The April 6 Youth Movement is calling for large-scale demonstrations on the anniversary of the January 25 uprising. With final election results expected on January 7, the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party reiterated assurances that it will seek to build a coalition with liberal and secular forces. Meanwhile, Mubarak's prosecutor recommended the death penalty for the former president and other officials.
With a strong performance in the third round of voting for the People's Assembly, which included the traditional Muslim Brotherhood strongholds of Gharbiya and Daqahliyya, the Freedom and Justice Party could hold an outright majority in the People’s Assembly.
Just one day before the end of the historic 2011, the Egyptian authorities could not bring themselves to end the year without undertaking actions that, yet again, have provoked domestic and international criticism. On December 29, several democracy and human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were stormed by combined police and army forces, accompanied by investigators from the General Prosecutor’s office. The raid targeted 17 offices of 10 NGOs on the grounds that they were illegally operating and accepting international assistance without the required registration permits, according to the Egyptian Middle East News Agency (MENA). This is part of a broader investigation launched by the government earlier this year into foreign funding and alleged violations of Egypt’s highly restrictive law regulating NGOs, Law No. 84/2002. Of the 10 organizations targeted in the raid, six have officially confirmed break-ins: The Arab Center for Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession (ACIJLP); the Budgetary and Human Rights Observatory; the German Konrad Adenauer –Stiftung (KAS), and the American National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and Freedom House. These NGOs reported that their offices were raided and sealed by military and police personnel, who confiscated documents and computers.
In a collective response, over 31 groups led by the Cairo Institute for Human Rights (CIHR) expressed their concern and outrage in a statement condemning the break-ins. They appealed to the international community and accused the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) of spearheading a campaign since July to defame human rights activists and organizations committed to democracy development. Another Cairo-based group, The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI) issued a statement describing the security crackdown as an attempt to intimidate and silence activists with an iron-fisted brazenness that even Mubarak’s regime never dared to exercise.
Although the latest raids indicate a sharp escalation in the government's crackdown on civil society, Egyptian NGOs have long faced difficulties operating in a hostile environment governed by the restrictive NGO law. The roots of the latest crackdown can be traced back to the aftershocks of Mubarak’s resignation in February of last year, when the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) allocated $65 million under the new Egyptian Economic and Transition Support programs for grants available to any Egyptian, American and international organizations working in Egypt. But the Egyptian government soon became concerned that American support for civil society would lead to intervention in domestic political affairs, and in July, Fayza Aboul Naga, Egypt’s Minister of International Cooperation, publicly announced that cases of illegal foreign funding to unregistered local and international NGOs in Egypt would be investigated. The government of former Prime Minister Essam Sharaf promptly formed fact-finding committee to launch a probe into the charges. By October, the Ministry of Justice stepped up its investigation by commissioning two judges to explore the allegations, while the interim government increasingly portrayed foreign funding as one of the primary causes of continued political unrest and protests.
By late November, preliminary findings of the commission’s investigations were leaked to the press. The investigation, according to Al-Shorouk newspaper, involved questioning around 400 organizations that received foreign funding over the past 6 years.
Although Fayza Aboul Naga had clearly intended for the investigation to incriminate US-funded groups promoting democratization, the commission's evidence supported a very different conclusion: Salafi Islamist organizations were actually the biggest beneficiaries of international assistance, much of it originating from the conservative Gulf monarchies. According to the report, Egyptian Salafis received at least $48.9 million in funding from Gulf donors. The Egyptian Salafi organization Ansar al-Sunna, which received almost $19 million from a single Kuwaiti Islamic association, was the biggest recipient of foreign funding, not any of the human rights groups or youth movements that had been so maligned and defamed by the Egyptian government.
Since the December 30 raids, growing international criticism and outright condemnations have significantly increased pressure on the ruling generals. Field Marshal Tantawi assured Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, in a phone conversation on December 31 - that the government will cease its crackdown and return the confiscated material. However, SCAF’s empty promises have not translated into action. In fact, the issue has escalated into a full-blown media war as the SCAF scrambles to deny responsibility for the raids. The Egyptian Defense Attaché to the United States, General Mohamed al-Keshki, said that the NGO investigation is under the jurisdiction of the judiciary and public prosecutor, denying any involvement by the SCAF. On January 1, the Ministers of International Cooperation and Justice held a press conference in which they defended the measures independently taken by the judiciary while insisting that the SCAF and interim government were not interfering or influencing the investigation. Meanwhile, NDI and IRI have issued updated statements describing the attacks on their offices and clarifying the nature of their activities to try to counter to the latest media attacks.
Why is the Egyptian government pursuing this campaign against civil society, and why now? An analysis of SCAF’s official statements sheds light on the situation and exposes the severity of the harassment faced by NGOs. Since July, the military council has been accusing opposition groups like April 6 and Kefaya of advancing foreign agendas by illegally accepting foreign funding. In the SCAF’s 69th communiqué, posted to its Facebook page on July 22, the military blamed personal interests and foreign agendas for rising tensions between the military forces and the people. This was further emphasized on December 20 in statements 91 and 92, which claimed that intelligence information pointed to a foreign-led plan to destabilize Egypt through mass protests and sit-ins. The government’s conspiracy theories have created a climate of fear and mistrust among the people, and the recent pattern of events – violent clashes in December followed by the latest raids – suggests that the SCAF is deliberately enflaming anxiety and panic to assert control over the transition.
The SCAF’s latest actions serve the purpose of consolidating the military’s power by sending several different messages to domestic as well as international actors including:
- Reminding human rights groups, NGOs, and revolutionary forces that the SCAF is still in control.
To the Egyptian public - countering critics of the military by claiming that the SCAF is protecting Egypt’s sovereignty and national interests by securing the country against the “foreign agendas and third party” represented by some NGOs and outside forces. A message reminding the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist forces that the SCAF is still in charge of the transition, even though Islamist candidates won a clear parliamentary majority. To the West and the U.S. in particular—we have the power. Much of the old system survived the fall of Mubarak; the military is still your best option when compared to rising Islamists, the only clear alternative. We just want you to keep writing us a $1.3 billion check each year that we decide how to spend without interference. By continuing its own propaganda campaign while allowing contradictory reports from different officials and ministries, the SCAF is trying to deflect blame for the crackdown by portraying the government as a decentralized network of independent institutions that operate beyond the SCAF’s oversight.
Today, Egypt's military leaders – who are starting to behave a lot like Mubarak – appear to be acting out against the prospect of new conditions linking Egypt's 1.3 billion dollar military aid package to progress on democratization. The U.S. Congress approved a new spending bill on December 16 that imposes tough conditions on military aid to Egypt for 2012. The new restrictions require the State Department to certify that Egypt’s government is supporting the transition to civilian leadership and respecting “freedom of expression, association, and religion, and due process of law.” Will the military leadership risk $1.3 billion in aid by refusing to cease its crackdown? The answer will become increasingly clear in the coming days.
Let us not forget that the ultimate irony here: The party guilty of receiving the most foreign funding is the Egyptian military, not NGOs, and generals in glass houses should not throw stones.
Photo Credit: Nahar Net
The latest clashes in Cairo have undeniably eroded the SCAF’s last shred of legitimacy and riveted the attention of Egyptian and international media. But the intense public focus on violence has taken the spotlight off the parliamentary elections process and distracted the public from the government’s glaring failure to investigate and punish violations observed during the first and second rounds of voting.
Crashing into protesters with military vehicles, shooting them by live bullets, targeting women, and accusing activists of being a fifth column for a subversive foreign agenda, are just some of the missteps taken by Egypt’s military leaders over the last three months.
Egypt’s economy has been deteriorating for months, but the latest indicators suggest that the country may be headed for a much more serious downturn. On December 21, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Egypt's government bond ratings by one notch to B2 from B1 and has also placed the rating on review for further possible downgrade. This news comes as no surprise given the current political instability as well as the absence of a clear roadmap for the remainder of the transitional period. It is common knowledge that predictability is the key to any investment decisions. The uncertainty of Egypt’s political future and its unpredictable institutional framework are a serious impediment to attracting foreign direct investment and, consequently, to economic growth.
In addition to political repression and recurrent human rights violation, the economic suffering of Egyptians and their frustration with inequality in the distribution of resources and opportunities were a fundamental catalyst of the January revolution that demanded the fall of the regime and ended by ousting Hosni Mubarak.
Eleven months after the revolution, the stagnant economy is still contributing to unrest in the streets, but the economic dimension of the uprisings remains to a large extent absent from the public debate. Although Egypt’s economic problems have been widely acknowledged by successive governments, by political parties and by Egyptians themselves, very little is being said about the economy’s unsteady trajectory during the transition and the prospects for recovery and growth over the long-run. Detailed economic programs are absent from the majority of new and old political parties’ manifestos. Apart from large and appealing headlines proclaiming the need for combating inflation, unemployment and class inequality, none of them presents a pragmatic and detailed program for improving macroeconomic stability and bringing growth, social cohesion and equality to Egyptian society.
The third and final round of elections for the People’s Assembly will take start on January 4, but the preliminary results indicate that the next parliament will be dominated by the Islamist parties led by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom Justice and Freedom Party (JFP). At first sight, one might believe that the economic program proposed by the FJP is generally free market-oriented. The party does support the development of the private sector and engagement with the global economy. Nevertheless, the FJP has not yet presented a concrete program outlining how they intend to put theory into practice. Ambiguities in the FJP’s platform raise a number of questions, particularly in the banking sector, where the party’s intentions remain uncertain. For example, it is not clear what will be the future of non-Islamic banks (an important repository for foreign capital) or if they will be “gradually” phased out in favor of Islamic banks. But again, economic issues, in spite of the anxiety they cause, are pushed into the background. Today’s debates revolve around politics, with the basic theme being dominated by the question of why there has been so little concrete change in Egypt, especially when compared to neighbour Tunisia, where post-authoritarian transition is progressing more smoothly.
Unfortunately, Egypt does not have the luxury of ignoring an economic situation that has already been deteriorating for far too long. According to the Central Bank of Egypt, net international reserves had fallen to $USD 20 billion by the end of November 2011 (equivalent to 5 months of imports), down from $USD 34 billion before the revolution. Inflation is constantly high (9 percent in November), with food inflation rising into the double digits. The reversal of portfolio investments from net inflows of $12.2 billion into net outflows of $8.9 billion in January/September 2011, and the dramatic drop in FDI to US$ 375.5 million (from US$ 5.7 billion) during the same period last year are increasing the pressure on Egypt’s already strained balance of payment.
Tourism activity and revenues have picked up slightly from the severe drop that followed the revolution. But another steep decline in tourism and in foreign reserves alongside a rise in an already high unemployment rate would only make matters worse.
So far, Egypt's government has been relying on local banks to finance its spending needs. But faced with a significant increase in domestic borrowing costs, the government has recently started to consider alternatives to decrease reliance on domestic funding. As a result, Egypt may resume negotiations over a previously rejected $3 billion IMF loan package. If an agreement can still be reached, external borrowing would help avoiding the crowding-out of the private sector and is likely to lessen the borrowing costs.
As an estimated 25,000 protesters rallied in Cairo on December 23 to condemn the military's violent suppression of peaceful demonstrations in recent weeks, it's clear that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) can no longer claim to be a stabilizing force or legitimate steward of a democratic transition that is veering dangerously off course. Participants in the current protest in Tahrir Square, dubbed the "Friday of Regaining Honor," are voicing both outrage and repugnance with the military's heavy-handed and humiliating treatment of civilian protesters, captured in the iconic image of a young woman being stripped and dragged across the pavement. There is growing consensus within Egypt and at the highest levels of the U.S. State Department that the SCAF's most recent misstep has crossed a forbidden "red line."
Calls for toppling "Mushir" -- traditionally a term denoting respect for the commander-in-chief of the Egyptian military, but now laced with disdain for Field Marshal Tantawi -- have been resonating in Tahrir Square for months. But increasingly, evidence of the military's deteriorating public image can be seen as well as heard. A museum's worth of derisive graffiti and "revolutionary art" has been generated on walls and in public spaces around Cairo, much of it targeting the SCAF. The political analyst Sultan Al Qassemi captured this particularly compelling collage of anti-military art, which makes for a damning visual referendum on the SCAF's handling of the transition. On the far right of the photo, a soldier and a police officer clasp hands in a display of solidarity above the caption, "The army and the police are one hand." The words are a warped and cynical echo of far-gone revolutionary slogans expressing unity and goodwill between the people and the military, which have long since been drowned out by demands for a return to civilian rule. Several of the pictures depict army personnel assaulting protesters, and a military officer is featured on a "wanted" poster at the upper left corner of the photo. Images of the faces of individual SCAF members including Tantawi express the now deafening demand for accountability at the highest levels of the military leadership. The writing on the wall isn't pretty, but the SCAF will need to face it sooner or ... not-so-later.
Photo Credit: Sultan Al Qassemi
EgyptSource will be posting less frequently over the holidays until January 4. Thanks for following EgyptSource and stay tuned for more coverage in the new year,
Fast away the old year passes … not so with the demonstrations in Egypt. The increasingly heated and diverse anti-military demonstrations in Cairo, Alexandria, and other cities are not likely to end soon because they express grievances that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has consistently refused to address and that are too important for demonstrators to give up on.