Since taking office in early 2025, US President Donald Trump has pursued a novel and aggressive tariff policy. Despite multiple legal rulings challenging the statutory authorities used to construct this tariff regime, the administration has remained committed to maintaining a broad protectionist “tariff wall.” This tracker monitors the evolution of these measures and provides expert analysis of the legal authorities the administration has used—and may continue to use—to impose tariffs.
Targeted economies: The evolution of the tariff wall
As the Trump administration rolls out its proposed Section 301 tariffs, we’ll keep track of the evolution of this new regime with two maps. The first shows how “reciprocal tariffs,” implemented under the now-blocked mandate of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), have given way to a universal 10 percent rate under Section 122. The second map covers Section 301 remedies as they pertain to individual countries.
- Trump’s tariff regime faces judicial scrutiny
- On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court ruled that IEEPA does not authorize the president to impose tariffs. The decision invalidated the April 2025 “Liberation Day” reciprocal tariffs, as well as the fentanyl-related tariffs imposed on imports from China, Mexico, and Canada. US Customs and Border Protection has since begun processing court-mandated refunds of IEEPA tariffs.
- In response, the administration invoked Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose a 10 percent across-the-board import surcharge on goods from nearly all countries for 150 days. On May 7, 2026, the Court of International Trade ruled against the Section 122 tariffs, though the decision is under appeal and tariffs continue to be collected. Unless extended by Congress, the Section 122 authority will expire on July 24, 2026.
- As a result, the administration has moved to reconstruct the tariff wall through an expanded use of Sections 301 and 232. While existing Section 232 tariffs remain in place, it has launched two major Section 301 investigations aimed at maintaining what officials describe as “virtually unchanged tariff revenue” in 2026:
- A Section 301 investigation into structural manufacturing overcapacity covering sixteen countries and more than 75 percent of US imports
- A Section 301 investigation into forced-labor enforcement practices across sixty economies, covering nearly all US imports.
Recent events timeline
Targeted sectors
Section 232 national security tariffs have become a central pillar of the Trump administration’s tariff wall. Click on each sector to learn about the current status of the tariffs and what they mean. Then, scroll to the second slide to see the scope of imports affected by each sector’s tariffs.
Exempt commodities
Imports exempt from newly proposed Section 301 tariffs, sized by 2025 import value
Legal authorities used for the administration’s tariff policies
Section 301
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 gives the US Trade Representative (USTR) the authority to investigate foreign trade practices that violate trade agreements or disadvantage US commerce. If an investigation affirms unfair foreign trade practices, the executive branch can then respond with a range of trade measures, including suspending or withdrawing the benefits of a trade agreement, including the imposition of import tariffs.
This investigation process can begin with a petition that any person can file, or USTR itself will initiate a case. USTR must request consultations with the foreign government in question to attempt to address the grievances. A “Section 301 Committee,” which is part of the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC), reviews the petitions and conducts public hearings, to then report findings and provide recommendations to the TPSC. The USTR must make a determination within twelve months after an investigation begins but can make a determination earlier. Section 301 tariffs expire after four years unless USTR decides to extend them
Section 232
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 gives the Commerce Department the authority to investigate if the quantity or circumstances of specific imports are a risk to national security. If the investigation finds there is a risk, the president must then respond and can do so by imposing tariffs or quotas. National security risks are defined broadly and can include a projected future risk to capacity or defense capabilities.
While any interested party can initiate a Section 232 investigation, the president, agency heads, or Commerce itself have initiated investigations (although this method has been little used until the previous Trump administration). Commerce has 270 days to report to the president on whether the imports pose a national security risk, but, in some cases, Commerce will complete the report more quickly. There is no termination date at which Section 232 actions expire.
Section 122
Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 gives the President the authority to deal with “large and serious” balance-of-payments deficits through imposing temporary import tariffs up to 15% ad valorem. If such duties are insufficient, the President may also use import quotas. These measures can remain in place for 150 days, unless extended by Congress.
Actions taken under this authority must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner and should aim to maintain the existing distribution of trade. However, the President can target specific countries by exempting one or more countries that are not of concern, specifically those that do not have large or persistent balance-of-payments surpluses with the United States.
Following the Supreme Court decision striking down IEEPA tariffs, Trump invoked Section 122. On May 7 2026, the Court of International Trade ruled that the Trump administration’s use of Section 122 authority to impose broad across-the-board tariffs exceeded the statute’s limits. That decision, however, remains under appeal, and the tariffs remain in effect pending further court action.
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) (struck down)
During national emergencies, the president can invoke the National Emergencies Act (50 USC Ch. 34), which grants the president the authority to declare a national emergency and terminate existing emergencies. This gives the White House unique powers to deal with crises, including the use of IEEPA.
IEEPA gives the executive the power to “investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit” a range of financial actions, including importation and exportation of property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The president must declare the emergency to Congress and publish it in the Federal Register and must subsequently report every six months on the actions taken to alleviate the emergency. Trump invoked IEEPA, among other authorities, to impose new tariffs on goods imports from China, Mexico, and Canada. He subsequently extended IEEPA’s tariff application to his April 2025 “Liberation Day” proclamation, imposing reciprocal, country-specific tariffs on most US trading partners. That authority was extinguished when the Supreme Court held 6–3 in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump (February 20, 2026) that IEEPA’s power to “regulate importation” does not encompass the imposition of tariffs—a core congressional taxing power requiring explicit statutory delegation that IEEPA does not provide.
Historically, the majority of actions under IEEPA have been directed at blocking foreign transactions or freezing assets, and the use of IEEPA to levy import tariffs is unprecedented. The closest precedent is President Richard Nixon’s imposition of tariffs in 1971 under the Trading with the Enemy Act, which IEEPA amended in 1977. From 1977 to 2022, presidents have invoked IEEPA for sixty-seven different national emergencies.
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Acknowledgements
Author: Sophia Busch, Madeline Chalecki
Contributions from: Saddat Nazir, Charles Wheelock, and Matt Geraci
The research team would like to acknowledge Elizabeth Baltzan, Daniel Mullaney, and Barbara C. Matthews for their feedback on this project.
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