JERUSALEM—Five and a half years after the signing of the Abraham Accords, four years after the establishment of the Negev Forum, and two and a half years after the October 7 Hamas terrorist attack and the subsequent war in Gaza, some argue that regional integration has run out of steam.
There is no doubt that the process faces serious challenges. Much of the region is focused, appropriately, on recovery in Gaza through implementation of phase two of US President Donald Trump’s twenty-point plan. Israel will hold elections later this year, prompting many actors to wait for the outcome. A disruptive rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) threatens to divide the region into competing camps and has been accompanied by troubling anti-Israeli rhetoric from Saudi influencers.
Yet I believe that careful implementation of Trump’s Gaza plan and expanded regional integration can be mutually reinforcing and advance US, Israeli, and regional interests. As we await the outcome of further US-Iran talks—and potentially renewed military escalation—Iran and its Axis of Resistance are weakened but not defeated. That reality underscores the importance of strengthening the coalition of Israel and moderate Arab states, all US partners, that seek a more stable and prosperous region.
In the immediate aftermath of October 7, 2023, many assumed regional integration was finished. In some respects, it was frozen. But continued work through the final year of the Biden administration and the first year of the second Trump administration demonstrated that regional leaders understand that fragmentation will not deliver prosperity.
The clearest example came on April 14, 2024, when a coalition of regional states, operating through US Central Command, helped defend Israel from a massive Iranian attack. Even as diplomatic tracks stalled, defense integration advanced—making all partners more secure.
As late as May 2024, the United States and Saudi Arabia had nearly finalized bilateral agreements, including a mutual defense treaty, intended to accompany Saudi-Israeli normalization following a cease-fire and hostage release. Although that normalization did not materialize, Trump has continued to press for expansion of the Abraham Accords—recruiting Kazakhstan, prioritizing discussions with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and encouraging Indonesia to take steps toward a relationship with Israel.
The focus should shift from headline normalization announcements to building durable regional architecture.
The cease-fire and hostage deal this past October, which brought all remaining hostages home, created an opportunity to turn the end of the war into a launching pad for a better regional future.
Here are several recommendations for US and Israeli policy to support these efforts:
First, phase two of the Gaza plan must move forward, and that requires, first and foremost, Hamas’s disarmament. Everything else depends on disarmament. Israelis are understandably wary of Qatar’s and Turkey’s roles. Yet they remain the actors with the leverage to pressure Hamas, as they did on hostage releases. That will require sustained US pressure on their leadership.
Simultaneously, the technocratic Palestinian leadership committee must be given the space to govern, deliver for Gaza’s population, and demonstrate to Israelis that Gaza can become a peaceful neighbor. As Hamas is disarmed, an international stabilization force—composed of several thousand pledged troops from Arab and Muslim states—could deploy under US Central Command leadership. The appointment of Special Envoy Nickolay Mladenov to lead implementation of phase two is encouraging, as he has proven credibility with Israel, Palestinians, the United States, and key regional players.
Israel will also need to fulfill its responsibilities as conditions permit. It should withdraw the Israel Defense Forces from areas of Gaza they continue to hold, accept point nineteen of Trump’s plan calling for a credible pathway to a Palestinian state, and enable a reformed Palestinian Authority to play a role in post-Hamas governance.
Discussion of Palestinian statehood is of course difficult for Israelis after the October 7 attacks. But a credible pathway need not replicate Oslo-era efforts, and it will take considerable time. Moreover, sustaining such a pathway is essential to turning Gaza’s recovery into a vehicle for broader Israeli-Arab integration. Reconstruction must be realistic, not utopian—Gaza is not going to look like Dubai—and deradicalization efforts should draw on successful Arab-led models from across the region.
Still, the Board of Peace structure remains a concern, given questions about the stewardship of funding and its seeming prioritization of control by Trump, while key partners such as European democracies are not participating.
Second, Israeli policy in the West Bank must avoid creating obstacles to Gaza implementation or deeper Arab cooperation. Unfortunately, it is doing the opposite. Policies that resemble de facto annexation—through unchecked settlement expansion, expanded land control, or weakening the Palestinian Authority—damage the environment for regional integration. Unchecked violence by Israeli extremists against Palestinian civilians is equally harmful, even as Palestinian terror remains a real threat. Israeli authorities must get control of it, and the United States should speak clearly about it.
Third, although Gaza implementation, Israeli elections, and the Saudi-UAE rift present short-term challenges, integration should not pause. Instead, efforts in 2026 should be steady and low-profile, laying the groundwork for breakthroughs in 2027. The focus should shift from headline normalization announcements to building durable regional architecture.
The Negev Forum—the first multilateral platform linking Israel and Arab states across working groups on water, tourism, energy, health, education, and security—should be revived and expanded to include Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and others, perhaps initially as observers. Over time, the ambition could be an Association of Southeast Asian Nations–style regional organization for the Middle East and North Africa. My colleagues at the Atlantic Council and I discussed such opportunities with regional partners and the Munich Security Conference earlier this month.
Syria and Lebanon, which were previously outside of integration discussions, are now potential candidates for nonbelligerence agreements with Israel, after which there would be room to explore their participation in regional forums.
Planning should also continue for the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC), with states investing in infrastructure on their own territory while preparing for broader connectivity.
Finally, partnerships beyond the Middle East should deepen. Frameworks such as I2U2, made up of India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States, should consider expanding to include additional partners—Ethiopia, Greece, Cyprus, Azerbaijan, and Indonesia—broadening the strategic and economic base of integration.