Seven things to know about the potential for resumed Iran nuclear negotiations

Following a massive military buildup in the Gulf, US President Donald Trump now appears to be pivoting toward negotiations with Iran. White House envoy Steve Witkoff and the president’s son-in-law Jared Kushner are tentatively scheduled to meet with Iranian officials in Istanbul later this week. The foreign ministers of Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan are also expected to attend the summit. At first glance, this seems to indicate that the Trump administration will delay striking Iran, but lots of questions remain. Here are seven things to know about potential Iran nuclear negotiations: 

1. This is not necessarily a clear pivot to diplomacy: Prospective talks don’t mean that Trump won’t strike Iran in the future. Last June, the United States struck Iran’s military sites two days before a new round of nuclear negotiations was scheduled to take place. Perhaps this is once again an elaborate setup to keep Iran off-balance or a chance to seek massive concessions before reverting to strikes if talks fail to achieve the desired outcome. The inclusion of regional foreign ministers indicates that this will likely not be an intimate or technical negotiation.
2. Military risks may outweigh elusive rewards: If this is a pivot away from a potential conflict, Trump has likely determined that his military options aren’t worth the risk. His reported options don’t have a clearly defined objective, probably wouldn’t tangibly help Iranian protesters at this point, and risk unknown regional implications. Perhaps most importantly, the administration has signaled that it doesn’t know what comes next if the regime falls. Uncertainty regarding the longer-term outcome has led many regional partners to actively lobby Trump against the strikes and facilitate a diplomatic off-ramp.
3. There may not be a deal to be made: There are conflicting reports about what negotiations may entail. Last month, Witkoff stated that Iran would need to permanently end enrichment, impose significant constraints on its missile program, and cease support for its proxies. These are probably still the long-term goals, but Trump has been more circumspect, returning to his initial 2025 position that Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon. As for Iranian leaders, they are continuing their long-standing position that talks should only focus on their nuclear program.
   
   At one point, it appeared that Iran planned to propose handing over its stockpile of 60 percent highly enriched uranium (HEU) to a third party such as Turkey.  Although Iran has since publicly wavered on this point, this is the same concession discussed at the United Nations General Assembly in September to avoid the “snapback” provision of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231. The United States and Europe rejected the offer in September. However, if off-loading Iranian HEU is coupled with a continued suspension of Iranian enrichment and restores access for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, it will be a notable achievement. Iran’s HEU is arguably its most significant piece of remaining nuclear leverage, and IAEA access is critical to ensuring that Iran does not covertly attempt a nuclear breakout.
   
   Of course, the specific details of a potential arrangement will be extremely important. We do not know what Iran is asking for in return. Furthermore, the IAEA must be able to account for all 440 kilograms of HEU that it was tracking in advance of the strikes on Iran’s nuclear program in June.
4. Many nations have tried mediating this dispute, with limited success: Turkey is the latest in a long line of well-meaning mediators. In the past few years, Oman, Qatar, Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Switzerland, Norway, France, the E3 (France, the United Kingdom, and Germany), France (by itself), and the European Union have all attempted to facilitate and mediate negotiations between Iran and the United States. In the case of Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s close relationship with Trump is a clear benefit. However, this is not Turkey’s first attempt at mediating the Iran nuclear issue. In 2010, Turkey attempted to engineer a deal around the Tehran Research Reactor that left all sides unsatisfied. Regardless, the fact that Iran continues to insist on a mediator and to avoid direct talks with the United States is a major concern and shows both a lack of Iranian seriousness and an unwillingness to make meaningful concessions.
5. This will not sit well with Iranian protesters: There is no sugarcoating that many Iranian protesters will see talks as a significant disappointment. Trump’s January 2 post offering support and protection to Iranian protesters had a significant impact on the trajectory of the protests, adding fervor and bringing more people to the streets. In the aftermath of Iran’s brutal crackdown on its people, many Iranians expected Trump to deliver a miracle. While this was likely an unreasonable expectation, this scenario has parallels to Hungary in 1956 and Iraq in 1991, where the United States called for the people to rise up but did little, and the protesters were brutally crushed.
6. Negotiations are a short-term win for Iran… Returning to negotiations is undoubtedly a short-term win for Iran. Eric Brewer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative nailed it when he noted: “Not to say that Iran feels safe or confident in its position, but I have to imagine it’s pretty stoked that just a few weeks after massacring thousands of its citizens, the conversation has returned to nuclear diplomacy and the disposition of its highly enriched uranium.”
7. …but do little to impact the Islamic Republic’s long-term trajectory: However, the benefits of negotiations or even a small deal will be temporary and will not address the systemic problems that led to Iranian protests in the first place. The Iranian economy is still in shambles. Iran is still facing an existential water crisis, and Iran’s decades of investment in its nuclear program and axis of resistance are virtually worthless. To address these failures, Iran must radically change its foreign policy and how it interacts with its own people. There is no indication the current regime is willing to do that.

As an analyst who has advocated against negotiating during the protests and warned about the downsides of a strike on Iran, I have mixed emotions about the reported negotiations. I am extremely skeptical about the utility of a military strike on Iran. There are also important nonproliferation benefits that could potentially be gained from a transactional agreement, especially if they come at a low cost in terms of sanctions relief. However, there are significant reasons to be skeptical of a diplomatic breakthrough. Most importantly, the fact that negotiations are coming in the aftermath of a brutal crackdown in which Iran massacred thousands of its people is extremely disconcerting, and there is no avoiding that reality.