December 1, 2018
It's Time to Stop Appeasing Putin – Here's How to Deter the Emboldened Russian President
By Frederick Kempe
This Bavarian city of beer halls and baroque beauty has another claim to fame it would rather shake, one that made its name synonymous with appeasement. On September 30th, 1938, beyond a date when one could have doubted Adolf Hitler’s perils, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, French Premier Edouard Daladier, and Italian leader Benito Mussolini signed the Munich Pact, which handed Nazi Germany large parts of Czechoslovakia in the name of peace.
There’s an unwritten rule among serious historians and journalists: no one and nothing should be compared to Hitler and the Third Reich, a singular personality and episode of evil. No direct comparison is reasonable or useful. Russians suffered more fatalities than any other people from what became known as the “Munich Betrayal” and the world war that was to come.
Still, there is a Munich lesson for how to respond to Putin today. Appeasement’s price is always high: It encourages malevolent actors to escalate their ambitions as they calculate what they wish to achieve against a reduced calculation of risk and resistance.
Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, and the de facto annexation of its two breakaway provinces; was followed by the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, the first forceful changing of European borders since World War II; which was followed by Moscow’s intervening in Syria to prop up murderous dictator Bassar al Assad in 2015; which was followed by Russia’s intervention in US elections in 2016.
Western intelligence services – mostly caught by surprise by these events – have been gaming what the Russian leader might do next. It was a safe bet that it would fall within his campaigns to rebuild regional influence or to undermine the United States, its European allies, and their democracies and primary institutions, NATO and the European Union, and block their ability to accept new members from Moscow’s neighborhood.
Part of the answer came last weekend.
Two aspects of Russia’s military action were significant. First, it was the first time that Putin had so brazenly used his own conventional military forces against Ukraine, where he has acted mostly in the shadows or through proxies. Second, by firing upon Ukrainian vessels, he must have factored in a potential chain of events that might have led to a wider war.
President Trump’s tweet on Thursday that he wouldn’t meet with Putin this weekend on the margins of the G-20 in Argentina was encouraging but insufficient.
In an interview with the German-language Bild Zeitung, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko this week warned, "The only language [Putin] understands is the solidarity of the Western world. We can't accept Russia's aggressive policies. First it was Crimea, then eastern Ukraine, now he wants the Sea of Azov."
So, here’s a brief reader’s guide, providing context and a range of responses recommended by Atlantic Council experts.
In 2003, Russia and Ukraine reached agreement on cooperation in the shared waterways of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait, which runs between Russia and Crimea as the only entrance to the sea.
After Russia illegally annexed Crimea in 2014, it used its new control of both sides of the strait to build a $3.7 billion bridge connecting Crimea to mainland Russia. It’s low height of 115 feet cut off access of larger ships to the Ukrainian ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk, resulting in a sharp decline of port revenues.
In May of this year, following the bridge’s completion, Russia moved naval vessels including warships from its Caspian Flotilla to the Sea of Azov. Since then, Russia has detained some 150 Ukrainian and foreign merchant ships and interrogated their crew members, according to a Ukrainian official and port authorities, deterring more ship traffic and further cutting revenues.
Last Sunday, Russian forces opened fire and seized three Ukrainian naval ships after rebuffing their attempt to travel from the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait. Russian troops detained 24 Ukrainian crew members, six of whom were injured, and have now transferred them to Moscow for criminal prosecution.
The United States, European allies, the European Union, and NATO have condemned the Kremlin’s aggression against Ukraine. Without more than that, however, Putin won’t be deterred.
Atlantic Council experts favor a three-pronged, diplomatic, economic, and military response, including but not limited to the following:
Diplomatically, the US, NATO, the EU, and other western allies should not only condemn the Russian actions but also detail how they violate specific international conventions. Demands should be made that Russia apologize, punish those responsible, and immediately release the Ukrainian sailors.
Russia should permit Ukrainian shipping free access to the Sea of Azov, in accordance with the 2003 agreement. The NATO and EU should jointly send a fact-finding mission to the Sea of Azov.
Economically, the United States and Europe should more stringently enforce the already existing sanctions imposed following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, since that is the source of the problem. They should then prepare new sanctions on Russian financial institutions and shipping interests, to be implemented if Russia doesn’t reverse course.
To impose even greater costs, the US should push Germany to suspend the ill-conceived Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea. Once operational, Nord Stream 2 — which bypasses Ukraine — will cost Ukraine a 3 percent drop in GDP. Russia’s multiple provocations undermine European efforts to obtain guarantees of continued gas transit through Ukraine after Nord Stream 2 comes on line.
Given the more direct Russian military involvement, it’s also time to increase OSCE and Western drone and other surveillance for monitoring the Sea of Azov. A stronger message would be to widen NATO and US military presence in the eastern Black Sea by increasing freedom of navigation operations.
Finally, the US and allies should provide additional defensive naval armaments to Ukraine, including coastal defense surface-to-ship missiles, patrol boats, radar, and additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets.
The arguments against such actions is that they would be provocative. History has taught us, however, that it is appeasement that is most inflammatory.
That is the lasting lesson of Munich.
This article originally appeared on CNBC.com.
Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe. Subscribe to his weekly InflectionPoints newsletter.