

### **U.S. Objectives:**

- 1) Maintain continuity of international shipping operations.
- 2) Prevent actor(s) from using malware to further exploit vulnerabilities within the U.S. shipping industry sector.
- 3) Reassure the relevant public/private sector stakeholders & enlist their cooperation in mitigating the threat.
- 4) Ensure the U.S. has adequate sealift capability to respond to its national security needs.

#### Overview:

Three concurrent threats are impacting international shipping: 1) Malware (designated SEASIQ) infected three vessels leaving the Port of Long Beach (POLB); inventory systems at POLB & allegedly Tuas Mega report similar issues; 2) Unknown actor threatened a ransomware attack against shipping; 3) 20% - 25% increase in demand peak shipping season.

### **Intelligence Assessment:**

USB injection of malware means 1) The actor(s) placed the USB; 2) The actor(s) knew USB usage was necessary for loading vessels; or 3) Both.

## **Recommendation:**

The subsequent policy recommendations are nested - enacting a succeeding option includes the actions in the preceding option. These options increase in intensity and take increasingly defensive/precautionary measures in the event the situation deteriorates.. **We recommend moving forward with Policy Option 2 - Getting Ahead of SEASIQ.** 

# **Policy Option 1 - Information & Monitoring:**

- <u>Diplomatic</u>: Direct Sec. State through Embassy Beijing & ASEAN posts to provide information on the Chinese security increase; Direct Embassy Jerusalem to request assessment from Israeli government on Ipnos leak.
- <u>Intelligence</u>: DNI to mobilize all-source intelligence assets in the ASEAN region to assess 1) Extent of SEASIQ-induced damage; 2) Reasons for Chinese threat level increase; FBI to evaluate domestic intelligence concerning TPM especially size, structure, TTPs, & credibility of DarkNode thread.
- <u>Logistic</u>: Expand search for Vessel 3 using NRO, Navy/USGC; CISA to 1) Collaborate with LOBH on SEASIQ patching/ replacement strategy; 2) Issue consequent CVEs & TLP Notices; Mobilize maritime ISAC & domestic shipping stakeholders (including Port Authorities) to coordinate remedial actions.

## Strengths/Opportunities:

• Collects actionable intelligence.

### Weaknesses/Threats:

• Focuses only on remediation, not prevention.

## Policy Option 2 - Getting Ahead of SEASIQ:

- <u>DHS to lead an Interagency Task Force (ITF)</u>: To coordinate both public & private sector efforts on the investigation/ response to SEASIQ.
- <u>Diplomatic</u>: Expand contacts with key partners in ASEAN region to alert them of possible spreading malware & potential disruption to shipping logistics.
- <u>Logistic</u>: ITF to 1) perform forensic analysis on infected USB device to ascertain what actions the malware carries out, how
  it spreads, identify the C2 servers, & TTPs to obtain a comprehensive assessment of recommended remediation actions,
   2) coordinate with private sector to develop alternative methods to SEAFARER & how they could be implemented, & 3)
  communicate updates to relevant state & local governments.

#### Strengths/Opportunities:

• Mobilizes a cohesive "whole-of-government" response, which capitalizes on Agency/Department advantages.

#### Weaknesses/Threats:

 Keeps knowledge from the public, which poses a public relations risk.

# Policy Option 3 - All Hands on Deck:

- <u>Diplomatic</u>: Raise issue publicly with International Chamber of Shipping regarding remediation of SEASIQ; Introduce UNSC resolution condemning malware exploitation & request assistance of all UN Member States to investigate this incident & take actions to identify the perpetrator(s).
- <u>Logistic</u>: MARAD to activate at least half of the Strategic Reserve Sealift in anticipation that this incident is a precursor to hostilities; Sweep U.S. merchant fleet & defense maritime assets for SEASIQ signature.
- <u>Intelligence</u>: DNI to mobilize all-source intelligence assets to monitor known major threat actors to assess attribution & possible preparations for additional cyber exploitation.
- Private Sector: Direct CISA to urge the private sector to remove SEAFARER & migrate to a remedial system.