The Atlantic Council of the United States

NATO in a New Security Landscape –
New Security Landscape: Implications for NATO

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IAN BRZEZINSKI: OK. If I could call everyone to their seats, we'll begin with our third and last panel. Thank you.

Good afternoon. I'm Ian Brzezinski. I'm a senior fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center at the Atlantic Council. And I got the privilege of moderating of this panel, "NATO in a New Security Landscape." And of course, it's a follow on from our last two conversations.

And from those conversations, I noted a couple of themes, one, from different persons, the importance of what I call the trans-Atlantic bargain, the need for the alliance as a whole to think about Europe's regional requirements.

Can you hear me? Good.

And also the need for the alliance also to take on and to continue addressing some of the broader global challenges.

And that trans-Atlantic bargain, as we discussed today, is being buffeted by increasingly powerful dynamics and trends. We touched on climate change, new technologies, the energy revolution, shifting economic balances, diffusion of military capabilities and such.

And in our panel today, this afternoon, we're going to try to address how they specifically affect the trans-Atlantic community in NATO. How do these dynamics affect what should be NATO's function and geographic realms of operations? What are the capabilities in lights of these dynamics and trends that this institution, NATO, and its members need to have or develop? What must it shed? What operational concepts need to be adjusted? One discussion – one person noted that we need to think about consensus. What are the things that NATO needs to do, to steal Harlan's (sp) favorite word, need to do to remain relevant in this increasingly dynamic had changing environment?

We can also look at how these dynamics are affecting some of the roles and proclivities of some of the key players of what one could call the North Atlantic area, namely, the United States and Russia – Russia, of course, being some – a country that I see sometimes as a great potential partner but too often a challenge.

We have a – we have a panel of four outstanding experts in this area.

Dr. Matthew Burrows is a counselor at the director of national intelligence on the National Intelligence Council, who's been there since 2007. He brings an esteemed career in intelligence.

MATHEW BURROWS: Thanks.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: He brings a great career in the intelligence community focusing on Western Europe and elsewhere but also stepped outside of that community several times, serving as a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations but also as a special assistant to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, when he was the U.S. representative to the U.N. He also served as the

deputy national security advisor to U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill. And in addition to that experience, he's here because he's been the principal drafter of "Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds."

Karl-Heinz Kamp at the end there, Dr. Kamp, is director of research – the research division in NATO Defense College. (Inaudible) – military affairs – (inaudible) – joined the German Council on Foreign Affairs in '86. (He has ?) a distinguished career at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, where he end up serving as the security policy coordinator. He's also served in German government on the policy planning staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And I might add that the – (inaudible) – he's actually built the research division.

Kori Schake to my right is a research at the Hoover Institution. And she served in – when we last spoke together, she was – I was working for her on McCain-Palin campaign, where she was the senior foreign policy and defense advisor to the candidate. She served in the State Department as the deputy director for policy planning and on the NSC staff, director for defense policy, where she had her fingerprints – (inaudible) – NATO's last command structure review and standing up of the NRF and ACT among other issues. She also played an important role helping build coalitions that served in Afghanistan and Iraq. And I might add she – (inaudible) – distinguished chair international security studies at West Point.

And Dr. Katarzyna Zysk is an associate professor at the Center for Norwegian and European Security, the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies. We welcome you here (all ?). I welcome you especially here.

KATARZYNA ZYSK: Thank you.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Her current research focuses on Russian security policy. She's also done a lot of work on Arctic security with an emphasis on how the Russian military is acting in that realm. She's also, I might add, serving as a nonresident fellow at the U.S. Naval War College.

We're going to start off with Matt. Matt, to follow our conversation this morning and over lunch, looking specifically at the trans-Atlantic community, how did you see some of the dynamics that we discussed today, and some that you might want to add affecting the trans-Atlantic community and particularly NATO and its relevance and the broader challenges of what is increasingly a global environment?

MR. BURROWS: So I thought I would actually begin with the glass half-full. I think a lot of – I wasn't here for the whole morning, but a lot of the discussion is always glass half-empty. And I think one of the things that we need to keep in mind is on the value side, actually, NATO is winning. And, you know, all of the studies, if you go into global trends, I mean, one of the big themes is this rise in middle classes, very interested in rule of law and democracy – I mean, you've seen – you know, we have to keep this in mind, over the past couple of decades, a real wave of democracy that nobody actually anticipated, not to the – it's obviously in Europe, but it's also in Latin America and Africa, very – democracy very much rooted in those values. If you look in the global surveys, people in China, in India, in Russia, even, others – I mean, those

are the values that they aspire to. So that's very – you know, I think the degree to which NATO espouses those values – I mean, you actually put yourself on the winning side.

The one caveat I would put on this is that – and this came out when we took "Global Trends" around – is that there is a huge interest in democratizing the international system. That's what you get in a lot of young audiences. And for – that means that, you know, yes, they agree with the Western values; they don't always see the West living up to those values; they don't always see the West carrying those out for the broader, you know, global population and for global interests. So we have to keep that in mind. But I think NATO has a lot going for it from the – and there is really no alternative out there. And we heard some of that discussion this morning.

The second thing is on – generally on institutions, and one – again, a theme going in global trends is that, you know, institutions really face some head winds as institutions. I was this morning up in New York with a business audience and, you know, we were making some comparisons on rate of change and on the institutions and so on. And of course, for businesses, they realize that their shelf life now in the Fortune 500 getting squeezed more and more. And if you look at CEOs' tenure, it's going down everywhere. So I think you have some of these same forces – we talk about diffusion and fragmentation in global trends – the same forces affecting institutions.

But one thing that we – you know, in terms of organizational style, what seemed to us to be much more of a winner going forward is the networked form of organization. So, you know, lots of organized criminal now organizations are networked: much more transnational; they're not, you know, have a link to one ethnic group or even one country; they spread around in regions – same way with a lot of very successful companies, internal organization, also very networked.

And that's, I think, bring – connects with this idea of partnerships. And obviously, you know – and a theme here too in global trends is that you're going into a world that's increasingly non-state-centric. So you're going to have to be thinking about not only developing those partnerships with – outside of the – of the core with other countries but also partnerships with nonstate actors. And this, I think, you know, is very important – if you're thinking about civilian – having a civilian arm for development or for humanitarian assistance, there you're going to have to look to nonstate actors who increasingly are really the makers and shakers in the development field.

And then the third is looking – and here's more in the head wind side – the glass half-empty – one of the continuing trends that we talked about in global trends is state failure. You can look – there's a list where we think in 2030 with the, you know, state failure, a lot of the same countries that are on would be on current list, except you have – you have a number of countries, very important countries, facing real stresses. These are the Nigerias, these are the Pakistans – important in terms of global security; it's not clear that we would be really prepared to deal with a humanitarian disaster on that scale. So that is something else to, you know, again, to think about, not only in developing more civilian capabilities but also the kind of scope that

you would need and the kind of partnerships, obviously, that you would have to develop to deal with those issues. I think I'll stop there.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I'm particularly taken by your point about values as an important theme for the alliance to leverage and I think ties very much to maybe what the alliance wants to communicate some time next year when it hits the summit.

Karl, could you address this from kind of a European perspective, from your vantage point in the world? How do you see these trends and dynamics to buffeting and the alliance and its ability to shape and direct events around the world?

KARL-HEINZ KAMP: Well, I think when we talk about the implications of all these trends we were talking about this morning, about the austerity and leaving Afghanistan and all these kind of things, there are probably five – there are five trends we should keep in mind and one conclusion. And these – and these five – and these five trends, some of them are more as bad news, and some of them are probably good news.

The first trend is that the austerity policy will not end soon in most European countries. You hear people saying that there might be some – there might be some light at the end of the tunnel. I think that in countries like Italy, like France, like Spain, it's getting worse for a while, which means it would be great if most of the European countries would not further cut the defense budgets; in fact, they will do. So that means that things like, for instance, smart defense is a great idea, but smart defense will not do the trick to compensate for all the cuts we have. That's the first trend.

The second trend is probably also bad news. And, of course, my own opinion, the EU will not live up to its ambitions to become a serious security player being able to take over the role the U.S. had in NATO, which means it would be great, yes, if at least the three big ones in the EU – Germany, France, the U.K. – could get their act together and could lead in those cases where the U.S. might decide not to lead anymore; simply, it's not going to happen. Why? Because we don't have common security priorities, we don't have a common security culture. So we will still have this gap between EU ambitions and what you see on the ground.

The first trend is – the third trend is that military crisis management, which is one of the core tasks of NATO, according to the strategic concept, will become less relevant. Why? Because NATO allies are less and less keen on doing exactly this. They are following – the European allies are following the Obama principle of saying nation building should start at home for us before we do it, let's say, in northern Africa or elsewhere. That means the question comes up, can NATO survive without a mission after Afghanistan? Or is there something that NATO will fall into sort of an identity crisis?

And this is my fourth trend, which is actually positive: Namely, there will not be a NAOT identity crisis, even if there will be no Afghanistan anymore. Why? Because NATO – I mean, we had this identity crisis at the end of the Cold War and asking, what is NATO going to do now, and so on. Today NATO is in a much better position. Due to three reasons, NATO has evolved significantly. We talked about this just this morning. NATO is military much stronger,

with combat-proven – and in all NATO nations, combat-proven forces. And third, particularly the Europeans have expanded their perspective to truly a global view. I mean, they understand now – through Afghanistan they have learned that their security does not end or start at their own geographical borders. That's a huge difference to '89, '90, '91.

And the fifth trend is also good news, that I think that the trans-Atlantic link in itself, the Euro-Atlantic security community remains stable. Why? Because it just benefits both sides of the Atlantic. Still this old deal of U.S. presence, so to speak, in Europe or for Europe is exchanged by U.S. – by Europeans giving influence to the U.S. in Europe. This deal still holds, simply because the U.S. profits from a Europe which is different from other countries: It is united, it is still prosperous, it is stable, more or less, and it is politically like-minded, and you don't have this on any other country – on any other – on any other continent. And in turn, the Europeans get U.S. protection, which is still important for some European allies, and the Europeans get the U.S. role as a power of order in a number of international regions.

Having said all this, I have my doubts whether this entire burden-sharing debate we are having from – having from time to time is the right one because burden-sharing implicates as if there would be a burden, which is actually not so much the case because NATO allies are not altruistic. They are not paying for the other side to please other allies. They are – they are paying because it's in their interests. And this is why we have a common benefit from NATO. If that would not be the case, we would not have NATO anymore because just allies would not – would not do this.

Having said all this, the conclusion, my conclusion would be, first, NATO will become less relevant, certainly not irrelevant, but less relevant in the post-Afghanistan period. It will still do what it – what it has done before. It will exercise. It will – it will do all the – it would do all military planning and these kind of things. It will – it will keep, I hope, a military quick reaction capacity, the NRF. And it will go on protecting the vital interests of its allies. It can be Article 5 in Turkey. It can be non-Article 5, that if we have an Israeli-Iranian war and the Strait of Hormuz will be blocked, NATO will not remain passive. So that means that NATO will have a rationale without having an ongoing mission.

And the very last sentence, there is one question that remains, namely, people ask, well, what happens if we have a crisis in northern Africa, in the Middle East, and the U.S. is not going to lead, and the Europeans are not able to get their act together? Nothing happens. NATO will not act, as we did not act in the Balkans between '92 and '95. And only when it hurts enough, then NATO might find the consensus to act. This might sound a little bit like a muddling through, which it de facto is, but that's how NATO lived in the last 60 years.

And on that happy note, thank you very much for your patience. (Laughter.)

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Thank you very much.

Kori, could you take – having served in the White House and in the – in the State Department and leveraging your connections on Capitol Hill, and when you think about some of the changes that are going on in the world, the different dynamics pulling the United States in

100 different ways, as our lunch speaker described today, when you look forward, how do you see these affecting America's role in the United States? Do these – do these dynamics lead the United States as an international actor to conclude that NATO is more relevant? Has it reaffirmed our commitment? Has it reanimated our commitment? Or does it lead the United States to drift away from the alliance as an institution that may not be as relevant? How will this affect American leadership in NATO?

KORI SCHAKE: So let me take that last point as a separate question, because I actually think that the kinds of trends that – (inaudible) – the report brings out and also the continuing austerity that not just Europeans but the United States is going to be exposed to on defense as well can and should be extraordinary coalescing factors. I think they are not yet, but they are likely to pretty quickly become so. I'd love asking (Barth Eide's ?) emphasis that China's not just rising for the United States; China's rising for Europe, too. And we – you know, back in the days when we were worried about getting Europeans to care about their security beyond Europe, we were really worried that we were going to have to handle this by ourselves, but in fact, as Karl-Heinz points out, both the Balkans, Afghanistan and Libya – all three, the Balkans, Afghanistan and Libya, have actually shown that Europeans have widened their perspectives far beyond their own immediate security, their territorial security, and really engaged in a broad set of issues.

If I had been asked to bet money in the year 2001 that Europeans would hang in there with us in Afghanistan for 12 years, when it wasn't obvious we were making progress or that the outcome was going to be successful, I would have never taken that bet.

And yet the affinities that hold us together in a world that to all of us feels unpredictable and scary, with the emerging power centers, most of whom do not share our values, and that we are engaged in a long-term game with trying to hedge against a rising China that's an enemy and create a China that plays by our rules, buys into our values and increasingly reflects them over time – Europeans are the natural partners in that. And the experience of Afghanistan and the fact that all of us are anxious about being able to afford what our government has vowed to do for us ought to be coalescing forms (sic).

I agree with Julianne Smith's point that smart defense at – is a little bit foundering, but I don't think it's foundering because we don't have the right model. It's foundering because the expensive things on which it was intended to hinge are actually not affordable for any of us now. It's not just not affordable for the Europeans, it's not affordable for the United States. And that too, I think, has a potential coalescing force because for most of the last 20 years debate about defense spending has in fact been a burden-sharing debate, with the United States saying, you guys aren't doing enough; look at how spiffy all our Army, our operational concepts and equipment and war-fighting experience is here in the U.S. Well, in fact most Europeans have very solid experience with producing efficient defense capabilities out of austere budgets, and the United States is actually now going to have to learn that.

And so that will change the nature of our conversation about defense spending, and we Americans have an opportunity to change that (in a way ?), instead of bemoaning that nobody else is spending money that will permit them to do what we are doing, to actually learn from

European allies about how do you do this when you can't afford what you want to do, because that's the circumstance we are going to be in for the next couple of years.

One other thing I would say about the pivot to Asia, because a lot of Europeans worry that this means the United States is leaving them behind, and I think the pivot to Asia speaks more to the Obama administration's ambition to carve out a new approach to the world. China may actually not be rising on a straight-line trajectory that it's rising now. In fact, a weakening China may actually be more of a concern to us than a rising China is.

There are a lot of interesting and important questions about this. Europeans could play a very useful role by, for example, helping the South Koreans, Indonesians, Philippines and Japanese come to terms with (World War II ?) issues they have not yet resolved. Europe is an extraordinary successful model for things that Asia has not figured out how to do and that the United States isn't particularly well-positioned to help them do.

The pivot to Asia, I think, grew out of the notion that Asia could be for us what Europe has been for us, and I wish that were true, because I'd love to trade Europeans for a better set of allies. (Laughter.) And my experience is that until we have a better set of allies, we actually ought to stick with the people who believe that people have rights – (inaudible) – the government; that the rule of law is essential, not just for human dignity but for economic prosperity; you that you band together and make compromises to help your friends, even if you don't necessarily agree with what they're doing at the moment, because it's about a long-term set of (entities ?) where we support each other. And I just think that's going to come roaringly back into fashion with the austerity of the current decade, rather than going out of fashion.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Great. Thank you.

I'm struck by Karl and Kori's optimistic assessment of kind of European strategic outlook on the world, and I hope we can come back to that, because actually I have some of my doubts, and they need to – maybe I need to be corrected.

Before we do that, let's talk a little bit about Russia, because that's clearly a country that's on the immediate horizon of NATO. It's a country whose future is somewhat uncertain. And it's a country who's increasingly buffeted by some of the dynamics we were talking about today.

Katarzyna, how is – how is Russia going to evolve in light of these changes and these trends? And how's that going to affect its relationship – how's it going affect the NATO-Russia relationship?

MS. ZYSK: Well, I've made a few notes during this day, and I will try to elaborate a little bit on just a few of them.

But first of all, the fact – dealing with Russia in the next few years will mean that we are going to deal with President Vladimir Putin and it might bring a number of challenges, and I will say in a minute why.

Putin has – Putin's Russia is more cooperative. NATO has a number of areas where the cooperation with Russia develops pragmatically. But at the same time Putin's Russia is also more nationalistic, isolationistic; is also a country that applies traditional perspectives on the mechanism that governs the international relations and the nature of security as well is parts of the picture.

It includes traditional realpolitik, great power rivalry, balance of power, which is basically our new interpretation of the – of the European concept of great power concept that was established in 1815, after Napoleon's defeat.

So these perspectives still apply, and military power, armed forces play a central in his thinking. And actually the U.S. policies, NATO's use of power in international relations after the end of the Cold War – Kosovo, Iraq, Libya, recently – has just strengthened these perspectives. So the conclusion is that actually the military power, armed forces play a more important role after the end of the Cold War than a decreasing.

So in other words, the strong – from the Russian perspective, the strong do what they want. They can ignore international law. They can ignore the costs incurred by themselves and also by others. And so the rational way of behaving in this kind of world Russia views is to increase on its power and strength and capabilities.

And that's what Putin has been doing in the last few years, introducing very radical, sweeping military reforms, which includes, among others, investing $670 billion in the next seven years. Major milestones to this program include sharp reduction of the size of the Russian defense, professionalization – partly professionalization of the armed forces, increased maneuverability, also flexibility of the forces, modernizing (key points ?). And in fact as a result of these reforms, the Russian capabilities in a number of areas has been increased.

And one of the consequences of stronger Russia militarily, in the longer term, may be that NATO will have a partner which is more capable, which is a more valuable partner in pragmatic military cooperation. And we've heard today that NATO needs this kind of partners.

But on the other hand, a Russia that is stronger military is – militarily is also a country that will be more self-assured and probably also more ready to use the force, apply the armed forces, in international relations to back up diplomacy. And I think the situation around Syria, Russia's deployment of the naval task force to the Mediterranean recently, which may block NATO's actions, if NATO would agree on that, it gives us a foretaste of – in which direction it may go when NATO and Russia interests will diverge.

So the differences in approaches to fundamental questions between NATO and Russia, to such questions like the nature of security, mechanism governing international relations, the legitimacy of use of force in international relations, principle of nonintervention, which Russia supports, noninterference in internal affairs of a state – they may still provide – we should expect farther ups and downs in the relationships in the next – in the times to come.

Also, the difference in the strength between the two parties makes it impossible to speak about a partnership of equals. So this will continue to generate – to be the source of recurring mistrust and disagreement.

The good news is that, on the other hand, Russia is not interested in isolation. Russia is not interested and cannot afford isolation, either. So the cooperation – pragmatic cooperation in a number of areas will continue, more or less limited.

Another thing is the globalization process, is the hyperconnected world, which Russia is part of, and the – increasing the business exchange culture, economic exchange, all that will continue to contribute to greater harmony of values. Also, it will have an impact on the Russian society, especially the next generations.

When it comes to the pivot to Asia, as many other countries, Russia also taken a note, of course, and – about the geopolitical shifts and moving of the center of gravity towards Asia, and also the austerity measures in Europe, the crisis in Europe – it all has an impact on Russian foreign policy. Russia has been readjusting, rebalancing its policy as well. And for instance, trade relations with Europe has become cooler. Europe is less interesting to Russia – the European countries. And Russia has re-emphasized the importance of Eurasian neighbors and China.

So Russia may continue to re-emerge as an independent play in – player in Asia, in the Asia-Pacific region, and the rivalry between the United States and China may give Russia more ways to assume a role of a balancer in the relationship. So on the one hand, Russia – we have seen that already – may participate in joint naval exercises with China in the Pacific, which some interpreted as having anti-American character, and on the next day will – Russia will join NATO and the U.S. forces to the same sort of exercises in the Pacific.

So Russia will seek to diversify its economic and political relationships as widely as possible to increase its options.

And when it comes to the Eurasian neighbors, Putin is investing much of attention in increasing the ties with Central Asia. And it has been one of the main foreign policy projects. The customs union with Belarus, Kazakhstan that has been operating since 2009 is envisaged to be – to become a single economic space.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Katarzyna.

MS. ZYSK: Now?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Yeah.

MS. ZYSK: Shall I stop? (Laughter.) OK.

But I would like to just end at this: There is a number of political – I mean, this – lots of these policies in Eurasia make sense, but also still the geopolitical perspectives are important too.

And so Russia seeks to enhance the geopolitical standing in this region, especially also in relation to European Union and China in this region.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Great. It sounds like a lot more of the same of other – I'm a little bit pessimistic than that, and I hope we can explore –

MS. ZYSK: Well, I was coming to the optimistic note, but – (laughter) –

MR. BRZEZINSKI: (Laughs.) My bad. My bad.

MS. SCHAKE: (Off mic) – didn't get to the optimism because he's down lower than your – (off mic).

MR. BRZEZINSKI: (Laughs.)

MS. ZYSK: Yeah.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Let me first hit the optimism of two of my colleagues here about Europe's – I just could say strategic mindset. The impression I've had is that this is a continent that's been beleaguered, aside from – largely beleaguered by fiscal crisis. It's been exhausted by two large-scale wars, which most contributed to, Iraq and Afghanistan. And you know, aside from those four that are increasing their expenditures, by and large, the European community, the West European/Central European community of nations, is nations that are increasingly inward-looking. They're going through their own phase of retrenchment.

I've seen very little evidence that they are – while they mouth endorsement of the U.S. Asia pivot, I haven't seen kind of a swarm of offerings to contribute to U.S. military exercises in the Pacific. I haven't seen many dialogues on how they're willing to kind of ramp up and contribute. I'm actually surprised by your optimism, because I see a Europe that probably for the next five or six years is going to be economically muddling through. Its defense budgets, if we're lucky, are going to level off. Even if they were willing, they would have a tough time contributing to operations in the Pacific.

MS. SCHAKE: OK.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Tell me where I'm wrong.

MS. SCHAKE: I'm so glad you raised this point. I have a couple of reactions to it. I have a couple of reactions to it.

The first is that you're exactly right. Europeans are – I mean, especially the countries who have their hands meshed in the gears of financial crises, of course they're not going to spend their money on defense. We wouldn't either. And in fact we aren't either, right, because we have a parallel problem about bringing our entitlement spending into a line with government revenues. We're not yet quite at the point that Greece was at, but we're not that far from it. I mean, all of us are wrestling with bringing that into fundamental alignment.

But two things: First, we are all bringing it into alignment, right? (Laughs.) And second of all, even in the extreme cases like Greece, democracy's actually holding, right? People (and governments ?) are able to make hard choices. You see a little bit of movement to the fringes in all of our countries, but in fact I think the story is the resilience of representative government in dealing with these problems.

So yes, the big – the big story is austerity, and it's going to be the big story. But – but – but I think you are unfair in suggesting that Europeans are thinking more narrowly than we are. And let me just point out that it was the Europeans who had to drag the United States into Libya. I think you are actually conflating a lack of American leadership with the lack of dynamism that you're seeing. (Off mic) – were terrific! Norway was terrific on Libya! Denmark was terrific on Libya! People stepped forward and dragged us. The country, by the way, that had all those caveats in Libya? That would be the United States, right? That's a huge reversal and gives us the opportunity to take these conversations out of a stale byway in which the United States was getting – has long been tiresome in how we talk about it and instead think in fresh ways about the fact that it's true that Europeans may not be participating in naval exercises in the Pacific, but does anyone doubt that the British, French and other navies could be a major force in the Pacific?

We, the United States, have been talking for so long about European inadequacies that both we and they have started to believe it when in fact unless Europeans are going to fight the United States, they're going to win the wars they're fighting, right? Like, we're the people they probably couldn't win against. Anyone else they could. And that's going to be true for a really long time. And we ought actually to encourage them to step forward and do stuff, to not be sulky and unwilling when there are things they are need from us in order to do things we want to have done, because actually the president's not wrong about the idea of leading from behind, but if you're – if that's your strategy, you actually have to encourage and reward other people for going forward, and that's what they're not yet doing. And if they did, I think you would see a lot more enthusiasm and activism going that direction. And I think we will.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: (You ?) need this.

MR. KAMP: Let me hammer on the same nail. You have a point if you focus only on the defense budgets, which is difficult to explain in many European societies, which just – which just don't feel threatened immediately, which is just a different thing. However, if they do feel threatened, they are very much able to act.

Your point of the inward-looking Europe was also true in 2001. There was even an academic explanation for this. We are the post-heroic societies, which are not able to take any casualties and to – and to act, and U.S. too. And then we had Afghanistan and Iraq, in which the U.S. took a lot of casualties. And in Afghanistan would you have imagined in 2001 that all European NATO allies would stay in Afghanistan for twice as long as the Second World War took, having casualties, having a completely unpopular war with which you don't win a single vote at the ballots? No, but they did. And still there is no stampede out of Afghanistan. We are all happy that we have this 2014 line.

So there is – as soon as there is a threat perception, then the Europeans are able to act, probably not as – sorry?

MS. SCHAKE: The French in Mali.

MR. KAMP: The French in Mali. Of course the question is we had – we now call all hail the European engagement, let's say, in Libya. At the same time, the question comes up whether it is really NATO's role to get engaged into civil war in the Middle East, but that's a different thing.

But just, the point is that the Europeans have learned a lot – learning by suffering, learning by doing – over the last 10 years. And this is why we have a different kind of Europe. It will never be enough for the U.S. global perspective, but you have to see the evolution which we had in the last years.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: You were both talking about – you have both been talking about contingencies in the Maghreb – Libya, Mali. These are next door. These are periphery. These are contingencies that our colleagues earlier today talked about because they're close to Europe.

Let me talk to Matt and Katarzyna. From your perspectives, do you see the Europeans – are you as optimistic about European proclivity and willingness to go beyond the immediate periphery and work with the United States, particularly work with the United States through NATO in areas beyond the immediate periphery, beyond the Arctic, beyond the Mediterranean?

MR. BURROWS: Well, I'm not quite sure. I mean, if they – you know, when you're talking about those areas, if you should be thinking about it through the prism of NATO, I mean, there's a lot of, you know, thinking – just thinking when you're talking about the conflict in Mali or Libya – I mean, I think there's a case more to be made as should they be doing more things so you can avoid those sort of conflicts, and that you actually help to really bolster regions around your neighborhood and also in terms of playing a big role in the global institutions, you know, in terms of trade and investment and so on.

I think, you know, the next 10 years is going to be very pivotal. We talked about two scenarios, particularly for Europe, one of gentle decline and another of a renaissance. And I think my worry would be that because, you know, at the moment the crisis is off the boil, that you're not going to have countries actually take the sort of structural reforms that they need to take.

You can have the same argument for the U.S., in fact. And I think we may be seeing it happen right now, that we will, you know, just kick that can down the road. And, you know, that worries me, that I think you could have a much stronger Europe, you know, one that uses the crisis actually to put in place a lot of reforms, and they have done that previously. But, you know, I have my doubts too that they have the leadership and energy to do that.

I think there is a bigger question here. And I remember we used to have a debate when you were in the department and I was doing another global trends of will you have – you know,

we all agree that you'll have a multipolar world, but will you have a multilateral multipolar world? And there is where you really need the Europeans. You need the Europeans to help reform the U.N., to help get WTO going – I mean, all of these major global institutions, because they have been historically the biggest proponents of multilateralism.

It's a question – you know, I have some questions whether that's going to happen without a strong Europe, and what we could lapse into is just, you know, a world of powers, and that's not good for I don't think anybody in the long run. It's certainly not good for small countries.

MS. ZYSK: No, I just agree with you that – on the point of it all depends on the outcomes of the crisis and the responses European countries will be able to generate. I mean, it's the – it will be a question of priority of challenges simply.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Actually, let me throw another question at you, and that's on Russia. If you were a NATO planner and you were thinking about opportunities and challenges, when you think about the Russia you're describing that's becoming more militarily capable – which creates opportunity but also threat – what would you see as opportunity for cooperation? What would you see as contingents we need to plan against in the Baltic and in the Arctic?

MS. ZYSK: Well, I think we should focus on the elements where any cooperation simply is possible. There will be – there will be areas of – contentious areas such as the normative basis. We are disagree, disagree, and it will be very hard to do something about that with the current Russian leadership.

But still there are a number of areas like, for instance, part of the Russian threat perceptions, part of the threat picture – which is very similar to the Western evaluations – they see part of the picture as a multidimensional security, which also – which includes such possible security problems like proliferation, international terrorism, cyber warfare, organized crime. All these issues Russia and NATO countries agree on, and we should focus on these areas and kind of, you know, agree to disagree on the others and move forward.

When it comes to contingencies, well, I mean, it is hard to imagine a war with Russia right now. Even from the Russian perspective, the West is still in the threat picture, but it's not about war. It's mostly – it's more about, for instance, the – as it is called in Russia, the Western technology of the "color revolution," the spreading of the democracy ideas, the regional change ideas. These kind of things are seen in Russia as a direct threat to Russian security and to Russian interests.

The Arab Spring is seen from this perspective as basically illegal use of soft power in international relations by using concepts of human rights, of rights of minorities to undermine the stability in the countries and get rid of regions that are inconvenient to Russia.

But at the same time, Russia focuses also – takes lesson learned from the U.S. and NATO's experience in these conflicts. And there is more and more focus on cyber warfare. The general staff has just recently came with a lecture and pointed that Russia has to take in account

that the warfare – modern conflicts are moving from the three dimension to the four dimension, which is information and space.

And I think these areas, which will be more and more relevant in the relationship with Russia, also potentially – not right now but in a longer-term perspective – development of nonnuclear strategic weapons, conventional precision weapons. All this NATO will have to think about if Russia really gets this capability in the longer term.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Great. Thank you.

Let me open it up to our colleagues on the floor here. Harlan?

Q: It seems to me that the takeaways from today's very interesting discussions all day are the pleas for NATO to think – need to be innovative and more creative. So I'd really like to challenge the panel to come up with one big idea, something that NATO ought to be doing that it's not doing, or something that it's doing that it should stop. And I'll give you three examples.

First, why don't we ban the word "austerity" for two years from the NATO vocabulary? (Laughter.) Secondly, when we talk about Russia's military expansion, start with the terms, 90 percent of all Russian youths are unfit for military service. And most importantly, maybe we want to think about changing the idea of NATO consensus perhaps to reflect the opportunity to vote just "present."

So what are your big ideas? One big idea each, please, including you, Ian, that NATO should do or not do that it's currently doing.

MS. SCHAKE: I'll start.

I think that one of the really fantastic things about the alliance Strategic Concept that the Obama administration and allies have agreed to is how strong it is on the importance of participation in nuclear missions and nuclear deterrence. And here again Harlan's banned the word "austerity." It's going to drive us to have to rethink participation in nuclear missions. Germany is going to have to decide whether to buy the next generation of fighters. And I frankly think – I don't think any country should be buying another generation of manned fighters because I think that technology is advancing so fast it's a bad use of all of our money.

But as we are going to have to deal with this in a force planning context anyway because of Germany's decisions about its fighter aircraft, it's a terrific opportunity to think more creatively about expanding participation in NATO's nuclear missions. A lot of new NATO members, for example, have aircraft that could be made more capable. You could station them in Germany to carry out – to carry alliance weapons and to train together and to – there are lots of creative ways we can do this in a way that actually syncs the fundamentals even further on something essential to our common defense, and something on which we have right now a stronger political consensus than I think I've seen in my lifetime. So I think that's worth doing.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: That will start a debate. That's great. (Laughter.)

Matt?

MR. BURROWS: I would go back to that idea of, you know, getting stronger ties with the EU, because I think they're – you know, as I said, I think the security problem I don't think is going to be in Asia. I think the security problem is probably going to be in the Middle East, maybe South Asia. But, you know, that's where countries are really coming under a huge amount of demographic, resource-linked pressures and you're really going to need that civilian arm.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Katarzyna?

MS. ZYSK: I actually got inspired by you, Kori. (Chuckles.) Yeah. But this goes a little bit in a different direction than nuclear deterrence versus the nonstrategic – the nonnuclear strategic weapons, which I have already mentioned how this will change the whole concepts of nuclear deterrence. And thinking about how – in the longer term, which countries may acquire these kind of capabilities and how this will interfere with the current strategic balance.

MR. KAMP: My new idea would bet that NATO should stop writing a Strategic Concept every 10 years – (laughter) – simply because – I mean honestly – honestly, because a company which only every 10 years checks whether its products are still in line with the demands of the clients would be bankrupt. What we need is an annual or biannual constant strategic discussion on what the roles are, what the missions are. It could be an annual strategic like a State of Union address or something like this, but get engaged, the alliance or the allies, in a constant debate beyond operations, beyond ops, ops, ops on what we really want to do and how we deal with all these issues.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I guess my – well, Harlan asked for an idea or two so I'll throw out my idea.

One, what I think NATO really needs right now – and it's going to become very urgent with the summit coming up in 2014 at the end of the mission in Afghanistan – is a sense of clear purpose and direction. And one thing that's going to be unique about the post-2014 environment or context, it will be the first time in NATO's history where it isn't undertaking a major operation with small gaps.

You know, during the Cold War NATO was on a full state of readiness. That was a highly intensive effort to deter, and it meant tanks and planes on alert, ready to do. It was very intense. And people, I think, tend to forget that.

During the '90s we had the Balkans conflict, not as big as the Cold War but still it was an operation. And during this last decade we've had Afghanistan. You could also argue Iraq indirectly, as in it pulled together North American and European militaries. That's a fairly high operational tempo.

After Afghanistan we'll probably have some undefined small NATO presence in Afghanistan and then, you know, a small mission in the Mediterranean and a small counterpiracy mission. That's not a driving operational center of mass that captures and animates institutions and governments, so we're going to have to fill that with some sort of purpose.

And the only rough idea I can give is we'd build off of what NATO is, which is a community of democracies, and a very unique, successful and prosperous community of democracies. And its purpose is not only just to preserve that but to promote those values globally. And that's very rough, and it's got to be more gentle than that, but something that will give the alliance a sense of purpose, a vision, something that's it's attractive and can be used to convince parliaments to resource militaries in cooperation.

The idea that I've put on the table is more tactical but it's something I'm interested in is missile defense. NATO provides – right now it doesn't really have a fully-fledged NATO defense capability, but of all multinational missile defense endeavors, it's by far the most mature. And one of the threats that we haven't faced – we didn't really address it today – is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies. It is global. It is a global problem.

Missile defense is expensive, it's complex, and you can get cooperation within NATO countries to create NATO missile defense. Well, I think you extend that cooperation through lessons learned, maybe even search capacities into the GCC or even into Asia. And you could use NATO as kind of a catalyst for eventually what could be a global missile defense architecture for like-minded countries. So that's a little bit out of the box.

Sir?

Q: Jeff Stacey, in transition from SAIS to CNAS.

So many great ideas coming out of the panel today, and it makes me think of another one. If we take yours, Kori, that maybe we shouldn't focus too much on a pivot to Asia because China is not turning out to be exactly what everyone has predicted, or as nearly or as quickly, haven't both – and this is a question to all of you – haven't both Europe and the U.S. informally already pivoted to the Middle East?

So Julie (sp) Smith earlier – she didn't say it today but she has said recently that 85 percent of the time of top Russian officials is now spent on Iran, Syria, Libya, on the Middle East. And if this is true, and we're thinking through how to work with our capabilities under these conditions of austerity that are not going to end tomorrow, doesn't this mean that NATO has to think about its partnerships in a new way, and that we have perhaps reason to be most optimistic about NATO's standardization?

So the Libya operation, we did that all, various pieces of it, before it was NATO, when it was NATO, and presumably had we done a post-conflict operation after, still with NATO. So we think about crises down the road with Syria, or something that hasn't come out of the woodwork yet. Shouldn't we do the work now – EU, U.S., NATO and these coalitions of the

willing, to get our standards with our somewhat limited capabilities because of austerity, but impressive modernization. And yet things like Germany developing UAVs, with France coming out with a great white paper saying that we aren't going to – France is not going to cut its defense budget severely and now has a new force posture that will allow for three simultaneous deployments of French forces.

These kind of developments ought to, including positive things in the U.K. and all what we've heard from Norway – it was such a key country with a strategic culture – shouldn't NATO really use its standard-setting to partner with everyone who has capabilities so that whatever principals decide when a crisis is essentially going down we can plug and play, whether it's the alliance, part of an alliance, the EU in the lead, Turkey leading the NATO alliance, or whatever it is? Is there hope for optimism in this area?

MS. SCHAKE: So I'm actually a lot more confident than you are that that occurs, and occurs routinely. I mean, there was no trouble folding UAE aircraft into the NATO air tasking order or – well, there may have been trouble and yet it was accomplished, right? (Chuckles.) And so I'm more confident actually in that the nuts and bolts of military interoperability is something that we can actually leave to the uniforms to figure out because they're great at that.

What I would love to see us do a lot more of, though, is the kind of outreach that NATO envisioned itself having in the Maghreb maybe 10 years ago. That didn't turn out to be possible. I actually wish maybe Damon would stand up and explain it since he did so much good work on it. But it didn't turn out to be possible because the kinds of things that NATO militaries are good at fostering and teaching – civilian control of the military, transparency, the role of civil society in free countries – the militaries, before the Arab Spring, in that part of the world didn't want to hear it. They weren't interested in what we were trying to do. Now they're hugely interested in what we're trying to do.

So it's a great sign that NATO defense ministers are starting to try and actually do something that we did terrifically well in Eastern Europe, that we did terrifically well in the Balkans, and that political alignment is now such that we could do a whole lot of help for democratizing countries in the Middle East to give those militaries useful military functions and create in them the patterns of cooperation with superior civilian control that they do not have experience at. And that's a huge contribution to make to those societies.

MR. KAMP: One comment that goes along with what has been said right now, militarily partnerships have worked quite well, particularly with the Middle East and the ICI, because for these countries NATO is the gold standard with regard to cooperation to multinational action. We have two problems, though, with the partnership now. The first one is that the political efficiency of partnership in the Middle East is limited. It just does not do the trick as we would like to have it.

The second problem is that the more partners you have – because you were saying you should partner with each and every one who is there – the more partners you have, them more is there a danger that some NATO allies have a bilateral problem with the partners, or partners have bilateral problems among each other and this carries into NATO.

We had a huge problem for a year in NATO because one or two NATO allies had a severe problem with one NATO partner. The entire partnership business was blocked. Nothing happened. The more partners you have which are pretty different in their political system, in their styles, in their interests, in the security priorities, the more you have the danger that exactly this happens. So there is an in-built limitation to partnerships, which does not speak against it but it is not a panacea for all the problems in the world.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Let ask a question about changing ways that NATO does business. Someone had mentioned today, should we adjust the consensus principle? I've always been very, very leery of doing that because I think that could undermine a very powerful bit of glue in the alliance, a binding force in the alliance, because it equalizes everybody.

But we all can remember NATO's inaction during the invasion of Georgia. NATO couldn't even meet because it couldn't get consensus to meet on it. It was unhelpful to that situation. It also certainly undercut the stature of the alliance and the credibility of the alliance. Should we consider any adjustments to the way NATO does business so that it's not paralyzed in crises like that?

MS. SCHAKE: So I too am extremely leery about any change to the consensus role, for two reasons. First, because I think there is no alternative to consensus as a means to bind societies. I just don't think to say, yeah, but those are the rules of the game; therefore you have to get your daughters and sons killed for this is – I don't think that ever trumps being persuaded that it's in their interests to do it.

The second thing is, I know what country is going to be the one, the consensus minus one, most of the time, and it's going to be the United States. Like, we're the big beneficiary of the consensus role, because everyone else can't go ahead until our problems are solved. And we are typically the one that has the most wrenching to do as we move into a multilateral framework.

So yes, it's a hassle. Yes, at some level it's occasionally irritating that the lieutenant colonel who commands Luxemburg's military has the same number of votes as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but I don't see any practical alternative to it. Moreover, I actually think the country that will be most deleteriously affected by it is the United States.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Karl?

MR. KAMP: I would agree that mostly consensus is a means of alliance management, like, by the way, also caveats are a means of alliance management, because otherwise you don't get the societies in these countries to accept these things. What if NATO cannot agree, like in Georgia? That means that NATO will not act, which is better than trying to force nations because then you will destroy the alliance completely. So I think there is no means for this.

What we have to change, though, is that if we have partners, we have to differentiate between the partners. And to those which are politically like-minded, we have to find different

ways of including them in our discussions, something like a red carpet lounge, because they contribute differently and we can work with them easier. And with all due respect, there's a difference between Belarus as a partner and Finland, or, let's say Austria.

So that's the way where you can change processes within NATO but you should never touch the consensus role.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: My colleague in front.

Q: Professor Brzezinski advises us that in future, United States, Europe and Russia should be included in the broader or larger West, cooperating with each other. In fact, things seemed to be developing in a good direction in '97 after Clinton-Yeltsin deal and the founding act of NATO and Russia.

Still, during the last few years, from the end of last decade, things have become more complicated, especially Northern Europe. There seems to be a kind of saber-rattling now around. So what went wrong? What should be done? And what is the role of NATO in all this, especially in future?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Let me go to Katarzyna.

MS. ZYSK: Right. The role of NATO in Russia – in responding to Russia, to these kind of actions, that's what you mean?

Q: Well, calming down first the rattling of their – as in becoming more cooperative in the perspective you indicated, that it there would be also partnerships and different things.

MS. ZYSK: I mean, we will see more of these kind of contradictions in the Russian foreign and security policy. In general, this is the mixture right now in Russia of these traditional perspectives, more modernizing views. We also see it in the military thought, in the strategic thought – in the military reforms where the old Soviet concepts, mixed with the modernizing approaches.

So there will be these kind of contradictions which sometimes will be confusing to outside observers. And I think what we can do – I mean, we can just try to separate these things and try to read them correctly. And that's why we have to know better the Russian perspectives, how Russia views these things.

And you probably refer to one of the Russian exercises, from the strategic bombers in the Swedish airspace. Is that –

Q: Yeah – (off mic).

MS. ZYSK: So, I mean, you have to – I would just take the example of the Swedish, of the exercise with Sweden. Norway has also experienced this kind of provocative exercise where

Russia exercised actually an attack on the Norwegian territory, and in this case it was in 2008 in Norway and now recently it was – Sweden was involved.

But, I mean, we should be very careful to read these things. It's not about preparation toward – it's more – how I view this particular exercise, it was more about the domestic politics. Of course it's also about prestige, about showing that Russia has the capability, attracting the attention that Russia also counts and has to be taken into account when important decisions are made. And the military power, as I said earlier, has to be central to that. So it's just – again, we have to be very careful in reading these kind of moves carefully.

MS. SCHAKE: So I'm going to be even less careful than she was – (laughter) – because I actually think the problem with NATO-Russia cooperation is Russia, right? I think in the last 20 years, NATO has done gymnastic contortions to try and make the Russians feel comfortable. Partnership for Peace as a glide slope to membership for new countries – like, the NATO alliance and its members have actually been extraordinarily indulgent of Russia making its peace with the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union and Russia as a major and important factor in all of our security.

What I think we actually ought to do about Russian bad behavior – first of all, protect the countries that would feel intimidated by Russia's behavior, most especially those that are NATO members. We ought to take the Russian exercises as the basics (sic) for our Article 5 exercises. We ought to take the exercise they run, and the next year, we would actually show how we would defeat that – (inaudible) – and invite the Russians to be observers for it, because there is no doubt that, actually, the Russians lose any engagement not just with the NATO countries but with practically any one of the NATO countries all by its little self.

So I think we actually ought to be much more assertive about the fact that the Russians are behaving extraordinarily badly, and that's the reason they are unappealing; like, they are losing the soft power battle because they're behaving like jerks. (Laughter.)

MS. ZYSK: Well, I think that is a very American perspective, and a Western perspective. (Laughter.) And that's my point. I think we have to understand both. We have to at least try to understand how Russia views these things. And I think from our perspective, Western perspective, it may look like NATO has been extremely indulgent about Russia, but it doesn't look like that. We have – I think we tend also to oversee some kind of smaller things, like when Russia is completely ignored when Russia's core interests are at play. It doesn't mean that we have to agree with these issues, but taking into account, also treat maybe Russia more – giving it a little bit of more respect would help. I think it's very – especially for – (inaudible) – that is sitting in the Kremlin right now, it's extremely important.

MS. SCHAKE: OK, so let's take the missile defense example. What should we do differently on missile defense to carry out what you're recommending?

MS. ZYSK: I mean, nothing. I think Russia said, "nyet," and that's it. I mean, this is – you have – you can just, I mean, go on with it, but I think the administration is trying to convince Russia all the time and doesn't take, really, this answer that it's for Russia – well, in

unacceptable for an answer. They're still trying to convince them, and they're still getting the same answer. So what you – I mean, from my perspective, you just do whatever you want, and Russia will disagree about that, and that's it. I mean, there will be areas when you will not agree, and you will just proceed with your policies. And there is no point, I think, in really convincing Russia on this issue.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Karl?

MR. KAMP: Probably I can – I can bridge a little bit. What NATO should do – and this is certainly not NATO consensus, but my view, but what NATO should do is to get its rhetoric right. You're talking about a strategic partnership with Russia. And this is just not the case. You do not have a strategic partnership, in the sense of really a more important – (inaudible) – that doesn't exclude cooperation on a number of issues, and if it works, fine; if not, also fine. But we should go a little bit or we should step back from NATO side from this hailing the NATO-Russia thing. And we have now the question, who lost Russia, which is just not the case. So let's pragmatically see whether we can cooperate, and if not, then we don't. So – but not always this strategic partnership, and therefore we have to, because this just blurs the entire perspective a little bit.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Do you think that we're doing – that the alliance is doing enough to demonstrate to the countries on its – to its members on the eastern periphery that it's serious about their security?

MR. KAMP: Well, we have – what we have to understand, and what also Russia has to understand, that cooperation with Russia and protection from Russia is not a contradiction. Only if all 28 NATO allies feel reassured, if you don't want to use the term "protection," then cooperation is possible. And Russia has to contribute to this. The problem is that we have some areas in which we just do not agree, and the Russians have a point when they say, we always thought that cooperation with NATO in the NATO-Russia Council is to find a way on this, basically to give Russia some kind of a vote, and we always said, oh, no, there are areas where we agree to disagree. So we have fundamental concepts on this where we do not get an agreement. So that's why I agree, we should speak very clearly if Russia is violating certain things and should not try to blame ourselves on what we have done because Russia is now behaving in such a nasty way.

MS. ZYSK: I just – I would agree that there are very different levels of cooperation, and there would the normative, the strategic, but also the pragmatic, where we have had some cooperation in a number of areas. So – and the things is that we should keep in mind that there is this different levels, and even if we disagree on the strategic level, we still can proceed on a number of these lower levels, maybe, areas of cooperation.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: A question in the back there.

Q: Stuart Mydon (ph) with Department of Defense. In the lunchtime session, it was mentioned that the next summit, in 2014, should look at the serious capability shortfalls for risk of hollowing out the force. And in the morning, we heard that NATO should look again at

genuine strategic defense planning. What practical ways do you think NATO can pursue those two in the run-up to the next summit?

MS. SCHAKE: You're probably the one of us most knowledgeable – (inaudible) –

MR. : I'll go after you and Karl.

MR. : No, I –

MS. SCHAKE: So the great NATO historian Stan Sloan used to say that the oldest refrains in the West were deterrence is breaking down, we need new thinking and the trans-Atlantic relationship is fraying. And I have worked on defense planning most of my career, and I feel like that's also true in defense planning, like we always have a new spending initiative, we always have a new capabilities initiative, they never achieve their goals, and we always find a better, stronger, faster way do it. Hans Binnendyk's named about a third of that and – (off mic) – (practicalities ?) of it.

And so it's easy to mock it, but it actually matters. And it matters because we have a continuing conversation about what are realistic objectives for all of our spending; where do our national programs take us; what are the gaps that exist – like, for example, we are all overinvested in manned fighters, in a way that, you know, is going to look ridiculous in 15 years, when we have new ways of doing things. So what are the – (off mic) – elements that we can and should be addressing?

And actually, NATO's doing a pretty good job about that. It looks to me like we've learned and interesting set of – we did learn an interesting set of lessons in Iraq about key capability – night vision goggles, for example, that some new NATO members didn't have that just made things impossible, and everybody – (off mic) – to fix that. And Afghanistan gets a whole new set of operational challenges, (and met ?). It has (proved through ?) pretty well. I actually think this has done – on the defense planning side, the system works extraordinarily well, and it works by always being in (process ?), always needing new thinking and deterrence breaking down. And you know – you know, that's what motivates the solution (set ?). But you know better than any of us –

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Actually, I take a slightly different approach. Of course, I wouldn't say that – of course, anything wrong. I would just say if I were sitting in the White House or in NATO, what I'd be worrying about is interoperability and how do we sustain the lessons learned over the last – over the last decade, and moreover, how do we demonstrate to foes and friends alike that we're going to stand up against them or stand with them as we enter this post-'14 phase?

And it's going to be, for me, training, training, training; exercises, exercises, exercises, because what I'm afraid of is that we're going to come home, and we're going to stay home, because where do budgets cut? They get cut in the training areas first and foremost. Travel budgets get cut. We talk about an interconnected forces initiative. We talk about smart defense.

But you can buy things, but if you're not training together, you've not going to be really testing interoperability and forging interoperability.

And that becomes an increasingly demanding requirement when technologies are evolving ever so more rapidly. I mean, look, we even had problems getting our Patriot systems from the Dutch, the Germans and the Americans to work together. That's the same system, but things are evolving so quickly even on the national basis, you can get divergences.

So training to demonstrate capability, training to sustain interoperability, I think, has to be a big priority.

We're coming towards a close. And before I turn over to my colleagues for some closing statements, I just want to turn back to Matt on his theme of democracy. And I was really struck by a point that you had made, which is that democracy is a theme that captures young people, not just in Europe and the United States but around the world. Do you see that as an opportunity for NATO?

MR. BURROWS: I think you have to be, you know, very careful about it because there's also worries about meddling, intervention. I mean, and obviously, NATO is seen as very much a Western club. So you don't want it to seem as if you're imposing these things. We had that experience in Iraq, which obviously did not go well. But I think certainly favoring those values, favoring the fight, the people who are fighting in countries for those values, is something that is very important.

I'm not sure, you know, NATO – you know, this is something that is more than NATO's role. I mean, it has to be combined with other actions, you know, other institutions, an array of countries, and regions, actually, to make it effective.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Interesting. The reason why I asked is because as I'm thinking of what's NATO's purpose afterwards, I don't think NATO should become a democracy-building organization. That's not its mission. It's a political-military organization focused on being able to bring capabilities to the battlefield. But to tie on a theme like democracy in a community of democracies might be something that could be useful.

So let me just start off with Karl and walk down the line here to speak and say, thinking of the conversations we've had today, and in light of the fact that NATO is going to have a summit in 2014, what do you think, in light of the big changes that are coming down the pike, that NATO ought to use this summit to position for, and how? What initiative or what concept should be driven, launched at this summit, to make sure that NATO is relevant, you know, 10 years from now, 20 years from now?

MR. KAMP: Well, the sec-gen apparently has the idea to come up with a (medium ?) report card after the Strategic Concept 2010, so what has been achieved and what is still to be done. I would like the heads of state discuss three major questions. The first one is which of the new challenges we have defined in Lisbon – cyber, terrorism, energy, climate, what have you –

are really relevant for NATO? Where can NATO contribute something significant? Because we don't have a – we don't have an agreement on this.

Second question is how can – because the Arab world, the instabilities in the Arab world are likely to stay with us for a long, long time, how can NATO execute any leverage there knowing that intervention is probably a very rarely available option, for all the reasons we were talking about? So what can we do there? We cannot ignore it; on the other hand, our possibilities are rather limited.

And the third one is quite simple. The secretary-general said that it is NATO's role to develop from an operational NATO to a – to a prepared NATO. Prepared for what? I think this is enough for the entire summit. (Laughter.)

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Katarzyna?

MS. ZYSK: Well, there is a number of things. I mentioned already the changing – the concept of strategic balance that is – will be changing because of the new weapons, the technology, new technology. And – but I would get back, again, to the climate change issue, which a number of allies, including this administration in the U.S., is taking seriously. And I'm still – I had a chance to think about it when I'm – when I studied in the Arctic. And I think the magnitude of changes we may experience, and not only in a long-term perspective but – (inaudible) – a medium-term perspective, we may just face a completely different world, with very different conflicts and challenges. And I think it will be good to kind of start thinking about how this world may look like and what we are going to face.

MR. BURROWS: I – just to build on these – both of these comments and say that, you know, I think there's an opportunity there to – for NATO to reach out and obviously talk and discuss NATO's role in dealing with these global challenges with a wider set of partners than just the core membership and that that – you – in the – some of the discussion this morning talked about the partnerships. I think developing those partnerships so that they feel some ownership over, you know, the mission, the role in the world and what that role is for, that there's an opportunity there, actually, after Afghanistan, to begin to think about carving out that broader role, just not one of the core membership.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: All right. Kori?

MS. SCHAKE: So I have one practical issue and one big potentially disruptive issue that I'd love to see taken up at the summit.

The practical issue is membership. We have been pretending that we have an open door to NATO membership for some time now, and just because we say it doesn't mean anyone believes it. And I think it is increasingly unbelievable because nobody's got a – well, Damon has a terrific strategy for it, but none of our governments have strategies for it. Nobody's pushing the issue forward. There are countries that should be obvious NATO members and that we just keep not getting around an axle on because of one particular or another particular country's objections. But we're probably – we don't have a – we don't have a creative strategy.

And the most effective thing NATO and the EU have done since the end of the Cold War is policies that create stability on the periphery and turn the periphery into the center. That's been fantastic for the new member states and for us, not least in Turkey, which is a very different country now than it would have been if the EU hadn't been so assertive about the importance of its – (off mic). And so I really – I would like to see us get back on track with thinking about how do we shape our security environment by creating incentives for countries to make choices that are going to make them more prosperous and more representative, and therefore us so.

The big, potentially disruptive issue is I don't think we as an alliance think nearly enough about the way that the assertion of our values and our economic interests reshape the security landscape. And let me just give you my favorite example of the moment.

The European Union court cases about Gazprom and Russian energy companies not meeting competition standards and monopoly practices – those are – those seem to me to have the potential to be hugely disruptive in Russian-Western (relations ?), because Russia doesn't have an economy; it has an energy sector, and it has an energy sector because it's a monopoly that's linked into the – (off mic). That is clearly at odds with EU law on these issues.

Now, those cases are going forward, and the Russians seem to believe that intimidating member states is actually going to stop this from happening. They don't have a concept of how once the rule of law exists someplace that it drives things forward, irrespective of what politicians want. So as that goes forward, I think there's the potentially for really bad changes in Russia's relationship with European countries. And the United States ought to be standing and cheering that the EU's pushing competition law. And this either has – it's our common cause about intellectual property rights and operation of free markets. But it's going to have big security consequences.

And I don't think we think enough about, for example, the way Chinese industrial espionage affects our ability to do cyber effectively. I'd like to see a little better integration of the way that the practice of our values and the practice of our laws and the practice of our business has the potential to be disruptive to our security.

MR. BURROWS: Could I add on just one thing? I mean, I think the U.S. does have an opportunity on the energy side, actually, because we have a bonanza that we're sitting on top of and actually developing, and for both Asia and Europe, in the sense that we will, you know, within probably a short amount of time be a huge exporter. And that actually gets to the whole Russia question. I mean, that's why they are suffering at the moment, because they don't hold the monopoly, and they aren't the only source of energy now that the Europeans can turn to. But you have an opportunity, I think, when – with the U.S., with its allies, actually, to reshape – using energy security to reshape that in the direction of rule of law and direction of actually – entrepreneurship, free trade, these kind of values.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Great. Well, thank you very much. I mean, I think what our panel has done is kind of reminded us that as we look forward and look at some of the new kind of dynamic – I'll use the word "disruptive" – changes that are coming down the pike, we can't lose

grip of some of the, quote-unquote – the traditional requirements we have, be it interesting neighbors to the east or long-standing and still important priorities like NATO enlargement.

So let me thank Karl, Katarzyna, Matt, Kori for your time and your insights today. Thank you. (Applause.)

BARRY PAVEL: Well, as the panelists get off the stage, I'll sort of make this closing session informal. For some career-damaging reason, I agreed to summarize today, number one; number two, to do it in 15 minutes; and number three, to do it publicly. So you probably won't be seeing me on a stage again after this.

But I thought I would just sort of be illustrative. We've heard a lot of ideas sort of woven through the different threads, the different sort of frameworks today. I won't repeat all the global trends that we discussed this morning, but I will sort of hit a couple of issues. And then if others have sort of major themes that they thought they heard, you know, this is a great time to do it, to let us know. And if there's things that you think are, you know, pretty significant ideas that should be addressed as this study proceeds, this is a great time, not the only time – and we're certainly – we're emailable, but this is also a great time to sort of suggest those major – those major things.

So I'll just, as I said, sort of go through a couple of things that I think I heard a few times. In terms of challenges for NATO, it seems clear that the traditional approaches and capabilities, you know, might not suffice, although that last sort of huge dose of optimism from that panel gives me a little bit of pause on what I thought I heard before that. But in light of the emerging global security environment, it strikes us that there are some traditional purposes that have to be sustained, but there's also some new capabilities and new approaches and new partnerships that will have to be established and developed.

I don't think the rebalance to Asia is going away on the part of the United States. It's a bipartisan approach that the U.S. has been looking at for quite a while now. So I think that means what we heard today, that Europe is no longer the primary regional focus for threats. And that's good news, and we heard a little bit of that on the last panel. But what we can't lose is the essential trans-Atlantic link, which we heard Karl-Heinz and others say looks likely to remain strong. So that – I think that's some of the initial thoughts.

In terms of sort of what some of these things mean for NATO, a proactive approach to what's going on in the world – I think we heard a little bit of about – a little bit of that on the last panel, sort of where do we seek to structure NATO's sustained outreach, to what regions, in what ways and with what new partners. And I think the most interesting – perhaps the most interesting thing I heard today was sort of a discussion that started in the morning on public-private partnerships and then was continued a little bit, but the thought we – some of us came away with this morning is we might have a small workshop later on public-private partnerships, not – we're sort of thinking of that in terms of cyber, but there might be some other important and interesting areas for the alliance that we should be thinking about or at least coming up with some new thoughts. But sort of the private partnerships for NATO and for NATO members –

how do they work, on what topics, you know, with what partners? I think that's a pretty important and unexplored issue, with a couple of exceptions.

Certainly the need for NATO to continue to look at ongoing threats in its periphery, to monitor developments in Russia, in the Middle East and North Africa, and now, certainly with what we heard today, to a degree elsewhere, but sort of how does NATO do that and with what level of intensity? We did hear about the critical importance of nonstate actors, so that sort of brings through the partnership theme. We heard a lot about how NATO needs to maintain high levels of interoperability, which I think is easier said than done, and the questions become in what areas and with what investments, because we did hear that. Despite the fact that we're not supposed to talk about the "A" word, there are declining defense budgets for the foreseeable future. And so how do we maintain interoperability in light of that and in light of different paces of military development – I think that's a key issue that we need to focus on for some of the core missions that the alliance is going to have to sustain.

And we didn't quite hear it this way, but at the operational level, I sort of summarize what I thought I heard, that there's sort of a threefold, sort of within Europe, within NATO game that I think NATO needs to focus on at the operational level. And I think it's certainly still watching Russia. We don't know what's going to happen. We don't think they're coming across the Fulda Gap, but there's Russian challenges that could be posed. How do we deal with that? They – it may play out in the High North, so that's a piece of it, but it's not the only piece. So that's one. I think there are still challenges in the south that we heard about today, Iran, Syria, the Middle East, North Africa. We heard a good discussion of that. So I think that's the second piece. And then I still am worried about terrorism with new forms of technology within Europe or within the United States.

So I would say for me, those are three – at least some of the more interesting, important threads that I picked up for sort of how does NATO do the core mission, and then that will have implications later. If we agree it's those three or another three, that'll have implications later in the project for what does that mean for capabilities, what does that mean for exercises and training, and then again, always being sensitive to resources, how can NATO support an effort that makes sense there but might not be sustainable fiscally if it's done too strongly?

So I'm going to – I know that was insufficient, but I was going to stop there, and if there – if others have any thoughts, sort of major things that are either worth reminding or worth raising, this is – I'm encouraging you to raise them now. And if not, then we can – we'll go on to sort of our final closing thoughts.

So I'll go on. I wanted to thank all of you for your participation today. And I'm going to thank you in advance for your participation in future such events because we will be having these as we go through this. So we encourage your emails in between, or your phone calls, and certainly your personal participation when we have these later. I wanted to thank the Norwegian MOD team for coming here. I know you're very busy. We appreciate your own personal investment in this and your partnership. I wanted to thank IFS, the great partners that we have and that we'll continue to have for your partnership on this. I also wanted to thank Simona

Kordosova and Ashley Stuart for their arrangement today. Thank you very much – (applause) – and all of the staff that are behind them that are unnamed and unseen.

And unless my Norwegian friends have any closing thoughts, thank you very much for coming, and we look forward to seeing you again. (Applause.)

(END)