



THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL
OF THE UNITED STATES

The Christopher J. Makins Lecture

given by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski¹

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Thank you very much, Jan Lodal [President of the Atlantic Council] and Mr. Ambassador [Sir David Manning, Ambassador of the United Kingdom]. First of all, thank you for hosting us here. As you said in your welcoming remarks, it's most appropriate that this event be held here, and your presence greatly enhances the significance of the occasion. Brent [Lt. General (Ret.) Brent Scowcroft, former Chairman, Atlantic Council, and former National Security Advisor], thank you for what you've said. I don't remember the debate that we had when we first met in 1954, but I am greatly reassured that you also have forgotten the details, since that means you can't claim that you were right!

Wendy and Marian Makins, I want to say that it is very meaningful for me to be here because of the name that is attached to the series which I am inaugurating. Christopher Makins and I worked together starting in 1974. That is when I first got to know him, and he was, as David so eloquently said, the son of America, the son of Britain, but also very much the son of Europe and thus he truly epitomized Atlanticism. But beyond that, he was a man of enormous clarity of thought, a man of great precision of expression, and a man of true

¹ *A transcript of a speech delivered without a written text.*

dedication to a cause larger than himself. He and I would have a periodic lunch at the Metropolitan Club, which I always found most enlightening. And we actually revived, in the course of those lunches, a dying tradition at the Metropolitan Club – namely, how would one decide who pays for the lunch? We were both members, and we revived the tradition of casting dice. Whoever wins is the guest of the other. It became a very serious competition! I think towards the end we almost attached more importance to that event than to the lunch discussion itself! It is an honor for me to speak under the auspices of his name.

It is also an honor to speak at the Atlantic Council. When I think of the Atlantic Council, because of the name, I think of World War II. And when I think of World War II, during which I was a very young but very politically minded boy, I think of the Atlantic Charter. I remember what it meant to those of us who were very much preoccupied at the time with what might be the outcome of World War II. When the Atlantic Charter was signed and issued, the outcome of the war was not yet clear, but the stakes were very clear. The stakes were well defined by the two people who signed that charter. The Charter, and the meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt, epitomized unity – unity of purpose and unity of comprehension of what was at stake. That was essential historically because it infused confidence at a crucial time. All of a sudden, one was aware that that lonely island, the last part of free Europe, was no longer alone. Rather, something very large stood behind it, an Atlantic connection that almost inevitably implied eventual victory – victory based on a shared understanding of the stake and a shared understanding of the historical moment.

I want to begin with the larger context of today's transatlantic interactions, a context of which the Atlantic Charter is evocative. Let me begin by a simple question: do America and Europe today share a jointly defined purpose? Do we partake of the same interpretation of the essence of the challenge that our new times, the post Cold War times, pose to us?

Before trying to answer that question, let me refer you to a speech made by the President a few days ago. It was an important attempt to define both the purpose and the meaning of what we face. In the speech, he compared the war on terrorism to the Cold War. He felt

there were significant historical analogies between these two phenomena that are helpful in understanding both our purpose and the nature of our times. With due respect to the President, I have an uneasy feeling about some of the formulations involved, beginning with his definition of the challenge, “we’re fighting the followers of a murderous ideology that despises freedom,” and continuing with his definition of the threat, “they’re seeking weapons of mass destruction, which means they would pose a threat to America as great as the Soviet Union.” In my opinion, his definition of the challenge is too vague, and his definition of the threat is too sweeping.

There are risks in definitions that are too vague or too sweeping. The vagueness of the President’s statement of the challenge runs the risk of unintentionally uniting our enemies while dividing our friends. This is the very opposite of what we did in the early years of the Cold War when we strove to unite our friends and to divide our enemies. And we ought to be particularly careful if our definition of the enemy is too vague but by implication too all embracing – it might unite the world of Islam against both America and Europe.

The definition of the nature of the threat is also too sweeping, because while the threat is serious in the long run, it is still minor compared to what the Soviet Union posed. Let me go back for a minute to my own experience in the White House (and I dare say Brent’s was identical). Part of my job was to inform the President that we were under nuclear attack. We could not exclude that possibility, and at times we were worried about it. I had roughly three minutes in which to verify the nature of the attack and its scale, which would involve several progressive steps. The President, once I reached him, would have four minutes to decide how to respond depending on the scale of the attack. Then the execution would be set in motion. Six hours later, approximately 160 million people would be dead. I think it’s important to have the distinction between the overwhelming threat of the Cold War and today’s terrorist threat in mind because exaggeration of a threat is liable to produce only excessive fear.

Some might say that deterrence worked, that we won the Cold War. But at the time there was no certainty. And in addition to that, there was always a chance of a mishap, of a technical glitch, of a war by miscalculation. I submit that the danger the terrorists might acquire nuclear weapons someday from one, two, or conceivably three nuclear powers is not as high as those risks. And indeed it is not so high because increasingly, we know that nuclear forensics will identify the source of the weapon and thus deterrence can be applicable for destruction of the source of that weapon. Moreover, the use of one or two or three weapons, while horrendous to contemplate given current circumstances, is still nothing compared to 160 million people dead in six hours.

It is important to have a sense of proportion, which helps to understand the problems we face. I do not feel that we have either a national or a transatlantic consensus about the nature of the challenge we confront or about the nature of the danger we face. We had that consensus at the time of the Atlantic Charter, and we need it today.

What we need today is a shared understanding of the things that make our time unique. That understanding must recognize what is unique both about the world in general and about the particular threat we face.

Let me make a stab, just a stab, at a formulation. On the general level, what is distinctive about our time is that the United States and Europe, the most advanced part of the world, face a massive and unprecedented global political awakening. That is something new in all of history. The world as a whole is experiencing today what French society as a whole experienced during the French revolution – a sudden stirring of political awareness, unleashed passions, fermenting excitement, and escalating aspirations. Today, that sense of revolution is the political reality worldwide and it is altogether new, though it has been developing over a number of decades.

Today, even in remote Nepal, Bolivia, and Kyrgyzstan, we see similar manifestations of political behavior. Today, in Somalia, East Timor, and Chechnya, we see similar

manifestations of brutal violence. And throughout the world, we see similar trends in the rise of radical populism, which carries with it the potential for violent extremism. This radical populism, organized through the Internet and fueled by the images of human inequality that are disseminated globally by the electronic media, is also stimulated by a new political reality. This political reality is no longer that of an aroused peasantry or that of the industrial proletariat of Marx – it is some 120 million fermenting and politically active university students throughout the world. That is the new reality we confront together, and it is a much more complex and difficult reality than we faced during the Cold War, World War I, or World War II.

On the more specific level, we are facing the reality of radical populism increasingly in the form of extremist Islamic fundamentalism. This specific political reality can be geographically described – it operates largely in that part of the world which I have referred to as “the global Balkans” which essentially extends from Suez to Sichuan. It is a part of the world which has faced and become increasingly aroused at foreign intrusion. This was the case in Afghanistan in response to the Soviet invasion, and this is now the case in the Persian Gulf in response to the American invasion.

This increasingly resentful and extremist fundamentalism uses terrorism to compensate for its technological weakness. This strategy is known as asymmetrical warfare, and its use is widespread. We should recognize the expanding potential for this danger in Afghanistan, a nation traditionally hostile to outsiders that is becoming increasingly xenophobic. What has prevented Afghanistan’s hostility from erupting against us is the fact that we helped Afghanistan; consequently, many Afghans still view us as their allies. But their numbers are decreasing.

This violent fundamentalism is also expressed by anti-colonialism in Iraq because for the Iraqis who dislike our occupation, our presence is an unpleasant reminder of their colonial past. And this new political reality involves intensifying hostility with Iran, instability in Pakistan, and the continued mistreatment of Palestine. All of these critical situations pose

the danger of American engagement in a fermenting and increasingly violent region of approximately 550 million people.

We need, therefore, a transatlantic dialogue about the nature of our time, about the new aspects of the dilemmas we face, and about what we can do together concerning these general and specific challenges.

That dialogue requires two sides. It needs – it requires – an atlanticist America that respects Europe and recognizes its own need for counsel and support. And it requires a political Europe that realizes that its global responsibilities are not only socio-economic – that the world needs a Europe that also has the political and military capacity to act jointly with America.

In recent years, America has veered away from the centrality of the American-European connection in world affairs. At the same time, the European Union, which was emerging as a political union when Europe was still divided in half, has been evolving into a European Community since Europe became whole and free. That itself is a paradox, because the apt name for what exists today is the European Community and what existed until 1990 was in fact a nascent European Union.

We can only have a transatlantic dialogue when there are strategically minded interlocutors speaking for Europe as a whole, not when they are speaking for individual national positions, as was the case during the initial phase of the Iraq war. When Prime Minister Blair whispered to us sound advice (which we accepted but rarely heeded) while publicly endorsing what we did, when Chancellor Schroeder disassociated himself from us for domestic political reasons, and when President Chirac did the same for reasons of historical nostalgia, our international dialogue failed.

America has an obligation to listen when Europe as a whole speaks to us. Perhaps a future European team involving Merkel, Brown, and Sarkozy, backed by Prodi, Zapatero, and

Kaczynski, can again formulate a European perspective that America will be forced to recognize. To arrive at that point of cooperation, we must cultivate our dialogue and move forward on several issues of common concern, thereby creating opportunities not only for joint action but for shared perspective as well.

Joint initiatives can also contribute to an Atlantic grand consensus. There are four areas in which I think joint movement is timely, necessary, and possible. I will not attempt to prescribe policies, but allow me to suggest some general principles.

First, in the region of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, our emphasis should be not on coercion but on consensus. Specifically, we need to engage Iran. I was gratified to hear the decision taken today by the United States to participate jointly with key European interlocutors in shaping a new proposal to Iran, offering it, putting it forward, and then negotiating it if the Iranians respond in a constructive fashion. I hope this initiative moves forward. I think it was a timely gesture and a courageous one by this administration as well, given the fact that the president's opposition to this type of approach is widely known. I feel that the initiative is both timely and potentially positive.

I am concerned about the tone in which the Iran proposal was packaged, however, because that could benefit Iranian extremists who do not want negotiations and who want to use confrontation as the basis for consolidating their position. I hope that we will be patient enough, even if the initial Iranian responses are not positive, to pursue this approach. That requires time, and I think we should recognize the fact that the Iranian problem, while serious, is not urgently imminent. We have time to deal with it intelligently and we have taken the right step: American participation is essential.

Second, regarding the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, I believe we must clearly define our ultimate objective. The two parties to the conflict are very suspicious of each other. Until they see the outline of an eventual settlement and until that settlement is articulated and supported both by America and Europe, suspicions will predominate and reluctance to make

concessions will remain strong. Both Palestinian and Israeli public opinions today, according to polls, are ahead of their governments in willingness to compromise. This applies both on the territorial issue and on the issue of Jerusalem. A joint American-European declaration of the basic principles upon which the peace settlement ought to be based would accelerate the peace process and galvanize moderate public opinion.

Thirdly, in Iraq, we have to make a break with notions of tutelage, which evoke memories of Iraq's colonial past. Talk of Iraq's incapacity for self-government and discussion of an indefinite American military presence in Iraq to forestall civil war is neglectful of history. It reminds me of the discussions in France regarding Algeria before President de Gaulle abandoned this refrain and realized that the French presence in Algeria was not only harming France but was perpetuating the conflict itself.

We must recognize that the Iraqis are no longer living in the colonial age, that they are a sophisticated people with the capacity to govern themselves, and that they have the ability to resolve their civil strife more effectively than an occupation army. Their solution may be more brutal than ours, but we do not have the capacity to resolve the problem decisively and our continued presence will only perpetuate the conflict.

Finally, in the Middle East regarding democratization: we should first focus not on elections but on human rights. Human rights enshrine the rule of law and develop the electoral process, eventually producing democracy. Elections are the last stage in the process of democratization. Insisting on immediate democracy in an era and region in which radical populism is particularly strong is an unwise and self-destructive policy.

The second large issue for a transatlantic consensus involves Russia. Russia must be neither isolated nor propitiated. America cannot abandon its attendance at the G8, but we should be prepared to use that platform to discuss Russia's stifling of democracy, including its intervention in Moldova and its support for separatism in Georgia. We should ask why Russia refuses to ratify the energy charter between itself and the European Union, which is

important to energy security. Inviting Russia to become part of our community by meeting international obligations is the right mode of engagement.

We must pursue a strategy based on a sense of history. If Ukraine sustains its independence and begins to join NATO and the EU, it would be a catalyst for Russia to follow suit. Poland and the Baltic Republics are too alien to the Russians to have encouraged Russia to follow them. But a democratic Ukraine which becomes increasingly a part of the European family is going to have a contagious impact on Russia. This could open the door to Russia becoming increasingly associated with Europe, which is in the long-term interest of Russia and also in the interest of the Atlantic world.

Thirdly, with regard to NATO, the Atlantic community must rely on a principle not of regionalism but of globalism. Although NATO started as a regional undertaking, neither America nor Europe is primarily concerned today with just regional self-defense. The world is now a collective concern, and responsibility for global stability engages both America and Europe. For this reason, the gradual expansion of NATO's scope is inevitable and implies increasingly global undertakings. The Dutch government and the Dutch General Secretary of NATO have recently explored the possibility of extending involvement to New Zealand, Australia, and Japan. I believe this process should be pursued in the interest of the expanding role of the Atlantic Alliance on the global scale.

Finally, regarding China, the Atlantic world should recognize that collision is not inevitable. Analogies between China and imperial Germany prior to 1914 are misplaced for two key reasons. At that time, the great powers were not part of an interwoven, interdependent community. We all, including China, increasingly are. Whether we are connected by the WTO, financial flows, or energy interdependence, even major powers today are less independent than was the case with imperial Germany in 1914.

The second reason is more prosaic but just as important. In 1914, most Germans were poor and young. The Chinese are becoming richer and older. By 2020, there will be 250 million

Chinese over the age of 65. If handled appropriately, China will not become a revolutionary country. We have to be very careful to avoid a self-fulfilling paranoia about China's rise; though it is a regional power, barring a failure to address China appropriately, it will not become a global power for a long time, and before that occasion arrives we can increasingly interweave it into the international system.

To conclude, let me say that when America and Europe are united, when we act on the basis of a shared geopolitical perspective, when we define our policies by genuine consensus, when we are motivated not by fear but by historical confidence, there is literally nothing we cannot do. That is what the Atlantic Charter was all about.

Thank you.

Question and Answer Session

Question:

In your closing remarks, you noted that when the United States and Europe have a common goal we can succeed together. But you mentioned earlier in your talk that Europe is lacking a regime with which we can engage. You mentioned the names of emerging leaders who might come together. But what do we do now when they are not yet in power?

Dr. Brzezinski:

First of all, of the names I mentioned, some are already leaders and others may become leaders soon. I sense in Europe a realization that there is an absence of leadership. And the realization of a negative condition is the beginning of the resolution of that condition. I think there is a growing consensus in Europe that the Europeans have to work together and, while a common perspective on world affairs must involve all twenty-five European states, in reality the opinions of some countries are more important than the opinions of others. Six countries are particularly important, and, in that sense, there is already an opportunity for

an informal dialogue and a shared perception. From an American point of view, I believe that forging this European consensus is essential.

Consensus is essential for Europe's unity, but it is also essential for us if we are to be effective in the global scene. I believe that America needs solid European counsel to avoid unrealistic views of the world. September 11th established a tendency towards self-isolation in American society by stoking domestic fear, spreading undefined anxieties, and revealing enemies that could not be precisely defined. In order to remove ourselves from this isolation we must seek a partner in our rapidly changing world. Europe is that partner. I think the Europeans themselves realize that if America is to be a constructive player in international affairs, Europe must support us and interact with us with the kind of vision that we shared at the beginning of the Cold War and during World War II.

Question:

The Atlantic Charter was signed in the dark days of 1941, and military victory was the consequence – it was a military romp. I'd be interested in your comments about the nature of the power that we, the new West, must organize to stabilize the world today. What is the role of the military in meeting this challenge?

Dr. Brzezinski:

That is a huge question. Let me answer it in this way. Military power is essential but secondary. Even though 9-11 has caused America to take a decidedly military approach to foreign affairs, the solution to the new problems we face cannot be purely military.

We need an American-European-led international effort to improve the quality of global institutions in order to forestall the world's growing inequality. This inequality is not only economic disparity in the most tangible sense, but also cultural inequality, the inequality of sophistication and understanding which creates friction and culture wars. Solving this problem will require wisdom beyond that which was necessary to win the past wars that confronted America and Europe. But Churchill and Roosevelt did not just concentrate on

winning World War II. Their message went beyond winning the war; their alliance was about the kind of world that would be built in the aftermath of the conflict.

Our problem is more complicated than that which confronted our ancestors; our challenge, more difficult. But it is now a global challenge and the Europeans and we are the people who must respond to it. The Chinese might someday be struck by radical populism. If so, I hope they do not attempt to become leaders of that hostile global movement. Knowing their sense of self-interest and their commercial orientation, I would predict that they will not do so, but if we fail to solidify the transatlantic alliance, even that could happen.

Question:

I found particularly stimulating what you had to say about the Middle East. What kind of military presence should we have in the Middle East, besides a naval presence?

Dr. Brzezinski:

I could envisage, for example, an American or NATO presence in the territories of an independent Palestinian state, working to provide for demilitarization and security. I can see, after the termination of the current American presence in Iraq, a continued American presence in Kuwait. I can see some arrangements for a residual military presence in Kurdistan as part of a united Iraq, in order to discourage the neighbors who feel particularly neuralgic about Kurdish autonomy. There are a number of ways such a presence can be defined in addition to air bases and naval facilities, but I think that the ones I have mentioned are the primary ones.

Of course, if we stumble into some sort of a military conflict with Iran, we won't have much choice. We will have to be militarily present in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and even Pakistan if it explodes. If that process begins to escalate, then the United States will be entrenched in the 'global Balkans' for the next 20 years, and American global primacy will be permanently lost.

Question:

Can you explain the evoked image of NATO with New Zealand and Australia? I wonder if you see the largest democracy, i.e. India, included in NATO.

Dr. Brzezinski:

I was talking of countries that are receptive to the idea. Since it appears that the governments of Australia and New Zealand and even Japan are interested in the idea, this is why I mention them.

The issue of some form of military collaboration with India is a very delicate one. While there are merits to the proposition of a strategic partnership, one has to recognize that there are some negative consequences of that relationship. A military partnership with India could have negative effects on our relationship with Pakistan, which is quite critical to the stabilization of Afghanistan and even Pakistan itself, and also on our relationship with China. These are two significant complications that will impede the expansion of the security relationship between India and the United States. The Indians recognize this themselves.

Even our current strategic relationship with India holds the potential for danger. One of the aspects for example of the arrangement we recently made with the Indians which is troublesome to me is that the Indians, as a consequence of that arrangement, will now have eight reactors entirely free to pursue the production of nuclear weapons. This in turn means they will be able to produce 50 nuclear weapons a year. Over five years that's 250 nuclear weapons – a sizable nuclear arsenal. This is troubling because the Chinese, who 41 years ago acquired the capability to produce nuclear weapons, have so far maintained a position of minimal strategic deterrence. Their total arsenal aimed at the United States today is still only about 18 ICBMs. They might not maintain that position if their neighbor and rival, India, begins to rapidly increase its supply of nuclear weapons. An increase in India's strength, therefore, impedes on our own security vis-à-vis China, which, for the moment at least, does not pose a serious nuclear threat to the United States.

Question:

In the spirit of your speech, would you be in favor of finding a galvanizing project for the transatlantic community now, such as a transatlantic free trade area? What about former Portuguese President Aznar's suggestion that Israel should be part of NATO?

Dr. Brzezinski:

In general, a transatlantic free trade area is an appealing idea, but the practical complications are serious, and I don't feel qualified to judge the issue. But as an idea, of course, it has certain intrinsic appeal, and it matches the need for a genuinely shared historical and political consensus.

As far as Israel being in some fashion associated with NATO, I support the idea, once there is peace – an equitable peace which is not imposed and will not be contested whenever opportunities arise. I think that without an equitable peace any relationship with NATO would essentially make the Atlantic Alliance a guarantor of a unilaterally imposed territorial settlement, which would be a continuous bone of contention.

Question:

I'm deeply concerned about the prospect of air strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities, which leads me to ask the question: is Iran containable, and if so what are the implications for a broader non-proliferation regime, starting with the Middle East?

Dr. Brzezinski:

Iran is containable, in the sense that it is contained right now. Whether it is contained because we have imposed limits that it does not dare to cross or whether it does not have the aspiration to cross these limits, I'm not sure I know. What I do know is that Iran is a serious country. It is not a country created at Versailles or shortly thereafter by Western statesmen with pencils in their hands. It is a serious country with a historical identity and a sense of its worth and imperial tradition. It is one of the six or eight truly historic nations in

the world, and you sense that reality when you talk to leaders of these nations. There is something specific, deeper, and broader about them.

Iran is a very serious country. It is also a country which was hesitantly, ambiguously, but gradually moving towards democracy until the deterioration in American-Iranian relations aborted that process several years ago. It is also a country which, if you look at social-educational indices, has the best chance of any Muslim country, after Turkey, of evolving into a democracy. Iran has a level of education, a degree of literacy, and a role for women in society that is outstanding in the Muslim world. The number of women in Iranian universities is greater than men, there are a large number of women in the professions, and there is even an elected female vice president – something we still don't have! I think Iran has a chance of evolving. I welcome what took place today, assuming it moves forward, assuming that it wasn't offered on a confrontational basis, and assuming we make real progress, because I am inclined to be relatively optimistic about the role of Iran in an extremely volatile part of the world in which established and firm political entities are still questionable. The more we can normalize our relationship with Iran and the longer we can postpone the moment of truth on the nuclear issue, the better, because I think time is on our side.

Question:

You spoke about the gap between the rich world and the poor world. What are your thoughts on how we can overcome this gap?

Dr. Brzezinski:

First of all, I am realistic enough to know that we can't entirely overcome it – certainly not in our lifetime and probably not in the lifetime of our children. What we have to do is create a situation in which there is a sense of progress towards equality, and on this issue the most important short-term test is the Doha round. I am worried that the Doha round is not going to lead to anything. If it doesn't, whatever the specific responsibilities may be, ultimately it will be our fault and the Europeans' fault, and it will be a major setback, because

the Doha round is critical for establishing movement, however slight, towards amelioration of the world's widespread inequality.

The problem of inequality will always be with us, but if we can dilute it, if we can establish some progress, if we can resolve the problem of migrations in a way that does not create political tensions (a challenge both for Europe and for us), then real equality will be that much closer. But we must be aware of the fact that "gated communities," whether here or in Europe, are no longer the answer.

Question:

How do you think the transatlantic community should approach and organize itself to deal with the huge challenge of our energy security?

Dr. Brzezinski:

First of all, I think we have a short-term test coming up in St. Petersburg. I think that's an issue the Europeans and we ought to discuss seriously with the Russians. Ultimately, it is also an issue in which a constructive approach is not only in our interest but also in the interest of the Russians, not just economically, but politically. Although the Russians may be drunk with dollars right now and call themselves a great energy world power, they're missing a very important point: they occupy a huge space that is becoming increasingly empty. They're dying. They're getting drunk. Their lives are getting shorter. And they're leaving the Far East.

Russia needs to be more closely related to the West so that there is investment not just in Russian energy but in Russian economic development. We have here an immediate agenda that we need to address. Beyond that, I think if it were possible to do something akin to the Manhattan Project on a transatlantic basis, undertaking it would be in our mutual interest. I think both the Europeans and the United States have a long-term interest in somewhat reducing our dependency on oil. I deliberately use the word *somewhat* because the notion of eliminating dependency on oil is (1) unrealistic and (2) uneconomical. The more we reduce

our dependency on oil, the more the price will go down. The more the price goes down, the more economical it is to use oil. That particular problem cannot be resolved. But I think a Manhattan project by us and the Europeans together, involving nuclear energy or fuel cells or other new technologies may be beneficial. It would be an objective that both our population and the European population would endorse, and it would be a signal to others that the free ride on exorbitant oil prices is going to come to an end.

It might also stimulate the Russians to stop emulating what the Saudis and even worse the Nigerians, have been doing with oil profits and encourage them to start emulating the Norwegians instead. The former export their oil profits to Cyprus, the Cayman Islands and elsewhere. The Norwegians have been using oil revenue to develop comprehensive plans for social transformation and modernization. The Russians have failed in doing that, and I see no reason why in the privacy of St. Petersburg we can't tell Putin: "You need to become serious about this money." Right now it's flowing either to the West or and just to Moscow and St. Petersburg – the rest of Russia is stagnating and depopulating. Therefore we have a powerful argument in the immediate future with Russia. We have the opportunity to do something like the Manhattan project with our European friends to insure our joint energy security.

Thank you very much.

The Atlantic Council of the United States and the C. J. Makins Lecture Series

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In 2005, the Atlantic Council of the United States established the Christopher J. Makins Lecture Series to honor Mr. Christopher J. Makins (1942-2006), the Council's past president, who served from 1999 to 2005. The Lecture series focuses on the state of the strategic Atlantic partnership, its future direction and the prospects for the furtherance of common European and U.S. interests in order to facilitate strong and lasting global leadership. It is directed at policy makers and political leaders around the world and sets out to challenge them to increase transatlantic cooperation.