Issue BriefJul 22, 2020
Troubled vision: Understanding recent Israeli–Iranian offensive cyber exchanges
By JD Work and Richard Harknett
Reported Iranian intrusions against Israeli critical infrastructure networks and alleged Israeli actions against Iranian proliferation-associated targets pose substantial new challenges to understanding ongoing competition and conflict in the Middle East.
Issue BriefApr 30, 2020
Loose cobras: DPRK regime succession and uncertain control over offensive cyber capabilities
By JD Work
Unconfirmed rumors surfaced in mid April 2020 regarding the potential incapacitation of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, leading to speculation about the ramifications of a sudden transition of leadership in Pyongyang. These rumors raise serious concerns over the stability of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) control of offensive cyber operations capabilities.
New AtlanticistJan 28, 2020
The 5×5—The 2010s: A cyber decade in review
By Simon Handler
The past ten years have, among other things, witnessed the most-costly cyberattack on record, the discovery of a computer worm capable of wreaking physical destruction, and USCYBERCOM’s elevation to unified combatant command status. As we turn the page to 2020, we’re looking back to recap the most significant, overblown, and emergent cyber incidents of the decade.
JD Work is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative. He is also a professor at the National Defense University’s College of Information and Cyberspace where he explores the theory, practice, and operational art of the cyber warfighting function, the wider role of the cyber instrument in national security strategy, and the future defense competition and stability problem space.
Mr. Work has over two decades experience working in cyber intelligence and operations roles for the private sector and US government. He previously directed multiple international research programs to provide insight into the emerging strategic issues, economic consequences, and technology implications created by hostilities in the virtual domain. This work has sought to establish a reliable baseline of observations regarding the engagements, follow on effects, capabilities, doctrine, and drivers behind the antagonistic action of potential combatants in the networked environment, in order to support early warning, crisis management and crisis prevention in and through cyberspace.
Mr. Work holds additional affiliations with Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies as well as George Washington University, Elliot School of International Affairs. He further serves as a senior advisor to the US Cyberspace Solarium Commission.