butter was as important as guns. Gorbachev had two goals: to preserve the Soviet Union and to end the Cold War because it was bankrupting them.

You were a young officer in Germany around the time that the Berlin Wall was built in a place called Gelnhausen. They've since named a street for you there. What were your impressions of the Cold War then?
I was just a 21-year-old second lieutenant out of New York, having just finished infantry school. We all knew our jobs. When the balloon went up, my job was to race to our positions at the Fulda Gap and beat the crap out of the Russians as they came through. That was it. We didn't need to know much more. I still remember being taken up to the Fulda Gap and seeing it for the first time. It's a huge, gorgeous valley. I still remember being shown where my position was between a couple of trees where we would stop the Russian Army. I had a mission to guard one of the 280-milimeter atomic cannons that we hauled around Germany with a truck. It fired nuclear shells. It was a huge, long thing. We also had smaller atomic weapons called Davy Crockett's. They looked like bazookas and were mounted on jeeps. It was an absolutely silly weapon with a couple of miles' range.

It all seems so unimaginable now.
The word nuclear was, in 1961, magic and all the services had to have their own nuclear programs. And once you had a nuclear weapons program, you had to have all ranges. So that's what containment looked like.

What role did military strength play in winning the Cold War?
It was crucial. It made it clear to the Soviets that there would be no walk in the woods and there would be war if they ever tried to come to Western Europe. Now we can wonder whether we could have stopped them, and whether they had the military capabilities we attributed to them.

What did you think of your enemy – and know about them?
In 1986, I was promoted to Lieutenant General and given command of the 5th United States Corps in Germany. I was back at the same Fulda Gap, except now I had 75,000 soldiers under my command and not 40. The mission remained unchanged for more than three decades: don't let the Russian army come through. My job was to stop an organization called the 8th Guards Army, headed by General Achalov. I researched him very carefully. He was a paratrooper who had been injured, and they made him commander of an armored unit. I kept his picture on my desk and I used it to brief congressmen who were visiting and wanted to know why I needed so much money. Rather than give a PowerPoint presentation, which hadn't been invented in those days, I would just point at the picture and say, "There's the reason – Achalov. He's one hour away with the 8th Guards Army and behind him, there are three other armies stacked up."

Could you have stopped them?
Not without nuclear weapons, which we would have had to use by the third day and then we would have been off and running in a nuclear world war. The Soviets knew that, too. The generals on both sides knew, deep down in their hearts, "This can never be allowed to happen."

How are the challenges today different than they were during that period?
In my early years of military service, I was involved in contests that were about containment and military superiority and regional wars – Korea, Vietnam. The most powerful trend right now is not so much a political trend or a military trend. It's about economics and the creation of wealth. The nations that are increasingly successful in the world are those that are doing something about creating wealth. We are experiencing the greatest explosion of advancement in the middle class throughout the world that the world has ever seen. Hundreds of millions of Chinese who rode the same bicycles and wore the same clothes and hoped they might have a sewing machine in their lives are now in the middle class. That changes everything. The weapon of the future is education, and what's most important now is properly educating our young people for our new challenges.

What happens with China? Does China become our enemy in this new world?
Absolutely not. What did they get from being our enemy before? They get much more out of selling us goods at Wal-Mart. It makes no sense to them to become our enemy. Yet in one of the greatest historical ironies in all of recorded history, a so-called undeveloped country is financing the profligacy of the largest, most powerful country in the world. And where do they get the money to buy our paper? By selling us stuff at Wal-Mart. It's incredible.

In this new world, what's the role of NATO? Of military power?
It's hard to close down a club when people keep asking for membership applications. I'm a big Atlanticist. I'm a supporter of NATO, but NATO has to adapt to the times. It will also be difficult to guide because it is a group of democracies. Yet it's given us a level of interoperability that other groups of countries lack that we can use when we want to act together. When we wanted to help the Kurds in northern Iraq, we could work off the same maps and use the same procedures. The same was true when we fought the Gulf War. We didn't have to train anybody to a new system of command and control because we took the European war and brought it to the desert. Desert Storm was nothing more than the battle we were planning to fight with the Soviets, except with no trees and no hills.

Did we miss a chance to more deeply integrate the Russians after the Cold War? Must we bear part of that blame?
It was extremely difficult and tricky to figure out what to do with respect to the new Russian Federation after the Cold War. We had to be very careful in expanding NATO in ways that did not provoke the Russians. But we did not make serious mistakes because the Alliance is enlarged there and Russia is not our enemy.

Was enlargement of NATO a good idea?
I don't think we had a choice. Will you say to these newly freed countries that you've closed down NATO? No, we did the right thing by saying you have to meet our standards and then you can come in.

What do we do now about Russia – and about Georgia and Ukraine in that context?
We need to show the Russians more respect – and at the same time press them on the issues we consider important. I would move very, very carefully on Georgia and Ukraine, which aren't ready for entry into NATO at this point. We also need to understand that Russia has far less capability to be a threat to anybody. Russia is one-half the size of the Soviet Union. It has an ageing and declining population through normal demographic attrition – because of bad healthcare, too much drinking, too much smoking, and low birth rate. They don't have what we have that keeps our system vibrant, and that's immigration. They are an energy provider and natural resource provider, but if you go to Kmart or Wal-Mart, you're not going to see any Russian products. Twenty years after the Cold War, they don't make anything anybody wants except gas, oil and minerals.

What concerns you most about the future?
What I'm not worried about is a world war. What I'm not worried about is a return to some superpower military contest because there are no longer any peer threats to the United States of America. I am worried about the instability we see manifested in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea and Iran. I think the Alliance has a role to play in dealing with these kinds of issues. I am deeply concerned about poverty throughout the world. I am concerned about infectious diseases. I am concerned about all the various problems that create failed states and the angry people that produces. It takes more money, and it takes more considered judgment. The Atlantic Community would do well to redirect more of its energies to these issues.

Colin Powell was the 65th U.S. Secretary of State, serving under President George W. Bush.

Welcome to Freedom

Frederick Taylor recalls the combination of events that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall



When it comes to offering explanations for any major historical event, there is, of course, the short version and the long.

For the fall of the Berlin Wall, the long version would have to follow minutely the process of political, military and economic decay that had served to undermine the communist project over decades before 1989. A milestone on that road was the Helsinki agreement of 1975, which opened a door for opposition movements in the Eastern Bloc. And then there was President Reagan's pugnacious demand at the Brandenburg Gate in June 1987 for Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev to "tear down that Wall!" expressing a renewed, active American interest in the liberation of countries long-dominated by the Soviet empire.

The short version – the one we must prefer here – centers on a single meeting of a government committee in East Berlin.

The location: a ministry building in the Mauerstrasse, yards from the lethal fortified wall that had divided East from West Berlin since August 1961. It is a fitfully sunny Thursday morning in the capital of the communist-ruled German Democratic Republic (GDR), with the mercury climbing slowly to 10°C (50°F). The date is November 9, 1989.

This four-person committee – two civilians, two Stasi officers – is under intense pressure to solve a crucial

President Reagan gives a thumbs-up sign after speaking at the Brandenburg Gate. With him is West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (right) and Phillip Jenninger, the President of the Bundestag (left)

The press conference that follows will remain one of the most avidly discussed events in modern history

problem. That same morning, the official newspaper, *Neues Deutschland*, has published an appeal, not from the communist leadership but from a group of reformists and dissidents who would just a few months earlier have been rewarded for their opinions with jail terms rather than column inches. "We are all deeply uneasy," they write. "We see thousands who are daily leaving our country... We beg you, stay in your homeland, stay with us."

The Berlin Wall is still in place – officially, the communist regime is still planning to upgrade the hated barrier with new, computerized security technology. So, why this heartfelt appeal?

First reason: after more than a quarter-century of being trapped in their tight little Soviet-sponsored state, on one side by a lethally fortified border with West Germany, on the other by the Wall built around West Berlin (East Germans' only escape-hatch until it was sealed in 1961), East Germany's 16 million people can, by November 1989, leave for the West if they want. And this, despite the roundabout routes and technical illegalities involved, they are proceeding, in their tens of thousands, to do. The election of a part-democratic government in Poland, the opening of the previously fortified border between communist Hungary and capitalist Austria, and most recently the re-opening of the border with Czechoslovakia, have brought the crisis to a head.

The second reason? East Germany is bankrupt. For years it has posed as the most prosperous communist country. This self-flattery has concealed low productivity, decaying infrastructure, and a permanent export/import deficit. Only generous subsidies by the Soviet Union and, as the 1980s wore on, loans from Western banks, have enabled the GDR to survive. For years the state's planners have warned of impending disaster. The ageing East German leadership, ideologically fundamentalist to the last, has chosen to ignore them. Now it is too late.

At the beginning of the year, the regime had still been headed by Erich Honecker, a 77-year-old hardliner who presided over the original construction of the Berlin Wall. Determined to mount a huge celebration of the GDR's 40th anniversary in October 1989, Honecker publicly insisted that the Wall could remain "for fifty or a hundred years" to come.

By November, however, Honecker is yesterday's man. On October 18 he was replaced, with Gorbachev's support, by 52-year-old Egon Krenz. This new "reformist" government is overwhelmed by intractable political and economic crises. It has, therefore, instructed that any issues that can be resolved, must be resolved. Among these is the "exit visa problem." Hence the committee's urgent deliberations in the Mauerstrasse this chilly November morning.

The committee obediently comes up with a more liberal but still "temporary" exit visa program; one that recognizes current realities but will, it hopes, provide a degree of order. East Germans will now be able to leave freely – if they first acquire a permit. This will normally be granted automatically.

Once the draft is agreed, the paperwork is couriered over to the Politburo building. General Secretary Krenz assures his colleagues that this is the only solution to the exit visa problem. It is also what their protectors in Moscow want. The arrangement is duly nodded through.

Meanwhile, the leadership's spokesman, an affable-seeming Berliner named Günther Schabowski, is due to give a press conference at East Berlin's International Press Centre. Schabowski drops by Krenz's office and requests an update on developments. This the General Secretary supplies, also presenting him with a copy of the new exit visa regulations for reference purposes.

The early-evening press conference that follows will remain one of the most avidly discussed events in modern history. Is what happens there a deliberate manipulation or just an inadvertent blunder? Arguably, it doesn't matter much, because it is not really what Schabowski says that will condition subsequent events, but how others interpret it and communicate it to the world.

Having outlined the exit visa proposal, the final point on a crowded agenda, a visibly weary Schabowski takes questions. There will be no preconditions for travel, he agrees. But, asks ABC's Tom Brokaw, when will this new arrangement come into effect? "Immediately," Schabowski

Citizens hold a German flag displaying "Unity" as they cross the newly opened checkpoint between East and West Berlin at the Brandenburg Gate

answers incorrectly. In fact, it is not valid until the next day, November 10.

Contrary to legend, this exchange, while intriguing, causes no immediate sensation. Only after the conference is over do the journalists begin to discuss its full meaning. Soon the Associated Press reporter chooses his "angle." According to Politburo spokesman Schabowski, his wire declares, East Germany is opening its borders. The phrase catches on. Everyone starts to use it.

Just over an hour after Schabowski's announcement, the respected ARD News on West German television leads its 8:00 p.m. bulletin with those same words: "The GDR is opening its borders."

It quickly becomes clear that East Berliners are watching, not the tame communist news, but the program beamed over the Wall from the West. Within minutes, they arrive at checkpoints, explaining that they have heard the border is open. They are told to first apply for a visa. The offices will be open tomorrow. East German TV hastily reaffirms this. Visas must be applied for in an orderly fashion.

The crowds pay no attention. They continue to besiege the checkpoints in ever-greater numbers. Most East Germans had meekly complied with the building of the Wall 28 years earlier, but now they are determined to assert their rights. They are no longer afraid of their government.

As for the new generation of communist leaders, they are no angels, but neither are they old-style mass-murderers. When Stasi Minister Erich Mielke – a Stalinist veteran, shortly to celebrate his 82nd birthday – calls Krenz, his new boss refuses to sanction force. To let the steam out of things at the border, a few pushier types can be let through. However, to deter the supposedly more docile majority, such people's passports will be stamped "no right of return."

This hopelessly unrealistic attempt to retain control merely shows East Berliners the rewards of persistence. Just after 11:00 p.m., at the Bornholmer Strasse checkpoint, the crowd overwhelms the unresisting border guards, pushes aside the barrier, and gleefully swarms across the railway bridge to West Berlin. Within hours, Berlin, east and west, is one big party.

Someone in an East Berlin bar quips, with sour native wit: "So... they built the Wall to stop people leaving – and now they're tearing it down to stop people leaving. There's logic for you."

Or, as the less cynical world at large would have it: "Welcome to freedom."

***Frederick Taylor is a historian and author of* The Berlin Wall.**

INTERVIEW

Former National Security Advisor **Horst M. Teltschik** talks to David Marsh about the complexities of the unification process

Horst Teltschik, Chancellor Helmut Kohl's right-hand man during the frenetic period of German unification, fulfilled an extraordinary combination of roles: governmental coordinator, policy sounding board, diplomatic go-between and communicator with foreign governments. Teltschik, a quick-thinking, extrovert foreign policy expert, had worked with Kohl since 1972 – 10 years before he became Chancellor. As head of the Chancellery department dealing with foreign, inner German and security policy, Teltschik was thrust into pole position in the adventure and intrigue of unification.

Teltschik is now a youthful 69-year-old with a seven-year spell behind him as board member of the BMW car company after he left the political scene. During the tumultuous events of 1989-90, he was far more than simply "his master's voice." Teltschik was at the center of a web of complex interchanges with West Germany's international counterparties: essentially the U.S., Soviet Union, Britain and France that had defeated Hitler in 1945 and still had control rights over Germany as a whole.

Heightening the Byzantine quality of these diplomatic manoeuvres was one essential fact. The prospect of German unification was highly unpopular among most of Germany's neighbors. Consequently, the West German government's messages to the rest of the world had to be geared, at least partly, to what other countries wanted to hear.

As a result, Teltschik found himself as Chancellor Kohl's central prism and reflector in a looking glass world that could have featured in a spy novel by John Le Carré, the British diplomat-turned-thriller writer who worked in Bonn during the 1960s.

Born in 1940 in the German-speaking Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia, Teltschik had a long-standing emotional interest in reunification – and was ahead of his Chancellor in promoting the view, months before the fall of the Wall, that German unity was fast approaching the surface of international politics. He earned Kohl's wrath when he gave a Bonn newspaper interview in July 1989 saying that the "German Question" was moving back on to the agenda. Teltschik's statement, which gave the impression that the Bonn government was far more active in preparing for reunification than was actually the case, sparked irritation not only in the Chancellery, but also with the Free Democratic coalition partners and with the Social Democrat opposition. Teltschik was forced to issue a statement to calm the controversy. Only a month later, Kohl himself said publicly that the "German Question" was "back on the agenda." But he was anxious to tell interlocutors such as Sir Christopher Mallaby, the British Ambassador to Bonn – who in autumn 1989 believed, like Margaret Thatcher, that German unity would damage Britain's interests – that this did not imply any fast-track route to unification.

The four powers all had somewhat differing views on reunification, but one thing united them. They were often taken aback by the speed with which Bonn was pushing ahead on German unity, and criticized the Germans for this. What is your reaction?
We were being pushed forward by developments on the streets of East Germany, not the other way around. Bonn had to speed up the process, for example over introducing the D-Mark into East Germany, in reaction to the pressure of events. The speed may have been uncomfortable, but it had one advantage with regard to the Soviet Union, which I have only recently discovered: it gave Moscow only little time to catch up with events and react to them. They were always surprised at the next step.

What was the importance of the U.S. in the unification saga?
I told Chancellor Kohl that, whatever else he decided, one person who always needs to know what's going on is the U.S. President. I took care to ensure that Brent Scowcroft [President George H.W. Bush's National Security Advisor] was briefed in detail at all times. But we clearly had to be careful to avoid mistrust and complications and so sometimes even the Americans – despite their fundamental support for reunification – were taken by surprise by the speed. Brent used to tell me sometimes of his worries that we were moving too fast.

How was the U.S. given priority in communications with the Allies?
On the morning of the announcement of the 10-point plan, November 28, 1989, the Chancellor sent George Bush by coded telex

We believed that full unity would take five to 10 years. That all changed when Kohl visited Dresden

an 11–page letter containing the 10-point plan along with our thoughts on the U.S.-Soviet position. We did not do this with any other ally. The letter was sent before I formally briefed the three Western allies, through the U.S., British and French ambassadors in Bonn, about two hours after the speech was made. (Soviet Ambassador Juli Kvizinsky was briefed shortly before the other three.) We knew, however, that there was no time for the letter to be translated and for President Bush to read it before the speech was made. There was even greater reluctance to consult with Mitterrand and Thatcher. If we had sent the text to any of them beforehand, and offered to talk to them about it, they would have told us that of course they supported unification but were worried about Gorbachev's position and wanted to discuss the text first. And the inevitable result would have been that the speech would have been delayed – which we didn't want to happen.

Around the time of the 10-point plan, how long did you think unification would take to achieve?
We believed in late November 1989 full unity would take five to 10 years. That all changed the following month when Kohl visited Dresden and realized the full strength of the forces behind unification. Dresden was the turning point; after that, it was clear that unity would happen much faster.

You wrote some years ago that, of the three Ambassadors in Bonn, U.S. Ambassador Vernon Walters was the most relaxed in his reaction to the 10-point plan. Walters arrived in Bonn in April 1989 after a long military and intelligence career in which, as a young U.S. Army officer, he had visited ruined Berlin in 1945. Shortly after he arrived in Bonn, he told German ministers that Germany would be soon reunified – something hardly anyone believed.

Exactly. A few days after November 9, he came to see me and said that he had stood on the Glieneke Bridge [linking Berlin and Potsdam] and had watched the flow of East Berliners visiting the West. He said that, a veteran of several wars, he had never seen so many men crying. "Mr. Teltschik," he said, "this is the beginning of the reunification of Germany." Walters reported this view directly to President Bush and to Secretary of State Jim Baker. He was heavily criticized for this, because Baker at the time was not keen on an accelerated move to unification.

What did you think of Gorbachev's position?
Like France and Britain, we realized Gorbachev's weakness and the way his reform policies might be endangered by the build-up to German unity. But this was an opportunity as well as a threat. Kohl saw this with his phrase: "We must bring in the hay before the storm breaks." Imagine what would have happened if the coup against Gorbachev had taken place in 1990 and not 1991. This might have stopped reunification in its tracks.

What was the significance of Gorbachev's visit to West Germany in June 1989?
We knew that Gorbachev was not in favor of unification. But when he came to see Kohl in June 1989, he signed a declaration that twice mentioned self-determination as a crucial condition for international affairs. For me, this opened the road to unification. After Kohl told the CDU party congress in Bremen in September 1989 that self-determination was driving change in Europe, I was visited by the Soviet Ambassador who told me this was not acceptable. I told him that Gorbachev himself had put the issue on the table.

What was your view of Mitterrand's attitude?
When Mitterrand came to see Kohl in Bonn in early November 1989, a few days before the Wall fell, he stressed the need for France and enlarged Germany to work together to further European integration. This was the reason why he sent me to Paris in January 1990 to discuss political union and also why in April 1990 a decision was taken to advance on the twin track of economic and monetary union for Europe.

INTERVIEW
HORST M. TELTSCHIK

The British government was plainly behind the curve on unification and seemed to make the mistake of giving priority to its own perceptions of what were the U.K.'s own interests, compared with what was actually happening on the streets of East Germany. What is your view now of British policy?
Britain failed to see how East Germans' desire for self-determination was building up unstoppably into momentum for reunification. This surprised me because, in the weeks before the fall of the Wall, we had tens of thousands of refugees from East Germany coming over into West Germany via Hungary and then Czechoslovakia. The borders were open. This was the beginning of the end for the German Democratic Republic.

What was the role of the British Ambassador?
I respected Christopher Mallaby. He came frequently to my office during the period. It was clear that he was under pressure from Margaret Thatcher. He knew how Thatcher's stance was undermining his own position in Bonn and was generally lowering Britain's diplomatic importance.

How did Margaret Thatcher use her good relations with Mikhail Gorbachev? She met him in 1984 when he came to London, a year before he became General Secretary, and termed him "a man we can do business with."
Gorbachev made a point of staying closely in touch with Thatcher. There was a lot of mutual respect. Before the fall of the Wall, Thatcher met him more than we did. But that changed after November 1989 – and was one of the reasons why Thatcher could not achieve her aim of making the U.K. the spokesman for Europe on general European issues. When the Wall came down, the special relationship with Gorbachev was over.

What was your view of Hans-Dietrich Genscher?
I always had some suspicions regarding Genscher. He seemed to be ready for concessions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, when Gorbachev was not in fact asking for them. Genscher had six meetings with [Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard] Shevardnadze and in the Chancellor's Office we never got the files. When Kohl held meetings with Gorbachev, we gave the Foreign Office the records of the meeting, but that didn't happen the other way around. When I asked the Foreign Office State Secretary [Dieter Kastrup] for the files, he said Genscher had told him not to send them since he would inform Chancellor Kohl personally about the meetings. When I asked Kohl for information on his meetings with Genscher, he would say to me, "Why are you asking me what went on between Shevardnadze and Genscher – he never tells me anything." As far as I know, the Chancellor's Office still does not have these files.

But we know that Genscher defended Kohl on several occasions, in private meetings with Gorbachev and Mitterrand, when the Chancellor had damaged sensitivities in Moscow and Paris. This must have been useful.
It is true that Genscher played a role as a lightning conductor. This could be supportive. It also helped his own position to be an intermediary who was always well-received by the others. But we were never sure what he was going to say.

As the head of the Free Democrat coalition party, why was Genscher not given advanced warning about Genscher's 10-point plan for unity? The speech was worked out over the weekend of November 24/25, 1989.
We believed he might have publicized the idea before the speech was made. Genscher did sometimes use the weekends to give interviews.

Did Kohl and Genscher have differences on neutrality?
This was an issue on which Chancellor Kohl was rock solid. United Germany would be a member of NATO. Gorbachev asked us in 1990 why we wanted this, since the Soviet Union was no longer an enemy. We replied that, with regard to our relationship with Moscow, NATO membership was also necessary to lower the mistrust of our neighbors. Crucially, this included Poland which, because of its past, feared it could suffer from understandings between the Soviet Union and united Germany unless the Germans were anchored in NATO.

Kohl's 10-point unity speech suggested "confederative structures." Some people, such as Genscher, have criticized this on the basis that an East-West German confederation was an old East German proposal and had little chance of being realized.
We were not in fact in favor of a "confederation" which would have set up a new status quo in Europe that would not have been sustainable. Our goal was to find a way to unification. We chose the phrase "confederative structures" because it might make things easier for Gorbachev and because it marked a process rather than a concrete goal.

Looking back, what did Germany do right and what did it do wrong in the passage to unification?
We got the international aspects right, both on NATO membership and European integration. But Germany made mistakes over the economics.

What mistakes were these?
For example, one could argue about the exchange rate for bringing in the D-Mark into East Germany. This was a political, not an economic, decision. It was also a mistake to resolve property issues in the east through restoration to former owners, rather than compensation, which held up recovery. There was a lot of talk about rebuilding the East German economy. Kohl organized monthly meetings in the Chancellor's Office with about 50 representatives of business and labor. We were told by industry that the West German system had to be exported to East Germany, and then they would invest.

The first part of the bargain was enacted – in fact, too much of West Germany's economic bureaucracy was transferred to the East. But the second part, the investment, was not carried out, because companies came to see that they did not need the extra capacity that East Germany offered. I was aware of all these problems. In autumn 1990, when I decided to leave government, I suggested to Kohl he should set up a special ministry for driving forward East Germany's economic recovery. But he was not able to do that because of resistance from the Free Democrats. I believe a grand coalition [with the Social Democrats] might have agreed that necessary step."

Horst M. Teltschik served as National Security Advisor to Chancellor Helmut Kohl from 1982 to 1990.

A New Set of Challenges

David Marsh looks at Germany's geopolitical challenges as, once again, perceptions of its strength gain ground

In the Humboldthain district of northern Berlin looms a gigantic World War II bunker modeled on a medieval castle, overlooking a shopping center and embedded into the landscape of a park studded with rose gardens and sedate walkways. The vast, semi-derelict concrete structure, now run by a local cooperative that offers tours for visitors seeking evocative remnants of Berlin's past, was once topped by a fearsome array of anti-aircraft gunnery designed to keep Allied bombers at bay from Germany's war-torn capital. On display today are panels illustrating how builder Friedrich Tamms, one of Hitler's favorite architects, planned to add large ornate windows after Germany's eventual victory to convert the edifice into a municipal palace for civilian use. Events turned out differently. The Humboldthain bunker succumbed after Soviet troops overran Berlin in April 1945. But Tamms went on to achieve post-war fame as a local authority planner responsible for the remodeling of the center of the Rhineland city of Düsseldorf – a testament to the longevity of German architectural achievement.

The tale illustrates some of the characteristics that reduced Germany to the low point of its and Europe's history – and then raised the country again to its status today as a rebuilt and reforged nation astride the crossroads of a continent. German capability for visionary civil engineering has gone hand-in-hand with often-unsuspected talent for flexibility and improvisation. These have been vital ingredients behind Germany's progress since 1945: a chronicle of unexpected developments generating better-than-anticipated outcomes from largely unforeseen events.

At the close of Hitler's war, Germany was politically bankrupt and physically shattered, its moral and human infrastructure in ruins – the very epitome of a failed state. As a new era of Soviet-American rivalry dawned in Europe, no one expected that the western rump of Germany, divided by Cold War confrontation, would emerge strengthened as a client state of the emergent U.S. superpower – and would rise up, within less than 20 years of the end of conflict, as

Chancellor of West Germany, Helmut Kohl and French President François Mitterrand (left), September 1984

the leader of post-war European recovery. No one could believe that the sprawling giant born of late unification in the 19th century, humbled by World War I and comprehensively felled by World War II, would so quickly become an international byword for the disciplines and the doctrines of sound economic management.

As the might of the Soviet Union ebbed towards the end of the 1980s, the motley array of European states that had fallen under Communist sway jostled for new bearing and fresh hold in a rapidly changing Europe. Yet, during this period West Germany, the successful rump of a nation that appeared to have become secure with post-1945 division, harbored no visible immediate acquisitive intentions on East Germany, the communist state that had grown up in the mirror image of the Federal Republic.

Until – and even for a few brief weeks after – the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the official line of the West German government housed in its admittedly provisional home of Bonn was that German unification would come in its own time, part of the gradual growing together of eastern and western Europe. When, as a journalist for the *Financial Times*, I interviewed Chancellor Helmut Kohl in the Bonn chancellery in February 1989, I asked him why he did not use the word *Wiedervereinigung* (reunification) to describe the future of the two Germanys. Kohl was truculently adamant that there would be no "Anschluss" of eastern Germany by the West. "The vision is that we want the political union of Europe... The difference is that you are a prophet and I am only the Chancellor."

When the Wall fell, the official line in Bonn and East Berlin – accepted at first with relief, then with querulousness and then with downright disbelief in the capitals in East and West – was that reunification "was not on the agenda." Few in Europe were enthusiastic about a reforging of the German nation. Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said out loud, often to the despair of her advisors, what many government leaders were thinking in private. Amid a welter of suspicion and double-dealing about the reopening of the "German Question," very few people (particularly Kohl) were able to say in public (or even in semi-private) exactly what he or

she thought was going on.

In November 1989, the German Chancellor believed another five years would elapse before reunification of the two Germanys. As it turned out, political reality massively accelerated the march of events – sparked by a mass western emigration by disillusioned and disenfranchised East Germans – an exodus that threatened to disrupt the Federal Republic. The Easterners' clamor for access to the good life (and the hard currency) of West Germany precipitated, first, the formal entry of the D-Mark across the Elbe in July 1990 and then, on October 3, 1990, the political unity of the nation.

Speedy unification was unpalatable to many European countries. But from a geostrategic point of view, it stabilized Europe – and led to a less disruptive disintegration of the Soviet Union than many had foreseen. The fast-track economic integration of East and West Germany was accompanied by many poor decisions, which were perhaps inevitable given the speed. These centered on the lack of remedial measures to accompany the introduction of the D-Mark into East Germany in July 1990 at a greatly overvalued rate against the East Mark – a move that increased unemployment in East Germany, heightened inflation in West Germany and precipitated higher interest rates and a subsequent recession across the whole of Europe. Crucially, however, reunification avoided the birth in the center of Europe of an entity that many (including, curiously enough, Margaret Thatcher) wished to see: an independent, separate East Germany. Such a country would have been in an economic and political limbo, possibly a neutral state occupying a fragile no-man's-land between communism and capitalism, prone to all kinds of influences including infiltration by terrorist groups, some perhaps with nuclear or chemical weapons.

As a result of the release of documents from state archives, the world now knows much more than it did 20 years ago about the support of the East German military and intelligence establishments for terrorist organizations that tried to destabilize West Germany in the years before unification. A non-aligned East Germany could relatively easily have turned into another form of failed state, a kind of Afghanistan *an der Oder*, that the West Germans and the rest of the West would certainly not wished to have had on their doorstep.

If Germany's unification in 1989-90 had been expected, it almost certainly would not have happened – because any move towards it would have been obliterated in a tide of domestic reserve and international opposition. Almost by definition, therefore, Germany was largely unprepared for the upheaval, as well as the rigors and hard choices that were to follow. Among the consequences were years of preparation for a single European currency, modeled on the D-Mark and run by an institution highly similar to the Bundesbank.

No one expected that the western rump of Germany, divided by Cold War confrontation, would emerge as a client state of the emergent U.S. superpower

West Germany did not bargain away its currency in return for the agreement to reunification by France and other countries. François Mitterrand, the historically aware and politically-devious French President, had predicted in 1982 and 1981 respectively to Kohl and his predecessor Helmut Schmidt that Germany would be unified by the end of the century as a result of a weakened Soviet Union relinquishing its power over the East. So Mitterrand knew that unification would happen, whatever the reluctance of countries such as France, the U.K. or Italy. The President wanted to ensure – like Kohl – that a new Germany would be embedded in a stable European framework – and he used a bravura combination of threats and blandishments to achieve it.

Egged on by the Bundesbank, Kohl actually toughened conditions for the single currency in the months after the fall of the Wall. But, surprisingly for many, the French were so eager to neutralize Bundesbank influence on European monetary affairs that they were willing to accept almost any condition to accomplish this prized objective. The result is what we have today: 16 nations (with Germany and France at the helm) monetarily united by a common currency, under the helm of a Super-Bundesbank, but still politically disparate. The euro club co-exists (without too much difficulty) with 11 other European Union members that remain outside monetary union, headed by the UK, Sweden, Denmark, Poland and the Czech Republic.

Germany's lack of preparedness for unification was in many ways a blessing in disguise for its neighbors, since an economically weakened Federal Republic was a less demanding task-master in the early years of monetary union. That may now change as Germany recovers from the 2008-09 downturn more quickly than many other European countries, strengthened by the global competitiveness of German industry and the re-election of Chancellor Angela Merkel at the helm of a new pro-business Christian Democrat-led coalition with the liberal Free Democrats. Germany has gained great benefits from the euro, but has also had to make what many German voters consider a notable concession through the disappearance of the D-Mark. In addition, through both voluntary and involuntary means, Germany is providing much of the necessary balance of payments financing to ensure that other members of the single currency – many of them in serious economic straits – have the wherewithal to stay onside.

As part of the bargain, Germany will probably in future seek a greater say in euro area institutional governance – possibly by insisting that a German national should take over the presidency of the European Central Bank when Jean-Claude Trichet, the incumbent, retires in two years. Twenty years after the fall of the Wall, Europe faces a new set of challenges arising from the same circumstances that caused so much perturbation in 1989-90 – a perception of renewed German economic strength. But Europe's success – sometimes against all expectations – in weathering the vicissitudes of the past 60 years lends us some confidence that the Old Continent may surmount the obstacles of the future.

David Marsh is Chairman, London & Oxford Capital Markets plc and Deputy Chairman of the German-British Forum. He is the author of **The Euro – The Politics of the New Global Currency.**

A message from the Government of Portugal

As it celebrates its 60th anniversary, NATO prepares its new Strategic Concept, a document which will very likely be approved during the Summit to be held in Lisbon in 2010.

This new Concept will provide the Alliance with a conceptual blueprint that enables it to face multiple present and future tasks, building upon the Concept approved in Washington a decade ago and the fundamental principles that consolidated NATO as a keeper of peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond.

One of the main characteristics of today´s strategic environment must surely be a different reality in global geopolitics. The world has become essentially multipolar. The decision-making process is more complex, as it involves several actors. We are confronted with disturbing threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs.

In post-Cold War and a post "9/11" times, NATO has learned that to uphold its core values is not the same as to impose them according to the old logic of "the West and the rest". Our Alliance has chosen to take on the challenges of enlargement to new Member States and to act decisively in critical operational theatres such as the Balkans and Afghanistan. This choice, which has brought on a considerable evolution to its guiding philosophy, to its structures and to its capabilities, has in many ways sought to keep pace with dramatic shifts in the world´s economy and the emergence elsewhere of new regional blocs and centers of power. These realities require political vision, courage and an innovative approach.

NATO´s present and future challenges encompass, therefore, the management and development of the relationships with its Eastern borders, Russia, the Mediterranean, Central Asia and the Middle East. NATO must also reassess its focus on the Atlantic region – as a geographically based Alliance that constitutes the very cornerstone of the Euro-Atlantic collective defence and security system – and take a fresh look at its ties to the Southern hemisphere.

As a founding NATO nation, with our membership of the European Union and our strong links to Africa and Latin America, Portugal will continue to contribute to the strengthening of NATO. We will be proud to host next year´s Summit in this spirit and with these objectives in mind.

Luís Amado
Minister of State and Foreign Affairs of Portugal

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The Power of Information

The Cold War was ended by an information revolution, which no wall could prevent. By Michael Dobbs



Looking back on a decade covering the collapse of communism as a reporter for the *Washington Post*, one moment stands out in particular. It was August 1980, and I was on assignment in Poland. Hearing that a strike had broken out at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, I flew immediately to the Baltic coast.

The shipyard gate was already decorated with flowers and a portrait of Pope John Paul II when I arrived. I did not expect to be allowed inside the shipyard. Poland was awash with labor unrest in the summer of 1980, but the negotiations had always taken place in private, far from the prying eyes of foreign correspondents. Nevertheless, I asked the guards if I could talk to their leader, a then-unknown, unemployed electrician named Lech Walesa. A 10-minute wait ensued as they disappeared with my press card.

To my surprise, when the guards returned, they opened the gate a crack, admitting me to the previously forbidden world on the other side of a high wall. Entering the shipyard, I was greeted by chants of "Amerika, Amerika" from workers sprawled on the grass. Up until that moment, I had never had a real conversation with a Polish worker, meaning one that was not supervised by a minder from the state "information" agency. Sitting in on the strike negotiations was like wandering behind the scenes of an elaborate theater production. For years, communist propagandists had forced Western journalists to watch the show from the balcony as the actors mouthed lines written for them by party ideologists. We suspected that what we were seeing on the other side of the proscenium arch was false,

Above: Solidarity leader Lech Walesa c.1989

but could never be sure. We now had front row seats and watched with amazement as the characters on stage rebelled against the director and tore up the script. The make-believe world created by communist propaganda was shattered for good.

Walesa instinctively understood that foreign correspondents could help him break the communist regime's monopoly over the information media. Our reports were fed back into Poland through Western radio stations such as Radio Free Europe and the British Broadcasting Corporation, forcing the officially controlled communist news media to pay attention to the labor unrest sweeping the country. Whether we liked it or not, we were not simply witnesses to a revolution. We were unwitting participants.

All revolutions are information revolutions, at least in part. The so-called "Twitter revolution" in Iran – using the internet to organize protests against a stolen election – is testimony to the subversive power of new information technologies. Dictatorial regimes devote enormous effort to controlling the flow of information, in order to shape the way their subjects think and behave. Loss of control over the flow of information is often a telltale sign of a dictatorship's impending implosion. This is what happened in one East European country after another in the decade leading up to the velvet revolutions of 1989. Conversely, as we saw in China in 1989 and Iran in 2009, an unpopular regime can gain a new lease of life if it is sufficiently ruthless about reasserting its control over the media, both official and unofficial.

Covering the revolutions of 1989 from Moscow, I was often reminded of the prophetic words of the Marquis de Custine, who visited Russia a century and a half earlier, under the dictatorial rule of Tsar Nicholas I: "As soon as speech is restored to this silenced people, one will hear so much dispute that an astonished world will think it has returned to the confusion of Babel." What Custine termed "the day of discussion" was facilitated by the appearance of independent radio stations and publishing houses and a torrent of pamphlets, faxes, and news sheets.

This Babel-like flood would have horrified both Lenin and Stalin who believed that the success of the Bolshevik revolution required total control of all media. They paid particular attention to "new media," such as the cinema, which Lenin described as the "most important of all the arts." (He meant

June 2009: a man uses his cellphone to record a protest in Tehran. The internet is making the organization of such protests much easier – while dicatorships struggle to control the flow of information

"politically important.") Stalin acted as his own chief censor, examining movie scripts, newspaper articles, and even cartoons line by line for signs of ideological deviation. "Your tsar has come out as being indecisive," he told the director Sergei Eisenstein, referring to his movie, *Ivan the Terrible*. "He resembles Hamlet." The red tsar complained that Eisenstein had depicted Ivan's dreaded secret police – precursor to the KGB – as "a kind of Ku Klux Klan."

Cinema, like radio, was well suited to the propaganda requirements of the great dictators, who relied on one-way information tools to spread their message. The task of ideological indoctrination became much more challenging with the rise of two-way information technologies, which allowed the governed to talk directly to each other, by-passing the official media altogether. The internet was not a factor in the East European revolutions of 1980-89, as it was still in the experimental stage. But other new inventions, such as copying equipment, miniature short-wave radio sets, and fax machines, were loosening the Communist party's stranglehold over the media.

In August 1980, the most seditious new information technology was the cassette recorder, newly arrived in Eastern Europe. Striking workers recorded cassette tapes of the Gdansk negotiations and distributed them throughout Poland, making a mockery of the regime's futile attempts at censorship. In the Soviet Union, ordinary Russians gathered round kitchen tables to listen to bootlegged recordings of the Beatles, Dylan, and their own unofficial bards, such as Vladimir Vysotsky and Bulat Okudzhava. Fax machines were common enough in Eastern Europe by 1989 for reporters (this one included) to write stories about "revolutions by fax." Combined with international direct dialing, fax machines represented gateways to the outside world that avoided the usual state controls.

Breaking the state's monopoly over the media is an essential precondition for a successful revolution – but is not, by itself, sufficient. A sufficiently determined dictator can lock up the photocopiers, unplug the automatic telephone exchanges, and hunt down the computers and fax machines. This is precisely what happened in Poland in December 1981 and in China in June 1989, after the Tiananmen massacre. General Wojciech Jaruzelski crushed the Solidarity trade union movement (at least

The Bolsheviks made a mistake in linking their political survival to total control of society and media

temporarily) through draconian martial law regulations that included a travel ban inside Poland and disconnecting all but official telephones. The Chinese authorities responded to the information revolution by stationing soldiers in front of fax machines and shutting down newspapers that refused to obey the new party line.

It turns out that the Bolsheviks made a mistake in linking their political survival to total control of society and media. The Iranian mullahs and Chinese communists have discovered that it is not necessary to control every cog in the gigantic information machine. Their counter-insurgency strategy includes a subtle mix of carrot and stick: technical controls over internet servers, threats and inducements to companies like Yahoo and Google to make them more cooperative, and straightforward political repression. These new tactics appear to be paying off, at least in the short term.

The long term is a different matter, however. The failed experiment in building a communist utopia demonstrated the impossibility of creating a modern society while maintaining rigid control over information. The information warriors – whether they were using cassette recorders, faxes, or crudely cyclostyled newssheets – were in the frontlines of the anti-Bolshevik uprising. Their success is a reminder of the dilemma confronting oppressors everywhere. Cut your country off from the outside world and condemn it to terminal economic decline; open up and risk a revolution.

Michael Dobbs was a foreign correspondent in Moscow, Warsaw, Paris, and Belgrade for the* Washington Post. *He was the first Western reporter to visit the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk in August 1980.

Reflections on the "Annus Mirabilis"

The revolutions of 1989 marked the end of the Cold War and the passing of an era, but how did they come about? **Michael Dobbs** reflects

"At 85, his voice is no longer as firm as it once was," reported Mary McGrory in *The Washington Post* on April 5, 1989, "but his opinions – forthright, imaginative, often iconoclastic – were vintage Kennan." The pre-eminent American expert on the Soviet Union, George Frost Kennan, had come to Capitol Hill to announce the end of the Cold War.

The Berlin Wall would fall seven months later, the highpoint of an annus mirabilis, a "year of wonders," that included the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the end of Communist rule in Poland, the Tiananmen uprising in China, free elections in Hungary, the overthrow of a hardline regime in Czechoslovakia, and the execution of the Romanian dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu. But it was already clear to Kennan in the spring of 1989 that "Marxism of the Leninist type" was "on the way out, not only in Russia but across the globe."

Communist leaders, including Joseph Stalin and Leon Trotsky, take to the streets during the Russian Revolution

It was appropriate that the task of pronouncing the obsequies for world communism before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should fall to Kennan. As a young diplomat in Moscow in 1946, he had articulated the strategy of containment that would guide U.S. foreign policy for the next four decades. He had also predicted the manner in which the Cold War would be won – not through direct military confrontation between America and Russia, but as a result of the "gradual mellowing of Soviet power." As Kennan saw it, the task of American diplomacy was to assist this mellowing by sharpening the political and economic contradictions in the Soviet system that would eventually lead to its collapse.

The year 1989 was a hinge moment in history, the end of one era and the beginning of another. It can be compared in its scope and consequences to other dramatic turning points such as 1945 (the end of World War II), 1917 (the Bolshevik revolution and breakup of empires), 1848 (year of liberal revolutions in Europe), 1812 (the defeat of Napoleon), and the great revolutions of 1789 and 1776.

The sight of joyous crowds streaming through the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 conjured up the lines of William Wordsworth on the French revolution: "Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive/And to be young was very heaven." Nobody knew exactly what would come next, but everyone understood that the world had changed forever.

The revolutions of 1989 marked the final discrediting of the 72-year-old Bolshevik experiment, the belief that a socialist utopia can be created through force, with the ends justifying the means. Communism did not just fail measured up against the liberal standards of Western democracies: it failed on its own terms. The Bolshevik commissars were unable to deliver on their promise of providing the working-class masses a better and more abundant life, even at the cost of curtailing individual freedoms. The fate of communism was sealed when the workers began to rebel against the "workers' state," most dramatically in Poland in August 1980.

The events of 1989 represented the culmination of several overlapping revolutions. First, there was the economic revolution, a wave of social unrest across the Soviet Empire motivated primarily by disgust at appalling living conditions and inadequate food supplies. Then there was the national revolution, as Poles, Balts, Hungarians, Ukrainians and other ethnic groups rebelled against centralized rule from Moscow. The third revolution can be dubbed "the revolt of the machines," symbolized most dramatically by the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986, a man-made catastrophe that resulted from slipshod supervision of modern technology. In the wry formulation of the Polish dissident Adam Michnik, "In Poland, in August 1980, it was human beings who went on strike; in the Soviet Union, we are witnessing a strike of inanimate objects."

And finally there was the revolt of the Communist Party's own rank-and-file, as well-heeled apparatchiks discovered that they could trade in their bureaucratic privileges for previously undreamed of capitalist riches.

Reporting from Moscow in the aftermath of the failed August 1991 coup against Mikhail Gorbachev, I was stunned by the docile way in which a once all-powerful institution accepted defeat. The Soviet Communist Party had 15 million members at the time of its demise. Not a single one of them put up any real resistance. The triumphant democrats under Boris Yeltsin took over the party headquarters in Moscow with a dozen militiamen and a few activists armed with a crumpled piece of paper ordering the evacuation of a building that had served as the hub of a worldwide revolutionary movement. When the end came, the communists were too exhausted and too dispirited to fight back.

The durability of communism and the speed with which it collapsed were two sides of the same coin. There came a point at which the strengths of the system – massive repression, rigid centralization, an all embracing ideology, the obsession with military power – turned into fatal flaws. By ruthlessly suppressing all manifestations of nationalism and political dissent, the Bolsheviks created the conditions for the simultaneous collapse of communism and the Soviet

state. When the end came, nobody was prepared to help them.

Historians have identified many claimants to the title of vanquisher of communism. Pope John Paul II exposed the moral failings and political isolation of communist leaders; Andrei Sakharov stressed the universality of human rights at a time when most of his compatriots kept silent; Lech Walesa led the workers' rebellion that splintered the monolithic unity of the one-party state; the Afghan mujahedin proved that the Red Army was not invincible; Ronald Reagan challenged Soviet leaders to an armaments race they could not possibly win; Mikhail Gorbachev allowed millions of Soviet citizens to confront their tragic past; Boris Yeltsin stood up to the tanks that had been dispatched to crush the anti-Bolshevik uprising.

All these contributions were significant, but none was decisive. Communism was not defeated by any single individual or even a combination of individuals. In the last resort, communism defeated itself. The system collapsed under its own weight, exactly as Kennan had predicted. The communists exhausted the land they ruled for "three score years and ten," the lifespan of the human organism. After the price of oil collapsed in the early 1980s and once-abundant Siberian oil reserves began to dwindle, it became impossible for Soviet leaders to sustain their ever-growing empire. Something had to give.

While the collapse of communism may have been inevitable, there was nothing inevitable about the way in which it happened, or what happened next. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 was greeted with widespread triumphalism in the West, best illustrated by an essay that the political scientist Francis Fukuyama wrote for the *National Interest*, entitled "The End of History?" (When he turned the essay into a book in 1992, he removed the question mark.) For Fukuyama, the events of 1989 were proof of the triumph of Western liberal democracy over all its ideological alternatives. "What we may be witnessing," he wrote, "is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."

Such predictions proved way too optimistic. During the 1990s, we were reminded of Winston Churchill's dictum that the Balkans "produce more history than they can consume," as Serbs, Croats, and Moslems set about settling old scores after a half-century truce. Mini-wars broke out in the Caucasus and Central Asia as former Communist leaders jostled for power with independence advocates.

The existence of large Russian minorities within newly independent nations, from the Baltic states to the Ukraine, supplied the Kremlin with a natural pressure point in the new post-Soviet era. Nationalism, rather than liberal democracy, became the driving political force across a large swathe of the world, including the two communist giants, Russia and China. Most ominous of all was the specter of Islamic fundamentalism rising like a phoenix out of the ashes of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

With hindsight, it is easy to trace many of today's geopolitical crises back to the euphoria of 1989.

The Tiananmen massacre in June 1989 provided a dark counterpoint to the string of pro-democracy victories in Eastern Europe, demonstrating that a repressive regime can crush a popular uprising, if it is sufficiently ruthless in the application of force. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989 was greeted with jubilation in many parts of the world, but left behind a dangerous ideological vacuum that was later filled by the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The pain and chaos that resulted from the early experiments with free market economics in Russia spawned a political reaction that paved the way for the eventual rise of the authoritarian Vladimir Putin.

The unraveling of the communist empire was a great human drama, as great a drama in its own way as the original Bolshevik revolution. In the space of a decade, playwrights and electricians were magically transformed into presidents, dissidents into prime ministers, Marxists into nationalists and general secretaries into jailbirds.

The familiar and seemingly ossified Cold War world – the world of *Dr Strangelove* and Checkpoint Charlie – vanished forever. But history did not end in 1989. Instead, it was accelerated.

***Michael Dobbs is the author of* Down with Big Brother: the Fall of the Soviet Empire *and* One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War.**

1989

Fall of the Berlin Wall

1945

WWII ends

1917

Communist revolution in Russia

1812

Napoleon defeated in Russia

December 1989: German Chancellor Helmut Kohl shakes hands with Berlin citizens climbing the Wall at the Brandenburg Gate

Beyond Containment: How the Cold War was Won

As part of the Bush administration during the 1980s, **Condoleezza Rice** witnessed first-hand the events that led to the fall of the Wall

Historians are often tempted to imbue the peaceful end of the Cold War with a sense of inevitability. With the benefit of hindsight, they frequently point to a seemingly predictable sequence of events in which Mikhail Gorbachev's campaign to restructure the Soviet system ultimately exposed its internal contradictions and seamlessly contributed to its collapse.

For those of us serving in the George H.W. Bush administration during the 1980s, however, the end of the Cold War seemed neither predictable nor inevitable. Gorbachev's "new thinking," which envisioned an end to the Soviet Union's isolation in favor of a "common European home" for capitalist and communist countries alike, confronted the reality of a sustained ideological struggle between the ideals of freedom and liberty championed in the West and the repressive policies undertaken to prop up socialist regimes in the Eastern bloc.

Faced with the prospect of an enduring rivalry that would continue to deny Eastern Europeans the blessings of liberty and prosperity, the United States articulated a bold, transformational vision for Europe in 1989, one that moved beyond containment strategies of the past to promote the peaceful reunification of Germany, end the Cold War and lay the foundations for a free and democratic Europe.

Ironically, Gorbachev's reforms provided the initial opening for this vision to be realized. By the early 1980s, the structural problems in the Soviet system had become increasingly difficult to overlook as the isolated, centralized and heavily militarized Soviet economy was surpassed by the more decentralized economies of capitalist systems that encouraged innovation from below. Although Gorbachev did not fully understand these inherent flaws in the Soviet design, he rightly recognized that the continued political and economic isolation of the Soviet Union would only exacerbate its predicament.

Ending such isolation, however, would require a fundamental shift in Soviet foreign policy. Abandoning the notion of class struggle and hostility towards democratic capitalism that had defined the Soviet Union's relations with the West, Gorbachev instead foresaw the Soviet Union taking its place in a "common European home" where it could coexist with capitalist, socialist and communist countries as partners in trade and international financial institutions. To facilitate its reintegration into the international system, the Soviet Union pledged to respect fundamental human rights and refrain from interfering with the internal affairs of other socialist regimes in Eastern Europe so that they could determine their own path free from direct Soviet influence.

On one hand, Gorbachev's "new thinking" augured a more conciliatory Soviet Union. By the end of 1988, the United States and the Soviet Union had signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which committed both



Former President George W. Bush (center) discusses the situation in Iraq with, from left: Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell

sides to eliminate these weapons systems and compelled the Soviets to agree to deeper arms reductions than their Western counterparts. The Soviets had also withdrawn from Afghanistan and negotiated settlements in southern Africa, easing longstanding tensions with the United States in each superpower's scramble for influence in the developing world.

On the other hand, Gorbachev's reforms also served to maintain – perhaps even enhance – the Soviet Union's status as a superpower, virtually guaranteeing that the ideological competition with the West would persist rather than abate. Gorbachev's commitment to self-determination in Eastern Europe appeared to extend only insofar as these countries organized themselves with deference to a common Leninist framework. His goal was to create sufficient political space for other like-minded reformers to stamp out the harshest aspects of their socialist regimes, without sacrificing their fundamentally Leninist foundations. He saw little contradiction, however, between a socialist ideology premised on the subjugation of individual liberty and free enterprise domestically and a foreign policy purporting to respect common international values.

When President George H.W. Bush came to power in 1989, the competing impulses of Gorbachev's reform efforts began to expose cracks in the Soviet system. Facing enormous economic pressure, the Polish communist leadership had entered into talks with workers seeking to revive the outlawed Solidarity trade union. Members of the ruling Socialist Unity Party in East Berlin attempted to crack down on reformist elements within their own party, widening the traditionally small circle of popular unrest against the regime.

This cascade of events presented President Bush's young administration with a possible strategic breakthrough. The United States could continue the successful containment policies of its past by working to stabilize developments on the ground in Europe and avoiding major confrontation with its rival superpower. On the other hand, it had an opportunity to move beyond containment, to seize both on Gorbachev's momentum toward reform and the stirrings of internal dissent in the Soviet Bloc to transform Europe into a free and unified society.

Though initially cautious, the Bush administration seized this historic moment. Within four months, President Bush became the first Western leader to say plainly that the Cold War would not be over until the division of Europe had ended and Europe was "whole and free." He also granted economic assistance to the Polish government in exchange for lifting the ban against independent political associations.

Perhaps most importantly, President Bush embraced the bold vision that the Cold War could only truly end with the reunification of Germany under a democratic system of governance. To call this pronouncement ambitious was a vast understatement; most officials predicted that even with greater openness and pluralism taking root in Eastern Europe, it would be at least a century before the divisions separating East and West Berlin would fully collapse.

President Bush, however, refused to allow present-day realities to constrain his thinking and pursued this transformative vision, even as critics derided it as politically unfeasible. Few, it seems, would have ever imagined that

by the summer of 1989, scores of East German refugees would flee to West Germany by way of Hungary, that by November the Berlin Wall would come crashing down, or that less than a year later – and almost a century ahead of schedule – the Federal Republic of Germany would absorb the German Democratic Republic into a single democratic state.

Although the United States articulated a bold transformative vision that helped end the Cold War, peace was not forged by America alone, nor were these efforts confined to a single time or place. Under the leadership of visionaries like Ernest Bevin of Great Britain and Konrad Adenauer of West Germany, America's allies were instrumental in foreseeing possibilities for unification and liberation of Eastern Europe from the very beginning of this struggle. They joined with American leaders like Harry Truman and Dean Acheson to give rise to institutions like NATO, which would prove invaluable in achieving a vision that in 1949 was all but a dream.

But perhaps the greatest credit for liberation of Eastern Europe lies with common people whose thirst for freedom survived decades of repression under Soviet rule – ordinary warriors like Russian author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, whose Nobel Prize-winning writings documented the horrors of Soviet labor camps. They are the ones who led the mass exodus from East Germany to West, who tuned in to the broadcasts of Radio Free Europe against the objections of their government, who shed the shackles of oppression in pursuit of the ideals of liberty and prosperity offered by a free society.

The brave actions of these impatient patriots – matched by the bold transformative visions of Western policymakers – ensured that freedom would triumph over tyranny.

Today, a new kind of ideological struggle emerges, one that finds freedom's enemies in the form of dictators who persecute religious and ethnic minorities, in the form of tyrants who cling to artificial symbols of legitimacy, in the form of terrorists who seek to slaughter innocent civilians and seek to destroy civilized ways of life.

We must marshal the institutions of the Cold War era, like the NATO Alliance, to help meet these 21st-century threats. And, perhaps most importantly, we must never surrender the bold vision that advances the goals of freedom and democracy around the world.

Condoleezza Rice was the 66th Secretary of State of the United States. She is co-author, with Philip Zelikow, of* Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft *and is also an Honorary Director of the Atlantic Council of the United States.

The brave actions of these impatient patriots ensured that freedom would triumph over tyranny

Russian author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn documented the horrors of Soviet labor camps

Freedom's Triumph

Klaus Naumann reflects on four decades of political and military containment

The Cold War was the longest of the three wars fought in the 20th century for a lasting order in Europe. Fortunately, it came to an end in 1989 after 40 years of confrontation without a single shot being fired in anger. Throughout these 40 years, Europe saw the biggest concentration of military forces known in its peacetime history along the front line, from the North Cape in Norway to Eastern Anatolia in Turkey, with the main emphasis along the 1,300km-long fence which kept Germany divided until 1990. Both sides, NATO led by the U.S. and the Warsaw Pact led by the Soviet Union, were prepared for a war that would have cost millions of lives and would have led to the destruction of most of Europe. The former USSR's war plans foresaw, until 1988, an attack on Western Europe which included, despite the Soviet declaratory "No-First-Use" policy, the use of hundreds of nuclear weapons in the first hours of the attack. This fact must be kept in mind by those who argue today that a "No-First-Use" policy plus a declaratory convention would suffice to reduce the risks of nuclear wars.

NATO prevailed in the Cold War and in the 20 years since then Europe has moved closer to the vision of a whole and free Europe that NATO's founding fathers had in mind when they signed the Washington Treaty in April 1949, in the Mellon Hall in downtown Washington while listening to the tune "It Ain't Necessarily So."

But the vision became true. NATO won the Cold War first and foremost because of the lifestyle that Western democracies and free market economies can offer their citizens. It is the best formula to guarantee people more individual freedom and the rule of law. Furthermore, it offers greater opportunities for social justice and individual wellbeing. NATO's opponent, the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact could at no time offer something similar. When NATO then moved beyond its reactive strategy of defending the treaty area militarily – and pursued as it adopted the Harmel Report in 1967 the two-track strategy of deterrence through credible defense and détente through dialogue and cooperation – the Soviet Union had lost the political initiative. It responded by proposing a conference on security and cooperation in Europe, which aimed at securing the Soviet territorial gains after World War II.

Ironically, the result was the Helsinki Agreement of 1973, which led to a slight raising of the Iron Curtain. Suddenly the suppressed people of the Warsaw Pact nations saw what life with freedom had to offer and thus the erosion of the Soviet Bloc began. The process led to the triumph of freedom, which was made possible by NATO's then 16 nations. They had, throughout 40 years of confrontation, maintained the will to resist and had resolved to fight standing shoulder to shoulder should they come under attack. They held firm that an attack on one of them meant an attack on all of them.

This was most visibly demonstrated along the Inner-German Border where nine allied Army Corps and the supporting air force elements were lined up for defense like a string of pearls. The readiness of these forces – the countless exercises, which included trans-Atlantic reinforcements, the employment of French forces as strategic reserves and the use of nuclear weapons training – made their opponents uneasy. This produced security: the Warsaw Pact was at no time able to calculate the outcome of an armed East-West conflict, but it knew for sure that they would suffer immense losses.

Thus military readiness, plus truly substantial military capabilities, plus nuclear deterrence, underpinned NATO's policy of collective defense and allowed the Alliance

to prevail. NATO's nations paid a high price for this: thousands of military personnel lost their lives in the countless exercises conducted to demonstrate credibly the ability to defend the NTA. Their sacrifices must never be forgotten.

Of course, initiatives such as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the resolve to fight – as shown in the Cuban Missile Crisis – and, most importantly, the deployment of Pershing II and the Ground Launch Cruise Missile (GLCM) in response to the SS-20 deployment were factors that underpinned the West's determination to resist and to prevail. Cuba taught the Soviets that there were lines that they should never cross if they wished to survive. SDI, although still in development, unleashed the Revolution in Military Affairs, showed the Soviets their technological inferiority and told them that they would never have the economic or financial power to match American might. Finally, the P II/GLCM deployment brought the message home that the USSR could be hit hard by the U.S. without forcing the Americans to resort to strategic assets. Moreover, the failure of the resistance movement throughout Europe, which the Soviets had triggered and massively financed, demonstrated convincingly that the West remained united and that its politicians were resolved to stay the course despite tremendous public pressure. Possibly this was the defining moment in which the then Soviet President Gorbachev understood that he had to change Soviet Foreign Policy from confrontation to cooperation, thus ushering in a period of stability, producing arms control and disarmament.

The Cold War came to an end in 1989 when NATO declared its end at its London Summit and extended a hand of friendship to the erstwhile enemies. This prompted reconciliation throughout Europe and the process that then followed proved that it is true that nothing is as irresistible as an idea whose time has come.

This "irresistible" idea was in 1989 the idea of freedom, democracy and the rule of law. It was eventually this idea which brought the Soviet empire down and the West was able to avail itself of this idea's power since it was based on thriving economies, on credible defenses under the protective umbrella of extended nuclear deterrence provided by the U.S., and, last but by no means least, on the unity and the resolve of 16 democratic nations to stand shoulder to shoulder. This is the lesson that must not be forgotten by today's leaders, as our nations have to cope with a truly unruly and unpredictable world.

Klaus Naumann, a four-star General, was Chief of Staff, Federal Armed Forces, and is former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee.

President Kennedy meets with U.S. Army officials during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962

Trans-Atlanticism Renewed: The Path to Force Effectiveness



Although NATO today faces threats from more unconventional enemies, its need to forge a strong trans-Atlantic Alliance remains essential, says **Thomas Enders**

Throughout the Cold War, the Berlin Wall signified the tension and distrust between the capitalist, democratic West and the communist, authoritarian East. No other symbol of the era conveys the sense of divide – the Iron Curtain – so vividly as the concrete and barbed wire that cleaved Berlin. Today, in marking the 20th anniversary of the Wall's fall and the restoration of freedom throughout all of Germany, it is important that we also consider the current state of the trans-Atlantic security relationship and the future of the NATO Alliance as it drafts a new Strategic Concept.

Some 30 years ago, NATO centered its military planning on the specter of a Soviet armored thrust through the Fulda Gap and into the heart of Western Europe. Faced with this threat, the Alliance focused solely on the defense of Europe against a modern, conventionally armed and highly mobile enemy. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, today's Fulda Gap is not found in central Germany, but in the mountains of Afghanistan, at the Horn of Africa, and in cyberspace, to name just a few frontiers of current or potential combat.

NATO must confront these challenges as it did during the Cold War – with a joint, cohesive posture that focuses the collective strength of the Alliance and protects the mutual interests of its trans-Atlantic members. The centerpiece of this policy should revolve around an Alliance-wide commitment to adequate resources and a continued modernization drive to meet current and future needs.

Resources, or the lack thereof, have long been an issue of contention among Alliance members. During the Cold War, the sheer bulk of Soviet military-might threatened to overrun Europe before reinforcements could be rushed across the Atlantic. Under those conditions, the combination of tailored, heavy European forces supplemented by forward deployed U.S. forces and nuclear weapons served as an effective deterrent against Soviet aggression. Based on this construct, countries coordinated force planning efforts and worked to build specialized capabilities among members, thus reducing redundant independent national force structures and stretching available defense funding. Though there were disagreements at times, this trans-Atlantic approach, built on the inherent cooperation that forms the foundation of the Alliance, proved its value.

Today, the tests facing the Atlantic Alliance, including the modern phenomenon of "hybrid warfare," are different, but the resource issue is similar. The progressive recognition by NATO of the need to confront security risks quite unlike the Soviet threat has continued, even exacerbated, the demands on force structure and resources – as exemplified by deployments in the Balkans and now Afghanistan. Given the current political environment, however, where many member countries are unwilling to increase their respective defense budgets, NATO is faced with the need to get more from less.

It is exceedingly clear that there are no simple answers to this resource question. Yet, in a very significant way, an examination of the past provides much of the answer – trans-Atlantic cooperation. The same principles that formed NATO's response to the Warsaw Pact threat – military specialization and mutual dependency among countries – can again be harnessed today to contend with current challenges. Efficiencies and greater effectiveness can be found in a truly shared approach to force structure across the Atlantic.

One approach to addressing this problem is to take advantage of the recent appointment of French General Stéphane Abrial as head of NATO's Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia. General Abrial can build on his predecessor's excellent work and inject energy and focus into what had become a moribund effort to transform NATO's doctrine, tactics and force structure. A critical element of this transformation effort must be the full acceptance of the economic principle of specialization. Because few countries can afford to field a military capable of meeting the full spectrum of 21st-century threats – whether they be conventional, hybrid, or even based on nation-building scenarios – mutual reliance among members for specialized military skills is imperative. General Abrial's position and stature as a European general officer afford him the ability to tackle this issue head-on and coordinate

Previous page: French soldiers attend a change of command ceremony of the NATO-led peacekeeping Kosovo Force in north Kosovo, September 17, 2009

Left: Dutch NATO-led soldier stands guard in front of an armored personnel carrier in the Bosnian village of Ahmici, December 18, 1997

specialization among NATO militaries. It is his mandate.

As part of this drive toward specialization, the Alliance should also look toward maximizing scarce budgetary resources through coordinated development efforts. From an industrial perspective, collaboration in the development and production of advanced capabilities can offer substantial material benefits. Clearly, NATO cannot afford to make multiple, redundant financial expenditures to field just one required military capability. The returns provided by a coordinated development process in terms of efficient resource allocation, interoperability, reduced logistic burden, and political alignment are too obvious to be ignored. Yet, given the political volatility of mutual dependency among countries, technology transfer issues, and industrial base evolution, it is necessary to pick a few high-leverage opportunities – the low-hanging fruit – and capitalize on those programs first.

Fortunately, there are several key trans-Atlantic programs where such successes can be achieved. One effort is the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), the sole effort for modernizing air defenses throughout the Alliance. Notably, the U.S., which is heavily invested in this program, intends to rely on the system to protect its deployed forces around the world. Though it is not without its challenges, MEADS is a case where real industrial cooperation can advance a critical capability across the Alliance.

Similar focus is required in other areas, foremost of which is the area of advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. The recently launched Alliance Ground Surveillance program, which brings advanced unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) abilities to the battlefield, is one such crucial collaborative modernization program. Its lengthy gestation period should not unduly cloud the positive benefits this opportunity offers. On a bilateral basis, the Eurohawk program also promises to significantly enhance the German military's effectiveness through the integration of German-developed electronic intelligence payloads and ground stations with the U.S. Global Hawk platform. Next-generation European UAVs now under development might equally offer possibilities for military and industrial cooperation in the years to come.

Like UAVs, Alliance strategic mobility shortfalls can also be tackled through a trans-Atlantic partnership. The Airbus A400M military airlifter, which will very soon take to the skies, will provide strategic and tactical lift for nine countries. As the U.S. looks to address a future airlift modernization requirement, it makes sense to leverage the investment partner countries have already made in the aircraft, thus freeing up resources that can be applied to other defense priorities.

Finally, it is important to consider trans-Atlantic cooperation as NATO and other allied countries replace and modernize their respective aerial refueling tanker fleets. Largely unrecognized in the widely debated U.S. Air Force tanker competition are the potential benefits Northrop Grumman and EADS/Airbus bring with the KC-45 offer (based on the A330 long-range aircraft). With the U.K. and Australia already committed to a Multirole Tanker Transport essentially identical to the KC-45, an opportunity for a largely common fleet flown by the U.S., U.K., Australia, and ultimately France, exists.

These suggestions are by no means the only ways to move the Alliance forward. That said, when such opportunities for trans-Atlantic cooperation are present, every effort must be made to extract the most benefit possible. Failure to take advantage of these situations results in little more than squandered financial resources and decreased military capability and interoperability among Alliance members.

For much of its history, NATO successfully partnered across the Atlantic and executed a strategy of deterrence to avoid war against a massive, conventional force. Now, in perhaps a defining moment, the Alliance finds itself embroiled in battle on a very distant front with an unexpected enemy posing a different, but equally grave, threat to long-term peace and security. In confronting the challenge of adapting its forces to this evolving threat, NATO must refocus on the trans-Atlantic foundation that served it so well for 60 years. Further collaboration on force structure and specialization, doctrine transformation, and equipment modernization will strengthen the Alliance and ensure that for every invested euro, pound, or dollar, NATO fields the best capability possible.

Greater effectiveness can be found in a truly shared approach to force structure

Thomas Enders is President and Chief Executive Officer of Airbus and International Advisory Board Member of the Atlantic Council of the United States.

Sharing Cultural Values

The trans-Atlantic exchange of ideas continues to create profound bonds between the nations of this geopolitical region. By **Michael Naumann**

Charlie Chaplin at the premiere of one of his movies in Berlin

Ever since NATO lost its immediate purpose, defending Western Europe and the United States against military threats by the Warsaw Pact, the German "Atlantiker" (Atlanticists) have been stressing the other element of the Alliance – the furtherance of its shared "values." And indeed, the reliance of all Western societies on the due process of law, on freedom of speech and the daily consolations provided by our literature, music and art is undisputable. These are the most attractive characteristics of our democracies.

While it is true that conservative Germany maintained an ignorant aversion to what was known as cultural "Amerikanisierung" in the 1920s, it is also true that liberal Germany, which was later to succumb to fascism, welcomed the exuberant and revelatory manifestations of American culture with open arms. Jazz defined the rhythm of Berlin in the Weimar Republic. During the 1930s, Ernest Hemingway, William Faulkner and Thomas Wolfe had found more readers in Germany than in the U.S. – at least for their first books. A nation, whose windows to the U.S. had been closed since the beginning of World War II, quenched its thirst for cultural news from America, once paperbacks appeared on the market. First prints of 50,000 copies became the rule for American authors. Plays by Thornton Wilder and Eugene O'Neill dominated the post-war theaters. Hollywood marched victoriously through Germany's post-war movie-theaters.

"Umerziehung" (re-education), remained a phrase used by conservative newspapers to denounce the extremely

The Amerika Haus (architect Paul Troost), Munich, Germany, late 1940s. Formerly known as the "Fuhrerbau," the building housed Adolf Hitler's Munich offices

fruitful progress of Western acculturation experienced in the Federal Republic during the post-war era.

Every major city in West Germany had its "Amerika-Haus." These public libraries provided citizens with an opportunity to learn more about American culture and politics. Large audiences attended discussions and debates on the U.S. and its role in the world. They became arenas for the fruitful exchange of ideas and also for the elimination of prejudices. The role of popular American music, at first provided by American Forces Network and British Forces Network, was also influential. Four years ago there was a movement in German parliament to introduce a quota of German pop singles on German FM frequencies. It failed.

Attempts by the French film industry to persuade this author in his political role as "Staatsminister für Kultur" to adopt an anti-American quota-system to reduce the screening of movies made in the U.S. also failed. The German preference is for an open cultural exchange, without quotas or state imposed rules.

Yet, all is not well. The emergence of the communication colossus Google threatens to undermine already fragile copyright laws, as do other U.S.-dominated search engines. This needs to be addressed by the European Union and the U.S. Congress. There can be no doubt as to the numerous positive advances in cultural exchange provided by the internet. Yet, when this expansion is solely based on profit making and the simultaneous destruction of the cultural property rights of those who generate them, whether in music, literature, photography or other arts, Europe and the U.S. will enter a stage of cultural discord, mistrust and endless conflicts. It is our good luck, however, that these conflicts can and will be discussed according to the terms provided by the cultural mutualities mentioned above.

Every major city in West Germany had its "Amerika-Haus"

Western culture will maintain its intrinsic persuasiveness, as long as it refrains from ethnical or ideologically inspired projections of power. Culture's real strength relies on its openness towards other ideas, its capacity for self-rejuvenation and self-criticism.

As long as the European nations and the U.S. share these mutual aspects of their individual or national self-understanding, they will be able to immunize themselves against the intellectual derailments of the 20th century – ideologies of racial or national or ideological superiority.

It was this derailment of national cultural self-interpretations, specifically Germany's, which led to the catastrophes of the 20th century. Not only Germany, but all of Europe has learned its lesson regarding the political consequences of cultural hubris. It remains to be seen whether these lessons will be remembered. Europe and the United States share a mutual cultural responsibility based on our cultural memories.

Michael Naumann is Co-Publisher of* Die Zeit *and was Germany's first post-war Minister for Culture.

A Warning From the Spy World

The Cold War may be over, but, as former CIA senior official **Tennent H. Bagley** explains, secret warfare is still being waged

Every bubble of champagne celebrating the anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall is justified. That amazing moment, followed two years later by the final lowering of the red banner from the Kremlin flagpole, symbolized the dawn of new hopes that, in large part, have become reality in the 20 years since.

Still, the celebrating can be overdone, especially if this symbol is equated with earlier ones that marked real victories – like the railway car in the Compiègne forest in 1918, or the deck of the battleship *Missouri* in 1945 – that seemed to offer real and durable peace.

No doubt the Cold War really ended after the Wall fell. Russia is no longer a military colossus seeking world domination for communism. In foreign affairs it has helped the West mitigate some threats to peace. In Russia itself, democracy sprouted and fear diminished (though more recently these trends have reversed). But despite the name change from "Soviet" to "Russian," no one admitted defeat and the same people ruled the country, most of them looking at the outside world with the same xenophobia and paranoia – and the same perceived adversaries. They rankle over the loss of prestige and vast territories from their old empire.

And they preserve, intact, their methods of waging secret warfare. These are easy to overlook because they are hidden, even denied. But now, as Russian assertiveness and revanchism grow – demonstrated by the invasion of Georgia in 2008 – it would be a mistake to ignore them. Because, today, these weapons and techniques remain active and deadly.

A former top KGB general, still closely connected to his old service, made this strikingly clear to me in Moscow. Though it was years after the fall of the Wall and the Soviet collapse, he was irritated by talk of friendly "post-war" get-togethers of "former" enemies. Looking menacingly at me, his Cold War enemy, he spat out, "Make no mistake, we are still working against you." He knew whereof he spoke. It was none other than KGB Lieutenant General Nikolay S. Leonov, former Head of the KGB's analysis of the intake from its worldwide spying, the Soviet equivalent of the CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence.

By "you" he didn't mean me personally, nor even the CIA where, as he knew, I had long opposed his work. He meant the United States and its Western allies, still "the main adversary" in the KGB lexicon and mindset.

By "we" he meant his KGB. Today, after the dozen or so name changes it has undergone in its near-century of existence, it goes by other initials, like FSB and SVR. Here we can call it, embracing all its parts wherever they may now be formally subordinated, "the Russian security services." But today it is much more than that. When the Soviet Communist Party fell, its "sword and shield" inherited its power. Today, KGB people, along with their old associates in repression, occupy some three-quarters of the most commanding positions in the Russian government and economy.

And by "working against" he did not mean merely spying. He wouldn't have considered that worth mentioning, taking

Watched over by Vladimir Lenin, a monument to Felix Dzerzhinsky, the founder of the KGB, stood before its headquarters in Moscow before being removed when communism collapsed in 1991

In the year 2000, the post-Soviet Russian regime published a book proudly describing dozens of these successful "special operations" abroad in Soviet times, lauding the murderers as heroes

it for granted (and rightly assuming I would too) that even in the happiest of peacetimes any state power necessarily tries to spy out the hidden capabilities and intentions of its potential enemies. No, this KGB leader was alluding to the much more warlike methods he knew I was familiar with, such as deceiving, misleading, disrupting and subverting foreign adversaries and physically eliminating actual and potential opponents inside the country and abroad.

Having honed these secret methods for nearly a century, the Russian security services continue to use them as before, through specialized units.

To mislead and weaken perceived enemies, they still launch "active measures." Through secret agents and friends in ostensibly objective Western media, they use forgeries and leaks of compromising information to discredit and bring down disliked foreign political leaders and bring more friendly ones to power. They shape information to stir animosities and resentments, to divide and weaken the Western alliance, among other ways by prolonging and exacerbating criticism and ridicule of any Western plan or policy that might be seen as a mistake, failure or shortcoming.

Other specialized units of the Russian security services physically liquidate opponents at home and abroad. Via teacup, umbrella tip, spray tube or whatever best carries to a particular target, they deliver the products of secret laboratories whose whole science is devoted today, as it has been since the early 1920s, to devising ways to induce death that would look "natural" even to forensic medicine. So naturally and unshakably does the post-Soviet Russian regime cling to assassination as an instrument of national security and foreign policy that in the year 2000 it published a book proudly describing – without a word of reproach – dozens of these successful "special operations" abroad in Soviet times, lauding the murderers as heroes.

Long after the fall of the Berlin Wall one such unit, designated URPO, was

Former URPO member Alexander Litvinenko, pictured here in the intensive care unit of University College Hospital, London, was murdered in 2006 with a radioactive product from a secret laboratory

given carte blanche to murder criminals – and in the process, political opponents. The world learned about URPO from one of its former members, Alexander Litvinenko, who for telling this and other hidden truths about the Putin regime was himself murdered in 2006 with a radioactive product from a secret laboratory. At the time, he was a British citizen living in London.

The security services' special military units – "Alpha" and "Vympel" and "Zaslon." etc. – stand ready not only to suppress insurrections inside the borders as in Chechnya, but also to strike down foreign leaders and seize points of power in support of insurrections or Russian incursions abroad, such as that into Georgia in 2008.

Although the Berlin Wall fell and the Cold War ended, no signal went out from Moscow Center telling its representatives abroad to stop this sort of work. All carried on – and some of their results became visible. To mention only the last few years, in 2004 in Kiev the bothersome Ukrainian leader Viktor Yushchenko was fed a uniquely toxic mix of dioxin concocted in a secret laboratory. Over the last five years, in such places as Qatar and Dubai and Vienna, as well as inside the Russian Federation, they shot and blew up political leaders of national groups such as Chechens and Kazakhs. They continue to instigate demonstrations in Georgia to topple NATO-friendly President Mikheil Saakashvili, after repeatedly trying (and only narrowly failing) to assassinate him. Rivals and critics of Vladimir Putin, himself a KGB man, have been murdered by the score, poisoned like Yuri Shchekochikhin in 2003 or shot like Anna Politkovskaya in 2006. Some three dozen journalists, including in 2003 the American Paul Klebnikov and in 2009 Natalia Estemirova, have fallen to units like URPO, who were doubtless also responsible for some of the dozens of murders of bankers and factory directors, although most of these were more likely gangland hits, amid the endemic corruption and lawlessness of the country.

These actions, so long after the fall of the Wall, cannot be attributed to rogue elements, common criminals, or to the reflexive kicks of a dying animal. They are carrying out the national policy of a major power. It is power that seeks to bring back under its control the lost republics of the Soviet Union and the once-captive nations of Eastern Europe, and so fervently opposes America and its NATO allies that it supports and makes common cause with anti-American elements anywhere, from Venezuela and Cuba to Iran, just as it did when it was called the Soviet Union.

The Wall is down and the Cold War is over, but what has followed remains, at best, a Cold Peace. While we rightly celebrate that event of 20 years ago, these signs from the secret "spy" world might give us pause as we raise our glasses.

Tennent H. Bagley is author of* Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games *and former Deputy Head of CIA counterintelligence against the Soviet Bloc.

A message from the Government of Italy

The Berlin Wall cut the city and, metaphorically, the world in half, becoming the most potent symbol of the Cold War. Its fall, twenty years ago, remains the most iconic landmark of the end of totalitarianism in Europe and the symbol of what suddenly became possible. The peaceful reunification of Germany, a wider EU membership, a larger transatlantic community, a stabilizing role for NATO as a security provider, a new relationship with Russia, a drastic reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe, a massive cut of defence budgets.

The events of twenty years ago changed the lives of Berlin's citizens and of the German people. But that extraordinary result had an impact on Europe as a whole. It marked a new moral impulse for Europe to accomplish the dream of a peaceful continent-wide community founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. Italians have been at the forefront of the Alliance in strengthening and rekindling the transatlantic bond within the new European and international environment, with the aim of consolidating a reunited and free Europe as their common home.

Today, in an evolving, multi-polar geopolitical order, the focus is shifting from Europe towards other regions. However, we should not forget the achievements made in the aftermath of the Wall's fall: a Europe reunited, whole and free, thanks largely to the farsighted NATO and EU enlargements. The same moral impulse should drive us all to cope with new and sometimes unforeseen challenges that require a special determination in updating and strengthening our security architectures.

First and foremost, I would like to refer to the North Atlantic Alliance as the main pillar and bedrock of transatlantic solidarity. After having emerged from the long and dark days of the Cold War as a most powerful and successful community of free democracies, NATO has embodied the sound faith of Europeans and North Americans in the objective of a more stable and free world.

The Alliance is our primary and strongest guarantee that the victory gained over the evils of war and slavery is irreversible. For this reason, we must be prepared to cope with all kinds of future challenges. This is precisely what NATO is currently doing, by updating the 1999 Security Concept so as to be ready to face what the Supreme Allied Command for Transformation (SACT) has described as "multiple (possible) futures". It is worth noting

that SACT, based in Norfolk, Virginia, is the only NATO footprint on US soil and it is headed today by two Europeans, French Admiral Abrial, with Italian Admiral Zappata as his Deputy.

As a strong regional bloc willing to contribute to the enhancement of international peace and to tackle today's security challenges, Europe has also been developing a capacity to take effective action where Europeans share the same interests and objectives.

The Union's investment in building a credible common foreign and security policy is based on an enduring and unchallenged idealism strengthened by realism and pragmatism. The day when the EU will set its own collective foreign policy priorities is not far off. Italy believes that this is the time for Europe to give more substance to its European security and defence policy, this is the time to focus on the Union's strategic interests and become more strategic and more effective globally, this is the time to engage with International Organizations and other global powers, and this is the time for the EU to be a global actor.

Important anniversaries such as the one we celebrated on November 9, 2009 are there to help us not to forget what Europe has overcome. But at the same time, they fuel our determination and political will. Italy's people and government celebrate this anniversary with Germany and the rest of the transatlantic community, renewing their commitment to working together to enhance NATO's effectiveness in protecting the freedom and security of the North Atlantic area, and to encourage the EU's capacity to cope with a more ambitious and global role.

INTERVIEW

Frederick Kempe interviews **James L. Jones**, National Security Advisor to President Obama and former Chairman of the Atlantic Council Board of Directors

How do the challenges that face you today as National Security Advisor to President Obama compare to those that General Scowcroft faced 20 years ago when the Cold War ended?
The very concept of national security is much more expansive in the 21st century than it was in the 20th century. In General Scowcroft's time, national security was really the province of Secretary of Defense, of Secretary of State and part of the State Department and the National Security Council. Everybody else was essentially a spectator.

In this new century, given the end of a bipolar world, the end of a unipolar world – multipolarity is with us. And national security encompasses much more than just the size of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps and the State Department. It encompasses economic realities; it encompasses the asymmetric challenges that face us in ways that have replaced the threat of the Cold War of a single entity on the other side of a well-defined border.

Borders are not meaningless yet, but they're certainly not as important as they used to be in terms of confronting the threats that face us: proliferation, energy, climate, cyber security, the emergence of non-state actors, human trafficking and the economic effects of our policies all contribute to defining national security. So the National Security Council of the 21st century is a much broader organization and has to deal with multiple challenges that arrive every single day.

Your job is more complicated than those of your predecessors who fought the Cold War? Is this period more complicated for U.S. leadership?
Yes, it's far more complicated with much more diverse challenges.

Is it more perilous as well?
It's a more dangerous world. The reason I say that is because even with the threat of mutually assured destruction in the 20th century, we managed to control that. If you lose control of proliferation issues and non-state organizations acquire weapons of mass destruction, you can't control that. We rail against North Korea and Iran, legitimately, but they are nation-states. They have to behave as nation-states. They are functioning in a world order that exists. We may not like what they're doing, but they know the penalties should they acquire nuclear weapons. The penalties of using them would be catastrophic for them. But terrorist organizations, they don't have the same fear.

Of all the threats we face in the world, which is the one that keeps you up late at night?
It is this nuclear proliferation issue involving non-state actors.

Is that danger growing? You appear to be focusing on this issue more than you did at the beginning of your tenure.
I think the danger is omnipresent because you don't know to what extent other nation-states might be enabling these non-state actors to acquire such weapons and capabilities.

We also know acquiring these capabilities is a driving goal of these organizations. They are pushing at it, and you never know who's enabling them to make progress. You can't be everywhere all the time. So it is something to be concerned about. I'm not really worried about the nuclear aspect as much as I am the other biological, chemical and related threats, which are easier for them to get a hold of.



What do you do about it?
I think we're doing everything we can, at least nationally. There's been a developing cohesion among the security forces of this country that's probably unparalleled in our history in a short period of time. I think one of the reasons I worry about it is because I know the successes we've had. Which means that there's got to be more out there because we're probably never going to be 100 percent successful.

Can you give an example of that success?
The most recent ones suggest direct links from individuals here in this country going through the al-Qaeda network back into Pakistan. They're still able to direct certain operations, although they've been disrupted. Fortunately, they haven't carried out operations but it's still a threat.

If you take a look at the role of the military in this new world, with these sorts of threats, how does it differ from the world that brought us the Cold War, the fall of the Wall?
I think the role of the military is much more diverse and much more complex because it's got to be able to operate in different environments. It's no longer one army. The army of NATO arranged against the army of the Warsaw Pact on either side of the line of scrimmage, the border.

The military forces of today have to be very agile and able to operate in different environments, from guerrilla warfare to conventional war, from highly specialized operations to some aspects of nation-building. So they have to be better educated. They have to be able to project power when needed and project stability when needed. The two are vastly different. So we need our young people who are out there to be nimble of mind and able to understand the environment they're working in, far more than ever before.

Does the U.S. have the same leverage it had at the Cold War's end to achieve results? Are we losing some of our relative influence in the world because of our financial difficulties and the fact that other powers are rising?
The world has changed. Perhaps the most dramatic threat to our national well-being over the next two decades is going to be around the issue of competitiveness. We've had a good run for over half a century. We're very comfortable and are used to being number one. We took a little bit of a dip over the last decade in terms of how people looked at us around the world, but we saw that this could be very quickly restored. The election of President Obama, and the actions of the President, so far, globally, have dramatically increased the esteem in which we are held.

What's your view on the Nobel Peace Prize?
The Nobel Peace Prize is not given lightly and I think it was given because of the ability of the President to capture the imagination of much of the world's population about the human potential here to live in peace, to forge better opportunities for our children and to hand over a better world for the next generation. That's pretty inspirational. I know that the President is determined to use the weight of the Nobel Prize to continue working every day to advance a robust foreign policy agenda that seeks greater peace and prosperity around the world.

With this reduced relative power, is it harder for the U.S to get things done in the world?
We've seen it's possible with the right style, using the right way of doing things. My gut feeling, however, is it is harder because the world is so complex. There are rising competing powers. There are other sleeping giants that are coming up all at the same time: India, Brazil, China, the European Union. Hopefully, our own hemisphere will also have a similar rebirth, to say nothing of the potential of Africa. By comparison, it was easy to get things done in a bipolar world. You had two big guys, two big countries and everybody fell in line relatively quickly. But now, it's much murkier and you have to work much harder to arrive at the successes you wish to achieve.

The National Intelligence Council has said in its *Global Trends 2025* report that China will be the greatest single new factor shaping affairs in the next 20 years. Will it do so as a rival or a partner?
There's going to be a little bit of everything. Our relations with China are developing and they're developing positively. China is going to be a friendly competitor. That's what the world is all about. That's not something that we should necessarily fear but we should rise to the challenge. The same is true for Brazil, India and others.

We'll have, hopefully, some convergence with them on what our core security problems are: clean energy, maintenance of the climate, a lot of cohesion on the threats posed by terrorists and the like. The world we live in is such a small place that we required a convergence on the big issues of our time.

How does NATO fit into this world you are describing?
NATO has served the cause of freedom extraordinarily well. It was a key contributor to the Cold War's end. It was an inspiration for what I have called the "forgotten half of Europe," which is now seeing, after so many years, a Europe whole and free come to fruition. The question now is how this NATO reorganizes itself in such a way to confront the asymmetric, multipolar world that we face and whether it will do so in a manner that reflects the proactive requirements of our time. NATO was conceived as a defensive, reactive alliance that was never going to strike the first blow. Being defensive and reactive against the array of multiple threats and challenges that face us every day is not a good position to be in.

That's a quite different NATO than what we have now.
We're not looking for a NATO to project its militaries all over the world to fight. But I would say we're interested in a NATO that is, through a series of interactions with not only member-states but states who wish to have a working relationship with NATO on the basis of mutual values and commonly recognized threats, able to deter future conflicts in their embryonic stages and to take on the transnational threats that face us in an asymmetrical way today: terrorism, human trafficking, flow of energy, protection of critical infrastructure and proliferation.

That's a pretty radical rethink of NATO. Is that what you want to see in the new strategic concept?
Yes. None of the things I just talked about are in NATO's mission portfolio doctrinally right now. If NATO can achieve that through reform, then it will have relevance in the 21st century. If it doesn't, then I think it could be a testimony to the past but not much else. Engagement – General Scowcroft in his interview for this publication talked a great deal about how the proper form of engagement with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev under President Reagan and

President George H.W. Bush was crucial to ending the Cold War. President Obama has also had a different view about engaging with adversaries than did his predecessor.

Engagement is a must in a globalized world. You do not have the luxury of time to sit back behind fortress America and ponder excessively on what's going on around you. The world's moving too fast and there are too many challenges that are out there that need immediate attention. Because communication is so easy now, travel is much easier, the personal engagement at the head of state level, the time spent in working the issues is going to be much more frequent, much more demanding on heads of state in order to make good progress. And that'll cascade down through the national structures as well. But I think that aspect of governance is definitely on the increase.

Iran is one place where U.S. engagement has increased. Russia is a far different situation, but we also have increased engagement through pushing what Vice President Biden called the "reset button." How are those efforts going?
This may sound simplistic, but I've always been struck by the fact that the way you conduct national relationships is not dissimilar to the way one develops personal relationships. It is important to establish a relationship based on mutual respect because that not only opens the door to working together, but also allows for disagreement to be expressed in a way that does not have to lead to conflict.

What the President is looking to do is to create opportunities for advancing United States interests through improved relations, while standing firm on our principles and national security interests.

I think President Obama, thus far, is off to a great start in re-establishing a basis for respectful, thoughtful, professional relations that are serving American interests around the globe – whether we are talking about re-setting our relationship with Russia, establishing a strategic dialogue with China, building stronger partnerships with countries like India and Brazil, fostering even closer bonds with Europe, promoting prosperity in our hemisphere and in Africa, and engaging with the Muslim world.

That's why in his inaugural address he said we are open for discussion; we'll extend the hand of friendship but you're going to have to show you're serious about it also. It's a two-way street.

I have already seen great receptivity among his fellow world leaders and people abroad to the President's policy of engagement and his clear message that we seek cooperation to advance common interests and tackle common challenges. And I think that's had, thus far, good effect.

Engagement is a must in a globalized world... that aspect of governance is definitely on the increase

Russia's President Dmitry Medvedev watches the West 2009 military exercises at the Baltic fleet training ground at Khmelevka, outside Kaliningrad

Apply that to Iran? Some say it could become the defining foreign policy issue of the Obama administration.
Both Iran and North Korea are, kind of, in the same envelope. Proliferation. They are two countries that have been working toward nuclear technology and the weaponization of the technology and the means to deliver them. That is anathema to a peaceful world order. And it could, if not checked, lead to an arms race in Asia and nuclear arms races in Asia and the Persian Gulf. So this is serious business.

And Russia? As we reflect on the 20th anniversary of the Berlin Wall's fall, did we miss options with Russia?
I can't make an informed judgment on that as I wasn't involved, but I know enough to say that the Russians perceived that they were mishandled. As usual, with epic issues like this there's probably criticism on both sides that would be fair. But of late, particularly in the last decade or so, I've personally felt that there was too much of an effort to characterize Russia as a country that would never be an ally or a friend of the West. And I've always felt that, at the end of the day, Russia should be inside the Euro-Atlantic arc, as opposed to the outside looking in. I think that's what Russia wants and we're now in the embryonic stages of reassessing – resetting, to use the exact word – a relationship that, hopefully, will lead to just that. Only time will tell, of course.

General James L. Jones, USMC (Ret.) is National Security Advisor to President Obama and former Chairman of the Atlantic Council Board of Directors. He was interviewed by Frederick Kempe, President and CEO of the Atlantic Council of the United States.

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



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Global Threat Analysis

Barry McCaffrey assesses the dangers facing the world today – from terrorist threats to climate change

We should reflect on the events of 20 years ago, when totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union collapsed as a result of their inability to answer the basic needs of their people and could no longer continue to subjugate neighboring states. We should also not lose sight of the fact that authoritarianism is still alive and well and that democratic gains are easily reversed when governments lose legitimacy as a result of failure to meet the social, political, and economic aspirations of their people. In fact, non-democratic regimes pose some of the greatest contemporary global threats that must be addressed. Global security is most effectively increased by expanding democracy and creating the conditions for equitable economic prosperity in all regions of the world.

The Warsaw Pact domination of Eastern Europe and the concomitant threat to Western Europe for almost half a century teach us that unchecked militarism can overwhelm militarily and politically weak nations that do not enjoy the protection offered by strong neighbors or allies. After World War II, the Soviet Union was able to occupy by force its smaller neighbors in the absence of an effective international response, just as Germany and Japan had done in the 1930s.

The global community must be attentive today to the aspirations of would-be regional hegemons – such as Saddam Hussein's attempt to swallow up Kuwait in 1990. Better to confront a cancer than to wait until it has metastasized. Allowing nations with hostile intent towards their neighbors to generate overwhelming military strength and to then politically corner their neighbors is a recipe for disaster. We learned that in the 1930s when Hitler was not confronted by the great democracies.

However, there are some contemporary spheres of interest – such as Russia's "near abroad," where there are recognizable limits on the ability of distant nations to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of small states. Realism must temper idealism. Unrealistic guarantees and unsound political-military pacts can result in devastating conflict as we saw in World War I, which resulted in an estimated 16 million deaths. The consequences of being wrong today are potentially much more severe given the spread of nuclear weapons. Sober assessments of national interest must inform decisions to continue or expand existing political-military alliances or establish new ones.

The greatest threat to the global community is a major conflict that involves the use of nuclear weapons, kills dozens of millions of people, tears the fabric that binds together the global economy, and causes enormous and irreversible worldwide environmental and social harm. Experts estimate that a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan could kill 20 million within weeks and devastate both nations. Continued nuclear weapon proliferation makes such catastrophic conflict more likely.

The imminent or actual acquisition of nuclear weapons by hostile authoritarian regimes could result in pre-emptive strikes – such as the one conducted against the Saddam Hussein regime –

If unchecked, terrorism could be the catalyst for broader conflict



Smoke and flames billow from the Taj Mahal Palace & Tower Hotel in Mumbai, November 27, 2008. Gunmen killed at least 80 people in a series of attacks in India's commercial hub

The "Tribute in Lights" illuminates the sky over lower Manhattan on the eighth anniversary of the attack on the World Trade Center in New York

to prevent or destroy a threatening nuclear capability. Unfortunately, it appears that several nations have concluded that the best defense against such attacks is to quickly acquire a demonstrable nuclear capability and delivery means. Inevitably, nuclear proliferation will result in mutually destructive attacks whose consequences will not be limited to the belligerents. All nations who would suffer from such a catastrophe must act collectively to prevent it.

Terrorism is a staple of history (consider the example of the zealots of Judea who opposed Roman occupiers 2,000 years ago). Whether it is state-sponsored – practiced by government security forces to subjugate their peoples via unpredictable arrests, imprisonments, and killing (eg. Latin American dictatorships in the 1970s, contemporary Iran, Soviet-styled communist regimes, or Nazi Germany) – or practiced by non-state entities, it must be confronted. Terrorism cannot be eliminated, but it

We should view the longer term with cautious optimism

can be contained and suppressed.

Localized terrorist organizations will generally not present threats beyond their immediate area of operations (eg. the Baader-Meinhof Gang, FARC, IRA, Sendero Luminoso). The level of threat they pose can increase as they gain access to more destructive weapons or benefit from support from friendly organizations or regimes (eg. Libyan provision of explosives to the IRA).

If unchecked, terrorism could be the catalyst for broader conflict, as occurred in 1914 when a single terrorist bullet precipitated World War I. There was significant concern last year that the alleged linkage of the terrorists who conducted the attack in Mumbai to organizations tolerated by the Government of Pakistan could have precipitated a devastating Indian-Pakistani conflict.

Terrorist organizations with broader agendas, such as al-Qaeda, cannot be ignored. If they benefit from significant resources from sponsor states or criminal enterprise, they could gain access to weapons of mass destruction. Few countries would be able to mitigate the devastating consequences of a nuclear attack. Contemporary terrorist organizations are unconstrained by traditional considerations of morality and decency. What was historically outrageous is now commonplace. Safe havens for such organizations cannot be tolerated. The global community must seek to understand the causes of extremism and radicalization and develop programs to counter them in order to mitigate the terrorist threat.

The breakdown or absence of the rule of law is also a significant global threat. Simply stated, bad things happen where the nation states' rule of law is weakest. What comes from the breakdown of the rule of law is genocide; drug cultivation, manufacturing, and trafficking; environmental degradation; international financial fraud; piracy; and terrorism. States where the power of central government is weakest can become the bases for non-state actors, some of which seek to act globally (eg. al-Qaeda in Afghanistan) or locally (pirates in Somalia, FARC guerrillas in Ecuador).

Countries with limited resources, weak institutions of government, and ethnic fissures are particularly vulnerable to socio-economic-political breakdown, the emergence of violent non-state actors, and penetration by transnational criminal enterprises. Coordinated international developmental assistance programs that harness both public- and private-sector resources are essential to build both the institutional capacity and the physical infrastructure required to provide good governance, build political legitimacy, and create viable and resilient nation states.

Environmental factors also clearly pose significant global threats. While the long-term consequences of climate change pose enormous future challenges, it is unlikely that global consensus can be reached in the near-term to make the collective and equitable economic sacrifices required to curtail human activities that contribute to global warming. Self interest and persistent economic inequity will prevent nations from acting in a coherent long-term strategy. Instead, it is much more likely that an economic incentive – such as an irreversible and staggering rise in oil prices – or a technological breakthrough (eg. a drastically cheaper way of generating and storing renewable, green energy) will precipitate the societal reorganization required to live in equilibrium with our fragile environment.

In conclusion, the challenges we face are many. Reasons for pessimism are overwhelming in the near term. However, we should view the longer term with cautious optimism. When I was an infantry battalion commander staring down our Warsaw Pact counterparts across the Fulda Gap in the 1970s, few predicted that the Berlin Wall would fall in just 10 years. No one could have anticipated that economic prosperity and democracy would flourish in Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe. Our task today is to identify and attain the possible, recognize and avoid the catastrophic, and avoid repeating the mistakes that have led to disaster in the past.

Barry McCaffrey served in the United States Army for 32 years and retired as a four-star General. He is currently the President of McCaffrey Associates, LLC and serves as an Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He is also a Member of the Board of the Atlantic Council of the United States.

A Shared Vision

Energy security, climate change issues, and the global economy are crucial to trans-Atlantic energy cooperation. By **John R. Lyman** and **Mihaela Carstei**

Energy policies have long been a cornerstone of trans-Atlantic cooperation. From rebuilding energy infrastructure after World War II to cooperating on developing smart grid technologies, energy is essential to nations on both sides of the Atlantic. This is increasingly true as these nations attempt to combat the effects of climate change, which is rapidly becoming a global threat. To understand what direction the trans-Atlantic energy cooperation will undertake, we need to first understand past strategies.

Historically, energy use on both sides of the Atlantic has largely rested on three fundamental elements. First, transportation in the United States and Europe is predominantly based on oil, and this reliance is projected to continue. The U.S. currently consumes 47.3 million barrels per day and demand in Europe equals 24.9 million barrels per day.

Second, the majority of electricity production comes from carbon-intensive sources. The U.S. and EU currently rely on natural gas, coal and oil for 86.4 and 78.1 percent respectively, of primary energy requirements.

Third, government spending has been insufficient in supporting energy research and development. Any efforts to stem climate change and increase energy security require a significant expansion of funding for basic research, development, and demonstration projects. Allocations to these types of projects have declined as a percentage of overall budgets over the last 15 years.

Legislation in both the United States and Europe Union is beginning to change the fundamental structure of their energy portfolio. The U.S. has revised its energy laws in the last several years. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 covers more than 900 separate provisions to improve energy security. Still under debate is "The American Clean Energy and Security Act", a piece of legislation meant as a comprehensive approach to America's energy policy, charting a new course towards a clean energy economy.

European energy policy has also begun to fundamentally change in nature. The 2007 "Energy Policy for Europe" notes "the point of departure for a European Energy policy is threefold: combating climate change, limiting the EU's external vulnerability to imported hydrocarbons, and promoting growth and jobs, thereby providing security and affordable energy to consumers." This policy, coupled with the EU's Emissions Trade Scheme, is creating significant changes in Europe's energy policies.

In addition to legislative advances, further cooperation is needed to address energy security and climate change. The U.S. and the EU account for approximately 40 percent of the world's energy consumption and almost 40 percent of CO_2 emissions. Current energy usage is unsustainable from an environmental and energy security perspective, which underpins the need for a new strategic trans-Atlantic partnership to change current trends.

The current global political debate is focused on the economic impacts of addressing climate change and energy security. Pressure is growing to increase energy cooperation across the globe in an attempt to address these issues. The world needs leadership to address issues such as the establishment of global market rules and standards for the energy sector, cooperation on improving energy efficiency, and the advancement of renewable energy sources.

Indeed, these issues have been the focus of many international meetings, going as far as the G8 and G20 Summits. World leaders clearly recognize the need for improved energy security, investment in clean energy sources, promoting green growth, and a commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, future cooperation may be obstructed by diverging responses to climate change and energy security. The trans-Atlantic community should to develop a series of common, compatible and complementary strategies that seek to coordinate action on climate change and energy security.

The first step was the establishment of the U.S.-EU Energy Council on November 4, 2009. Subsequent actions must also include: creating stricter energy efficiency standards, developing smart grid technology, harmonizing renewable portfolio standards, increased coordination on transportation standards, greater

Queuing to buy gas in Manila, 2009: world energy demand is expected to rise by more than 50 percent over the next 20 years

Energy security and climate change will be the catalyst for renewed trans-Atlantic cooperation

incentives for the automobile and utility industries, and increasing research and development levels. While the purview of these policies may be large, the trans-Atlantic community will only be able to effectively combat the effects of climate change by implementing these common compatible and complementary strategies.

Forging a durable global consensus will prove difficult, perhaps impossible, if the United States and Europe cannot overcome their differences. Present trends forecast world energy demand to increase over 50 percent by 2030, and global oil consumption is projected to grow by 1.6 percent a year. The trans-Atlantic community should lead the way in building an energy economy that is secure, environmentally responsible, and conducive to economic growth and prosperity around the globe.

Together, the trans-Atlantic community can help shape the post-petroleum world of the 21st century. Just as the Berlin Wall signified a galvanizing threat for the trans-Atlantic community, energy security and climate change will be the catalyst for renewed trans-Atlantic cooperation. As the world faces this new existential threat, our shared values and common interests will lead the way helping to build an energy economy that will ensure global prosperity and security for years to come.

John R. Lyman is a member of the board of the Atlantic Council of the United States, and Co-Director of the Energy, Environment and Economics Program. Mihaela Carstei is Assistant Director of the Energy and Environment Program of the Atlantic Council of the United States.

A Dangerous Future

Charles F. Wald, Sherri Goodman, and David M. Catarious, Jr. explain why climate change and energy security are key to stability in the 21st century

As 2009 marks the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, it also marks the beginning of a new era of challenges posed by threats that were little recognized and less appreciated those 20 short years ago: climate change and energy security.

Simply put – as a matter of science and as a matter of military assessment, planning and preparedness – the fact of global climate change and the challenges of energy security pose serious risks to the stability of many regions of the world. And these two interwoven security threats will dominate and shape the state of nations in the decades to come.

That is not wild speculation but the sober assessment of the CNA-convened Military Advisory Board (MAB) which first raised this issue in its 2007 report, *National Security and the Threat of Climate Change*[1].

The MAB found that climate change has the potential to create instability in economic, environmental, and social issue areas, acting as a "threat multiplier," particularly in the most fragile regions of the world.

As well-documented by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the most direct impacts of climate change will be on the environment, specifically manifesting through: retreating glaciers, rising seas, hurricanes and storms of increasing severity, floods, heat waves, drying soils, drought, shifting habitats, the spread of diseases.

The victims of these changes will be the people living in these environments. Those populations will face such life-threatening consequences as vastly

reduced water supplies, decreasing long-term agricultural productivity, ill health, and mass migrations forced by the changing environment. That is what is meant by "threat multiplier" and as those impacts are felt, regional states will begin to understand they lack the capacity to adapt to the effects of climate change. The threats will multiply again as resentment builds toward the developed world, which will be seen as responsible for spawning the climate crisis.

Many nations in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East already stagger under the weight of extreme poverty, pervasive hunger, social unrest, and political instability – all of which climate change will only exacerbate, further eroding the legitimacy of many governments and heightening international security concerns.

In Asia, fresh water for hundreds of millions of people comes from glaciers that may not exist by mid-century. In the Middle East, rising seas threaten to contaminate aquifers, reducing precious fresh water resources in the region. In Africa, many trace the genocide in Darfur to the impacts of climate change, and land that now supports crops and animals is quietly, inexorably, turning to desert.

In Asia, fresh water for hundreds of millions of people comes from glaciers that may not exist by mid-century

For weakened and failing governments, conditions wrought by climate change will lead to a rise in extremism, internal conflicts, radical ideologies, and authoritarianism – all of which are likely to lead to a dramatic increase in the number of humanitarian-assistance and crisis response missions launched by the international community.

Perhaps the most dangerous and destabilizing potential result of climate change is mass migration. As the world's population continues to grow (an increase of more than a billion people in just the past 12 years), migratory pressures become a major concern even without the added pressures brought on by extreme climate conditions. But with climate change added to the equation, the problem has the potential to increase exponentially.

The Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker *Louis S. St-Laurent* makes its way through the ice in Baffin Bay, Canada, July 2008. As the Arctic ice thins, nations are keen to claim previously trapped resources and newly thawed trade routes. Competition for these areas is likely to increase, as are disputes

Left: Denmark's Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen speaks at the summit on climate change at the United Nations in New York, January 22, 2009

Right: a worker clears coal from railway tracks at a mine in Dadong, Shanxi province, China. With inexpensive fossil fuel expected to end soon, industry around the globe needs to address energy issues

The complex challenge posed by a warming earth is further complicated by the other great challenge of this era: energy security

Nations unable to respond and adapt to the impacts of climate change will, by default, force citizens to, literally, seek greener pastures. Migrations within nations and regions, and across borders and continents, are hugely destabilizing events – for the nations being evacuated and those being populated. Disorder, poverty, disenfranchisement, cultural clashes, overtaxed social welfare mechanisms; all are consequences of human migrations from have-not nations, and are serious challenges to be faced in the decades ahead by many, if not all, of the haves.

Many other strategic challenges lie ahead. The thawing Arctic ice cap, for example, may be the first test of climate change impacts. As NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer said in January 2009, "Here in the High North, climate change is not a fanciful idea, it is already a reality ... [and] ... although the long-term implications of climate change and the retreating ice cap in the Arctic are still unclear, what is very clear is that the High North is going to require even more of the Alliance's attention in the coming years."

That is because as the ice thins, NATO members – including the United States, Canada, Norway, Iceland, and Denmark, in competition with each other and with Russia – are scrambling to claim the resources trapped for millennia beneath frozen waters. (In 2007, Russia staked its claim by planting its flag 14,000 feet below the North Pole). And with the no-longer-ice-bound Northwest Passage emerging as a viable trade route, legal disputes and competition for resources could also increase.

The complex challenge posed by a warming Earth is further complicated by the other great challenge of this era: energy security. The age of inexpensive fossil energy will end soon – within decades – and well before the world is prepared to deal with its demise. So as we struggle to manage the impacts of climate change, we must also adjust to a fundamental change in the way we use energy.

This issue was also assessed by CNA's Military Advisory Board in its report *Powering America's Defense: Energy and the Risks to National Security*[2]. Released in May 2009, the report's clearly stated findings constitute their own set of challenges that America must address, beginning now:

1) Our nation's current energy posture is a serious and urgent threat to our national security, with U.S. dependence on oil undermining our national security on multiple fronts, and our outdated, fragile and overtaxed national electrical grid existing as a dangerously weak link in our national security infrastructure.
2) A business-as-usual approach to energy security poses an unacceptably high threat level from a series of converging risks.
3) Achieving energy security in a carbon-constrained world is possible, but will require concerted leadership and continuous focus.
4) The national security planning processes have not been sufficiently responsive to the security impacts of our current energy posture.
5) In the course of addressing its most serious energy challenges, the U.S. Department of Defense can contribute to national solutions as a technological innovator, early adopter, and test-bed.

At present, the U.S. and nearly every other nation on the globe are uncomfortably tied to the oil- and gas-rich countries of the world. This leaves us continually vulnerable to supply disruptions (a weakness that has not gone unnoticed by terrorist and criminal organizations) and complicates our nation's foreign policy decisions by forcing unwelcome compromises on such issues as human rights and democracy.

Myriad other reasons (including mitigation of climate change) dictate we move away from carbon-emitting fuels. But one of the most practical is the fact that at some point, perhaps soon, the world's oil supply will no longer meet demand.

Simple prudence dictates that we face this reality now. To sustain the rate of global progress enjoyed during the 20th century, new, secure and sustainable sources of energy must be developed that are readily accessible and affordable.

The size and scope of the challenges we face must not prevent us from taking action to guard against what is likely to be a dangerous future. And while we cannot prevent all the negative consequences of climate change and energy challenges, we can, by acting now, ensure a better future for the generations that follow us.

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[1] *National Security and the Threat of Climate Change*, CNA, April 2007. Available at CNA.org

[2] *Powering America's Defense: Energy and the Risks to National Security*, CNA May 2009. Available at CNA.org



Completing Europe

In the wake of the collapse of the Berlin Wall, "Europe whole, free and at peace" was not just a vision; it was a successful policy leading to the consolidation of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and the integration of the region into Europe's great institutions. This outcome was neither easy nor obvious.

The same bipartisan leadership demonstrated over the past 20 years is required today to "complete Europe" – that is, to finish the unfinished business of integrating the western Balkans and Eastern Europe into the European mainstream, including ultimately the European Union and NATO.

However, on this anniversary of the beginning of the end of a dividing line in Europe, we are missing the vision and the policy to extend this great success story to the south and east.

Europe is moving forward with the goal of assisting nations in the Balkans to advance the reforms necessary to find a home in Europe and to turn their backs – like much of the rest of Europe – on a bloody history of ethnic violence. To their credit, European leaders have embraced the vision that the region does indeed belong in Europe, without denying how far societies in the region have to travel.

Slovenia was the first to blaze the path. Croatia, Albania, Macedonia and now Montenegro are moving at varying speeds in the right direction. Serbia's population is poised to make the right strategic choice. Bosnia's leaders run the risk of letting their country be left behind. While Bosnia is particularly challenging, there is a European consensus, albeit fragile, that if a nation in the region gets its act together, there can be a place for it within Europe. The vision exists even if the strategy is on a slow track.

Yet this consensus breaks down looking East.

In fact, since Russia and Georgia went to war in August 2008, it has become conventional wisdom that too much Western outreach to Georgia and Ukraine is understandably provocative toward

A Russian military convoy passes local residents, outside Gori, Georgia, August 13, 2008. Russian tanks, troops and paramilitaries rolled into the strategic Georgian city, apparently smashing an EU-brokered truce designed to end the conflict that uprooted tens of thousands and scarred the Georgian landscape

Damon Wilson looks at the strategies needed to achieve a Europe that is whole, free and at peace

Russia. Russia has after all declared its "privileged interests" in the region.

Imagine if Western leaders had accepted that argument regarding the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These nations, now perceived as obvious members of the European Union and NATO, might have been forced to follow a different path.

Then what's different now with Ukraine and Georgia?

Certainly, Georgia and Ukraine are harder cases. The transitions to which these nations aspire are more profound. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in many respects rejoined the European tradition of much of their history, including building on pre-war democratic traditions and free markets. Even the Baltic states achieved their transitions building on the legacy of their independence in the 1920s and 1930s.

While Georgia and Ukraine have both had periods of national consciousness and independence, they have not benefited from historical traditions rooted in the mainstream of European political and economic development. Furthermore, Ukraine has lacked decisive, effective leadership during its transition, exacerbated by divisions within the Ukrainian public about where the country should be headed. Georgia, which enjoys a population united behind a vision of Georgia as part of the West, has paid a high price for perhaps too decisive leadership.

The West should welcome joining forces with Russia to tackle global challenges

And then there is Russia. The Russia that was irritated by the Baltic states, or even Poland, joining NATO, is not the Russia of today. Cooperation with the West used to be a source of domestic strength for post-communist Russian leaders. Unfortunately, in recent years, the inverse has become true. Confrontation with the West has become a powerful source of political strength for Russian leaders at home as Russia has moved away from European democratic values.

The Russia of today is exerting its privileged interests – diplomatic niceties for a sphere of influence – in the region, is asserting its right to defend Russians wherever they may live, and is working to rollback democratic progress in Georgia and Ukraine seen as a challenge to the Moscow model.

Georgia and Ukraine clearly have more to transform than their neighbors to the west did during their transitions. And yet, Georgia and Ukraine are seeking to achieve the success of these neighbors while dealing with Russian efforts to undermine their progress.

The West is not on the sidelines. The European Union, with Swedish and Polish leadership, has launched the Eastern Partnership to strengthen ties with neighbors who were once part of the Soviet Union. While details of the partnership remain to be defined, it offers the prospect of a credible mechanism to help these societies pursue the transformation required to draw closer to the West, much as NATO's Partnership for Peace did in the 1990s. The EU's soft power approach could prove ingenious. Judging by Russia's critical reaction to the EU initiative, Moscow believes the Eastern Partnership will be more effective than many of the detractors who fear it is too vague.

NATO, however, seems like a deer caught in headlights. Yes, the Alliance did agree at the Bucharest summit that Georgia and Ukraine will become members of NATO. And in the absence of agreement on a Membership Action Plan for either, Allies launched a NATO-Georgia Commission to

A gas pipeline near the town of Boyarka, near Kiev. Former Russian President Vladimir Putin met his Ukrainian counterpart Viktor Yushchenko on February 12, 2008 in Moscow amid crunch talks on averting a cut in Russian gas supplies to the neighboring state

parallel the NATO-Ukraine Commission as an alternative means to help these nations reform and prepare for eventual membership. Yet, most NATO allies believe it taboo to put too much meat on the bones of these cooperation efforts. In fact, Moscow is succeeding in imposing a *de facto* arms embargo on Georgia, and to a lesser extent Ukraine, by dissuading Western nations from maintaining normal military-to-military cooperation with these nations.

Ultimately, completing Europe is not about NATO and EU enlargement. Rather, it is about assisting societies in Europe's East so that they succeed in their efforts to embrace the values and practices of the European mainstream – democracy, free markets, open media, individual liberties, rule of law, etc. As these societies transform, discussion of and then decisions about membership in the EU and NATO should follow.

Clearly, the burden is on the leaders and populations of Georgia and Ukraine to make the difficult choices that their Central and Eastern European neighbors have taken over the past 20 years. But the West has an equally important role to articulate and back a vision that makes clear that if societies transform, they will find a home in a Europe whole, free and at peace.

Russia also deserves a place within this vision. As a diminishing commodity in an ever-globalizing world, the West should welcome joining forces with Russia to tackle global challenges. The Obama administration is seeking such cooperation with its pragmatic "reset" policy. And yet realism about (an authoritarian) Russia today should neither create shortcuts for Russia to join our community of values nor deny opportunities to support transition and pluralism within Russia. Russia's citizens need to know that if their society becomes more democratic and embraces rule of law, a more profound partnership with Europe and North America will follow.

In the meantime, only with a clear vision is there a realistic prospect that tough decisions on reform will produce the desired results on integration. NATO and the EU have long served as engines of reform for nations aspiring to join their ranks. That engine only runs, however, when fueled by vision.

"Europe whole, free and at peace" remains a valid vision and policy. It's time for a new generation of leaders in Europe and North America to apply this strategy and extend this opportunity unequivocally to the western Balkans and Europe's East.

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Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin (left) holds talks with Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshchenko (right) in Moscow on April 29, 2009. Tymoshchenko said that Kiev and Moscow had put behind them disputes over their vital energy trade, after cut-offs in January affected a swathe of EU states

Bonfire of the Certainties

George Robertson tells Simon Michell how the fall of the Berlin Wall brought in a period of confusion that saw a transformation in the role and mission of NATO

According to former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, it is the way in which the transition from a fractured to a unified Europe came about that makes it so extraordinary. He admits, like most if not all of his contemporaries, he did not see it coming and even viewed those who demanded it as being a bit odd. Those in the House of Commons who spoke in terms of a reunified Europe and called specifically for the freedom of oppressed nations were viewed with amusement.

"Sir Bernard Braine comes to mind," says Lord Robertson. "He was the one who was constantly calling for the freedom of the Baltic States and was consequently regarded as a bit of an eccentric – almost as if he believed that the Earth was flat." Lord Robertson even recalls asking the governing Mayor of West Berlin, Richard von Weizsäcker, if, by 2001, he would be able to walk through the Brandenburg Gate. The response was an emphatic "no."

It was this backdrop of almost universal acceptance of the status quo that brought about a state of panic and confusion when it became clear what was actually happening in the East. "There was undoubtedly a sense of joy when the Berlin Wall fell," says Lord Robertson, admitting to having tears in his eyes when he saw the historic TV footage of the Wall being breached on the evening news. "However, there was also a feeling of impending doom. People spoke in apocalyptic terms. There was an expectation of massive disruption and bloodshed as those who had been oppressed for decades took revenge on their former masters. People had visions of a sort of Northern Ireland scenario, only on a grand scale."

It was, then, a stroke of enormous good fortune that the NATO Secretary General presiding over these events was himself a German, Manfred Wörner.

"He was a genius. He recognized immediately that NATO would be able to help the East transition peacefully. It was down to him that NATO was able to react in such a brilliant way."

It was Wörner who proposed the Partnership for Peace process, which was so instrumental in bringing about a change that was, by and large, devoid of turbulence and violence. The reason for this, according to Lord Robertson, was that the Warsaw Pact countries feared NATO, but they also respected it. They recognized that it was a force to be reckoned with. "So when NATO held out a helping hand and spoke to them, they listened."

Despite NATO's obvious success in aiding the transition, there were still some in the West speaking against the level of NATO involvement, who saw the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the reunification of Germany especially, as something to be avoided at all costs. However, they were quickly becoming a very small minority. Lord Robertson attended a lunch held by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher given in honor of the Polish Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki. The lunch was memorable for the way that Thatcher addressed Mazowiecki, saying that both Great Britain and Poland knew only too well what happens when you have a united Germany. Lord Robertson chuckles when he remembers Mazowiecki's reaction. "He clearly thought that the interpreter had gone completely mad and that she could not actually be saying these things."

Looking back on those years Lord Robertson insists that it is important that we remember the truth about what happened and who really said and did what. "We should try not to rewrite history and airbrush things out. People tend to forget that even Churchill had his critics. Many people forget that Lord Halifax persistently and doggedly called for Britain to negotiate with Germany. In a less dramatic way, the former British Defence Secretary, Denis Healy, cautioned against NATO expansion, saying that it would weaken the bonds of unity."

This caution, however, seems to ignore the fact that throughout its 60-year history NATO has always followed a policy of enlargement. In 1952 it invited Greece and Turkey to join, and later, in 1955, less than six years after NATO's formation, it invited former enemy, West Germany, to join its ranks – against significant opposition. Likewise, as soon as Spain had transformed itself into a liberal democracy, following General Franco's death, it too was welcomed into the fold.

So when the former Warsaw Pact countries asked to become members, it was not something that NATO hadn't faced before. Of course, there was some trepidation and soul-searching within the existing member governments. This explains to some degree why an incremental process was adopted with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland being chosen as the first countries to join in 1999. The significant émigré populations from these countries domiciled in the U.S.

Former NATO Secretary General George Robertson briefs the media prior to leaving Alliance headquarters in Brussels, December 17, 2003

helped to oil the wheels for this expansion and prepare for the next wave of countries that joined in 2004 – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.

The enlargement process continues. In 2009 Albania and Croatia joined NATO, and Macedonia has also been set conditions to become a member. Lord Robertson is a committed supporter of the enlargement process.

"Enlargement has strengthened NATO because it has brought in nations who were previously opponents, it has fortified their transformations and it has given a huge political boost for an Alliance transformed out of all recognition.

"There is no specific end to the enlargement process. You cannot say to countries which have made the changes that would qualify them that NATO is full up. The key criterion will be ensuring that all new additions add value and do not, by their membership, render NATO less than the organization they so keenly want to join."

Turning back to the events that made the last waves of enlargement possible, Lord Robertson reflects that what happened during those years was a revolution – albeit a bloodless one. "What started on the border of Hungary just snowballed into a complete revolution. It was not a violent, hysterical bloody one, but a fundamentally radical one. It transformed Eastern Europe from a region of command economies and military dictatorships, where people were denied freedom of thought and assembly, into free nations, growing and prospering in a way that had hitherto seemed impossible." Ultimately, NATO helped that happen because of its inherent strength. The former Warsaw Pact countries respected it and wanted to become members. They recognized that the collective defense that it offered the West could be expanded to include them.

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Europe in the World of 2025

As dramatic as global change has been since the Berlin Wall's fall, hold your seats for an ever more dramatic period ahead. **Mathew J. Burrows** reports

The global transformation is being fueled by a globalizing economy, marked by an historic shift of relative wealth and economic power from West to East, and by the increasing weight of new players – especially China and India. Concurrent with the shift in power among nation states, the relative power of various non-state actors – including businesses, tribes, religious organizations, and even criminal networks – will continue to increase. By 2025, as written in the U.S. National Intelligence Community's recent work on global trends, the international community will be composed of many actors in addition to nation states, but will lack an overarching approach to global governance that might harness their efforts.

The international "system" will be multipolar with many clusters of both state and non-state actors. Multipolar international systems, such as the 19th century Concert of Europe, have existed in the past, but the one that is emerging is unprecedented because it is global and encompasses a mix of state and non-state actors. The most salient characteristics of the new order are likely to be the shift from a unipolar world dominated by the United States, to a relatively unstructured hierarchy of old powers and rising nations, and the diffusion of power from state to non-state actors. The transition isn't likely to be smooth or easy.

History tells us that rapid change brings many dangers. Despite the recent economic recession, which could end up accelerating many of these ongoing trends, I do not believe that we are headed toward a complete breakdown, as occurred in 1914-1918 when an earlier phase of globalization came to a halt. However, the next 20 years of transition toward a new international system are fraught with risks. These risks include the growing prospect of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and possible interstate conflicts over resources. The breadth of transnational issues requiring attention also is increasing to include issues connected with resource constraints in energy, food, and water; and worries about climate change. Global and regional institutions that could help the world deal with these transnational issues and, more generally, mitigate the risks of rapid change, currently appear incapable of rising to the challenges without concerted efforts by their leaders.

The rapidly changing international order at a time of growing geopolitical challenges increases the likelihood of shocks and surprises. No single outcome seems preordained: the European and Western model of economic liberalism, democracy and secularism, for example, which many assumed to be inevitable, may lose some of its luster in this multipolar world.

For Europe, it will be challenging to develop itself in the midst of these tectonic shifts into a cohesive, integrated and influential global actor able to employ independently a full spectrum of political, economic and military tools in support of European and Western interests and universal ideals. The European Union would need to resolve a perceived democracy gap dividing Brussels from European voters and move past the protracted debate about its institutional structures into one more focused on how it perceives its global role. Continued failure to convince skeptical publics of the benefits of deeper economic, political, and social integration and to grasp the nettle of an aging population by enacting painful reforms could leave the EU a hobbled giant distracted by internal bickering and competing national agendas, and less able to translate its economic clout into global influence.

The drop-off in working-age populations could prove a severe test for Europe's social welfare model, a foundation stone of Western Europe's political cohesion since World War II. We fear progress on economic liberalization is likely to continue only in gradual steps until aging populations or prolonged economic stagnation force more dramatic changes. There are no easy fixes for Europe's demographic deficits. Defense expenditures also risk being cut to stave off the need for serious restructuring of social benefits programs.

The challenge of integrating immigrant, especially Muslim communities, may also become acute. Slow overall growth rates, highly regulated labor markets, and workplace policies, if maintained, could make it difficult to increase job opportunities, despite Europe's need to stem the decline of its working-age population. We continue to believe that the question of Turkey's EU membership will be a test of Europe's outward focus. Increasing doubts about Turkey's chances are likely to slow its implementation of political and human rights reforms. Any outright rejection risks wider repercussions, reinforcing arguments in the Muslim world – including among Europe's Muslim minorities – about the

incompatibility of the West and Islam.

Whether regional and global institutions – including the EU – adapt and revive is likely to be a function of leadership and flexibility. Most of the pressing transnational problems, including climate change, regulation of globalized financial markets, migration, failing states and crime networks are unlikely to be effectively resolved by the actions of individual nation states. The need for effective global governance is likely to increase faster than existing mechanisms can respond. Leaders everywhere, not just in Europe, will likely have to pursue alternative approaches to solving transnational problems with many informal groups. In response to likely deficits in global governance, networks will have to form among states and non-state actors focused on specific issues. These networks will operate to pursue convergent goals and interests, including a genuine intent to solve problems, business self-interest, moral grounds, and the desire of institutions and non-governmental organizations to be relevant to the problems facing a changing world.

Looking forward, the international system, as constructed largely by Europe and America following World War II, will be almost unrecognizable by 2025. Indeed, "international system" is a misnomer as it is likely to be more ramshackle than orderly, its composition hybrid and heterogeneous as befits a transition that will still be a work in progress in 2025.

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

A busy shopping street in Istanbul. Doubts over Turkey's European Union membership may reinforce arguments in the Muslim world that the West is incompatible with Islam

Stratcon 2010: A Military Route to Freedom?

An Afghan police officer near the site of a blast in Herat, west of Kabul, Afghanistan, September 27, 2009: Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated that military operations need political legitimization to succeed

As NATO establishes a new Strategic Concept, the Alliance is re-focusing on its political and military purpose: to defend freedom in the face of those without ethics. By **Julian Lindley-French**

Freedom is under threat the world over, just as NATO begins the search for a new Strategic Concept (Stratcon 2010). This threat is posed by a dangerous new cocktail of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, information technology and enormous flows of illicit capital in a global struggle between the state and the anti-state. Be it the challenge posed by the radically old or those, particularly in Europe, who endeavor to wish away the competition between new and old ideas that is implicit and endemic in strategic affairs.

In this struggle, the experience of Western armed forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan has emphasized a gap between military victory and political stability that has left many of NATO's political leaders unsure as to the role of the Alliance and its armed forces in contemporary grand strategy. This has led to political defeatism in many NATO capitals at a time when financial constraint, stabilization fatigue and political correctness are combining to undermine the one truism that must be defended: namely, that the world is safest when the Western democracies are credible purveyors of strategic stability, founded on a credible, commonality of purpose backed up with both diplomatic and military tools self-evidently up to the job.

That is why the crafting of a new Strategic Concept will be critical. First, it must re-establish a contract between the political leadership and the security and military practitioners that support it, so that NATO can, once again, be restored as the cornerstone of the liberal-democratic security system for which the Cold War was fought. Second, credible military power remains and will remain the foundation of credible power just at the moment when Western armed forces are grappling with a new form of warfare. Hybrid warfare will see NATO's armed forces having to fight to effect in the hazy realm between the conventional and unconventional, in which political courage and legitimacy will be almost as important as the strength of the force deployed. Stratcon 2010 must thus urgently re-establish the political and military purpose of the Alliance: the defense of freedom in the face of those without ethics. Such purpose will only be crafted if there is a sound understanding of three missions:

- to embrace and ease insecurity in and around the Euro-Atlantic community by offering both membership and partnership where applicable;
- to better protect the societies of the community against catastrophic penetration; and
- to project security worldwide through new power partnerships with cornerstone security states.

Therefore, if NATO's armed forces are to be properly prepared for success in such a struggle, conceptual clarity at the outset will be essential, about the role of armed forces and thus the Alliance in preserving freedom in the face of a range of risks and threats. Unfortunately, old ideas about the preservation of state integrity assumed a threat from another state organized along similar lines. However, the dark side of globalization is one in which state borders are as much virtual as physical, and security and defense merge into the need to protect people – not just from threat, but the very fear of threat which weakens resolve and cohesion.

In such an environment, the utility of armed forces is not just in the fighting power they can bring to bear on open contact with threat, but as an organizing and planning nexus to both prevent threat becoming danger and coping with the consequences of such danger. No other organization in society possesses those attributes, and thus the military role of NATO will be to ensure that armed forces go about their business in such a way that they can come together effectively and at short notice to act as levers for a comprehensive security effect. That is why the work NATO is doing to promote civil-military cooperation is so important. Often called the Comprehensive Approach, such military-led cooperation will need to operate at several levels; the strategic-political, the political-military, at the theater and operational levels, if it is to afford effective counter-terror and counterinsurgency.

Moreover, hybrid warfare does not imply a one-way street for cooperation. Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the extent to which military operations, to have any chance of success, require the political legitimization afforded by coalitions and active civilian involvement. Indeed, the task-list implied by today's security environment is so long and complex that only with a new civil-military partnership will strategic terrorists be denied bases of operations, and NATO must be front and center of such developments.

Given the insecurity of modern Western society in the face of terror, there is unlikely to be credible power projection without credible homeland protection, and in Europe in particular that can only be afforded through a new and pragmatic homeland security relationship between the EU and NATO, much of which require synergy between criminal and military intelligence through NATO. Equally, the need to project credible military stabilizing power will likely grow and that in turn will require new power partnerships with partner states in Asia (India, Japan and possibly China), Africa (South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya), Latin America (Argentina and Brazil), Australasia (Australia) and, of course, Russia. However, Russia must once and for all decide if it is part of the Alliance's security mission or a challenge to it. The invasion of Georgia was anti-freedom and NATO must resist such adventurism firmly.

Front and center of Stratcon 2010 must be the modernization of NATO's military Standards

Front and center of Stratcon 2010 must be the modernization and exporting of NATO's military Standards. Indeed, if transformation is to become smart and move beyond the rhetorical, the Alliance must forge grand interoperability that exports NATO's way of doing business worldwide to new partners. As part of this drive, NATO Standards will require a new set of civil-military interoperability criteria based on lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan. Such partnerships will demand the early involvement in planning of key civilian agencies. Only then will Stratcon 2010 be set firmly on the road to freedom – be it military or civil.

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NATO's Strategic Concept for the 21st Century

In order to grow, the Alliance needs global leaders to actively champion its relevance to the people. By **Hans Binnendijk**

The 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall was an unforeseen shock in spite of many signals that a tipping point was near. These included the long period of spreading *glasnost* encouraged by Mikhail Gorbachev, the astonishing victory of Lech Walesa's Solidarity movement in Poland's June elections, and Hungary's quiet dismantling of its portion of the Iron Curtain as 80,000 Soviet troops stationed there watched – but did not interfere.

At a Berlin conference of experts on Germany that I organized in mid-summer 1989 as Director of Studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, not one expert predicted that the Berlin Wall would come down. It fell just four months hence. Then in late August, Hungary allowed a trickle of East Germans to cross into Austria, and on September 11 the mass exodus from East to West suddenly began; an exodus that culminated in the Berlin Wall (and the entire inner German border) coming down two months later on November 9, 1989. It was a time of indescribable joy as well as high uncertainty.

Of course, the Berlin Wall was not the last shock in recent history. In contrast to the joy of the unforeseen end of the Berlin Wall, September 11, 2001 was a tragic shock for America and the world. So it is that we live in a time of rapid change in international security affairs, a time when we should expect the future to be punctuated by spikes of strategic surprise that both shake and shape our world.

The fall of the Berlin Wall also marked the end of the bipolar Cold War period and the beginning of the so-called post-Cold War period, when the United States briefly stood alone in a unipolar world. However, that era in international security was short lived as the attacks of 9-11 ushered in another new era, one marked by the challenge of global terrorism and eventually by a new multilateralism.

The end of the Cold War saw the shrinking of NATO forces and lowered readiness postures. In 1991 the Alliance crafted a new Strategic Concept to address the uncertain demands of an emerging era, including the need to reach out to former adversaries, maintain a guarded posture toward reversals, and to ponder NATO's role in responding to crises beyond its borders.

Though hesitant at first, allies heeded Senator Richard Lugar's advice in 1993 that NATO had to "go out of area or out of business." In the Balkans and elsewhere, NATO soon had plenty of business, filling a critical role in regional security. For the Alliance, change came to mean new members and partnerships as well as military restructuring for new missions. It transformed from a static collective defense organization to a crisis prevention and response organization,

The Brandenburg Gate, Berlin, November 1989

The Alliance crafted a new Strategic Concept to address the uncertain demands of an emerging era

including at times the deployment of forces well beyond Alliance territory.

As many states progressed from partner status toward NATO membership, as the aspirations of the EU in the arena of security and defense became apparent, and as a new crisis erupted into open conflict in the Balkans, NATO agreed to another revised Strategic Concept in 1999. The 1999 Strategic Concept intended to make the case for the national and international forces and capabilities that would be needed in order to perform a growing list of new NATO missions.

However, soon afterward, the attacks of 9-11 tested NATO cohesion in a third and far more challenging international system, a global security environment that frequently faces challenges not from traditional strong states but rather from non-state actors, failed and rogue states, and terrorism. NATO has continued to expand but fissures have developed among allies on what future roles of the Alliance will bring the most security value to members.

Some emphasize the need for NATO to reassure them of its commitment to collective defense (Article 5 of the Washington Treaty) as the enduring core mission of the Alliance. Other allies look to NATO to define a new role of supporting or supplementing members' capabilities to protect the resilience of their populations and economies at home. Such a role would call for new capabilities to address mainly non-military concerns like cyber security, energy security, counter-terrorism, and stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Still other members want NATO to find ways to more equitably share the responsibility of conducting operations at strategic distance. Innovations such as pooling of national assets for airlift or collectively funding some operations could allow more allies to participate more fully by lowering the cost of deploying or sustaining forces in austere environments far from home territory. Better sharing of responsibility also comes from greater consensus on undertaking operations, which can reduce national caveats placed on troops provided, hindering their value to NATO commanders.

Finally, there are allies who place a greater emphasis on NATO's political, diplomatic and training roles. They want an alliance that re-engages in arms control negotiations with Russia, consults closely on political developments, employs what might be called "defense diplomacy" and military assistance with key countries, and develops a global network of partners with common interests and interoperable military capabilities.

Re-engagement also means extending partnership energetically to the European Union, the Istanbul Cooperation

Initiative countries (the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council), the Mediterranean Dialogue countries of the North African littoral and other partner states around the world.

Almost every ally values all of the "four R's" – Reassurance, Resilience, Responsibility and Re-engagement – to some degree, yet each has its own top priority. The situation in NATO today is similar in some ways to the mid-1960s, when several allies favored stronger deterrence while others saw opportunities for détente with the Soviet Union. The solution in that period of intra-Alliance stress was the well-known Harmel Report and the new strategy of Forward Defense and Flexible Response. Today's situation calls for a similar solution, a new Strategic Concept that brings the various groups of allies together in common agreed purpose and with the intent to invest in the minimum essential capabilities to implement member decisions.

A new Strategic Concept needs to reflect these four future missions of the Alliance: collective defense (conventional and nuclear); homeland resilience and population security; responsibility sharing during crisis response and stability operations; and re-engagement with national and international partners. These four missions, pursued in tandem, represent a re-balancing of NATO operational priorities to address member concerns within the NATO area and at its borders, as well as beyond the Treaty area. NATO will be both engaging with partners and responding to challenges to member collective interests.

All of these demands necessitate a much broader set of force requirements for the Alliance, including deployable land, sea, and air forces for combat (including counterinsurgency operations) as well as stability operations, plus capabilities to assist members and partners in cyber security, energy security, counter-terrorism, and other missions. Finally, future NATO capabilities will need to embrace fully the emerging concepts of operational civilian-military cooperation and engagement in a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution.

At the same time, a persistent global

NATO TIMELINE

1961
Erection of the Berlin Wall.

1962
Cuban Missile Crisis.

1963
Assassination of U.S. President Kennedy.

1964-1965
U.S. military intervention in Vietnam.

1966
France withdraws from NATO integrated military structure.

1967
NATO HQ and SHAPE relocate to Belgium. Allies adopt strategy of "flexible response," integrating nuclear weapons into NATO's entire force structure and adopting high readiness levels.

1968
Warsaw Pact armed forces invade Czechoslovakia.

1969
"Prague Spring" movement crushed by U.S.S.R.
First man on the Moon.

1970
Signing of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

1971
U.S. engages in détente with China and U.S.S.R.

1972
U.S.-Soviet agreements on strategic arms limitations (SALT I) and anti-ballistic missile systems are signed.

1973
NATO and Warsaw Pact talks on reductions in conventional forces.

recession and the steep ongoing cost of NATO operations in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and at sea sap Europe's already underfunded defense resources, limiting much-needed investment in new capabilities. Therefore, NATO must determine how to do more with less by working hard to find efficiencies everywhere possible.

Most of all, a new Strategic Concept must be championed by heads of state and government in their legislatures and with their publics. It is not enough to simply listen to public opinion, leaders also need to lead – they must make a convincing case for investing in NATO in a lasting way. If they succeed in energizing renewed public support, NATO will be well positioned to meet "Freedom's Challenge" far into the future.

We owe this to our children: to pass on to them a robust and enduring Alliance that will serve their security needs, as well and as successfully as it served our own. That should be NATO's lasting legacy.

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Left: soldiers on the newly built Berlin Wall, December 1961; center: Russian troops roll in to Prague during the Czechoslovakia Uprising; right: Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, 1985



1974
Oil price hikes provoke global recession.

1975-1978
U.S. *Apollo* and Soviet *Soyuz* meet in space. Total withdrawal of U.S. from South Vietnam. The Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE recognizes Europe's existing frontiers and pledges respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

1979
SALT II is signed but not ratified due to Soviet deployment of SS-20s and invasion of Afghanistan.

NATO deploys Pershing and Cruise missiles but pursues arms control measures.

1981
Martial law declared in Poland following civil unrest.
U.S.-Soviet talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) begin.

1982-1984
Spain joins NATO.
U.S.-Soviet strategic arms reduction talks (START) begin.

Soviets walk out of all arms control negotiations.

1985
Gorbachev initiates process of reform in Soviet Union.

1987
Signing of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

1988
Warsaw Pact countries announce major reductions in conventional forces.

1989
Fall of the Berlin Wall.

The Threat to NATO's Future

New challenges like Afghanistan require the Alliance to change the way it operates and cooperates. By **Kori Schake**

NATO has much to be proud of, both during and after the Cold War: enemies found the basis for cooperation, the United States was woven into European security, new missions and new members were adopted as the security environment evolved, creative compromises were found for seemingly irreconcilable contradictions. The Dual Track decision to both deploy modernized nuclear weapons and negotiate their withdrawal was the quintessential NATO *coup de grâce*. Patterns of cooperation were established through the minuet of civilian and military consultation that have served both the United States and Europe extraordinarily well.

But there are reasons to be skeptical that the Alliance can find common ground on current threats and future areas of cooperation. The Afghanistan mission is revealing how cost-ineffective our approach is relative to that of enemies such as the Taliban. The nature of new threats requires participation by non-defense agencies that NATO allies are loathed to bring into Alliance deliberations. Unless the Alliance addresses these issues it will find that its efforts to project security outside Europe will prove impossible.

Europeans have fought in Afghanistan out of affection for America, but European publics have not been persuaded that European security is defended at the Hindu Kush. Even most European security experts consider terrorism an internal policing matter, rather than a problem amenable to the projection of military power. By and large, European publics want their governments to make their homeland safe, not to help make the world safe from terror. The Afghanistan experience is more likely to cause Europeans to pull in their strategic horizon than further expand it. Europeans do not yet accept they are on a common global mission that is about universal values.

Warfare is always asymmetric against thinking adversaries: they probe for and exploit our weaknesses. NATO countries excel in the domain of force-on-force military engagements; no adversary could expect to fight NATO militaries and win. But they could drag NATO countries into a slow stalemate during which our public support for prosecuting the war erodes. This appears to be the approach those we are fighting in Afghanistan have adopted. And we strengthen their hand in two crucial ways: by holding our military forces to a zero-error standard; and by ceding political control of events to Afghans. We have boxed ourselves into a self-defeating situation where success is much, much more difficult and costly for us to achieve than it is for our adversaries.

Terrorism is, sadly, not the only threat – and perhaps not even the predominant one – NATO countries face. Strong enemies are as likely to choose asymmetric warfare as weak ones. We have already experienced successful attacks on transportation systems (the use of airplanes in the 9/11 attacks, subway bombings in London, trains targeted in Spain) and communications (cyber attacks against Estonia and Georgia), and we have seen Russian energy resources used for blackmail against their neighbors. Systemic attacks against American and European networks of transport, communications, finance and supplies of energy cannot be far behind. They are simply too lucrative a target set for those who would wish to sow panic in the powerful, comfortable and self-satisfied West.

Moreover, our networks are vulnerable in significant ways. The expansiveness of our road, rail, pipeline, and electrical systems makes protection expensive and difficult. They are public-private partnerships in most NATO countries, with distrust of government involvement by the private sector in some states and outright state ownership in others. Agreeing to a common means of protection is nearly impossible, yet attacks against these networks would have global repercussions. Responding to attacks would be a matter for domestic agencies, yet the Alliance might view such attacks as an "Article Five" matter requiring common defense. Effective

A soldier from the 2nd Battalion Mercian Regiment provides security at a patrol base in July, 2009 as part of a five-week offensive against the Taliban in southern Afghanistan. Operation Panther's Claw involved around 3,000 British troops backed by U.S., Danish and other NATO units

action to protect our modern networks would fall hostage to high policy debates over the respective "competences" of national governments, the European Union, and NATO even as our adversaries pounce. These factors are likely to make communications, transport, financial, and energy networks the targets of choice for those who would damage the West. It's a dream confluence of difficulties for an adversary to exploit, and we are ill-prepared to handle these problems.

existing "NATO plus" practices that incorporate a collective EU presence. NATO has worked very creatively with non-NATO force contributors, such as Australia, on missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan, including them in reviews of operational plans and giving them decision-making influence. Giving the EU an institutional role would facilitate addressing threats that are not traditional defense, but for which we want a trans-Atlantic management structure. This

and National Guard equivalents to our defense ministers and military leaders meeting to develop a common threat perception; identify the means needed to counter threats; determine in which country's assets those means exist; and stitch together an agreed program of terms under which national assets would be employed to collective threats. NATO is just fine at managing traditional defense threats. It is still struggling to establish in Afghanistan its capabilities in

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If the NATO countries are to build a means to respond cooperatively to these new threats, we must get past the doctrinal debates about where to manage the problem. There is no ideal existing forum for attacks against civilian infrastructure that have the purpose of creating havoc in our ability to defend our interests. One way (perhaps more achievable now that France has returned to NATO military structures) to circumvent the EU-NATO debate would be to extend is surely the right way to incorporate like-minded states. Though we still may be undermined by European politics that might exclude Turkey and make EU-NATO cooperation more difficult.

In order to effectively bring together the government departments with domestic responsibilities and the means to manage these new threats, NATO would need to establish a parallel structure to Defense Ministerials that included interior ministers, Coast Guard projecting security "out of area."

What's needed is a whole new realm of NATO cooperation to embrace home security, interior ministers and others if we are to master the non-defense threats to our communications, transportation, financial and energy networks.

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Getting Smart

Jamie Shea asks what smart power means to the Atlantic Alliance

NATO is not usually associated with smart power. The organization's normal public profile is firmly associated with the hard power instruments of combat troops and heavy military equipment. Although many international institutions are involved in security tasks these days, including peacekeeping and reconstruction from Afghanistan to Africa, NATO usually finds itself occupying the more kinetic end of the spectrum. Indeed, after the Alliance's relatively casualty-free experience in the Balkans in the 1990s, Afghanistan has seen NATO forces involved in intensive combat with casualty figures that many Allies have not had to cope with since World War II or Korea.

This said, and if we take a broad perspective, NATO has certainly learned to use its military forces in more diverse and versatile ways than when they stood sentry at Checkpoint Charlie and along the Fulda Gap. Since NATO began to intervene in the Bosnian conflict in 1992, the Allies have launched naval embargoes in the Adriatic, no-fly zones over Bosnia, air campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo, peace

U.S. military commander Lieutenant Colonel William Clark (right) listens to Afghan tribal leaders and district officials at Camp Costell at the forward operating base of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Spin Boldak, southern Afghanistan, October 5, 2009

NATO's approach to smart power is to be ready to use its military capabilities in ever more multifaceted ways

implementation missions in both these places, counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan, training missions in Africa, Iraq and Afghanistan, and counter-terrorism and counter-piracy missions using naval forces in the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Aden. Moreover, NATO has also been prepared to deploy forces to deal with humanitarian disasters, most notably in the wake of the Kashmir earthquake in 2006.

The Alliance's added value in responding to crises is its ability to mount military operations, using an unrivaled integrated planning and command structure. Those military operations, as we have seen in the Balkans and Afghanistan, are vital if an environment of security is to be created for reconstruction, governance and longer-term development. NATO knows what it is good at, and sticks to it.

The Alliance is not about to acquire civilian capabilities or to compete with institutions, such as the UN, EU or World Bank, in areas where they have far more experience and expertise. Rather, NATO's approach to smart power is to be ready and technically able to use its military capabilities in ever more multifaceted ways, to respond to the complex needs of modern stabilization operations.

For instance, in Afghanistan today the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force is running combat missions, provincial reconstruction teams, election support, training courses for the Afghan National Army and police and cross-border defense diplomacy with Pakistan. It is not only the ability to do all these things at once, but also to shift emphasis rapidly as the security situation changes, that defines the smart power challenge for NATO today.

In this context, there are three specific challenges that the Alliance will need to master if it is to successfully convert classical hard power to modern-day smart power.

One is the comprehensive approach, which is the NATO parlance for the Alliance's increasing need to interact with other international organizations on the ground in Afghanistan and elsewhere. If those other international organizations are not engaged to a similar degree and with comparable resources, NATO's military efforts in clearing territory of insurgents are not backed up by governance and development programs. It is not only the Afghans, but also NATO's own public opinions who then become frustrated by the lack of progress.

Today it would be more accurate to speak of a "comprehensive attitude" than a truly comprehensive approach. All the major institutions pay homage to the need to work together, but that does not mean to say that they actually find it easy to do so on the ground. In part this is because the major institutions often have different geographical priorities. The UN has devoted a great deal of time and attention to Africa; the EU has also been active in Africa and the Middle East, whereas NATO has tended to focus on the Balkans and Afghanistan. So, having a clearer sense of the mission priorities among the major institutions will help to drive the comprehensive approach in a more top-down fashion.

The other aspect of the issue is to have better coordination of effort and more joint planning between the civilian and military aspects of reconstruction. Security operations must more directly assist governance and development plans, and the latter can be prioritized in those areas where they can most immediately help to fill the security vacuum. Benjamin Franklin's famous dictum that "we must all hang together or we shall all hang separately" has never been more true. The comprehensive approach, whereby NATO's security responsibilities are increasingly transferred to the Afghan security forces and the Taliban are driven away by good governance and economic development as much as by NATO's guns, is the Alliance's only viable exit strategy from Afghanistan.

The second area where NATO can bring its smart power to bear more effectively is in the area of partnerships. Nearly 20 countries that are not members of NATO

Right: U.S. Army soldiers prepare to fire a 155mm field artillery piece at a Taliban fighting position near forward operating base Blessing, September 11, 2009 in Nangalam, Afghanistan

contribute to its mission in Afghanistan, many, such as Australia, with troops and combat forces. This is not only a more equitable form of burden-sharing but also adds to the Alliance's legitimacy as the center of a broad international coalition. Others, such as Japan, contribute finance to NATO's Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

NATO is not a global organization, but its ability to act globally depends increasingly on its ability to sustain this broad network of partnership relations. As partners have been very willing to contribute, they have also been relatively undemanding; but as they also suffer casualties and face a loss of public support at home, it will be important that NATO does not take the partners for granted, but is careful to consult them and involve them fully in planning and decision shaping. Moreover, many of NATO's partners do not contribute to operations with troops, but that does not make them any less important to NATO's success. They may be needed to provide temporary bases, or to provide over-flights or intelligence or to contribute to counter narcotics efforts and so on.

The more NATO is able to build a relationship of trust with its partners, the easier it will be to resolve complex legal issues, such as status of forces agreements, when the time comes. Partners can also be invaluable if NATO is to develop serious programs to deal with new security challenges such as energy cut-offs, or cyber attacks, or threats to the international land and maritime supply routes. NATO will have to think harder about how it can make itself more attractive to the partners by involving them more closely. Breathing more life into consultation mechanisms like the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Council and the Alliance's Mediterranean and Middle Eastern dialogues, will certainly be a priority area for the new Alliance's Strategic Concept.

Finally, even if we talk of smart power, this concept will only be meaningful if there is also power behind the new smart approaches and the new smart thinking. In NATO's case, this will mean improving substantially on its current reservoir of military capabilities, particularly in areas such as helicopters, transport aircraft, intelligence gathering assets and naval vessels, which have been all too scarce in NATO's recent operations. At a time of financial crunch, spending tight defense budgets on the right things will be even more important, as will the development of more multinational solutions, such as NATO's recently acquired C17 transport aircraft and Allied Ground Surveillance Capability. NATO and the EU will also have to work doubly hard to avoid duplicating their research and development activities and spending money twice on expensive training activities for the NATO and EU Rapid Reaction Forces. NATO's nations will also have to focus more on doing what they do best and in role specialization. Even today, 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, having more than two-thirds of NATO forces in units that cannot be deployed beyond their territories is not the best application of smart power.

Smart power is the effective marriage of hard and soft power. Provided they are efficiently plugged into an international system of cooperation and joint action, NATO's capabilities are certainly the first stop whenever North America and Europe need to defend their security interests and solve major security crises. Of course, smart power only becomes smart when it is used in an effective way and in service of the right strategy. Too often, however, strategic reviews become disguised ways of compensating for the absence of resources and capabilities.

Clearly in the 21st century, in which NATO has to deal with a much broader spectrum of challenges than during the Cold War and conduct many missions simultaneously, it will be important for NATO to focus on the threats that can affect its security most and areas where it truly adds value. Certain tasks are really better left to other organizations. This said, although NATO cannot prosper without the engagement of the rest of the international community, it is equally true that the international community will continue to need the backbone of NATO. Smart power is, therefore, not the prerequisite of any single institution, but the result of those institutions learning to work better together.

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NATO: A Bridge Across Time

NATO is constantly adapting and transforming in order to maintain security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. By **James G. Stavridis**

Six decades ago the foreign ministers of 12 nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D.C. In doing so, they built a geographic and geopolitical bridge between North America and Europe, a cultural bridge between diverse peoples, and a temporal bridge that today spans from the 20th century to the 21st.

Like any bridge, NATO has swayed under the force of the winds of change. Its pillars, anchored on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law grow stronger even as the bridge grows longer.

The last 20 years have been particularly dynamic. For those paying attention to the events unfolding as a consequence of *perestroika* and *glasnost*, the fall of the Berlin Wall was another step in the journey towards economic restructuring and political liberalization. But it was far more than that; it was a crucial moment in the collapse of totalitarianism and communism in Europe.

As the walls once confining both people and ideas collapsed, the world transitioned from a bipolar world bounded by the ideological struggle between Soviet communism and Western liberalism to a multi-polar world defined by globalization and the rapid flow of information, ideas, and ideologies.

The Berlin Wall fell with an echo felt around the world. Before the dust settled, the "Velvet Revolution" led communists in Prague to step down; the Romanians overthrew dictator Nicolae Ceausescu; Hungarians elected a non-communist government; Germany re-unified; Poland elected a pro-democracy President, Lech Walesa; the Baltic States gained their independence; and the Soviet Union ultimately dissolved – all in a period of just over two years.

The 18 years following were no less turbulent, and it is during those years that NATO changed the most. Following the end of the Cold War, Europe's political and military landscapes transformed, and NATO's role and purpose re-examined. In mid-1991 NATO affirmed its unwillingness to accept any coercion or intimidation against emerging democracies in Eastern Europe. Later that year, the Alliance completed a Strategic Concept emphasizing improved and expanded security for Europe as a whole. NATO responded to the evolving security conditions, which for five decades were focused on containing communism and Soviet encroachment on Western Europe, by promoting security at a strategic distance.

Fortunately, the tensions of the Cold War never erupted into major military conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the 1990s saw NATO reaching eastward with an invitation to former Warsaw Pact nations to join in a "Partnership for Peace." The trans-Atlantic bridge continued expanding as NATO welcomed Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the Alliance in 1999 – the first such expansion since 1982.

In the final years of the 20th century, NATO engaged in combat in the Balkans, where it stemmed the tides of violence and helped establish conditions favorable to the Dayton Peace Accord. Almost 13,000 NATO troops remain in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina today to assure a secure environment and ensure NATO's mission there is viewed as a success for decades to come.

As the 20th century came to a close, NATO leaders developed yet another Strategic Concept to contend with 21st-century challenges. The 1999 Strategic Concept reaffirmed the importance of the

"NATO is broadly engaged in a complex multi-polar world"

Members of the NATO-led Kosovo force test a reconstructed bridge in the village of Gadime, some 25km south of the Kosovo capital Pristina, October 5, 2004

trans-Atlantic link and of maintaining the Alliance's military capabilities. But it also acknowledged that Alliance security interests can be impacted by a wide range of challenges, including terrorism, sabotage, organized crime, and the disruption of the flow of resources.

As the 21st century dawned, NATO was postured for conflict prevention and crisis management; partnership, cooperation, discourse and enlargement; and arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. Against this backdrop, Article Five was invoked in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States – the first such invocation of the bedrock principle of collective defense – and the pillars of the trans-Atlantic bridge were strengthened when Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia became new members in 2004, and Albania and Croatia joined the Alliance in 2009.

Recognizing that preserving Euro-Atlantic security requires looking outward as much as looking inward, NATO took command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan in 2003. Today NATO forces, along with those of 15 non-NATO partner nations assigned to the International Security Assistance Force, stand and fight shoulder-to-shoulder with Afghans. Together, they are working tirelessly to erode the foundations of terror and tyranny and enable the democratically elected government of Afghanistan to build the confidence and trust vital to wresting that country from the grip of insurgency.

NATO forces are also in Iraq where the NATO Training Mission provides mentoring, advice and instruction to Iraqi security forces and it can be found at sea as part of Operation Active Endeavor, where it is resolute in deterring, disrupting, and protecting against terrorism in the Mediterranean – and also off the Horn of Africa, where as part of Operation Ocean Shield it safeguards those strategic waterways from the scourge of piracy.

NATO is broadly engaged in a complex multi-polar world. Today, the 80,000 men and women of NATO, representing 28 member nations, are found across three continents resolutely committed to each other – stronger together – as actors in a globalized world. Our civilian leaders are likewise engaged and developing a new Strategic Concept to address the family of challenges of the coming decades.

Considering how well NATO has adapted to the security environment over the past 20 years, the outlook of NATO adapting to future threats and challenges is quite bright. Those challenges include NATO's missions in Afghanistan and the Balkans, piracy, terrorism, cyber security, global pandemics, climate change, energy flows, poverty and urbanization, migration, an aging population, and their implications to the security of NATO's member states and its partners.

The above challenges are indicative of the diversity of real-world threats to trans-Atlantic security and underscore the need to deliver comprehensive security that balances the countering of conventional threats with preparing for unforeseen or emerging ones; hard power with soft power; military force with civilian expertise and capabilities; a Euro-centric approach with a broader global approach; and fixed defensive forces with a flexible and deployable force.

NATO's continued adaptation to emerging threats make NATO an organization capable of protecting our collective interests and providing the comprehensive security that its member nations and their citizens have come to expect and deserve.

During the long decades to come, NATO will remain a bridge to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region as long as it remains resolute in its efforts to provide balanced and comprehensive security to its member nations, bridges the gaps of understanding with its former adversaries, lives up to its role as an actor in a globalized world, and remains determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of its peoples guided by the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.

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A Sponsor of Good Governance

Chris Donnelly asks, how can NATO help countries to achieve better statecraft and governance?

September 10, 1968: Soviet troops march through the streets of Prague, Czechoslovakia

The fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union created a particular problem for which Western countries were not prepared: none of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe – not even Russia – had the national governmental institutions they needed to function as a democracy and a market economy. Russia alone had institutions and experienced staff that could function in a sovereign state. Warsaw Pact countries such as Czechoslovakia had national institutions, but on many national and international issues they were only mouthpieces of Moscow without any real capacity for policy-making. Smaller countries emerging from the former USSR had no national

institutions and very little expertise available in how to run a government department in an independent country.

But if these countries newly emerging or re-emerging as sovereign states lacked the institutions and expertise for government, they did not lack "men with guns" – soldiers, militarized policemen, border guards, security and intelligence services. There was a real and immediate potential threat to the reestablishment of democracy from militaries and quasi-military bodies whose members – particularly the officer corps – were by no means universally happy with the turn of events. These men (there were virtually no women in significant posts) had, after all, been first and foremost the guardians of communism rather than the guardians of their nations. The officers had all been volunteers to defend the system. But at one stroke they had lost their salaries, their pensions, their ideology and, in the case of the USSR, their country too. The outbreak of violent conflicts in several places on the periphery of the former USSR showed just how dangerous the situation was.

In hindsight, it is remarkable that the dissolution of such a vast empire was accomplished with so little violence and that, in most places, the armed forces were not a block to democratization. Much of the credit for this must go to the soldiers, policemen and agents themselves, whose common sense, patriotism, professionalism and sense of duty quickly won out over their sense of outrage, and resentment and betrayal. There was no mass military move to prevent the "revolutions" of 1989 or to halt the break up of the USSR. But for many months the armies and quasi-military forces in Eastern Europe existed in an uneasy, and often difficult, situation. Gradually the tension eased and the complex and painful process of reform began.

From start to finish NATO played a very significant role in this process. This is an aspect of the Alliance's work that is often little known and appreciated outside close official circles. It led to NATO gaining new areas of expertise that are very applicable in many other parts of the world today.

As soon as the political changes got underway in Central Europe, NATO's military and civilian staff began to engage with the military establishments of their former Warsaw Pact opponents. There is always a common bond, a basis of understanding, between soldiers of any nation, and this common feeling often enabled good working relationships to be made at an earlier stage than was possible in political circles, where uncertainty, suspicion and apprehension still hindered contacts and communication. NATO staffs very quickly realized that there was going to be a very big problem in all Central and Eastern European countries with what

1989 population totals behind the Wall

1. U.S.S.R. 290,938,469
2. Poland 38,169,841
3. Romania 23,153,475
4. East Germany 16,111,000
5. Czechoslovakia 15,658,079
6. Hungary 10,566,944
7. Bulgaria 8,972,724



Figures: 1989 est.

became known as "democratic control of armed forces." The relationship between the "men with guns" and their new political leaderships would need to be rebuilt on an entirely new basis. The armed forces of Central and Eastern Europe would have to be massively reduced and totally reorganized in a very short time. The governments and parliaments would have to develop effective and acceptable mechanisms of democratic control. The publics of Central and Eastern European countries would have to learn to love and support their armies, police forces and security services – not always an easy transition to make.

The first reaction of the newly formed democratic governments of Central and Eastern Europe, as soon as they realized the problem, was to ask for the "NATO model" of democratic control. In some cases, governments expected NATO to step in and take control – for the "comrades in Brussels" to replace the comrades in Moscow. It took some time to get over the message that there was no single "NATO model" and that the essence of independence was, well, independence. Establishing the relationship between army, government and people is not only a fundamental issue for any sovereign country, it is also a relationship that differs widely from country to country. Each country has to work out its own model, and work out how to handle the tension that always exists between government and army in a democracy.

But although NATO could not step in to take charge of Central Europe's military forces and there was no NATO template to apply to establish control, NATO could help – indeed NATO was at this time the only international organization with expertise. As NATO officials and officials (military and civilian) from NATO member nations became involved, it rapidly became clear that there were three areas in particular where NATO could play an important role.

Military Strength NATO vs. Warsaw Pact*

Personnel:
3.6 million vs. 3.7 million

Tanks:
51,500 vs. 59,500

Artillery:
43,400 vs. 71,600

**Pravda* newspaper Jan. 1989

Firstly, there was the destruction of the Cold War "enemy image." NATO HQ in Brussels and subordinate military HQs such as the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and Allied Forces Southern Europe threw open their doors to visits from military and political staffs from Central and Eastern Europe, embracing their former adversaries both physically and metaphorically. A process of "getting to know one another" began, which rapidly gained momentum and spread from the military into other areas of the body politic.

Secondly, NATO began the process of educating military and civilian leaders on the various philosophies and mechanisms of "democratic control" that had evolved in NATO member nations to suit the very different national circumstances. As the Partnership for Peace (PfP) process developed, this became the principle mechanism whereby civilian officials from Central and Eastern European countries gained practical education and experience, not only in procedures and mechanisms for democratic control of armed forces, but also in the mechanisms and procedures for foreign and security policy development.

Thirdly, NATO promoted an understanding of the need for fundamental reform of armed forces and other security agencies. The structure and function of an army or a police force in a totalitarian state is fundamentally different from that in a democratic one. The transition to democracy was very painful. NATO's engagement, and the work done by member nations, which was often

Red Army troops parade in honor of Nikita Khrushchev's visit

initiated from or coordinated in Brussels, did a great deal to ensure that this painful transition was completed in a way which would not threaten the new and often fragile democratic processes developing.

This practical help was not confined to Headquarters or to senior officers. NATO member nations set up training schools and new-style military academies in the newly independent Central and Eastern European states. The most telling success of these programs to assist reform was in the way the soldiers of the newly reformed armies were treated by their officers. Maltreatment of conscripts was a serious social problem in the Soviet and Warsaw Pact armies. After 1991, this tradition was set to continue in the legacy armies. It took a lot of effort to introduce humane terms of service and re-educate officers to treat soldiers with respect. But the outcome has been to make Central and Eastern European populations proud of their soldiers and proud to serve.

As the 1990s rolled on, the progress made in reform and democratization of the defense establishments of Central and Eastern European countries was gradually spread to influence firstly police forces, border guards and security services; and secondly, central non-military functions of government. NATO, simply put, became a sponsor of good governance, and remains so to this day.

The primary influence, and most powerful incentive, was NATO's establishing democratic mechanisms and procedures as a *sine qua non* of membership. The EU, of course, also had this as a qualification for membership. But as the EU was far less easily accessible and further in the future for most Central and Eastern European countries, it was NATO that took the lead. Having set standards for membership, NATO member nations could not but help candidate countries to achieve these standards.

Throughout the latter half of the 1990s, programs sponsored by NATO and NATO member nations were instrumental in leading not just the military reform, but also the democratic reform process in many Central and Eastern European countries. The help given was eminently practical. It was not only re-education of officer corps. It was also the education of civilian officials so that they could effectively set up and man the newly created institutions of government and democratic control.

It was the design of the institutions themselves, and it was the spread of defense and security expertise to publics for whom this had previously been secret, forbidden territory. This was done through the sponsoring of newly created NGOs, strategic studies institutes, university departments, think tanks; through education courses run locally in Brussels for journalists, academics and teachers; and, through enrolling Central and Eastern European civilians and military personnel on courses in Western institutions.

Working initially independently and later with institutions such as Transparency International, NATO fostered the development of good governance and anti-corruption programs both for central government and for the defense and defense industrial sectors in the new democracies. The Defence Academy of the U.K. is now the PfP center of excellence for good governance and leads the academic establishments of the Alliance and partner countries in developing this topic and promoting it on a wide scale.

While the programs with Central and Eastern European central governmental and military establishments were initiated and run primarily by the major departments (divisions) of NATO international staff and international military staff, many of the programs with NGOs and those aimed at civil society were frequently sponsored by NATO's Science for Peace program.

This had long existed to bring scientists of NATO countries together to collaborate on civilian science projects, ranging from astronomy to medicine. The program was now harnessed to open up the previously closed, highly militarized scientific establishments of Central and Eastern European countries, linking them to their NATO counterparts and showing the way to civilianization. It was extended to address social sciences and democratization, and came to have a huge influence on the transformation of

the civilian educational sector in Central Europe to democratic practices.

Lastly, but by no means least, the opening of NATO's central institutions to participation by Central and Eastern European leaderships provided, in most cases, the first multi-national environment in which the newly elected democratic leaders could meet their experienced Western counterparts and learn how to move and act in international diplomatic circles.

The NATO acronym has two well-known Cold War period alternative expansions: "No Action, Talk Only," and "Needs Alcohol to Operate." Both these proved true in a most specific sense. No one today doubts NATO's willingness and ability to act. But one of NATO's greatest achievements is that, over the 60 years of its existence, it has developed mechanisms that get nations talking rather than fighting over their disagreements. The Council, ministerial meetings and summit meetings and the many and various committees all provided for Central and Eastern European countries the mechanisms for dialogue and debate that had been so painfully absent in their previous existence. The wine shared over the NATO Ambassadors' dining tables and after hours in the NATO restaurant helped fuel the development of many a diplomatic relationship or solve many a political problem. It is easy to overlook this feature, or dismiss it as peripheral or trivial. But it is an integral part of the process of dialogue and consensus building that is so basic to NATO, so all-pervasive, that it is frequently taken for granted. In fact, it is one of NATO's greatest assets, and should be recognized for what it is.

So far we have discussed the development of what amounts to a massive program of sponsoring good governance solely in terms of NATO's support to the democratization and transformation of the former Soviet and Warsaw pact adversaries. But the program has now spread far beyond these beginnings. To be sure, the program is still very important in those Central and Eastern European countries that are not yet members. Ukraine is one of the biggest beneficiaries, and the progress that Ukrainian governmental institutions have made in comparison to those in some neighboring countries is good evidence of how effective NATO help can be, even if this is not widely recognized.

But NATO's influence has spread much wider. Firstly, NATO experience has been instrumental in promoting and supporting the democratization, demilitarization and reform programs of the EU and UN, through which organizations experience gained by NATO from the early 1990s onwards is now applied worldwide.

Secondly, NATO has been an "information exchange" for its members. Allies' own national institutions, which now send teams around the world to deliver education in democratization, gained a lot of their own experience working with Allies and partners and sharing knowledge.

Thirdly, the creation of the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative has for some years enabled the experience gained in the transformation process in Central Europe to be applied to countries of the Mediterranean and "Broader Middle East." These countries continue to be very active, particularly in the scientific and civil sectors where NATO educational activities fill a much-needed gap in their societies. Initially, there was some concern that the experience gained in European countries would not in fact be applicable in the different cultural environment of the Middle East and North Africa. There are certainly cultural adjustments to be made. But in practice, experience has shown that, in the main, the lessons learned in Central Europe are highly applicable in other continents and cultures.

It is this that is the real message for the future. NATO's experience since the fall of the Berlin Wall shows that many issues of democracy and good governance are of concern to all societies, notwithstanding cultural differences. African countries that face serious problems of governance, corruption, or control of their armed forces frequently think that these problems are unique to them, that no one understands or can help, and that the problems are so great as to be insurmountable. Nothing could be further from the truth.

If NATO's experience has shown anything, it is that all societies face much the same challenges, albeit in different measure and at different times in their history. NATO has now amassed an enormous wealth of experience and expertise in this area and is ready and able to share it. The mechanisms that NATO has created for dialogue and consensus building are unique in their effectiveness, even if NATO member nations today do not use them to full advantage. These mechanisms are, for example, the envy of Pacific Rim countries, which today face some old-fashioned military challenges without a NATO to bring them all together to talk.

If there is a negative side to this success story, then it is that, as NATO moves forward into military and security operations around the world, projecting its member and partner nations' power to stabilize distant regions and bring security to troubled areas, there is a tendency to forget, and perhaps even neglect, the bedrock of mechanisms and procedures for dialog and consensus-building on which the Alliance is based, and which have evolved so much since November 1989. These mechanisms and procedures are perhaps NATO's greatest treasure. But they could be lost if we fail to appreciate them for what they are.

Chris Donnelly is Director of the Institute for Statecraft and Governance.

Soviet soldiers are told that all Soviet troops in Kabul have withdrawn. February 6, 1989

Breaking Down the Barriers

Political friendships in the 21st century can be ambiguous. But, says **Shuja Nawaz**, a culture of suspicion can only do more harm than good

The 21st century has ushered in changes in the global political landscape that demand a transformation of the mindset of policymakers around the globe. NATO and the European Union no longer inhabit a world of black and white, with a clear and defined set of antagonists and allies. Global issues that bring together North America and Europe and help create partnerships with other countries around the world too often separate the allies.

Climate change, trade, energy dependence, and access to resources of the international financial institutions – all these issues create different dynamics among nations and groups of nations. Political allies become economic competitors. A U.S.-India civilian nuclear deal may be celebrated one day, but a bitter battle between these two "friends" erupts the next day, when discussions on greenhouse gases takes place in the context of global warming. China and the U.S. become co-dependent in trade but clash on the environment. Similarly, a West dependent on Middle Eastern oil finds itself coping with hostility on political issues such as Israel and the rights of the Palestinians, or the management of the international financial institutions. And some denizens of the Muslim world have sworn lasting enmity against some Western nations. Yes, most of the attackers that took part in the suicide missions against the United States on September 11, 2001 were from the U.S.'s major Middle East ally: Saudi Arabia.

Today, the United States is Pakistan's major trading partner and supplier of economic assistance. Yet, according to an August 2009 poll by the Pew Research

Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami party supporters at a march towards the U.S. embassy in Islamabad on August 18, 2009. The protest was against the expansion of the U.S. embassy and deployment of further U.S. Marines to guard it

East German soldiers cordon off the border line in front of West Berliners waiting to welcome East Berliners at Checkpoint Charlie, 1989

Center, some 64 percent of Pakistanis surveyed regard the United States as an enemy of Pakistan.

How does one explain these contradictory trends? How should one attempt to unravel these issues and improve relationships between countries? What are the barriers that remain today, and how can we dismantle them?

A basic problem that affects relationships between the West and the rest of the world has been the focus on government-to-government ties. Somehow, the post-World War II relationships that brought the people of North America and Europe together got lost in the noise and confusion of the 20th century. It became harder for friends of the United States in Europe and other parts of the world to relate to the United States as a congeries of peoples, much like themselves, and devoted to helping others and understanding them. Overarching themes, such as the Cold War, began guiding relationships. Alliances were struck by the West, not with countries but with ruling elites or often single individuals that ruled with an iron fist. This confused the inhabitants of the new nations of the world that were emerging from colonialism. How could the nations that espoused democratic values be blind to the depredations of their allied rulers in the Third World?

Today, similar mistakes continue to be made. In pursuit of a "global war on terror" or to assure access to energy resources, relationships are being fostered with rulers, not with the people of the countries they rule. Those people see a major disconnect between the principles the Western alliance stands for at home and the actions that Western governments appear to be taking abroad. A much sharper focus needs to be put on relations with civil society and economic partners inside the countries that the West wants as friends. Greater social and cultural interaction and a greater ability of the people of the world to travel to the West would help eliminate some of

the emerging barriers of distrust. Yet, the emphasis on security seems to be working the other way: bringing down the shutters on social intercourse and especially travel. The default option seems to be: suspect everyone in order to prevent the very few that mean us harm. The result is that we anger and antagonize most of our potential partners in the countries that we need as friends. And we fall back on dealing with the complaint leaders. The disconnect widens. The militants inside developing societies profit from that widening gap.

The West needs to come up with better, less intrusive means of vetting travelers from the developing world so everyone is not treated as a "suspect" and considered "guilty until proven innocent." Arbitrary detention and deportation do not help create friends for the West either. As Western populations age, their economies will badly need an infusion of labor from these countries. They should begin preparing for that. Even Japan, a bastion of purity in terms of its national population,

The "we" and "they" syndrome fosters the creation of new barriers

has opened the doors, though somewhat grudgingly, to other nationalities. Yes, this will change the nature of Western societies as we know them today. But it will also make them stronger and more resilient, and more aware of global pluralism. Along with greater labor mobility across the globe, the West needs to follow its own economic precepts and allow for freer trade, knocking down tariff and non-tariff barriers alike, so the less developed parts of the world can benefit from increased trade opportunities and help themselves. Over time, this would help reduce aid dependency. But this can only be done if civic and political leaders exhibit the vision that will transform them from simple leaders to statesmen.

Talking about Islamic militancy also creates a division. The "we" and "they" syndrome fosters the creation of new barriers, much more divisive than the Berlin Wall. Instead of resorting to such broad characterizations of the Muslim world, we must recognize the causes of unrest and militancy, and the West must be seen as aiding and abetting the forces of change and modernity inside those countries, not the anachronistic power structures or autocrats who serve the West's short-term interests. When the West's actions begin matching its pronouncements of the principles of freedom and democracy, the barriers will begin to crumble.

Most denizens of the Muslim world seek a voice in their own government. They resent the privileged access to state resources of the connected few. When they stand up to dictators and hereditary rulers who do not respect their own people, the West needs to stand by them, as it did with the people of East Berlin. And it must do so consistently. Only such actions will bring down the emerging barriers across the globe.

Shuja Nawaz is the Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council of the United States in Washington D.C. He is the author of **Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within** ***(Oxford University Press 2008) and*** **FATA: A Most Dangerous Place** ***(CSIS, 2009).***

A New Frontier In Democracy Assistance

David L. Phillips explores how best to promote democracy going forward, in the Obama administration and across the Atlantic

While the end of the Cold War signaled a victory for the forces of democracy, today's global setting is in flux and democracy faces an uncertain future. Democracy assistance no longer consists of consolidating pro-democracy movements through training, capacity building and technical support. Current challenges require new approaches that are more responsive and relevant, especially in the Arab and Muslim world where extremists reject democracy as a Western construct. The U.S. should not falter from championing democracy. Not only is democracy the best system of governance to realize human potential, it also advances U.S. national security by providing a political alternative to those who might otherwise mistakenly conclude that they can advance their aspirations through sensational violence.

Critics of U.S. democracy assistance at home and abroad point to the Iraq War, where the promotion of democracy was used to justify military action post-facto. Even authoritarians who are friendly to the United States resent calls for democracy, insisting that democracy assistance is really a Trojan horse for undermining regimes that are hostile to America's interests. They justify their resistance to democratization efforts as defense of national sovereignty and protection from foreign intervention. They label democracy activists who receive political or financial support from the United States as stooges of the West.

U.S. opponents of democracy are also cynical about America's motives. They question America's commitment to the rule of law, pointing to Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and the rendition of suspects to countries that torture. In addition, they are quick to criticize the U.S. for turning a blind eye to the abuses of its autocratic allies.

Democracy assistance typically focuses on constitutional arrangements protecting and promoting individual and minority rights. It often emphasizes electoral assistance and measures to strengthen political parties, independent media and civil society. This is anathema to political Islam, which emerged in the 20th century as an effort by fundamentalists to address challenges of the modern world. Rejecting innovation, they believe that any Muslim who deviates from Shari'a, the strict interpretation of Islamic law, is impure. Linking piety with an end to political corruption and misrule, they reject constitutional democracy as the basis for secular government that empowers human rulers over the law of God.

Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad is the primary proponent of this radical political theology. He maintains that Islam and democracy are fundamentally incompatible: "Liberalism and Western-style democracy have not been able to realize the ideals of humanity. Today, these two concepts have failed. Those with insight can already hear the sounds of the shattering and fall of the ideology and thoughts of liberal democratic systems." (Open letter to President George W. Bush, May 2006).

While Ahmedinejad believes that democracy represents the secularization of Christian and Western values and therefore lacks universal appeal, many Muslims reject fanaticism, citing Islam's traditions of pluralism, cosmopolitanism, and open-mindedness. Hundreds of millions of Muslims live in democratic countries, either as minorities or majorities in countries ranging from Turkey and Indonesia to Western Europe, and enjoy democratic freedoms. They maintain that the Islamic process of consultation is entirely consistent with democratic debate. The democracy deficit in the Arab and Muslim world is more a problem of supply than demand.

At this pivotal moment, the Obama administration would be well advised to reflect on America's Cold War experience and garner guiding principles for democracy assistance to the broader Muslim community. These principles proceed from the recognition that America's role should be to stand behind, not in front of democracy movements. The U.S. should not "lead" or "teach" democracy. It is most effective as a catalyst for change. To this end, patience is required; democratization is a process, not an event. Overheated rhetoric risks discrediting pro-democracy activists by making them appear as agents of a foreign power. The U.S. must tread softly; reform is ultimately driven by the societal demand of local stakeholders.

Without the U.S. to blame for their societal ills, voters in the Arab and Muslim world are increasingly holding their leaders accountable

There is, today, a moment of opportunity. It flows from President Barack Obama's Cairo speech (June 4, 2009), which fundamentally shifted the dynamic between Western and Muslim societies:

"I have come here to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world; one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect; and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share common principles – principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings."

Without the U.S. to blame for their societal ills, voters in the Arab and Muslim world are increasingly holding their leaders accountable. Soon after Cairo, Lebanese voters balked at a coalition including Hezbollah; Iranians voted overwhelmingly for reform candidates (according to exit polls); and Indonesia returned its secular president to power in the first round.

Reversing negative perceptions of the U.S. will require skillful public diplomacy. But restoring America's credibility requires substance as well as spin. Policies must both advance U.S. national interests and reflect favorably on America's intentions. Successful democracy assistance should be based on broader, value-based principles such as safeguarding rights and enhancing human capital through formal education systems and economic development.

In Cairo, President Obama spoke compellingly about assisting the democratic aspirations of people for democracy, freedom and justice. While his words were welcomed, the U.S. will be judged by what it does and not by what Obama says. First and foremost, restoring U.S. credibility requires more balanced and effective U.S.-led efforts aimed at realizing a viable state of Palestine alongside a secure state of Israel.

Reaching out to those directly affected by democracy assistance is also critical to restoring credibility. Right after President Obama's Cairo speech, 30 U.S. embassies surveyed civil society in countries that are part of the Arab and Muslim world to seek their views on programmatic approaches to implementing the so-called Cairo principles. The White House also launched an inter-agency task force and established a fund to support activities. The Obama administration deserves credit for "walking the talk" and dedicating resources to democracy assistance at a time when budget priorities are constrained by the financial crisis and the costs of engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Democratization of the broader Muslim community is a generational endeavor that requires international cooperation. The U.S. can leverage its democracy assistance by working with other countries and international organizations. European countries, as well as the UN, EU, OSCE and others have important roles to play supporting elections and governance. As was the case during the Cold War, democratizing the broader Muslim community will require vision and U.S. leadership. The Obama administration is off to a good start, but if there is one lesson from the Cold War it is the need for patience and partnership, with both the international community and those on the front-lines of democratic change.

***David L. Phillips is Director of the Program on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding at American University in Washington D.C. His most recent book is* From Bullets to Ballots: Violent Muslim Movements in Transition.**

Unexpected Consequences

From a single European currency to new immigration patterns, **Moisés Naím** looks at the surprising effects the end of the Soviet Union has had on Europe

The fall of the Berlin Wall was bad news for sovietologists. Thousands of spies, military officers, diplomats, professors, journalists and assorted experts made a living studying the Soviet Union. None predicted its collapse.

But if the sudden and peaceful end of the Soviet empire was a surprise, the effects of the collapse for Europe have been almost as surprising. Here are four of the unexpected consequences that the end of the Soviet Union had for Europe – and that the experts also failed to anticipate:

1. China Displaced the Soviet Union (USSR) as the Main Threat For Europeans

When the Berlin Wall fell, no one imagined that China would more directly affect the lives of Western Europeans than was ever the case for the USSR. Not because of China's military might, but as a result of its economic prowess. After World War II, Western Europe had lived under the threat of a deadly confrontation with the Soviets. Fortunately, that threat never materialized and, in practice, the daily lives of Europeans were not that affected. In contrast, the economic rise of China touches the daily lives of all Europeans: from what they pay for a TV set, to medicines, and from gasoline to their home mortgages or the possibility of finding a job. Chinese capitalism is transforming Europe far more than Soviet communism ever did.

2. The Euro

No one predicted that the fall of the Berlin Wall would stimulate the creation of a single European currency. That the Germans would be willing to leave the D-Mark or that the French would accept having a currency controlled from Frankfurt – the headquarters of the European Central Bank – were unimaginable possibilities. Or that 14 other countries would also shed their old currencies to adopt the euro. Equally impossible to imagine was a scenario where after a massive global financial crisis with devastating effects on European economies, the reserve currency for those who feared that the U.S. dollar would plummet would be the euro. The euro was a utopia and today is a reality that does not surprise anyone. And that's a surprise.

3. Europe's Geopolitical Weakness

The influence of an international alliance should be proportional to the number of nations that join it: the larger the number of nations, the more powerful the alliance. In 1960, the European alliance had six member countries, in 2003 it had 15, and today it has 27. Europe is one of the world's largest economic powers, its democracies are a model and its social policies are envied by the rest of the world. Its generous development aid is coveted by all developing countries. Yet, despite the numbers, the resources and its success, Europe's influence in world politics has been declining.

Take, for example, the defense of human rights, a core European value and a frequent goal of the European Union's international efforts. According to a study by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), the influence of the continent at the United Nations regarding

Opposite: Europe's first President, Herman Van Rompuy, and the EU's Foreign Policy Chief, Baroness Ashton, with EU leaders in Brussels. Below left: A textile factory in Taiyuan: Chinese capitalism touches the lives of all Europeans. Below right: The Mahmud Mosque in Zurich: immigrants make up about 10 percent of the population of many Western countries

human rights has plummeted. In the late 1990s, 70 percent of the countries in the United Nations supported European initiatives on human rights. Today, 117 of the 192 countries regularly vote against Europe at the United Nations. The ECFR also notes that in 2008, Europe sent more troops to Afghanistan than the United States – 500 of whom lost their lives. The EU was also at par to the United States in financial aid there. Yet, its weight in the overall strategic approach to Afghanistan is very limited. The same applies to the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Europe sends a lot of money but has little effect. The countries of the European Union do not act in a very united and determined fashion and, inevitably, this diminishes Europe's geopolitical importance in the world.

Anxiety over immigration has become a topic of daily discussion

4. Islam in Old Europe, and America in New Europe

At the height of the Cold War it would have been hard to imagine that the European public would feel more threatened by the flow of immigrants from Arab countries than from the expansion of communism in their continent – or by an armed conflict with Russia. At the time, it would have also been surprising to learn that Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic would become bastions of pro-Americanism. But these are some of the surprising realities of the post-Berlin Wall Europe. Anxiety over immigration, especially from Muslim countries, has become a topic of daily discussions from parliaments to dinner tables. The possibility that Europe could turn into "Eurabia" is a corollary of these anxieties. Today, immigrants make up about 10 percent of the population of most Western European countries, and in some large cities they reach 30 percent. Inevitably, surveys show that 57 percent of Europeans consider that in their country "there are too many foreigners." Meanwhile, in some countries of the former Soviet Union economic, political, cultural and even military pro-Americanism is flourishing. That this should happen in a continent where anti-American sentiments are common is another astonishing legacy of the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Moisés Naím is Editor in Chief of* Foreign Policy *magazine.

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The Limits of Force: The U.S. in the 21st Century

Senator Chuck Hagel, Chairman, the Atlantic Council of the United States

We are only now coming to terms with what it will take to lead in the world that has evolved in the 20 years since the Berlin Wall's fall, instructed by the hard lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan.

When I came to the Senate in 1997, the post-Cold War world was being redefined by forces no single country controlled or understood. The implosion of the Soviet Union, and a historic diffusion of economic and geopolitical power, created new influences and established new global power centers – and new threats. The events of September 11, 2001 shocked America into this reality. The 9-11 Commission pointed out that the attacks were as much about failures of our intelligence and security systems as about the terrorists' success.

The U.S. response, engaging in two wars in Iran and Afghanistan, was a 20th-century reaction to 21st-century realities. These wars have cost more than 5,100 American lives; more than 35,000 have been wounded; a trillion dollars has been spent, with billions more departing our Treasury each month. We forgot all the lessons of Vietnam and the preceding history.

No country today has the power to impose its will and values on other nations. As the new world order takes shape, America must lead by building coalitions of common interests, as we did after World War II. Then, international organizations such as the United Nations, NATO, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and GATT (now the World Trade Organization) – while flawed – established boundaries for human and government conduct and expectations that helped keep the world from drifting into World War III. They generally made life better for most people worldwide during the second half of the 20th century.

Our greatest threats today come from the regions left behind after World War II and the Cold War. Addressing these threats will require a foreign policy underpinned by engagement – in other words, active diplomacy but not appeasement. We need a clearly defined strategy that accounts for the interconnectedness and the shared interests of all nations. Every great threat to the United States – whether economic, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, health pandemics, environmental degradation, energy, or water and food shortages – also threatens our global partners and rivals.

Global collaboration does not mean retreating from our standards, values or sovereignty. Development of seamless networks of intelligence gathering and sharing, and strengthening alliances, diplomatic cooperation, trade and development can make the biggest long-term difference and have the most lasting impact on building a more stable and secure world. There really are people and organizations committed to destroying America and other free countries, and we and our allies need agile, flexible and strong militaries to face these threats. How, when and where we use force are as important as the decision to use it. Relying on the use of force as a centerpiece of our global strategy, as we have in recent years, is economically, strategically and politically unsustainable and will result in unnecessary tragedy – especially for the men and women, and their families, who serve our country.

Adapted from Senator Hagel's article in the* Washington Post*, September 3, 2009.



Being a soldier in an operational theatre can sometimes be a lonely feeling but Finmeccanica is always there in support. A multitude of sensors involving unique advanced technologies, together with systems to fuse the information and novel communications, place the soldier at the centre of an infantry hub to provide constant situational awareness and robust self-protection. These capabilities represent the combined efforts of more than 73,000 people across the globe where, together with our soldier, all are working towards a safer world.

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