

# Global Futures and Implications for U.S. Basing

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Working Group Report

June 2005

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## Foreword

Examination of America's basing, force structure and forward engagement strategies is a never-ending process. These studies have been particularly vigorous since the end of the Cold War and there is no sign the situation will become less urgent in the future. To help all concerned understand these problems, the Atlantic Council has organized a study group to examine the geopolitical context that will likely frame the security environment of the next 20 to 40 years, and to identify the implications of U.S. bases in foreign countries.

Thorough examination of basing problems over the years has shown the matter to be enormously complex, and the details of each situation are important. Some of these studies stem from the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, which indicated the need to develop greater flexibility in foreign basing decisions. These activities resulted in an Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy, directed by the Secretary of Defense. Subsequent efforts resulted in papers on Overseas Basing and Requirements and the U.S. Defense Posture. Clearly, the issue receives continuing attention at the highest level.

We believe, nevertheless, that it is useful to collate the collective knowledge and experience of leading authorities and decision makers who participated in many of these studies, and who have had to operate within the problematic basing system as it has evolved. Thus we organized a group of former senior military leaders, diplomats, business leaders, and other experts, with the goal of pooling their wisdom and providing insights into planning for future military installations overseas. The resulting report is more selective than comprehensive, and represents informed judgments on key issues. We hope it will stimulate further research and discussion of the vitally important issue of U.S. bases abroad.

This project was undertaken in collaboration with the Navy Surface Warfare Center at Dahlgren Laboratory. It is based mainly on the contributions by members of the working group and the thoughtful leadership of the chair, Franklin D. Kramer. I also want to acknowledge the capable management of the project by Banning Garrett, with the diligent assistance of Jonathan Adams. In addition, our military senior fellows, Lt. Col. Gordon Hendrickson (USAF), Captain KJ Johnson (USN) and Colonel Albert Zaccor (USA), provided helpful contributions throughout the project. Finally, we are grateful to our long-time colleague and friend Dick Nelson for drafting the report.

Henry E. Catto, Jr.  
Chairman of the Board  
Atlantic Council of the United States



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## Working Group on Military Bases Abroad

The members of the working group believe that this report provides a useful contribution to the study of U.S. military bases abroad. While there may be some parts of the report with which some participants are not in full agreement, each participant believes that this report, as a whole, provides a sound basis for future actions by the government of the United States. The views of the working group members do not represent the official position of any institution.

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The Atlantic Council working group on U.S. Military Bases Abroad also benefited from contributions from members of the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.



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## Key Judgments

U.S. overseas bases serve as both substance and symbol of U.S. global power, engagement and leadership. We believe that a robust U.S. overseas presence, including a network of multifunctional overseas bases, will be needed for the foreseeable future to protect and advance U.S. security interests. The roles and nature of these bases will vary, but they will serve to help enhance security in regions where important U.S. interests are at stake, including those threatened by instability. The central question is how to optimize this network to meet both short- and long-term U.S. security requirements given the potential evolution of the geopolitical and strategic environment.

Overseas bases must serve U.S. interests in an unpredictable future environment. The future is rarely a straight-line projection of the present nor is it often accurately predicted by analysts and political leaders. Although the overarching trend of globalization is likely to shape the strategic environment of the next 20 to 40 years, its impact will be multifaceted and largely unforeseeable. In the recent past, globalization has contributed to economic expansion, rising living standards and democratic transformations in many countries. These trends may well continue. At the same time, thoughtful studies such as the Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project suggest the possibility of simultaneous negative developments, including pervasive insecurity exacerbated by weak and failing states, some significant reversals in progress towards democratization, a growing gap between "haves" and "have nots," the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the potential for catastrophic terror attacks, bloody internal conflicts that verge on genocide, and the challenge of integrating new rising powers, as well as the always difficult problems of randomly occurring natural disasters.

To meet these challenges will require a combined use of all elements of national power—diplomatic, economic, informational, and in appropriate circumstances, military. Comprehensive application of U.S. power is not new and is perhaps best exemplified by the Marshall Plan. The need for such a combined effort will probably be even greater in the future while the circumstances in which it will be exercised may be far more challenging. Specifically, an important feature of the future environment may be widespread prevalence of anti-U.S. sentiments if current attitudes in much of the world persist. While bases are only one part of the exercise of U.S. power, they are a very visible manifestation. Accordingly, foreign leaders might face serious domestic opposition to allowing the United States to maintain or to use bases on their nations' territories. Thus, the United States must consider the politics and public diplomacy of basing as well as the technical requirements for regional and global military operations if it is to maintain an effective overseas presence and be broadly engaged to help shape future security environments in positive ways. If the politics are managed effectively, new coalition partners, as well as existing allies and friends, may provide additional basing opportunities to facilitate the projection of U.S. power in a variety of ways.

U.S. bases represent a rear-view mirror of U.S. needs as, almost without exception, they are in locations associated with past crises or wars. Some U.S. bases, such as those in Guantanamo and, until recently, in the Philippines came into being as a result of the Spanish

American War over a century ago. Many bases in Europe, Korea, and elsewhere in the Pacific are the result wars during the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century. These bases may not be located in areas that support the focus of current U.S. defense activities. Because basing rights on foreign soil are difficult to acquire, the U. S. is reluctant to relinquish foreign bases even in locations that are not needed today. In most cases, bases are kept as a hedge against future needs.

The U.S. military presence and basing requirements likely will continue to vary by region according to the differing political contexts and security objectives. If current trends continue, for example, in Europe U.S. forces and bases will play a “post-modern” role that includes underpinning multinational stability operations such as those in the Balkans as well as transforming allied forces and strengthening the capacity of NATO and the EU to conduct security operations both in Europe and out of area. In East Asia, U.S. forces and associated bases will continue to perform the more traditional roles of reassuring allies and partners and deterring conflict on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. A new prospect for the region, however, might be the development of cooperative security arrangements and organized multilateral cooperation among the region’s military forces, in which case bases could be supportive of such international efforts. In the broader Middle East, traditional stability concerns likely will continue, although significant change in the region certainly cannot be ruled out since major changes are already occurring in some regional states. U.S. forces are likely to continue to deter aggression and the use of WMD by regional states and generally to support stability. They will also perform a diplomatic function of supporting political change, as occurred in Central and Eastern Europe. Bases will facilitate both these roles.

The nature of overseas bases may undergo substantial changes in coming decades. To enhance their value, they may be increasingly integrated with host-nation and multinational forces and may include broader capabilities to support interagency operations, including reconstruction, stability, public health, disaster relief and other functions beyond traditional military functions. While traditional main operating bases will retain their value, we expect to see more forward operating sites and more contingency cooperative security locations, ad hoc bases and possibly some sea basing.

All of this is not to say that overseas bases will not continue to have significant costs and risks. They may become lightning rods for anti-U.S. sentiment and/or for opponents of specific regimes. U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia, for example, provided a major focal point for Osama bin Laden’s appeal to Muslim sensitivity to Western “infidel” presence and influence. Therefore, the United States must pay close attention to foreign perceptions of U.S. bases and forward deployed forces. Are they viewed by people of the host nation and regional states as contributing to security, stability and economic growth, like U.S. forces in Europe and Japan after WWII? Or are they perceived as unwelcome intruders, which currently appears to be the case for important sectors of public opinion in much of the Middle East, with the potential to be sources of instability? The “welcome test” will be important to the ability to utilize bases in a contingency and to maintain them over time. The most valuable bases generally are those that the host nation sees as enhancing its security as much or more than the security of the United States. When there is agreement on common security concerns and objectives, the host nation is generally willing to pay a significant portion of the basing costs for an extended period.

A related factor in determining the long-term viability of a specific base is the legitimacy and stability of the host government. Since areas of potential military operations include weak and failing states in the “arc of instability,” bases in or near these areas would seem to be especially desirable. But they also carry with them the risk that the host governments may be part of the underlying problem.

The configuration and uses of a particular base may change substantially over time and in ways that are not anticipated when the base is first acquired. Overseas bases and base access are usually difficult to acquire and thus should not be abandoned merely because their previous specific uses have diminished in importance or been constrained in some instances. Careful consideration should be given to both possible future uses of those bases as well as acquisition of reliable alternatives. Each base is potentially a key part of a system of nodes through which goods and people are connected in a global network that may be called on to support operations nearly anywhere on the planet.

## **Conclusions and Recommendations**

### **Bases in a Strategy of Combined Power**

To maintain U. S. security in an increasingly globalized world will require the effective use of all elements of national power. Bases can be important for military reasons, but, if properly utilized, they have significant diplomatic value as well and can support U. S. informational and even economic goals. Given the unpredictability of future challenges and difficulties the United States will face, maintaining a flexible base network will be extremely valuable to overall U. S. national security strategy.

### **Building Trust and Promoting Common Interests**

In order to maintain access to existing bases and gain options for new bases, the United States will need to commit substantial resources to promoting common interests and building trust with existing and new partners. We cannot assume that “if we need it, we can get it” in terms of future operating bases. Common interests develop from common understandings and a willingness to act in concert on common problems. Developing the ability to act together requires a wide range of formal and informal efforts that include regular information exchanges and consultation before action is taken that will affect a partner’s interests. Countries will act in their interests but how they see those interests is subject to development over time. Interpersonal relationships can be important in shaping those perceptions, and particular attention should be devoted to the next generation of political and military leaders who may have more anti-U.S. sentiments or simply less of a connection with the United States than do their elders.

### **Multi-Dimensional Bases**

Given that all elements of national power will be necessary to advance U.S. interests, bases abroad should be evaluated to determine whether there are benefits to supporting multidimensional goals through the bases. As the concept of security becomes more broadly defined, U.S. capabilities must adapt to this changing environment and bases should be an important part of this adaptation. While bases will primarily have a military function, some overseas bases could increasingly support a more diverse and better integrated set of capabilities. For example, they could be a center for joint interagency planning at the strategic and operational levels including the implementation of stabilization and reconstruction efforts and for humanitarian and disaster relief. Such a transformation in bases could be part of an overall effort to improve the political-military interface. Whereas great strides have been made in achieving better integrated military operations among the armed services, progress has been much slower in coordinating essential political-military operations. Diplomatically, the use of bases to support regional activities may be important elements in the war on terror or in dealing with weapons of mass destruction—or even in maintaining general regional stability. Multinational bases may be important in supporting the goals of the host and regional countries—and may be the best way to advance U.S. interests. As an example, the disastrous Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004 and its

aftermath may present new opportunities for the United States to explore multi-purpose bases with countries in the region.

### **Comprehensive Assessments**

There are many important benefits to be derived from bases in the future, but the current approach to thinking about and managing overseas bases is suboptimal in several regards. First, the overseas basing network is not subject to a systematic evaluation and review process. Periodic assessments of the overall base network would be useful inputs to management of better overseas bases. These assessments could drive a global base network evaluation and review process. Taking into account the importance of all elements of national power, the assessments could include interagency considerations and views of U.S. ambassadors in regional states and could look at the base network from many perspectives, including how the base network could be improved to become more cost efficient and provide U.S. forces with more flexibility and agility, as well as how broader U. S. national security goals could be achieved. Comprehensive base network assessments also should examine how the bases are viewed from foreign perspectives and the impact of such views—and how to enhance the value of the bases to the host country and the region. Such an effort could build on the global force posture review undertaken by the Secretary of Defense over the last few years and could become part of the Quadrennial Defense Review process. A second suboptimal element of base management is that base costs are paid out of the budget of a single service while a particular base generally provides benefits that extend far beyond the requirements for the particular service paying the bill. Accordingly, the DoD should look at a budget process that takes account of the overall benefits from bases.



# Global Futures and Implications for U.S. Basing

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## Overseas Bases and International Security

This report provides the working group’s insights about the future of overseas bases derived from U.S. experience over the last 60 years. It highlights key assumptions about the future security environment, proposes recommendations and identifies issues that need further study.

Overseas bases are best understood as an integral part of a network of political relationships rather than a collection of units, installations or facilities. In the past, these political relationships were primarily about deterrence and providing forward forces against a specific threat. Now the political relationships are much more diverse and the bases provide a wide range of contingent capabilities. In the globalizing 21<sup>st</sup> century, U.S. national security depends on the wise use of all elements of national power. Bases are part of that national power, supporting not only military but also diplomatic, informational, and economic policies and actions. “Being there” is the defining characteristic of bases, and “being there” offers some benefits that cannot be achieved otherwise. But with increasing technological developments and other changes, even the military significance of a base no longer depends on what forces are there at a given time, but also on the combination of those forces and additional capabilities that can be deployed on short notice. On the diplomatic, informational and economic fronts, “being there” is also a factor that combines with other efforts to achieve U. S. goals. Thus, bases in the future can have flexibility to meet a full spectrum of national security requirements.

### Multiple Perspectives

There is no single metric that measures the full range of costs and benefits afforded by overseas bases. Instead, we must use a variety of perspectives to understand how bases fit in both the short- and long-term international security environment. Among these perspectives, operations plans are probably the most important, but they should not be the sole factor in determining the configuration of our base structure. For example, the complex and uncertain international security environment requires that the U.S. global force posture and network of supporting bases be flexible and adaptable to a wide variety of requirements in

peacetime, crisis, conflict and post-conflict circumstances. Furthermore, this capability may be called on simultaneously in different areas for different types of contingencies.

In peacetime, overseas bases help sustain a stable, predictable environment that promotes economic and political development and, at the same time, maintains and enhances U.S. influence in a region. They provide opportunities for military-to-military contacts that are often useful in subsequent collective efforts. In crises, bases provide the capability to rapidly surge U.S. forces and promote U.S. political interests. In times of conflict, overseas bases are necessary to deploy forces in a timely manner, to supply combat operations and to launch strikes against enemy targets. Bases also are essential to support post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization efforts. And the Asian tsunami in December 2004 dramatically demonstrated the importance of U.S. overseas bases and base access for large-scale humanitarian operations.

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. forces have engaged in combat mainly in failing and failed states, most of which are in the “arc of instability” that stretches from parts of South and Southeast Asia through Central Asia, the Middle East, North and sub-Saharan Africa and into the Caribbean and parts of Latin America. Most potential future conflicts are likely to be located in this arc of instability as well. Bases in these regions are obviously desirable, but they also carry with them the risks that host governments may be part of the underlying problems or that the U.S. military presence would exacerbate factors of instability. This requires continual reassessment of how well particular bases serve overall U.S. interests—interests that often pull in different directions and have short-term versus long-term trade-offs.

In all of these circumstances, we depend on overseas bases much more than we generally realize. Air operations against Serbia used more than 20 airbases. Deploying forces and conducting operations in Afghanistan required more than 80 over-flight, refueling and other agreements with foreign countries. Moreover, experience suggests that basing U.S. forces close to the theater of operations provides more leverage and options in a crisis or conflict, underscoring the value of a robust network of bases.

In addition to using a variety of perspectives to understand the roles of overseas bases and likely future needs, it is useful to view them over long time frames because of their enduring value. In retrospect, bases often are used for purposes other than those originally intended and may well be useful in the future for roles and missions not currently envisaged.

## **Key Assumptions**

A robust U.S. forward presence, including a network of overseas bases will be needed for the foreseeable future to help enhance security and project U.S. influence to regions where important U.S. interests are at stake, including regions threatened by instability. Regardless of the threats and challenges we may face in the coming years, the need for access to a substantial network of overseas bases will likely be based on U.S. interests.

Overseas bases will serve U.S. interests in an unpredictable future environment. The future is rarely a straight-line projection of the present nor is it often accurately predicted by



analysts and political leaders. Although the mega-trend of globalization is likely to shape the strategic environment of the next 20 to 40 years, its impact will be multifaceted and largely unforeseeable. In the recent past, globalization has contributed to economic expansion, rising living standards and democratic transformations in many countries. These are important trends which may well continue. At the same time, thoughtful studies such as the Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project<sup>1</sup> suggest the possibility of simultaneous negative developments, including pervasive insecurity in an increasingly interconnected world. This insecurity will be exacerbated by weak and failing states, some significant reversals in progress towards democratization, and a growing gap between "haves" and "have nots." The sources of instability will continue to include the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the potential for catastrophic terror attacks, bloody internal conflicts that verge on genocide, nationalism, ethnic conflict, religious intolerance, poverty, transnational crime, mass refugee flows and other conflict-produced humanitarian crises, randomly occurring natural disasters, and the challenge of integrating new rising powers. Non-state actors, including terrorists, will be especially significant purveyors of security threats. Responding to these various forms of instability, humanitarian disasters and conflict will pose difficult challenges for the international community and will place a high premium on international cooperation, pooling of resources and some preemptive actions – all of which may be facilitated by having forces based near the areas of crisis and conflict.

At the same time, we cannot ignore current highly-armed stand-offs, especially on the Korean Peninsula, across the Taiwan Strait, and between India and Pakistan. Hopefully these confrontations will be resolved peacefully, but in the meantime we must be concerned about incidents beyond our control triggering military responses that could engage the United States as well as the threats posed by the proliferation of WMD, including North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

The United States plays important leadership roles throughout the entire world. The U.S. government, backed by a bipartisan consensus, has labored to expand democracy and free markets over the years. But current surveys show a wide-spread international disquietude with at least some U.S. policies—and with a spill-over into a general anti-U.S. sentiment. If anti-U.S. sentiments become prevalent in much of the world, foreign leaders may face insurmountable domestic opposition to allowing the United States to maintain or to use bases on their territory. A variety of anti-U.S. messages in different regions ranging from the Middle East to Western Europe to South America to South Korea may reinforce each other and influence a new generation around the globe to believe that the United States poses a threat to its security and way of life. Such a development could represent a dramatic change in the geopolitical environment as this new generation moves into leadership positions.

In any event, a flexible and agile set of military capabilities is needed as a hedge against an uncertain future. There was a consensus among the working group that there will be a need for U.S. expeditionary forces and overseas bases since the United States is likely to continue to see a need to exercise global influence and be prepared to effectively use military forces globally, however reluctantly. Other needs, including, unimpaired global access to world trade and energy supplies, deterring aggression and dissuading regional hegemony by hostile

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<sup>1</sup> *Mapping the Global Future*. Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project, December 2004.

powers, will provide enough diverse threats to justify a robust military force posture with a very broad set of military capabilities.<sup>2</sup>

There is no substitute for the understanding that comes from having people on the scene and working with local counterparts for extended periods—not just six-month rotations. And these thinly deployed, widely dispersed U.S. forces will need to be able to call on quick, reliable support from bases that also demonstrate a visible commitment of the United States to important interests at stake in the region. In addition, the bases demonstrate important “buy-ins” to cooperative security ventures on the part of allies and friends, particularly if the host country shares in the burdens.

We also assume, as previously noted, that the concept of security will be conceived of broadly in the future, and that protecting our security will include all elements of national power. We therefore expect to continue to see a more multi-faceted National Security Strategy. Furthermore, we believe that the U.S. presence abroad, including bases, will provide the first line of defense for threats that we cannot yet foresee.

All of these assumptions, along with the many other explicit and implicit assumptions that underlie U.S. national security policy and military strategies, need to be reexamined regularly, along with their implications for overseas bases. Previous assumptions about U.S. access to and use of specific overseas bases may become increasingly tenuous. But new uses for existing bases may be apparent in the future.

## Political Context

First and foremost, we must keep our eye on the political objectives which military efforts, including the use of overseas bases, are designed to achieve. In some cases, different political objectives will pull in different directions, requiring leaders to establish priorities and make trade-offs. Nevertheless, overseas bases must be managed in the political context of U.S. foreign relations, especially with the host countries. These political relationships are essential to promoting and preserving U.S. influence. Bases serve as statements of important U.S. interests and relationships because of the resources they entail and the high risks they potentially incur. They represent visible U.S. commitments to various alliances, treaties and other arrangements. They stabilize global and regional relationships. U.S. forward deployed forces and bases can also facilitate cooperation among countries that would otherwise not be so inclined, as may be increasingly true in Northeast Asia. At the same time, any substantial changes in bases may send a signal that the commitment is decreasing or increasing accordingly.

Given this political context, the United States needs to understand how U.S. forces and bases are viewed through the eyes of current and potential future partners, as well as competitors and publics in order to maximize the U.S. ability to obtain and maintain bases and base access. In the broadest sense, U.S. forces abroad are seen as either stabilizing or destabilizing. In Europe and much of East Asia, for example, they have been generally viewed as contributing to regional stability. In the Middle East, while the U.S. presence may

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<sup>2</sup> The intervention and non-intervention argument is based on Stuart Johnson’s report, “Peering Into the Futures,” Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, forthcoming.

be welcomed by some countries, in others, our forces can be a lightning rod. The fact that a base has some negative impact does not mean that its overall effect may not be beneficial. In those areas where U.S. forces are generally not welcome, however, a balance can be considered between a more substantial base and bases that are less intrusive or even in some cases “over-the-horizon,” as the sea-basing concept suggests.

### **Current Configuration of Bases<sup>3</sup>**

Overseas military facilities are part of the overall global defense posture that includes key security relationships and command structures at various levels, military activities such as training, exercises and operations, legal arrangements with other countries, and the capacity to surge forces quickly from sources throughout the world—not just those from within a theater. Each base incorporates a unique set of features including legal status, tenant units, support capabilities and local relationships. Nevertheless, the facilities that are a key part of this global posture are categorized currently as:

- Main operating bases with permanently stationed combat forces, command and control structures and family support facilities.
- Forward operating sites that are expandable facilities with a more limited U.S. military presence and possibly pre-positioned equipment. They can host rotational forces and be a focus for bilateral and regional training.
- Cooperative security locations that are host-nation facilities with little or no permanent U.S. presence. They do, however, require periodic service, with contractors, and/or host-nation support. They provide contingency access and may be a focal point for security cooperation activities.

These categories also reflect important differences in the degree of political commitment by the host countries. Main operating bases represent an enormous commitment, forward operating bases represent a significant commitment and cooperative security locations a somewhat lower level of commitment. In this study, we have used the term “base” to cover all these arrangements.

Currently, the United States has about 860 military bases and facilities in 46 foreign locations. About two-thirds of these bases are located in three countries: Germany (306), Japan (158) and South Korea (105). Overall, overseas bases account for less than 20 percent of the total U.S. military base structure (see tables 1 and 2 below). Note that these figures are based on inventories of facilities by value and do not correspond to the three categories of bases described above.

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<sup>3</sup> The basing terms and definitions are derived from Office of the Secretary of Defense Report to Congress, “Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture,” September 2004.

Table 1. **Configuration of Installations**

<i>Size<sup>4</sup></i>	<i>Foreign Based</i>	<i>U.S. Based</i>	<i>Total</i>
Large	15	95	110
Medium	19	102	121
Small	826	3645	4471
Total	860	3842	4702

Source: Department of Defense Base Structure Report FY 2004

Table 2. **Distribution of Installations**

<i>European Command</i>	<i>Southern Command</i>	<i>Central Command</i>	<i>Pacific Command</i>	<i>Northern Command</i>
Belgium	Antigua & Barbuda	Bahrain	Antarctica	Canada
Denmark	Antarctica	Diego Garcia	Australia	Cuba
France	Bahamas	Egypt	Hong Kong	
Germany	Colombia	Iraq	Indonesia	
Greece	Curacao	Kenya	Japan	
Greenland	El Salvador	Kuwait	Kwajalein Atoll	
Iceland	Ecuador	Oman	New Zealand	
Italy	Honduras	Tajikistan	Singapore	
Luxembourg	Peru	Uzbekistan	South Korea	
Netherlands	Venezuela			
Norway				
Portugal				
Saint Helena				
Spain				
Turkey				
United Kingdom				

Source: Department of Defense Base Structure Report FY 2004, plus updates

We expect the current configuration of such bases will change, resulting in fewer main operating bases, more forward operating sites and more contingency cooperative security locations. As a result of a reconfigured network of bases, combined with new technologies and approaches to power projection, U.S. forces in the future will be less tethered to specific bases. Improvements in the international security environment and/or new technologies will probably not be sufficient to risk substantial cut-backs in overseas basing options, however.

These bases are also more vulnerable than in the past both politically and militarily. Adversaries increasingly have access to better weapons and the lack of the common, unifying

<sup>4</sup> Based on plant replacement value; large: > \$1.553 B; medium: \$828 M - \$1.553 B; small: < \$828 M.

threats of the Cold War reduces the level of confidence about our ability to use bases. In addition, we can expect a decline in host nation support in some cases and further difficulty in negotiating status of forces agreements. The issue of providing for families of service members (dependents) overseas will continue to be vexing. We can no longer assume that we can use bases for whatever purposes we want and that our forces will have immunity from local prosecution.

## **Short-term Priorities**

### **Operations Plans and Contingency Plans**

The current U.S. global military force posture and related network of bases support a series of operational and contingency plans that constitute a clear and authoritative expression of U.S. security priorities and requirements. They are updated regularly based on changes in the strategic context, intelligence assessments, policies, political-military strategies, resources, gaming and analyses, technologies and other factors.

From this perspective, response times are an important factor in determining basing requirements. The basic questions are: How much, how far and how fast? While planning requires making assumptions about response times, experience over the last several decades has found that our current network of bases has generally been up to the challenge. Even as times changed – for example, with increased use of special operations forces based in the United States – their rapid and secure deployment has been effectively facilitated by the use of overseas bases.

In addition to facilitating deployment of forces in combat, bases are critical to sustaining operations. For example, extended conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, even at reduced levels and with greater international involvement, require support from a network of bases to sustain these operations. Refueling requirements alone drive the need for a substantial number of bases.

Technological improvements in the armed forces are not likely to reduce significantly the operational requirements for overseas bases. For example, the search for more mobile forces by reducing the weight of tanks, personnel carriers, artillery and other systems has yielded only modest reductions in the overall sea-lift and/or air-lift requirements. Bases are important factors in supporting operational requirements: deployment times can be substantially reduced without sacrificing survivability or lethality by providing more pre-positioned equipment at overseas bases.<sup>5</sup>

Future basing requirements also need to be evaluated in terms of anticipating “What Ifs?” Forty years from now the United States may have a much different force posture with substantially different demands for overseas basing. A wide range of possible developments could affect our need for bases: What if we have smaller ships but many more of them? What if a major power conflict emerges over competition for access to energy? What if Iran

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<sup>5</sup> See “Alternative Approaches to Army Transformation,” by Joseph N. Mait and Richard L. Kugler, in *Defense Horizons*, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, July 2004.

develops nuclear weapons? What if Taiwan declares independence from China or for some other reason China becomes an adversary? What if Pakistan elects a radical Islamist leadership? What if areas in Africa become of major interest to the United States? The list of potential challenges is long and a robust program of gaming exercises, including the role of bases, can provide useful insights.

In any event, the operational and contingency planning process will no doubt continue to lead to changes in basing requirements, including the need for new bases, reduced requirements for existing bases and other developments that require realignments. In light of the need for a comprehensive national security strategy, these important military requirements need to be assessed as part of addressing the system as a whole and anticipating long-term requirements.

### **International Terrorism**

We assume that terrorism will continue to present a risk that must be managed over the long-term. It represents an attractive competitive strategy for disaffected non-state actors to attack the militarily more powerful. Managing the problem is difficult because international terrorist organizations are increasingly decentralized, diverse, and global in their operations. They are also adaptive in coping with government countermeasures and have access to increasingly lethal technologies. These evolving terrorist capabilities make international cooperation increasingly important, particularly in intelligence sharing and law enforcement. Historically, individual states have had the primary responsibility for fighting terrorism, but it is increasingly clear that they cannot do it alone. They must work with other states and multinational institutions such as NATO. Defeating terrorism and responding to terrorist attacks will also require international U.S. military operations for which bases may play useful roles in providing security assistance, support for consequence management and protection of critical infrastructure, including back-up communications, power generation and medical support. Thus, bases that have been focused on conventional military operations will be increasingly useful in support of a counter-terrorist strategy, including informational aspects.

### **Proliferation of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons**

Preventing the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and keeping those weapons out of the hands of terrorists will continue to be a priority security concern for the United States. In dealing with this problem, the United States is still developing its strategies. One effort, the Proliferation Security Initiative, shows potential for mobilizing a growing international effort to interdict illegal arms and technology shipments. This relatively new arrangement benefits from a network of supporting bases and probably will require even more bases than are currently available.

It is not clear what will happen with respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For example, the development of the capability to produce nuclear weapons by Iran or North Korea could put strong pressure on other countries to follow suit. On the other hand, U.S. military presence and bases may be critical to deter use of nuclear weapons and to reassure U.S. friends and allies—thus helping to reduce proliferation. An important issue is whether the United States has an effective strategy to deal with so-called “loose

nukes” in a country which lacks control over these weapons. Bases in the region may be crucial for implementing effective contingency plans.

## **Long-term Considerations**

### **Regional Security**

The U.S. military presence and basing requirements will continue to vary by region according to the differing political contexts and security objectives. For example, in Europe, U.S. forces and bases will play a “post-modern” role that includes underpinning multinational stability operations such as those in the Balkans, as well as transforming allied forces and strengthening the capacity of NATO and the EU to conduct security operations both in Europe and out of area. In East Asia, U.S. forces and associated bases will continue to perform the more traditional roles of reassuring allies and partners while deterring conflict on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. A new prospect for the region, however, might be the development of cooperative security arrangements and organized multilateral cooperation among the region’s military forces, in which case bases could be supportive of such international efforts. In the broader Middle East, U.S. traditional stability concerns likely will continue although significant change in the region cannot be ruled out since major changes are already occurring in some regional states. U.S. forces are likely to continue to deter aggression and the use of WMD by regional states, and to generally support stability. They will also perform a diplomatic function of supporting political change as occurred in Central and Eastern Europe. Bases will facilitate both these roles.

One of the principal benefits gained by a robust U.S. military forward presence is building defense and security relationships with host countries and other regional partners. These relationships shape the security environment and create the conditions for the effective deployment of military force when needed, as recently demonstrated after the December 2004 Asian tsunami catastrophe by the Thai government’s decision to provide U.S. forces access to Utapao airbase. This requires extended contact over a long period of time, and is accomplished through a wide variety of engagement or security cooperation activities including exercises, joint training, senior officer visits, and the implementation of assistance programs. It would be far more difficult to build the durable security relationships needed with U.S. forces operating exclusively from U.S. territory. Moreover, it would be prudent for the United States to maintain bases or base access in every region where U.S. forces may need to operate in a crisis.

### **Power Projection**

Power is the ability to influence the behavior of others and overseas military bases can play important roles in projecting U.S. power. Power includes a variety of political, economic and military means and may involve a range of approaches. Long-term planning needs to focus on the desired behavior on the part of target groups and how overseas bases can best contribute to such outcomes.

Overseas bases obviously facilitate U.S. projection of military power, including sustainment of U.S. forces. In recent history, the speed of large-scale military responses has not been as decisive as in past military conflicts. Rather, political decision-making time and the time required to prepare the world politically to support the decision has been the dominant factor in the time line. It is possible that this will continue to be the case in future conflicts, but the military needs to plan to have the capability to respond if speed became important—which may be truer for terrorist and weapons of mass destruction contingencies than for conventional ones. Bases can help meet the requirement for prompt deployment.

### **Interoperability and Transformation**

For the past 55 years, the United States has maintained sizable forces in Europe, Northeast Asia, and elsewhere for the peacetime purpose of promoting interoperability with the forces of friends and allies, and for helping encourage their efforts to improve and modernize. For the most part, this effort has yielded substantial dividends. In the coming years, U.S. military forces will be undergoing transformation in order to prepare for new missions and to make the transition from the Industrial Age to the Information Age by embracing new information networks, structures, doctrines, operating practices, sensors, munitions, and weapon systems. The military forces of friends and allies will need to undergo similar transformation if they are to remain interoperable with U.S. forces and to be capable of waging 21<sup>st</sup> century warfare. Achieving this goal will not be easy. For this reason, transformed U.S. military forces, with appropriate bases and facilities for combined training and exercises, will need to be stationed overseas in order to work continuously with partners and allies during peacetime. This requirement applies to Central Europe and Northeast Asia, but it also will apply to new geographic regions such as Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, the Broader Middle East, and South Asia, where new friends, partners, and allies are emerging. U.S. main operating bases, forward operating locations, and cooperative security locations should be preserved or created with the goal of interoperability and transformation in mind.

### **Alliances, Partnerships and Coalitions<sup>6</sup>**

Over the next 20 to 40 years, the United States will likely engage in a multitude of political arrangements with like-minded states regarding use of military forces. All of these different types of arrangements may involve the use of bases, although often at the more informal level.

Alliances have proven to be more durable than expected in outliving their original purposes. This is because the members continue to find value in security cooperation and to adapt the institutions to fit changing circumstances. NATO, for example, has undergone remarkable transformation over the last decade and has expanded its sphere of operations well beyond Europe. Japan is developing its place in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, as is Korea.

These changes present new challenges. For example, for NATO, there is the issue of how to support out-of-area operations. Logistics support, which traditionally was the responsibility

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<sup>6</sup> This section draws heavily on the report by working group member Andrew J. Pierre, “Coalitions: Building and Maintenance,” published by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University in 2002, based on a joint working group with the American Academy of Diplomacy.



of individual member nations, needs to be reexamined. A new requirement such as this raises the possibility that it would make sense to consider establishing NATO bases for operations beyond Europe. How to undertake a multinational effort along those lines is yet to be determined, including such issues as what kind of basing arrangement is desirable and attainable and who will pay the cost. These and other questions need to be reviewed, especially as NATO may increase its involvement in new types of missions such as stability and reconstruction, counter-terrorism, and counter-proliferation operations.

Less formal partnerships also have proven effective in establishing patterns of cooperation that may assist future operations. In particular, these relationships can pave the way for the use of bases, including temporary access, if the need arises.

Coalitions provide another form of cooperation that has basing implications. Coalitions are groups of like-minded states that agree on the need for joint action on a specific problem at a particular time with no commitment to continue that particular coalition once the specific objectives are accomplished. They entail political, military and economic contributions, although these will be unequal in size and form. The use of bases that results from the coalition-building process may be only “temporary,” but also may be critical to a vital interest of the United States and its partners, and therefore may endure a number of years beyond the coalition.

### **Growing Threat Capabilities**

Overseas bases present lucrative targets for political and military attack. Many are particularly vulnerable because of their location and the difficulty of defending some of their key components, such as pipelines. Furthermore, defense must be coordinated with the host country which often provides the bulk of the base defense forces. We must assume that potential adversaries will have increasing capabilities to attack these bases. For example, long-range, precision missiles, including nuclear weapons in some cases, can threaten U.S. forces and their forward operating bases.

To reduce vulnerabilities, the United States and host countries need to bolster security around key bases. In particular, missile defense may be an important part of the arrangement the United States will have to consider in order to obtain access to foreign bases. Several countries in the Persian Gulf, for example, have asked for U.S. missile defense units deployed as part of basing arrangements. They want these missile defense systems to be able to protect capital cities, ports and other areas important to the host government. Furthermore, host governments prefer land-based systems that they can see and believe are more closely tied to their defense than sea-based systems that operate over-the-horizon and are not threatened by an attack on a Gulf state capital.

As potential adversaries acquire more advanced strike capabilities, the United States will have to adapt and be able to operate within these increased threat environments. Moving forces and bases out of range is not a viable strategy in the long-term, as we learned during the Cold War. As the Soviet Union introduced longer range, more accurate missiles, the United States undertook a series of relocations from forward air bases eventually back to the central United States. This is ultimately a losing proposition, as we eventually understood, and we

learned to operate within the expanding Soviet threat rings through a combination of hardening of bases, rapid dispersal of forces, and maintaining a percentage of assets on quick reaction alert.

## **Rising Powers**

Economic growth and rapid technological development will place China and India among the most important rising powers. What basing arrangements will help ensure security as these countries develop is less than clear. The two countries are not the same – India being the world’s largest democracy, a rather vital distinction as compared to a country run by the Chinese Communist Party. Thus, we assume that, for the most part, that India’s interests will be substantially similar to – or at least not seriously conflict with – those of the United States. Indian officials have even raised the possibility of basing arrangements for U.S. forces, which should be explored to help enhance security in Asia. Even for China, however, its growing power presents more of an opportunity than a threat since to an important extent its growth has depended on deepening economic interdependence and maintaining the system of international rules and regimes that underpin global economic growth and political stability. Thus, there is a good possibility that China’s interests will continue to be consistent with U.S. interests on key issues. But for the foreseeable future, the Sino-U.S. relationship will continue to be troubled by the issue of Taiwan and the absence of democracy in China. Existing basing arrangements provide a reasonable capacity to deal with possible tensions in U.S.-China relations over these and other issues. Moreover, if a Northeast Asia security arrangement including China could be developed, existing bases could help support that arrangement.

## **Optimizing the Network of Bases**

### **Expanded Roles for Bases**

The nature of overseas bases also will undergo substantial changes. They will probably be combined increasingly with host-nation and multinational forces and they will include broader capabilities to support interagency operations including reconstruction, stability, public health (given the bioterrorism threat as well as the threat of infectious diseases from natural causes and disasters) and other functions beyond more traditional military missions.

Intelligence fusion centers on overseas bases can be useful in adapting to the changing nature and scope of international security affairs, including terrorism and proliferation. These centers can include host country intelligence officers, local law enforcement authorities and perhaps representatives from other countries in the region. Such centers can provide useful information about the immediate security environment.

Medical teams on overseas bases also have proven mutually beneficial. Medical experts are active in the local community and monitor the public health environment for early signs of dangerous diseases that may spread rapidly throughout the world. These teams may be bolstered by medical supplies pre-positioned at overseas bases.

## Sea Basing

Historically, the United States has always obtained sufficient base access, in part because of the substantial redundancy of basing alternatives — one further reason to maintain a significant base structure. Nonetheless, access cannot be taken for granted over the next 20 to 40 years, especially considering the multiplicity of security threats and the evolving strategic and political environment. Thus, it makes good sense to explore the alternative of sea basing for situations in which access to facilities on land may be denied. Developing contingency bases, at sea as well as ashore, will assist the United States in responding in a timely manner to emerging crises.

While sea basing is in its infancy as a concept, it does have the promise that the United States would be able to bring to bear substantial military force as well as humanitarian assistance without the constraint of having to necessarily achieve diplomatic clearance in advance. Since nations or groups practicing an anti-access strategy might seek to deny the United States freedom of operation in an affected area, it seems useful to explore such a sea basing capability. Development will take time and resources, but military planners cannot always count on an alternative strategy to recover from such a contingency as Turkey's refusal to allow U.S. forces to use Turkish territory at the outset of the Iraq war.

Sea basing can complement a robust network of overseas bases, but it should not be viewed as a replacement for land bases, which provide visible U.S. presence and commitment. Land bases also provide opportunities for sharing the costs of regional security. Under such arrangements, host nations commit to common security goals and, in many cases, to the costs of basing U.S. forces in their country. In addition, overseas bases provide the United States with situational awareness and local ties that are not otherwise available. Furthermore, the relationships established in conjunction with overseas bases can facilitate the establishment of coalitions.

A combination of land and sea bases also is more survivable than either mode alone. Such a combination complicates the problems of targeting and appropriate strike capabilities for potential adversaries. The logistics necessary to sustain combat and post-conflict operations will eventually require a substantial network of integrated land and sea facilities. Finally, sea basing could provide the opportunity when deemed necessary or desirable to maintain an overseas basing presence with a lighter footprint.

## New Locations

While it is not clear where U.S. forces will be most needed in the future, much of our focus will probably continue to be on the “arc of instability” that stretches from parts of South and Southeast Asia through Central Asia, the Middle East, North and sub-Saharan Africa and into the Caribbean and parts of Latin America. This area has broad potential for producing failing or failed states and their concomitant ills. Key regions within this area are home to much of the world's energy resources in a period of rapidly increasing demand for energy. While additional U.S. bases in this volatile region may be either impossible or undesirable to attain, acquiring or maintaining bases and base access on the region's periphery from which to project force rapidly may be of even greater importance in the future than it is today.

## **Conclusions and Recommendations**

### **Bases in a Strategy of Combined Power**

Protecting and enhancing U.S. security in an increasingly globalized world will require the effective use of all elements of national power. Bases can be important for military reasons, of course, but if properly utilized, they have very important diplomatic value as well as and can also support United States informational and even economic goals. Given that the precise difficulties that the United States will face are impossible to predict, maintaining a flexible base network will contribute significantly to implementing overall U.S. national security strategy.

### **Building Trust and Promoting Common Interests**

Without an agreed upon common purpose with host countries, it cannot be assumed that we will continue to be able to use specific foreign bases. Thus, to maintain access to existing bases and gain options for new bases, the United States will need to commit substantial resources to building trust and developing strategic understandings with existing and new partners, and building trust with respect to the exercise of power and the use of bases. Common interests develop from common understandings and a willingness to act in concert to respond to common problems. To undertake successfully such an approach requires a wide range of formal and informal efforts. Countries will act in their interests but how they perceive and act on those interests is subject to development over time. Interpersonal relationships can be important in influencing these perceptions and actions and thus special attention should be paid to the next generation of political and military leaders. These relationships will need to include regular information exchanges and consultation before action is taken that may affect a partner's interests.

The United States is widely perceived as a world leader and U.S. values are broadly shared. Nonetheless, much of the world's public views at least some U.S. policies negatively which, to some extent, has spilled over into a general anti-Americanism, making trust building more difficult. A focus on common interests as well as better public diplomacy to improve the U.S. image will be critical for improving the U.S. ability to work broadly with other countries. Disaster relief and similar efforts may help change perceptions of the United States and the U.S. military and even improve chances that governments in regional states can gain support or at least acquiescence for providing bases or base access.

### **Multi-Dimensional Bases**

Given that all the elements of national power will be necessary to advance U. S. interests, the criteria for evaluating U.S. overseas bases should include determination of their capacity for supporting multidimensional goals. As the concept of security becomes more broadly defined, the capabilities of U.S. forces will also need to adapt to this changing environment and bases should be an important part of this adaptation. While bases will have a military function, some bases abroad could increasingly support a broader and better integrated set of capabilities.

One important element of future strategies is the necessity for interagency coordination and joint actions. Bases could be centers for interagency planning at the strategic and operational levels. Such a transformation in bases could be part of an overall effort to improve the political-military interface. Whereas great strides have been made in achieving better integrated military operations among the armed services, progress has been much slower in coordinating essential political-military operations. For example, it has proven much more difficult for the United States to win the peace in post-conflict situations than to win battles, and bases could be utilized to implement interagency stabilization and reconstruction efforts as well as disaster and humanitarian relief. Winning the war on terror and stopping the use of weapons of mass destruction are at least equally difficult, and will likewise require concerted interagency efforts utilizing all elements of national power.

Bases are often used for other than their originally intended purposes, so, to the extent possible, the United States should develop bases with excess capacity to enhance their flexibility and adaptability. Based on the historical record, changes in the U.S. defense posture will change our overall base structures, sometimes at our instance and sometimes at the instance of host countries. Thus, we should also plan for major transitions in bases, including the ability to move key capabilities elsewhere should the need arise.

Some bases also could become more international in character. They could be used to support new regional security arrangements, including meeting the challenges of the war on terror and preventing the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction. While the specifics would have to be developed, in appropriate circumstances U.S. overseas bases could host UN or NATO activities. This could help develop more internationally-integrated security operations and provide additional political legitimacy to the bases. Opportunities for such changes may occur in cases where the bases are no longer needed for their original purpose but may be useful in undertaking new roles. In Korea, for example, if the conflict between the North and South were to be peacefully resolved, some U.S. bases might be available to support a new regional security arrangement with broader participation, possibly including China and Russia. As bases take on an increasingly international character, they also may be subject to more limits on their use, but even bilateral base arrangements can make the use of bases subject to limits, as we have noted several times in the past.<sup>7</sup>

## **Comprehensive Assessments**

There are many significant benefits to be derived from bases in the future, but the current way we think about and manage overseas bases is suboptimal in several regards. While fiscal and operational responsibility for overseas military bases currently is shared mainly between the Services and the Combatant Commands, this division of labor is not well-suited to address bases in their broader context and to anticipate long-term needs. The DoD's recent Global Force Posture study recognizes this problem.

To make bases as effective as possible to meet future U. S. national security requirements, periodic assessments of the overall base network will be needed. These assessments would

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<sup>7</sup> Some examples include Germany asking the United States not to use our NATO bases to re-supply Israel during the 1973 war, Italy not wanting NATO bases on their territory used to bomb Bosnia, Turkey not wanting the Incirlik airbase used to attack Iraq in the Gulf War, and others.

take into account the importance of all elements of national power, including interagency considerations, as well as the very real needs of the bases as part of a military power projection system. A comprehensive assessment would take a long-term perspective, focusing on key national interests, including how we want the United States to be perceived in the coming decades and how bases should fit into shaping those views. A global review of this nature should assess the base network from many perspectives, including how the network could be changed to become more cost efficient and provide U.S. forces with more flexibility and agility, as well as how to meet joint interagency requirements.

Such comprehensive assessments also should examine how the bases are viewed from foreign perspectives and the impact of those views—and how to enhance the actual and perceived value of the bases to the host country and to the region as well. Inputs from the U.S. ambassadors in the host nations and the region would provide essential data for broad-based assessments. As noted, such efforts could build on the global force posture review undertaken by the Secretary of Defense over the last few years and could become part of the Quadrennial Defense Review process. This would allow the DoD also to take a budgeting approach to bases that considers the benefits of specific bases beyond the value of those facilities to the service which is paying the cost. Any deliberations about changing bases will become politically sensitive as can be observed from the domestic base review process. So any future efforts along these lines on a global basis will need to be insulated, at least initially, from outside lobbying.

## Issues for Further Study

### Long-term Investment Strategy

Overseas bases are developed through a series of incremental decisions that focus mainly on short-term needs. Yet experience shows that many temporary bases tend to take on a more permanent character. What is lacking is a long-term investment strategy for overseas bases that takes into account the wide range of factors discussed in this report. Such a strategy would address the entire base network to determine priorities and investment requirements. It could build on individual base development plans which would, in turn, be linked to negotiations with host nations to include infrastructure development to insure that the bases are well-served by road, rail, pipeline, airfield and port facilities. The State Department and other government agencies as well as Congress also would need to be part of a process that produces an integrated long-term investment strategy for overseas bases.

### Personnel Management

One of the adverse consequences of operating from a broad network of overseas bases is the high levels of attrition of military personnel with critical skills following such assignments. The problem is exacerbated by the high operations tempo and the fewer forces available following the reductions in U.S. forces after the Cold War. We cannot assume that this is a temporary condition. Yet operations from bases in remote locations are likely to be necessary. What are the personnel management options in the short- and long-term?

### Logistics and Transportation

Supply and maintenance are among the important functions served by overseas bases. Yet when crises occur, many of the logistics arrangements are handled on an ad hoc basis and many of the logistics units are transformed on the spot to perform other functions. A comprehensive study of our current network of bases in terms of logistics and transportation would be useful. It could develop guidelines for stockpiling that indicate what kinds of items are better to warehouse at overseas bases and what items are more appropriately transported directly from the United States. It could also clarify what is the appropriate mix of logistics and transportation units in the active and reserve forces.

A related study should look at transforming logistics for NATO. Traditionally, logistics has been a national responsibility, but as NATO has expanded its scope beyond Europe, a more integrated logistics system and base network seems desirable.

### Bases as a Force for Change

There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that overseas bases can make positive contributions to geopolitical change, but the subject deserves a more systematic investigation. For example, bases have operated in conjunction with International Military Education and Training (IMET), which has been instrumental in introducing positive changes abroad. There are other approaches that could better utilize the opportunities presented by overseas bases.

## **Continuity in Managing Bases**

The Department of Defense has a poor institutional memory concerning specific overseas bases. The rotation of personnel through overseas bases, combined with changes in management at the Service, Joint Staff, Combatant Command and Office of the Secretary of Defense level, can result in poor understanding of the key issues related to each base. New managers need to know what issues are sensitive and how the host country system works regarding bases. A history of the base, including the key features of base negotiations and agreements would be useful, particularly regarding who pays for what and any responsibilities after the base is no longer needed. In some cases, the United States has promised more than it has delivered.<sup>8</sup> Newly assigned U.S. personnel may not be aware of such promises, but host country officials do not forget.

## **Sustainment and Reconstruction**

Following major combat operations, the requirement for sustainment and reconstruction is formidable and has important implications for the bases. How should such requirements be anticipated? What kinds of divisions of responsibility are desirable or feasible? Where should such capabilities be located? Who will be responsible for funding these efforts? These and other questions should be addressed as part of a conceptual framework for thinking about providing such capabilities and adapting the network of U.S. bases to meet these evolving responsibilities.

## **The End Game**

Closing bases is never easy, especially overseas bases. Some of the problems, however, may be mitigated if they are anticipated and appropriate steps taken. To help prepare for such developments, a series of case studies of the problems associated with closing bases and the lessons learned would be useful. Environmental concerns are among the contentious issues along with recovering some of the value of infrastructure development. In Europe, for example, the United States demanded compensation for facilities constructed on bases that were no longer needed but had been provided by allies for decades at no cost to the United States. In Panama, problems arose over responsibility for removing unexploded ordnance from bombing and artillery ranges.<sup>9</sup> These kinds of problems should be anticipated and understandings arrived at well before the bases are no longer needed.

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<sup>8</sup> In the lead-up to the Gulf War, for example, the United States promised Turkey Patriot missile batteries that were not later provided as grant aid.

<sup>9</sup> The United States stipulated in agreements for handing over bases at no cost to the government of Panama that the facilities would be turned over for like use; that is a firing range would be turned over for use as a firing range, not for public use and free of all environmental dangers.