

SCOWCROFT CENTER FOR STRATEGY AND SECURITY

# NUCLEAR STRATEGY PROJECT

# The Scowcroft Center's namesake, General Brent Scowcroft,

was the chairman of the 1983 Scowcroft Commission that established the foundation for US nuclear deterrence and arms control policy through the present day. As the United States enters a new era of strategic challenges, the Scowcroft Center's *Forward* Defense program is proud to play a central role in crafting an effective and nonpartisan strategic forces strategy and policy for the twenty-first century.

The 2022 National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review caution that the United States will, for the first time in its history, face the challenge of simultaneously deterring two nuclear great powers, each with aggressive revisionist goals. Our Nuclear Strategy Project, within the *Forward* Defense program, focuses on the role of nuclear deterrence, nuclear strategy and employment, missile defense, and arms control in deterring conventional aggression and nuclear escalation against the United States, its allies, and partners.



#### Nuclear strategy



Shape US nuclear strategy and implications for extended deterrence, allied assurance, and nuclear escalation.

Inform the national and international debate concerning potential changes in nuclear strategy and nuclear force structure.

Assess the changing requirements for extended deterrence and assurance of allies under nuclear tripolarity.

#### **Arms control**



Understand and shape the changing nature of and role for arms control in the new trilateral security environment.

Assess the relationship between US nuclear deterrence requirements and nuclear arms control to inform US negotiating positions for a potential future arms control framework.

#### **Missile defense**



Shape the relationship between homeland missile defense and US nuclear strategy as it relates to North Korea, Iran, Russia, and China.

Anticipate and inform the national and international debate on new technologies for missile defense and their implications for strategic stability.

#### **Emerging threats**



Assess the implications of new threats and technologies for US nuclear deterrence and strategy.

Understand and assess which threats have the greatest potential for affecting the military balance and nuclear deterrence.



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# On US nuclear and missile defense strategy and policy



Robert Soofer and Matthew Costlow, "<u>US homeland missile</u> <u>defense: Room for expanded roles</u>," November 15, 2023.



Keir Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "US strategy and force posture for an era of nuclear tripolarity," May 1, 2023.



John R. Harvey and Robert Soofer, "<u>Strengthening</u> <u>deterrence with SLCM-N</u>," November 5, 2022.

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John Harvey and Robert Soofer, "<u>Nuclear priorities for the Biden</u> administration," December 15, 2021.

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-	Missile Defense: The End of the Interim Solution	

Patrick O'Reilly, "<u>Missile defense:</u> <u>The end of the interim solution</u>," December 14, 2021.



Matthew Kroenig and Mark J. Massa, "<u>Are dual-capable weapon</u> systems destabilizing? Questioning nuclear-conventional entanglement and inadvertent escalation," June 16, 2021.



Matthew Kroenig, Mark J. Massa, and Christian Trotti, "<u>The downsides</u> <u>of downsizing: Why the United</u> <u>States needs four hundred ICBMs</u>," March 29, 2021.

# SELECT RESEARCH PRODUCTS

# **On deterring Russia**



Matthew Kroenig, "<u>A strategy for</u> <u>deterring Russian de-escalation</u> <u>strikes</u>," April 24, 2018.





## **On deterring North Korea**



<u>countering North Korea's advancing</u> <u>nuclear threat</u>," December 23, 2021.

Markus Garlauskas, "Proactively

Gregory Weaver, "<u>The role of</u> <u>nuclear weapons in a Taiwan crisis</u>," November 22, 2023.

### **On arms control**



"<u>Requirements for nuclear</u> deterrence and arms control in a two-nuclear-peer environment," February 2, 2024.

Greg Weaver and Amy Woolf,

Control C

Matthew Kroenig, "<u>Arms racing</u> <u>under nuclear tripolarity: Evidence</u> for an action-reaction cycle?" December 20, 2022.

# **On deterring China**



Matthew Kroenig, "<u>Deterring</u> <u>Chinese strategic attack:</u> <u>Grappling with the implications</u> <u>of China's strategic forces buildup</u>," November 2, 2021.

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# **New Atlanticist articles**

Robert Soofer and Walter B. Slocombe "<u>Congress</u> should fund the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile," *New Atlanticist*, August 3, 2023.

Robert Soofer, "<u>Before embarking on arms control</u> <u>talks, Biden needs a nuclear deal with Congress,</u>" *New Atlanticist*, June 14, 2023.

Matthew Kroenig\_"<u>How to deter Russian nuclear</u> <u>use in Ukraine--and respond if deterrence fails</u>," *Atlantic Council Memo to the President*, **September 16, 2022**.

Matthew Kroenig, Mark J. Massa, and Alyxandra Marine "<u>To decipher Putin's nuclear threats, watch</u> <u>what he does—not what he says</u>," *New Atlanticist*, **March 4, 2022**.

Alexander Vershbow, "<u>The case for extending New</u> <u>START</u>," *New Atlanticist*, **February 5, 2020**.

## **KEY STAFF AND FELLOWS**

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