

Vicente Garcia

The Atlantic Council of the US

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The following is a recording of the Vicente Garcia teleconference with The Atlantic Council of the United States on Tuesday, July 9th, 2013, at 10:00 a.m. Central Time.

Operator: Excuse me, everyone. We now have The Atlantic Council President and CEO, Fred Kempe, Atlantic Council Vice President and Director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Michele Dunne. Please be aware that each of your lines is now in a listen-only mode. At the conclusion of our guests' remarks we will open the floor for questions. At that time, instructions will be given as to how to proceed if you would like to ask a question. I would like to now turn the conference over to Mr. Kempe who will be offering some introductory remarks and facilitate a discussion with Dr. Dunne. You may now begin.

Frederick Kempe: Hi, this is Fred Kempe. Welcome to everyone on the line. We've got a great group of members on the call. As all of you know, we instituted these members' calls for two reasons. First of all, the membership of The Atlantic Council stretches way beyond Washington around the world and we have a good global group on the call today. Second of all, it's a good way to deal with issues that are happening in the moment that they're happening so that we can update you all as quickly as we can, both with our own experts and experts from our network. I'm joined by Michele Dunne, Atlantic Council Vice President and Director of the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, to hear her insight and analysis on the current situation in Egypt. It's the second anniversary of the launch of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and I

really want to congratulate Michele on what she's done to build this center up with the Atlantic Council to be really a shining star in Washington in dealing with the transitions and the disruptions of the Middle East and North Africa.

I'm not going to set up the situation myself; I'll leave it to Michele to do that as things are moving so quickly. Let me just give her a brief introduction. She, like so many people who work at the Atlantic Council, has had some important jobs in government. She served in the White House on the National Security Council staff, on the State Department's Policy Planning Staff and its Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and she was diplomat in Cairo and Jerusalem. Before joining the Atlantic Council, she was a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She holds a doctorate in Arabic language and linguistics from Georgetown University. We decided, even before bringing Michele Dunne into the Atlantic Council as Director, that we wanted the Rafik Hariri Center to take a particular focus on Egypt. We knew from the very beginning that Egypt was going to be, if not the most crucial of the transition states, certainly in the top two. Clearly, what we're seeing in the last few days underscores the importance of Egypt and where it's going to go.

So, let me just tee up one question to get Michele started with some opening comments and then I'll turn to all of you as quickly as possible. We are seeing a situation where it's really hard to know where things are going to go next. So, I wonder if you could tee up the situation but also where things are going to go next. Are we headed in such a violent situation where more repression is inevitable, civil war is inevitable? Is there any way the Muslim Brotherhood backs down from the track that it's going? I'd love to hear your analysis of where we are right now, Michele.

Michele Dunne: Okay, thank you, Fred. Good morning, everyone, and thank you for joining in this call. So, let me start, I'm going to start with sort of the most

recent developments, what's going on right now, and then I'll have a few things to say about some— an analytical framework or a way to look at the situation in Egypt that I think helps to understand what's going on there. So, first of all, the very latest thing, and this just happened in the moments before our call started, is that the interim president that was appointed by the military last week, Judge Adly Mansour, has now appointed a Prime Minister and a Vice President. So, Mohamed ElBaradei will be Vice President for Foreign Affairs, which also suggests maybe they'll be more than one Vice President. There could be two or three, I think. And so, obviously his role will be primarily dealing with the international community and explaining what has happened and what will happen in Egypt to the international community. The Prime Minister will be Hazem Beblawi, who is a prominent economist who was Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister in one of the other governments after Mubarak. He is a respected figure, but there was an initial impulse by the revolutionaries to have ElBaradei as Prime Minister. He's the one that the young revolutionaries trust the most and he's a very strong figure, and someone who would be able to stand up to the military. But there were objections to him by the Salafis and some of the Islamists who are going along with this transition, and they preferred a technocratic and economic Prime Minister. So, that is the most recent political development.

The other very recent political development is within the last 24 hours, they have put out a constitutional declaration. They had suspended the constitution when they removed President Morsi last week. They've put out a constitutional declaration that sketches out a pretty fast process going forward: the appointment of a cabinet, which we've seen the beginning of that now, the appointment of a committee to revise the constitution that was passed in December and now has been suspended, parliamentary elections, a presidential election. Once again, we see the military dictating a kind of fast timetable to

get things moving, although it's really unclear whether that will be respected. So that's the political scene.

Now, Fred, what you asked about is the other big story which is the unrest. First of all, I think unrest and violence going forward are inevitable, they're going to happen. Will it escalate to a civil war? I hope not. I can't exclude that possibility. At a previous time, I would have said that won't happen in Egypt. I'm not entirely sure now, but I definitely do see unrest and violence going forward. Islamists, the Brotherhood, and their Islamist allies are extremely angry about the removal of Morsi. The top leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood has been detained. Islamist media has been closed down. There are pro-Morsi demonstrations going on here, there, and everywhere. They're not enormous, but they're not tiny either. And there have been some very bad clashes, notably the one that happened yesterday at the Republican Guard facility in which Morsi is being held. So there's been an ongoing demonstration there and there was an incident that happened early Monday morning in which more than 50 people were killed, two of those apparently security officers and the rest of them Islamists, pro-Morsi demonstrators. It's really not clear right now what happened. The Army says that the Morsi demonstrators tried to infiltrate the headquarters, perhaps in an effort to free him, and that that's why they used force. The demonstrators say that the Army was trying to clear this demonstration from in front of the Republican Guard and used a great deal of force and live fire in doing so. There is an investigation. The Presidency, this Interim President who is the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court, says there's an investigation, I think, so I don't really know what will happen.

But there's an extreme amount of tension between Islamists and non-Islamists. There are suggestions that the Brotherhood could be outlawed again. And so there are various kinds of violence going on. As I mentioned, there are demonstrations and people in Egypt now are armed in a way that they weren't two years ago, and there are clashes

between Morsi supporters and those against him. There have been a number of attacks by Islamists on military outposts in the Sinai. There's also been an uptick in Muslim-Christian violence and a couple of very ugly incidents of sectarian violence since last week. I'm afraid we're going to see more of this. I think that a return to the situation of the 1990s in which Islamists carry out anti-government attacks like assassination of government figures is entirely possible. Whether it will escalate to more than that and toward a civil war type situation, I don't know. At this point, there are not real Islamist militias. So that's one thing. The Egyptian Army and Police enjoy a monopoly on the use of force in the sense that they're the only organized groups using force, but there has been a proliferation of small weapons throughout Egypt, and so people, as I said, are armed in a way they weren't before. That's what's going on right now.

Let me step back for just a minute because I think there's an important context here to understand. People are seeing the situation in Egypt as polarization between Islamists and secularists, and there is certainly an element of that. But I think that's not at all the whole story. There's a very important third player here which is the "old state", the institutions of the old state. So that includes the military, the police, the intelligence, the state media, an enormous seven million person bureaucracy. The old state was merely decapitated when Mubarak left. A few of the ministers were removed, but most of the old state apparatus remained in place, which is good and bad. But the old state is a player here, and there really is an element here I think in which we are seeing a revenge of the old state against the Brotherhood and Islamists. So you've got these three players, right? I'm speaking in sort of simplified terms, but the Islamists, the secular opposition, the old state. And it's been a two against one game. During the revolution against Mubarak, the Islamists and secularists worked together against the old state, and they got the military to come over to their side and it was over, Mubarak fell. After Mubarak fell, it was the military working with the Islamists and sidelining the secularists. And that

alliance went on, even after Morsi was elected and he made a deal— he removed the old defense minister but he made a deal with the next rung down of the Egyptian military leadership, and they stuck by him until just a few weeks ago.

Then what we saw is a gradual souring of relations between Morsi, and the military, and the old state. There was a honeymoon period after Morsi took office a year ago, but in November of last year he put out this very controversial constitutional declaration and then he forced a new constitution through a very non-participatory, non-inclusive process in December of last year. It's been downhill since then, relations between the Brotherhood and the old state, as well as the secular opposition. From the beginning when Morsi was office, he never took the secular opposition seriously and he never undertook and serious process to reform the old state with the help of the secular opposition. Rather, the Brotherhood chose to try to master the old state from within and try to make alliances with some people, to sideline others, but they really were dealing exclusively with the old state. This is why Morsi refused to make any compromises on the constitution and other issues with the other political parties. But the Brotherhood effort to master the old state failed. And more and more we started seeing, over the last six months, police insubordination, insubordination of the state media and other parts of the bureaucracy who became more and more disenchanted with the military and started moving, in a way, to the side of the secular opposition.

And then the last straw was the military. And they made their decision some weeks ago in which they started coming into contact with the Tamarod campaign, this campaign that gathered 22 million signatures for early presidential elections and so forth. I really think that the military had made its decision to remove Morsi one way or another before the big demonstrations, but the big demonstrations were what clinched it. Once the military saw the number of people who came out into the street, frankly, it was over. And these last-ditch attempts to get Morsi to agree to step down, I think it was all just window

dressing that they had decided to remove him. So, I think what we are looking at is a military coup, although, as we saw, with significant public backing, but not universal, of course, because Islamists are a significant part of the political process in Egypt. And even though now everyone in the military and the new President are speaking the language of inclusivity, of course the Brotherhood is rejecting this, is seeing this purely as a military coup against a democratically elected leader, and I think they will reject being included in the process going forward. And the military is sending very mixed signals. They're speaking the language of inclusiveness but they have arrested the Brotherhood leadership, closed down the Islamist media, etcetera.

The United States at the moment is being strongly criticized by both sides, and this is basically due to a policy of just hewing very close to whoever is in power: Mubarak, the military after Mubarak, Morsi, now the military again. So, unfortunately we've reached a situation in which the secular opposition became increasingly critical of the United States for being too close to the Brotherhood while Morsi was in power, and I'd be happy to discuss this more in detail if you're interested. And now we have the Brotherhood accusing the United States of giving the green light for the military coup. I think many of you probably saw the story in the New York Times discussing back and forth telephone calls in the last days before Morsi was removed on July 3rd, and this is supporting the narrative among the Islamists that the coup could only take place because the United States gave the green light. The U.S. Administration now faces this decision whether to apply the law. The law I think is pretty clear, that the United States cannot provide assistance to a government in which a democratically elected leader has been removed by military coup or decree. There's no mention in the law of whether putting that aside because of the coup was popular, or the president was unpopular, or anything like that. However, of course we've seen the United States do a number of things in the past; sometimes apply this law, sometimes seek a waiver. And that might be what will happen,

that Congress would have to issue a law basically waiving this if the United States wants to keep its military assistance going.

The Administration is delaying a decision for now, which I think is a reasonable tactic. But it's going to be difficult to sustain that for any length of time and I think it's going to face the United States with some painful choices. Because I think that the violence that we've seen going on is likely to continue. This is not going to cast the Egyptian military in a positive light and it's going to be uncomfortable perhaps for the United States, for the Congress to pass a law saying we need to continue aid to the Egyptian military. So, I'll stop there and look forward to discussing these issues with you.

Frederick Kempe: Thank you very much, Michele. We're going to go ahead and introduce how the question and answer process is going to work and then I'll just ask a question or two briefly while the audience that we've got on the phone gets their questions into the queue. So if the operator could give us please the instructions for your questions.

Operator: Thank you. At this time we will open the line for questions. If you would like to ask a question, please press the 'star' key followed by the '1' key. That is 'star 1' on your touchtone phone now. Questions will be taken in the order in which they are received. Please be sure to introduce yourself when asking a question. If at any time you would like to remove yourself from the questioning queue, please press 'star 2.' Again, if you would like to ask a question, press 'star 1' now.

Frederick Kempe: Okay, then let me just get started. You talked about the U.S. role. Can you talk about the role of others? Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE,

whoever else from the international community you think playing a role in the situation right now, Michele, and who are the other important external actors?

Michele Dunne: Well, when Morsi was in power, Qatar and Turkey were his major international backers. They were the ones who were providing assistance, Qatar of course much more than Turkey. But Turkey has been the number one investor in Egypt for a long time, so they play an important role there. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait had kept their distance, particularly after the Brotherhood took power of the presidency. The Saudi leadership was one of the first to congratulate the new President of Egypt and I think it's indeed possible that we will— but Qatar also did, even though most people expected Qatar to be displeased by the removal of Morsi. So, I think it's possible that we will see a shift and that we will see more assistance coming from Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, and Kuwait, and less from Qatar and Turkey at the moment. But at the moment, I don't see any of them playing a major role. I mean, the New York Times story did speak of a foreign minister from the Gulf being involved in making some of the calls, a last-ditch effort to persuade Morsi to accept an early election and so forth, and that's indeed plausible. But the other question is the international financial institutions. I think placing ElBaradei in the Vice President's role and a prominent economist who was in favor of an agreement with the IMF when he served in the cabinet before into the Prime Ministership would be a signal that they, the Egyptian leadership and the military, understand that the economic situation is dire and that they will want to connect, again, with the IMF and with the international community in the hopes of getting some assistance flowing quickly.

Frederick Kempe: So you could see some economic support coming from off the sidelines, both from international institutions and from some neighboring states.

Michele Dunne: I would be surprised if we see any kind of IMF assistance coming before they've gotten back into a democratic framework of some kind. I mean, the IMF may be willing to talk to them, but I don't— the IMF wants whatever they agree with on Egypt to have broad enough popular support. But of course that doesn't constrain at all the Gulf Arab donors, and we might indeed see some of them stepping forward smartly.

Frederick Kempe: Okay, thank you. First question is Jeff Steinberg of EIR please.

Jeff Steinberg: Okay, I wanted to ask a question about the sequencing that was announced by the interim president. One of the big criticisms that the opposition presented I think credibly against the way that things proceeded the first time around is that the parliamentary and then presidential elections preceded the drafting of a constitution. And this really put all of the advantage in the hands of the Muslim Brotherhood because they were clearly the most organized opposition force, and there was a lot of money pouring in from the Gulf into the Salafist party. So you wound up getting an Islamic constitution that was, I think, the beginning of a lot of the problems. This time around, the interim president announced that the constitution will come first so people will be aware of the powers of the parliament and the president before they have to cast votes. Do you see this as an indication that there are some lessons learned moving forward and that this could brighten the prospects at least of getting it more right this time around? Thank you.

Michele Dunne: Jeff, I think that— I share those criticisms that it was a big mistake to have a parliament and a president elected to full terms, not on an interim basis, before the constitution was written. Particularly the president, because then they wrote a constitution that kept way too much power in the hands of the president, and by the way, in which there was no process for removing the president by impeachment, which is what led us into this whole mess last week. So, yes, I agree in a way that it's better to have the rewriting of the constitution first. But I want to raise two notes of caution. First of all, the military has set out an exceedingly fast process. I mean, this whole thing is supposed to happen just within weeks that they're supposed to, a very small committee, propose amendments to the constitution. They're not going to have elections for a constituent assembly; they're just going to select people. So, this means once again, not inclusive. People will be excluded from this I'm sure, and once again, you'll have part of the population calling the constitution illegitimate. So, they're trying to rush the process and not be as inclusive as they should.

The other thing that I want to caution against, Jeff, is there's a tendency to see what happened as a move against Islamism. I don't think that's necessarily true. It's a move against the Brotherhood. But the Salafis, the Salafi Nour Party are playing a very prominent role in this transition. And in a way, the military needs them on board because they give them some cover on the Islamist side. And if you look at the interim constitutional declaration that was just issued yesterday, the things that the Salafis wanted are very, very prominent in there. So there are Islamist things even in this interim constitution. And I would expect the Salafis to play a prominent role in the amending of the constitution. So, I wouldn't necessarily see this as oh, now Islamism is going to be expunged from the constitution.

Frederick Kempe: Very interesting. Just a reminder, again, anyone who wants to ask a question, press the 'star' key followed by the '1' key on your touchtone phone. Let me turn to Martin Klingst of Die Zeit. I also forget to mention, for those who do want to use this information, this is an on-the-record members' call. Martin?

Martin Klingst: Okay. Thank you very much, Michele, for your great expertise. I just have a short question. What are the repercussions and the consequences going to be of this coup for the Brotherhood and Islamist movements in other countries like Syria? Do you fear more violence, or what could be the consequence?

Michele Dunne: Martin, unfortunately, the removal of Morsi through the means that were used last week feeds into a narrative that Islamists are not allowed to win elections or not allowed to serve out their terms if they do win. And for Islamists, this builds on the experience of Hamas in the Palestinian elections in the mid-2000s, on the Algerian Islamic movement in the 1990s. We've seen a couple of examples where either elections in Algeria were cancelled because Islamists were poised to win. In the Palestinian elections, Hamas was allowed to win but then there was an international campaign basically to keep them from forming a government and succeeding. This is going to feed into that narrative unfortunately and it's going to lead Islamists to question whether they should try to play by democratic rules of the game, or whether they simply have to pursue power by other means. I think it would have been much more powerful had Morsi been voted out of office. He was a very bad President, he did a terrible job, but it would have meant more and it would have set a much better example had there been, for example, a referendum on his presidency or early elections. Now, I know that was offered to Morsi and he said 'no,' but then the military moved immediately to a coup.

There was no attempt to wait this out, to sort of keep pressing him. Perhaps the Brotherhood could have been maneuvered into a position—it might have taken weeks or months—in which they were forced to go to an early election. But there was no patience for that and the Egyptian military moved very quickly. By the way, I want to point out this campaign of 22 million signatures that Tamarod, this youth campaign, gathered and the demonstrations were calling for an early presidential election. That's what they were calling for. That isn't what happened.

Frederick Kempe: Thanks for that answer. Before I turn to Steve Shapiro, just let me let you all know on the line the Hariri Center of the Atlantic Council has been tracking what's going on on the ground in Egypt on its own blog called EgyptSource, and you can access that at www.acus.org/egyptsource. [EgyptSource has] a lot of reports from the ground in Egypt as well as analysis from outside as well. And this has become an incredibly popular and widely used source of information over the last few days. Steve Shapiro?

Steve Shapiro: Thanks, Fred, and thank you, Michele. Can you comment please on the effect on role of participation in these events of the other North African Arab revolutionary countries, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, and just what's the play there?

Michele Dunne: Well, Steve, first of all, I don't think that they have—I don't see outside factors having played much of a role on what has happened in Egypt. I mean, I think that everything that we've seen happen over the last week or so has been completely generated from inside of Egypt. I mean, there is some effect, I mean, I've seen, for example, there apparently is a Tamarod, which means 'rebel,' campaign in Tunisia. I don't know exactly what they're looking for because Tunisia's at a different

place politically than Egypt was. Tunisia took the patient route. They've been slowly proceeding toward writing a constitution, they're getting very close to the end of that process now and they only have interim elected officials, and all of those people will leave after the new constitution is passed and there'll be new elections. So, there's no particular reason to call for people to leave power in Tunisia now because they're all leaving soon at any rate. But Tunisia does have some of the same problems between Islamists and secularists, particularly Salafis, Salafi Islamists and secularists. But I think the negative demonstration effect of the Brotherhood— the narrative, as I said, will be that the Brotherhood played by the rules of the game. They played by the rules of the democratic game and yet they were forced out of power undemocratically. And I think that's going to have its effect in Tunisia and Libya particularly because those are places where constitutions and laws are still in play, and Islamists I think will be viewing the process with increased suspicion.

Steve Shapiro: Thank you.

Frederick Kempe: Great, thank you. Any follow up on that, Steve?

Steve Shapiro: No, no. That's good, I appreciate it.

Frederick Kempe: Okay, Garrett Mitchell of the Mitchell Report.

Garrett Mitchell: Thanks, Fred, and thank you, Michele. Two quick questions, the first of which you've pretty much covered but I want to be sure I understand. The first part of the question was, in the constitution that's now been suspended, were there any provisions for a constitutional removal of a president? You

said there was no specific notion about impeachment, but I wondered if there were any escape clauses constitutionally. And the second [question] is: where's Morsi?

Michele Dunne: Thanks, Garrett. Regarding where's Morsi, he's been held in a Republican Guard, which is the Presidential Guard, facility since last Wednesday, since July 3rd when he was removed from office. And they're really not saying much about him. It's interesting because they've been detaining other senior members of his party and the Muslim Brotherhood and there's been discussion of charges, various different charges that might be brought against them. There hasn't been much discussion of whether any charges will be brought against Morsi, and my guess is that the military doesn't want to sort of inflame Brotherhood supporters further. But he is under a— he's detained. I mean, he's not under house arrest because he isn't in his house, but apparently he's only been— news reports say he's only been allowed to sort of have one phone call a day with his wife to tell her that he's alive and okay, and other than that he's incommunicado. And there may be some of his close aides with him as well. That's not entirely clear whether there are other people because there are a number of his aides who haven't been heard from last week, so it's not clear where they are. But this was at the route of this bloody event that took place yesterday with some sort of clash, and we don't know who started it, between his supporters and the Republican Guard who are holding Morsi.

Regarding your other question, there were so many loopholes in this constitution that was passed last December. [It did not include processes or] procedures for the President resigning, what would happen in the case the President resigned, who would take over, and what would happen if he was unable to fulfill the duties of his office temporarily or permanently, illness or something like that. Those were in there. The best procedure that was in there that could have been used is that the President could call for

a public referendum on any issue basically. And the Brotherhood wanted that in there because the Brotherhood was so confident of their ability to win elections, they wanted to be able to call a referendum and win it on any point when they wanted to. But of course, this could have been used as a referendum on the Morsi presidency. A referendum, for example, on whether to go to an early presidential election, but he refused to do that.

Frederick Kempe: Again, a reminder for anyone who wants to ask a question, 'star' key followed by the '1' key on your touchtone phone now. Let me ask one question myself. We know that the military's the strongest actor and will be for whatever foreseeable future we have. How do you think they're thinking about their role and how do you think that they feel they'll deal with the Brotherhood? Any particular insight into the thinking of the Commander-in-Chief Abdel Fattah al-Sisi? And then is there a chance or is there any set of circumstances you can imagine where the Brotherhood backs down from its calls to resist and fight Morsi's refusal, or are we on a collision course that's inescapable?

Michele Dunne: Okay, thank you, Fred. Okay, well first of all, let me say that I think the military, from what I understand, they initially intended to stick by their bargain with Morsi. They actually abandoned their bargain with Morsi and their alliance with the Brotherhood rather reluctantly because they thought that the Brotherhood was the strongest political actor in the country aside from themselves, and they thought the Brotherhood would be the best ones to run the country. I don't think the military is fundamentally anti-Islamist, and they were very willing to work with the Brotherhood. But I think they felt, over time, they felt that the Brotherhood disappointed them, that they should have been clever in how they handled the country, in how they handled the state

bureaucracy, that they should have made compromises and so forth and not been so stubbornly sticking to their agenda, and that there was increasing unrest, and incidence of violence, and insubordination around the country. I think the military found that very troubling. They like things to be nice and quiet and stable inside the country. And they also wanted the economy to get back on its feet for lots of reasons. They have their own very significant economic interests and they wanted to resume making money via those, and also just to stabilize the country you need to get the economy moving again. So I think they were very disappointed in the Brotherhood and I think they were somewhat reluctant to become involved in politics again. But now that they have, they will be the ones calling the shots for this foreseeable future. And I think we have to— the only indication we have of how they will be in power is how they were in power in the 18 months after Mubarak. This was not pretty. Now, these are not— it's not the same Defense Minister and Chief of Staff. They were changed last August. So, it's different people, but these people were on the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and were players at that time. There's no indication that they disapprove too much of the way things were done in the past. And unfortunately we saw in the past— we saw, first of all, the biggest mistake I think was that the military would not hand the political game over fully to civilians, that they insisted on making most of the decisions themselves. Now this time they've tried to put a civilian out front in the role of this interim president. But although Judge Mansour is a respected figure, he's not a very prominent or strong figure. So, the military are still going to be the ones calling the shots.

Now, regarding the question about the Brotherhood, could the Brotherhood back down, that of course is possible. The Brotherhood has made, over the getting close to 100 years now that the Brotherhood has been in existence, we've seen periods of cooperation with the government and periods of resistance and tension with the government on and off. Probably more often resistance and tension than cooperation,

but deals are always possible. The problem is I don't know how the Brotherhood gets over this removal of Morsi. It's just such a big bone for them to swallow, very, very difficult for them to swallow. And of course, we'll see— I assume that this detention of the leadership of the Brotherhood that there's kind of an experimentation going on here and the military's waiting to see how strongly the Brotherhood's going to resist, how much trouble they're going to cause, how much violence they're going to cause, and there will be some kind of dealing with the Brotherhood according to how well they behave. Anyway, right now the signals are not good. I mean, not only are there demonstrations and some members of the Brotherhood calling for martyrdom and violent resistance, there have also been one of the Brotherhood leaders suggested yesterday that the attacks going on on the military in the Sinai were at Brotherhood instigation. They're not by Brotherhood people, they're by other jihadis. So, the Brotherhood's trying to indicate there that they have other cards to play in terms of violence. So, unfortunately right now the trajectory is toward greater violence and conflict and we have not seen at this point any opening up of dialogue or the possibility of some kind of compromise.

Frederick Kempe: We try to end promptly. We started a couple minutes late. Let me just ask one more question before we let you all get back to your work. I always look for comparable situations in trying to understand how things could historically evolve. I don't know if you see one. The one that I see that's closest is sort of the evolution of the AK Party in Turkey where Erdoğan was in jail, the predecessors of the AK Party, Refah Welfare Party were outlawed, but over the time the AK Party itself became more democratic. And many people argue that part of the problem for the Muslim Brotherhood is it's not a democratic party to start with and that it had to create a democracy. Is there any antecedent, is there any precedent for this that one could look at that either the military can take as a guide or the Brotherhood could take as a guide?

Michele Dunne: Yes, I think, Fred, that if you look over the longer term, I would say Turkey is the more optimistic scenario for Egypt, that the Brotherhood evolves, or there's also been a big tradition of break off movements from the Brotherhood, some of which have been more democratic than the Brotherhood, some of which have been more violent than the Brotherhood. So, it could be either that the Brotherhood itself evolves or there's some significant breakaway from the Brotherhood. I think the Brotherhood does have the capacity for self-criticism and revision of its behavior over time. This is something, though, I think that would take years to emerge. This is not something that we're going to see emerging in a year or two, especially after this very, very difficult experience of the removal of Morsi. So that's the optimistic scenario. The darker scenarios are there's the Pakistan scenario of the military continuing to be in power, removing democratically elected governments from time to time, having relations with Islamists and so forth. There's also, and probably the darkest scenario of all right now for Egypt is the Algeria scenario, in which the frustration of the democratic ambitions of Islamists leads to an actual civil war in which many, many people are killed. That would be the disastrous scenario. I don't think Egypt has to go that way, but these are all possibilities to be alert to.

Frederick Kempe: Thank you, Michele. And thank you so much for taking the time. I think everyone here at the Atlantic Council is incredibly proud of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, your staff, and the work you're doing, not just on Egypt, but across the region. For members on the call, this is your Atlantic Council. Let us know other calls you'd like to have in this series, other subjects, other individuals you would like us to tee up for you, we'd be happy to consider it. Thank you so much for joining the call and thank you to Michele.

Michele Dunne:

Thank you, Fred. Have a good day, everyone.

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