By Lt Col Tyson Wetzel and Barry Pavel

Faced with the shocking images of Russian military forces indiscriminately shelling civilians across Ukraine, Western countries are under mounting pressure to find new ways to help Ukrainians defend themselves. As the Atlantic Council’s military fellows concluded in their latest assessment, Russian forces—despite seriously stumbling during their first week of combat in Ukraine—still pose a perilous threat as the Kremlin’s invasion proceeds.

While the Biden administration is working closely with NATO allies and European partners to respond to the invasion diplomatically and economically—as well as pledging billions of dollars in military aid to Ukraine—many analysts also are advocating specific ideas for how Western leaders can “do more” to bolster Kyiv’s defenses. Clearly, if the United States and its allies and partners are going to increase their support for Ukraine, it must happen immediately. But such action also must be carefully considered, and its relative benefits in terms of effectiveness must be weighed against the potential risks of escalating the conflict to a war between Russia and NATO.

With that in mind, on March 3 the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security conducted a survey of thirty-seven national security experts, including a former ambassador to Russia and top NATO official, former senior officials at the US National Security Council and Defense Department, retired and active-duty military personnel, and experts across the Atlantic Council. We asked them to evaluate eleven options, all primarily military in nature, that the United States and NATO could take to strengthen Ukraine’s defenses. The result is a strategic risk calculator for policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic to assess the possible risks and benefits of boosting their military assistance to the Ukrainian government.

Our approach

We presented our survey respondents with eleven options that span humanitarian assistance, the transfer of military equipment to Ukraine, and even covert and overt military actions within the country. The description of each option included a basic concept of operations and purpose.

These options were evaluated on two criteria:

Military effectiveness

Defined as the chance that the option helps prevent the collapse of the Ukrainian military, using the following assessment score:

Military effectiveness evaluation
Score	Effect
0	No/Virtually no military effect
1	Limited military effect
2	Moderate military effect
3	Significant military effect

Risk of escalation

Defined as the chance that the option leads to a direct NATO-Russia armed conflict, using the following assessment score:

Categorization of risk
Score	Effect
0	No/Virtually no risk of escalation
1	Limited risk of escalation
2	Moderate risk of escalation
3	High risk of escalation

For every option, we calculated the average score across all survey respondents on the effectiveness and escalation measures. Based on how each option scored on these measures, we then gave it an overall designation of “significantly positive,” “slightly positive,” “neutral,” “slightly negative,” or “significantly negative.” We calculated this “net rating” by subtracting the average effectiveness score by the average escalation score as a proxy for the balance our experts felt the option struck between offering effective support for Ukraine and managing the risks of escalation. We also asked survey respondents to rank each option using these two criteria and offered them the opportunity to provide additional comments describing their assessment and recommendations for improving or modifying the option. Our results are plotted in our “effectiveness versus risk” matrix below:

The best options

• The experts we surveyed assessed the transfer of UAVs to Ukraine as the most effective option relative to the risks of escalation.
• Our respondents identified the transfer of electronic-warfare equipment, counter-fire systems, and the CIWS and Iron Dome air-defense systems as the next most advantageous options.
• Any actions that involved US or NATO personnel deploying to conduct operations inside Ukraine, even humanitarian operations, were rated as relatively more escalatory than militarily effective, with the riskiest being SOF operations.
• The no-fly-zone option was clearly identified as the one most likely to lead to NATO-Russia conflict—with all respondents saying it would entail a significant risk of escalation.
• Most notable among the humanitarian options: The Lviv airlift was rated as moderately effective with only a moderate risk of escalation. But our narrow instructions to respondents to focus on the military effects of this option overlooked its broader potential benefits in terms of supporting Ukraine’s valiant efforts to defend itself: If successful, such a move could not only provide humanitarian benefits but also have a significant deterrent effect on Russian military forces—and potentially even offer a safe haven if Kyiv is overrun.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.