

Europe's Geostrategic Sovereignty and Turkey

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A more positive relationship between the European Union and Turkey is a decade-long project of advocates from all over Europe and across the Atlantic. Drawing on history, witnesses see how this relationship can be an excellent win-win algorithm, as much as it can rapidly turn out to be a lose-lose situation or even a triple win-or-lose equation—with political, economic, and social resonance reaching far beyond the Continent.

The challenge is to upload this historically well-tested algorithm into the twenty-first century: rebooting a version 5.0 of Turkey's European integration with updates on democratic conditionality, foreign policy cooperation, and an economic framework, as well as on the digital, green, and social dimensions.

The Turkey debate's focal point is "Europe's geostrategic sovereignty."¹ Turkey should evolve to be a net contributor to Europe's security and global

The **Atlantic Council in Turkey** aims to promote dialogue and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region through research, programming and high-level discussion forums to address critical issues around energy, economics, migration, and security.

1 The concepts of Europe's geostrategic sovereignty and strategic autonomy have been interchangeably referred to in an evolving debate since the late 2010s. Nathalie Tocci remarks that "autonomy, compared to sovereignty, is a condition rather than a set of attributes, although an entity with the attributes of sovereignty is presumably able to ensure its own autonomy. In other words, autonomy is a prerequisite of sovereignty." Nathalie Tocci, *European Strategic Autonomy: What It Is, Why We Need It, How to Achieve It*, Istituto Affari Internazionali, February 2021, <https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/european-strategic-autonomy-what-it-is-why-we-need-it-how-achieve-it>; see also Suzana Anghel, *Strategic Sovereignty for Europe*, European Parliamentary Research Service, September 2020, [www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/652069/EPRS_BRI\(2020\)652069_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/652069/EPRS_BRI(2020)652069_EN.pdf); Mario Telò, "The EU's Role in the World Should Be at the Center of the Conference on the Future of Europe," Carte blanche blog, Institut d'Etudes Européennes, Université Libre de Bruxelles, March 2021, www.iece-ulg.be/en/blog/highlights/conference-on-the-future-of-europe-eu-international-role; Mark Leonard and Jeremy Shapiro, eds., *Strategic Sovereignty: How Europe Can Regain the Capacity to Act*, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2019, https://ecfr.eu/archive/page/-/ecfr_strategic_sovereignty.pdf; Pierre Mirel and Xavier Mirel, *The Challenges and Constraints Facing a "Geopolitical Commission" in the Achievement of European Sovereignty*, Fondation Robert Schuman, European Issue 560 (2020), www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0560-the-challenges-and-constraints-facing-a-geopolitical-commission-in-the-achievement-of-european; and Ivan Krastev, "Thirty Years after the 'Fall of the Wall': Aspirations, Illusions, Harsh Realities and the Future of the EU's Strategic Standing," Institut du Bosphore - Paris, September 2019, <http://www.institut-bosphore.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/IBPolicyPaper2.pdf>.

competitiveness. No matter how significant today's drawbacks are, such as freedom of expression and tensions like the life-consuming Cyprus imbroglio, the guiding question for the EU ought to be: "how can Turkey, in the near future, become a country that is progressively in convergence with the values and interests of European citizens?" This includes citizens of the Turkish Republic as well.

In this respect, beyond the narrow scope of the EU-Turkey relationship's bilateral agenda, EU policies on Turkey may be filtered through the prisms of at least five major axes of change shaping Europe's global role.

"Five B Effects": Brussels, Biden, Berlin, Brexit, and Beijing

First and most consequential is the "**Brussels effect**."² Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU has continued to externalize regulations and standards outside its borders and will continue to do so. This unilateral globalization happens as a result of market mechanisms, competitive conditions, ever comprehensive trade agreements, and Europe's damaged but still effective global soft power. Indeed, how effectual would international norms on various fields such as human rights, child labor, antitrust, chemical substances, food safety, or data protection and privacy be if the EU did not promote and enforce them? While the EU is elaborating a comprehensive digital sovereignty strategy on the one hand, the European Green Deal has become yet another impactful EU policy with geostrategic effects. It is quintessential for the EU to become a global reference and standard-setter for the energy transition. Countries like Turkey must invest in clean energy technologies, promote sustainable cities, and comply with upcoming carbon footprint and clean energy investment requirements. The stakes are high for all sides to protect their competitiveness in the EU market and vis-à-vis third country rivals. Moreover, environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors increasingly are used to gauge the sustainability of an investment as a part of finance practices.

An example of a far-reaching Brussels effect is the EU-Turkey customs union. Thanks to its inclusion in the EU's customs union for industrial goods, Turkey is appreciably in compliance with single market regulations in several areas including competition, intellectual property rights, and consumer protection.³

Meanwhile, the European Commission in February 2020 set a trade strategy for the coming years.⁴ Reflecting the concept of open "strategic autonomy," the objective is economic recovery, whereas the main tools are green and digital transformation strategies. A renewed focus is projected on strengthening multilateralism and reforming global trade rules to ensure that they are fair and sustainable. The strategy prioritizes a major reform of the World Trade Organization, including global commitments on trade and climate, new rules for digital trade, reinforced rules to tackle competitive distortions, and restoring its system for binding dispute settlement. In a revitalized multilateral trade system, Turkey should move forward in its integration into Europe to keep a comparative advantage toward third countries.

The "**Biden effect**" is about the impact of new US leadership and the extent to which the forty-sixth US president is right in saying: "The transatlantic alliance is back."⁵ The Biden effect was felt on day one of the post-Trump era. The United States is back in the Paris Agreement on climate change and the World Health Organization. A new transatlantic partnership's tangible fields of progress have rapidly become a main theme for the chancelleries, business lobbies, and think tanks on both sides of the ocean. At the transatlantic system's core, NATO is falling behind global challenges.⁶ It needs budgetary readjustments and technological and institutional innovation. A stronger joint capacity in science, research, digital technologies, green energy, space programs, as well as policy coordination on issues ranging from Russia, Iran, and China to data privacy, cybersecurity, digital tax, and COVAX are all priorities for the transatlantic agenda.

2 On the EU's regulatory and policy soft power, see Anu Bradford, *The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World* (New York: Oxford University Press US, 2020); and Marise Cremona and Joanne Scott, eds., *EU Law Beyond EU Borders: The Extraterritorial Reach of EU Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

3 A recent example is the Turkish Parliament working on a draft law in view of aligning with Directive 2019/633 of the European Parliament and Council of April 17, 2019, on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships in agricultural and food supply, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019L0633>.

4 "Questions and Answers: An Open, Sustainable, and Assertive Trade Policy," European Commission website, February 18, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_21_645.

5 President Biden's comments were made during the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference in February.

6 The Atlantic Council, *NATO20/2020: Twenty Bold Ideas to Reimagine the Alliance after the 2020 US Election*, 2020, www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/NATO-20-2020-Twenty-bold-ideas-to-reimagine-the-alliance-after-the-2020-US-election.pdf.



European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel give a press conference at the end of first day of a two days video conference of the Members of the European Council on COVID-19 pandemic, in Brussels, Belgium February 25, 2021. Olivier Hoslet/Pool via REUTERS

More importantly, a sound and efficient US-EU partnership is the driving force for the “wider West.” Essentially, the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) gathers countries from the Americas, Europe, East Asia, and Oceania around common denominators in rule of law, economic governance, and social progress ideals. Liberal democracies need innovation as well, to deal

with populism’s conquest of the political center at home and disruptive authoritarian regimes abroad. The latter has been assertive in promoting a model of society which merges fear and conformism with technological surveillance, public health, and social protection; and inciting, eventually, a paradox of security versus liberty. Both US and EU officials admit the urgency to prepare together for long-

term strategic competition with China, defined explicitly as a contest between democracy and autocracy.⁷ On the other hand, as Rosa Balfour, director of Carnegie Europe, observed: “The United States and Europe will need to vigorously reform their democracies to counter the attractiveness of the authoritarian model, which has been promoted through rising geopolitical competition, and fireproof their relationship from further populist backlashes.”⁸

For Turkey, the “Biden effect” means to do what it takes to be back in the democratic orbit; to diffuse doubts about any leaning toward autocracy. A comprehensive constitutional reform on the rule of law, individual freedoms, and the judiciary is pressing. The European integration process is a determinant factor in this respect. Its conditionality, transformative power, and economic impact on Turkey are once again tools to strengthen transatlantic values and interests. On the diplomatic side, Ankara’s most imminent issue at stake is the readjustment of its loopy dealings with Russia on the S400 missiles. Meanwhile, Turkey will have to continue nourishing a sound partnership with Moscow on energy supply chains, Syria, Caucasus, tourism, and trade. Admittedly, this is a tough dilemma, yet an unavoidable challenge for Ankara, as well as for Washington and Brussels. Recalibrating Turkish foreign policy accordingly with the transatlantic alliance also is consequential in policy chapters such as Iran, Libya, Cyprus, Afghanistan, immigration, and terrorism.

The Biden era also compels Turkey to put an end to its self-exclusion from the Paris Agreement. This requires reckoning the cost of carbon dioxide reduction commitments, negotiating equitable financial schemes to support them, and translating all these efforts into green technologies and economy. In the medium term, another challenge will be to avoid exclusion from a possible new transatlantic trade and investment partnership (TTIP). As of 2017, when Trump’s term was beginning, business communities on both sides had made some progress in convincing governments to consider the cases of Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, and Turkey, as well as Canada and Mexico. A draft proposal to insert a docking mechanism to the TTIP deal for these countries, once an agreement is settled, is waiting for its moment to come.

Hence, in this historic turning point, Turkey’s alignment with the transatlantic relationship would firmly demonstrate the triple-win equation, boosting Turkey’s political and economic competitiveness as “the West’s Eurasian gateway,” amplifying the geography of the transatlantic policies, and expanding their impact in Europe’s neighborhood. “Indeed, aside from the quick fixes on which the EU and the United States can reach easy agreement,” said Balfour, “most other dossiers on which the two sides stand close to each other—from fighting the climate crisis and terrorism to engaging with the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, Turkey, and Iran—will call for convergence as well as trade-offs.”⁹ In the Munich cyber conference, President Biden argued that democracy was essential to meet today’s challenges, but warned it was under assault. “We have to prove that our model isn’t a relic of history,” he said, calling this moment an “inflection point.”¹⁰ Turkey is a parameter in this graph.

The “**Berlin effect**” on Brussels’s Turkey policy has always been proportional to its weight in the EU economy and policy making. Since 2005, a relatively constant factor in this equation had been Angela Merkel. After the September 2021 elections, Germany will add more variables into the European political and policy calculus. Throughout the *annus horribilis* of 2020, Merkel’s leadership set the stage for the EU to secure its landmark 750 billion euro recovery fund (\$888.9 billion) for member states and its 1.1 trillion euro budget. Other major achievements in the European Green Deal, digital sphere, vaccine cooperation, joint EU borrowing scheme, and immigration have enhanced her legacy.

These developments are all relevant for Turkey since the EU’s economic and public health have direct consequences on Turkey’s own. Merkel orchestrated a temporary appeasement following the Greco-Franco-Turkish confrontation in the Eastern Mediterranean in autumn 2020. This so-called positive agenda will either evolve, thanks to a post-Merkel Germany, or remain null and void. Certainly, a relative increase of Paris’s effect on Brussels, both in the EU and NATO headquarters, needs to be taken into account. The triangularity of the Ankara-Berlin-Paris axis will

7 Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center and the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), *Stronger Together: Strategy to Revitalize Transatlantic Power*, December 2020, www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-12/Transatlantic/StrongerTogether.pdf.

8 Rosa Balfour, *Working with the Biden Administration: Opportunities for the EU*, Carnegie Europe, January 2021, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/01/26/working-with-biden-administration-opportunities-for-eu-pub-83560>.

9 Balfour, *Working with the Biden Administration*.

10 The White House, “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference,” February 19, 2021, www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/19/remarks-by-president-biden-at-the-2021-virtual-munich-security-conference.

be magnified.¹¹ Turkey's trade, investment, tourism, social, and cultural relations with Germany have precedence; however, France is a strong No. 2, especially since the United Kingdom's recent departure from the EU.

The “**Brexit effect**” is about Europe's future in the 2020s and 2030s. In the shorter term, the urgent arrangement for Ankara is in order. A post-Brexit trade deal between Turkey and the UK has safeguarded in extremis more than 20 billion euros in business between the countries that now find themselves as two of the largest economies on the fringes of the European Union. Whereas the Brexit deal itself has several loopholes, especially concerning capital markets and regulatory harmonization, it has triggered an overall debate on Europe's future. Four scenarios continue to define the present analysis.¹²

1. *Europa mercātus*: the EU focuses on its role as a confederal trade power.
2. *Europa nostrum*: a federal political and economic union is the focus, as was envisioned by the founding generations.
3. *Europa progressio*: a combination of the previous two is pursued for a well-organized differentiated integration.
4. *Europa etcetera*: Europe continues to evolve without deepening or enlarging, and struggles both to revitalize its institutions through minor reforms and to instill confidence in its constituents and partners.

After Brexit, the prospect of a *Europa progressio*, a new European political architecture based on a variable geometry, is now gleaming with potential. An innovative project of institutional engineering with a progressive approach is possible. Brexit has accelerated the trend in Europe toward varying levels of integration, the possible end result being different circles of membership from a broad confederal Europe to a narrower, core federal eurozone. The latter's modest evolution took a new impetus with pandemic economics, resulting in the emergence of a genuine eurozone sovereign bond market. The European Commission is now pushing the agenda to reinforce the EU's economic and

monetary sovereignty in completing the banking union, making significant progress on the capital markets union, and improving the eurozone's governance. Yet, some EU members will remain outside this emerging core because of lack of political will or technical readiness. On the other hand, the UK is joining wider Europe's outer circle of non-EU European economies with particularly deep arrangements attaching them to the EU's economic space.

A legal instrument of flexibility for “enhanced cooperation” is inserted in Article Twenty in the treaties governing the EU, allowing willing member states to further integrate without others.¹³ A Europe of variable geometry already exists based on the eurozone's evolution, but also to a certain degree on the Schengen area, defense cooperation, and the ability to opt out of social policy.¹⁴ In the hypothesis of a better organized variable geometry, with an eventual continental confederal structure comprised of the federal core and the others in multiple axes and speeds of integration, the enlargement may become an easier topic to manage in national political discourse. Politicians in capitals such as Berlin, Paris, Rome, and The Hague would have rhetorical room for maneuver to argue that core Europe is not affected by new memberships to wider Europe, whereas this flexible form of enlargement is necessary to protect Europe's global interests and to promote its geostrategic sovereignty. “There will be no future for the EU without a strong and strategic link between the needed internal reforms and an enhanced international role for the Union,” argues Mario Telò, who adds: “Reorganizing the interplay with the near abroad is a priority for every would-be power: the Mediterranean area and Eastern Europe should be reorganized by a far-seeing EU's initiative for this great macroregional space, by concentric circles of cooperation and various degrees of cooperation with the hard core (the eurozone).”¹⁵

Meanwhile, this is not the right time to propose and negotiate a special status specifically for Turkey. Membership to the EU is not today's question. Turkey's politics and economics are in transition, and so is the European integration process. Moreover, without the clear democratic and

11 Michael Thumann, *Germany-Turkey-France: Strategic Relationship*, Berlin Bosphorus Initiative (BBI), February 2021; and Güven Sak, *Time for a Positive Agenda in EU-Turkey Relations. Start with the EU Green Deal*, BBI, February 2021, www.bbi-de.org/bbi-inbrief-series.

12 Bahadır Kaleagasi, “Four Scenarios for Europe's Future,” policy brief, German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), February 2013, bit.ly/KaleagasiEU.

13 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Part Two, Article Twenty, Official Journal of the European Union, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12016E020>.

14 Yves Bertoncini, *Differentiated Integration in the EU: A Variable Geometry Legitimacy*, Jacques Delors Institute, 2017, <https://institutdelors.eu/en/publications/differentiated-integration-in-the-eu-a-variable-geometry-legitimacy>.

15 Telò, “The EU's Role in the World.”

economic governance conditionality of the accession partnership process, the EU's transformative power would be diminished with adverse consequences for Turkey's economic and social stability, whose side effects may then rapidly cross the waters toward the EU. The bottom line is drawn by a need for political courage and leadership to explain to the European public that positive steps in the relationship with Turkey are not a gift to anyone: they are tools of action to protect European values, standards, and interests. The timing is now right; European populism is in a period of temporary hibernation.

The **"Beijing effect"** is horizontally present in every field and trend framing Europe's future, and thus Turkey's relations with the EU: trade, climate change, green technologies, digital infrastructure, cybersecurity, data protection, security, and vaccine diplomacy are among them. In particular, climate change and energy transition have become a matter of industrial and national security policy, as have data policies with their digital infrastructure, 5G telecoms equipment, and taxation components. Beijing's Fourteenth Five-Year Plan is projecting an impressive domestic decarbonization program. Its robust growth will continue to be fueled by the state capitalist model in leading global supply chains for new technologies. The EU's main trade partner is now China, replacing the United States, and 2020's last minute EU-China investment agreement will create even more interdependence. China's rise, because of the scale of its economy and military, the speed of its technological advancement, its human rights record in Xinjian, Tibet, and in Hong Kong, problems with Taiwan and in the South China Sea, and its alternative political model to Western liberal democracy, now impacts every major US national interest and Europe's geostrategic sovereignty.¹⁶

On its end, Turkey will have a double challenge: to reposition itself in a pivotal role for Beijing's new silk roads (via the Belt and Road Initiative), while also trying to benefit from the West's postpandemic trends: diversification and "near-shoring" of global value chains in trade, logistics, services, finance, tourism, technology, data, health products and services.¹⁷ In this respect, proximity matters. Proximity to the transatlantic economy—geographic, but also political and regulatory—is a determinant for Turkey's international

position as Eurasia's economic hub; not only for Western economic actors, but also in the eyes of Chinese companies and other markets around the world.

Problems? Tensions?

Political tensions between Turkey and the EU are real, challenging, and harmful. However, nonconstructive policies of engagement also are part of the problem. They have been stimulated by years of ever weaker partnership, deadlocks, prejudices, and policy errors from both sides. Thus, we cannot find in more negative policies—blocking, suspending, or sanctioning different aspects of the EU-Turkey relationship—a relevant solution to contemporary problems. As Albert Einstein would have said: "Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results."

Excluding Turkey from Europe has been very costly for citizens of both the EU and Turkey. If Turkey had been deeply, skillfully engaged—on issues such as foreign policy, rule of law, refugees, economic growth and energy policy—when the open-ended accession negotiations began in 2005, the sequel today would be much different. Including Turkey would have strengthened the EU as a global power and would have contributed to the development of Turkey as a European democracy in convergence with European values and interests.¹⁸ The EU's Turkey policy has been a failure.

EU-Turkey 5.0

Thinking in terms of Europe's own geostrategic sovereignty includes policies of engaging Turkey. The EU has significant soft power which it has proven consistently successful in using: accession chapters, in particular chapters twenty-three and twenty-four, which cover fundamental rights, justice, and freedoms.

Over a decade ago, then EU Commissioner Olli Rehn warned: "We need to apply rigorous conditionality. Experience shows that the better the new member states are prepared, the smoother the EU functions after enlargement. Difficult issues, such as judicial reform and the fight against corruption, must be addressed at an early stage of the negotiations."¹⁹

16 Richard Higgott and Simon Reich, *Hedging by Default: EU "Strategic Autonomy" in Binary World Order*, LSE IDEAS: Europe Program: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2020, www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/reports/LSE-IDEAS-Hedging-by-Default.pdf.

17 Near-shoring refers to the practice of bringing outsourced activities closer to the home economy.

18 Bahadır Kaleagasi, "EU and Turkey: Time to Act," Euractiv, 2016, www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/opinion/eu-and-turkey-time-to-act.

19 European Parliament, "Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006: The Institutional Aspects of the European Union's Capacity to Integrate the New Member States," Debate of December 13, 2006, www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20061213+ITEM-004+DOC+XML+V0//EN.



The potential for a successful modernization of the EU-Turkey customs union also is an important asset for the EU. Progress on the customs union would involve the extension of the model to include services, agriculture, public procurement, and dispute settlement mechanisms. This needs to be a twenty-first century version partnership, a customs union 5.0 which also covers the EU's new "Industry 5.0" vision, the European digital single market,²⁰ the European

Green Deal,²¹ and more broadly Turkey's commitment to converge with the EU's Sustainable Development Goals policies. Meanwhile, the pandemic-triggered changes that are worth reemphasizing in the global supply chains in trade, services, logistics, tourism, finance, technology, and data mobility highlight the importance of the proximity factor: being closer to the EU is important. Another "B effect" enters the picture at this point: business. Europe's most

20 European Commission, "Shaping Europe's Digital Future: The European Digital Strategy," Commission webpage, accessed on March 2021, <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/content/european-digital-strategy>.

21 European Commission, "A European Green Deal: Striving to Be the First Carbon-neutral Continent, Commission webpage, accessed on March 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en.

representative and influential voice of the private economy, BusinessEurope, The Confederation of European Business, lists the EU-Turkey customs union's modernization among its key proposals to EU institutions and governments in view of a postpandemic economic recovery.²²

Reengaging with Turkey also would propel convergence on various foreign policy topics such as Cyprus, the Northern Mediterranean, the fight against terrorism, and management of the refugee crisis. "In a nutshell, bringing the modernization of the customs union to the negotiation table provides the EU with the opportunity to capitalize on Turkey's continued interest in the matter. It will help Europe to establish a rules-based communicative space where the EU and Turkey can negotiate their positions. As such, the EU can contribute to the de-escalation of the present conflicts with Turkey without jeopardizing Ankara's cooperation. Moreover, resocializing Turkey back into diplomatic circles may help Europe convince Turkey to abide by agreements."²³

It's Democracy . . .

Globalization prompts increased mobility and prosperity to human civilization, but also stimulates us to be more innovative to deal with global viruses of all kinds: biological, digital, and financial; the disinformation virus contaminating our democracies; and also the viruses of terrorism, organized crime, corruption, and unemployment. Most importantly, the CO₂ virus endangers the human civilization.²⁴ In this context, Europe's future is marked by existential questions. Shall European states ultimately commit to a prerequisite level of coherence and solidarity to craft the EU's new global role? Will there be agreement to transfer more effective economic policy competences from member states to the EU's supranational level? How can Europe continue to

generate soft power for a more democratic, greener, human-centric, and safer world? Turkey can be a part of the answer for these questions. The only realistic strategy for Turkey's global competitiveness is to reposition itself as the West's Eurasian gateway of democracy, economic dynamism, and social progress.

The EU's capitals, including Athens and Nicosia, can either be idealistic or realistic. However, both ways of thinking point toward more benefits from reengaging Turkey in the European integration process, including conditionalities on concluding, not initiating, different phases such as a modernized customs union. Maybe there also is a third way: extreme and short-sighted populism. There is enough historical evidence to argue that the more Turkey will be excluded from the EU's sphere of influence, the more it will become part of the problems which in turn nourish populist demagoguery and threats to Western democracy. In the end, the main purpose of all these thoughts and recommendations is the search for a better twenty-first century democracy.

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22 BusinessEurope, *Proposals for a European Economic Recovery Plan*, April 30, 2020, www.busseurope.eu/sites/buseur/files/media/position_papers/businessseurope_recovery_plan_final_30_04_2020_v2.pdf.

23 Sinem Adar, Nicola Bilotta, Aurélien Denizeau, Sinan Ekim, Dorothee Schmid, Günter Seufert, Ilke Toygür, and Karol Wasilewski, "Customs Union: Old Instrument, New Function in EU-Turkey Relations," *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP Comment*, 48 (October 2020), www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2020C48_CustomsUnionEU_Turkey.pdf.

24 Bahadır Kaleagasi, "Global Viruses and Goals," *Analyses website, Institut des Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS)*, 2020, www.iris-france.org/148215-global-viruses-and-goals.



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