Transcripts

Atlantic Council 2019 Global Energy Forum

An Update on Saudi Vision 2030 & the Oil Market

Speaker: H.E. Khalid Al-Falih, Minister of Energy, Industry, and Mineral Resources, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Moderator: Frederick Kempe, President and CEO, Atlantic Council

 

Location:  Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

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Atlantic Council

2019 Global Energy Forum

Official Opening of the Global Energy Forum

 

 

Speakers:

Frederick Kempe,

President and CEO,

Atlantic Council

 

General James L. Jones, Jr., USMC (Ret.),

Executive Chairman Emeritus,

Atlantic Council

 

H.E. Dr. Sultan Al Jaber,

Minister of State, United Arab Emirates and Chief Executive Officer,

Abu Dhabi National Oil Company

 

H.E. Suhail Al Mazrouei,

Minister of Energy and Industry,

United Arab Emirates

 

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Twenty Seventh Annual Mikulás Dinner

Remarks by Damon M. Wilson
Executive Vice President, Atlantic Council

Embassy of Hungary, Washington
November 30, 2018

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THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES
Members and Press Call: Escalating Tensions Between Ukraine and Russia
Ambassador John E. Herbst
Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
Ambassador Daniel Fried
Distinguished Fellow, Eurasia Center and Future Europe Initiative, Atlantic Council
Moderator: Geysha Gonzalez
Deputy Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
November 26, 2018
11:00 a.m. ET

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Amb. Richard Morningstar, Chairman of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center
Marine Biological Laboratory Falmouth Forum Lecture Series, Woods Hole, Massachusetts
October 12, 2018

 

REMARKS

I am very happy to be here at Woods Hole this evening. I want to thank Susan Morse who has been a friend for 45 years for suggesting it and Nancy Bridges for making the arrangements.

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The Atlantic Council Global Forum on Strategic Communications and Digital Disinformation (StratCom 2018)
Closing Keynote

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Statement of Christopher Porter
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, Atlantic Council
Chief Intelligence Strategist, Fireeye, Inc.

Committee on House Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection
Subcommittee on Transportation and Protective Security

September 6, 2018

Thank you Chairman Ratcliffe, Ranking Member Richmond, Chairman
Katko, and Ranking Member Coleman for convening this joint
hearing today. We appreciate the opportunity to share FireEye`s
perspective on threats to the aviation sector and provide an
overview of how the private sector is helping to secure the
sector.

My name is Christopher Porter, and I`m the Chief Intelligence
Strategist for cybersecurity company FireEye and a Nonresident
Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. At FireEye I manage our
``Intelligence for Executives`` program for senior corporate and
government clients across the globe. Our strategic intelligence
products reach more than 4,000 customers in 67 countries. Prior
to joining FireEye in 2016, I served for nearly nine years at the
Central Intelligence Agency, including an assignment as the cyber
threat intelligence briefer to White House National Security
Council staff, several years in counterterrorism operations, and
warzone service.

In addition to the 300-plus security professionals responding to
computer intrusions, FireEye has over 200 cyber-threat analysts
on staff in 18 countries, speaking 30 different languages, to
help us predict threats and better understand the adversary -
often by considering the political and cultural environment of
the threat actors. We have an enormous catalog of threat
intelligence, and it continues to grow everyday alongside the
continually increasing attacks on organizations around the world.

FireEye is supporting the aviation sector here at home. We`re
protecting the Transportation Security Administration with both
email and web inspection, managed by the Department of Homeland
Security`s Enterprise Security Operations Center. As TSA
continues to stand up its intelligence capabilities, we are
providing support through their subscription to our intelligence
reporting.

The Federal Aviation Administration also makes great use of our
intelligence reporting and they`re using our malware analysis
tool to help prevent and detect future cyber attacks. I want to
share with you today FireEye`s perspective responding to breaches
in the aviation sector and from the intelligence we have
collected on what might be coming next.

I am sure it will come as no surprise to you that the aviation
sector is one of the most targeted for cyberattack. Safe,
reliable air transport is vital for everything from national
defense to global commerce to personal freedom. Malicious actors
seeking to undermine America`s strength in aviation through
cyberattacks and theft include foreign governments, terrorists,
organized crime, and other non-state actors.

I want to start by discussing the most common cyber threat facing
the aviation industry: cyberespionage. Foreign governments
routinely seek to steal industrial secrets from manufacturers,
researchers, designers, and operators of both military aircraft
and cutting edge civilian planes. China, Russia, and more
recently Iran have all targeted the U.S. or its close allies for
theft of aviation secrets via computer network operations.

All three countries also routinely target ticketing and traveler
data, shipping schedules and manifests, and partner industries
such as railways and hotels as they gather counterintelligence
data on suspicious travelers and intelligence on VIPs they wish
to track.

There are two aspects of cyberespionage targeting the aviation
sector overall that I want to emphasize: first, that because of
its pervasive nature, the best defense against cyberespionage is
rapid, detailed information sharing with context. Our company
pushes alerts to customers in real-time, and industry groups
share information between peers because, as we have learned, a
threat to one is often a threat to all. The US Government also
shares threat information, although it is generally classified
and available only to cleared vendors; there is room for
improvement in government information sharing with uncleared
industry partners. Most importantly, the timeliness of
information within industry and between the private sector and US
Government must improve. In my line of work, if we can`t provide
context and additional information in 24-48 hours of an attack,
we have not met customer expectations.

The second thing to know about cyberespionage though is that,
because it is routine, it should not be viewed as destabilizing.
Media reporting on cyber incidents is often focused on the worst-
case scenario in ways that are sometimes unjustified and
needlessly alarm the public or inflame opinion against a foreign
adversary. Every major cyber power, including the United States,
has an interest in knowing about the potential defense technology
developments of both its friends and potential threats, and the
US aviation sector is not unique in being targeted in this way.

When cyberespionage operators get a foothold on a system, they
can often use that access for stealing information or to launch a
disabling or destructive attack using the same technology. But
they rarely choose to do so, and in the US there are significant
redundancies in place to ensure safety. A crashed IT system does
not mean a crashed plane, and it`s important for the public to
keep that in mind.

So while cyberespionage on its own does not pose an urgent threat
to life, I am concerned that continued theft of trade secrets
poses a long-term threat to American economic health.

Aviation is one of our nation`s leading export industries, and
China in particular is harnessing all aspects of national power
to displace the U.S. as a military and economic power in Asia and
worldwide. Chinese theft of U.S. intellectual property for
commercial purposes has almost entirely dropped off since a
September 2015 agreement between President Xi of China and
President Obama, but because aviation research and development is
so closely tied to national defense this particular sector of the
American economy never stopped being targeted.

Chinese hackers pursue fewer targets in the United States than
they did before the Xi-Obama Agreement, but they have just as
many hackers who are more skilled and better resourced than ever,
meaning that industries that do continue to be threatened face a
greater threat than ever before that technologies the U.S. spends
billions developing will be stolen and adopted by economic
competitors and military rivals in China.

Cybercriminals likewise pose an economic threat to the aviation
sector and its customers. For years we have seen airlines and
third-party ticket sellers exploited so that illicit tickets
could be resold for profit in underground fora. Because airlines
are trusted by their customers with a wide variety of sensitive
personal data, they are also frequently targeted by
cybercriminals looking to gather data to enable other types of
fraud. In the last two years, our devices have detected a sharp
increase in the use of ransomware to temporarily disable airline
ticketing and support operations air travel is a time-sensitive
business, and cybercriminals know that they can extort quick
payment from airlines that are unable to move passengers until
their systems are decrypted.

Finally, in addition to threats to the aviation sector`s
proprietary information, customer records, and systems that
support flight operations, there are cyber threats intended to
use aviation`s prominent place in our lives as a means of
creating psychological damage or political pressure. Airports in
Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and here at home have
had their websites defaced or disrupted, mostly by non-state
actors seeking to draw attention to a particular political cause.

The primary victim in these situations are members of the public
who may wrongly fear that a loved one is at risk or grow in their
distrust of flying, even though the affected systems may be
public-relations focused and support no flight operations at all.
The fear these operations cause is particularly pronounced when
those outages are caused by groups affiliated with terrorists. In
other cases, these virtual sit-ins that affect a company`s
website have, in limited cases, delayed takeoffs for airlines
that also relied on those computers to make or distribute flight
plans, though even these attacks did not have a direct effect on
flight safety.

It is important that officials and airlines representatives
communicating with the public during such events differentiate
between taking down systems that cause inconvenience from those
that directly support flight operations and passenger safety.

Conclusion

Thank you again for the opportunity to participate in today`s
discussion. And thank you for your leadership improving
cybersecurity in the aviation sector. I look forward to working
with you to strengthen the partnership between the public and
private sectors and to share best practices to thwart future
cyber attacks. I`m happy to answer any questions from the
Committee.