What the world thinks of Trump’s return to the US presidency
What happens in the United States doesn’t stay in the United States. The consequences of President-elect Donald Trump’s victory on Tuesday will radiate across the globe. To get on-the-ground insight into how people are reacting to the results of the 2024 US elections in different countries, we turned to our global network of staff and fellows. Embark on your world tour below.
Many Ukrainians see Trump’s victory as a risk to US support for Kyiv
KYIV—Prior to the US election, Ukrainians were anxiously contemplating the possibilities, fully aware that US assistance is indispensable for their country’s struggle against Russian aggression. Ukrainians were assessing each candidate on how strongly and consistently they would support Ukraine, if at all.
Many Ukrainians look at Trump with suspicion because of his well-known doubts about continuing assistance to Ukraine and especially because of his “peace plan” for ending the war, details of which were revealed by his running mate and severely criticized by Ukrainian media. Here in Ukraine, this plan is viewed as hostile to Ukraine’s national interests and playing into the hands of Russian President Vladimir Putin. There is also a fear that Trump will exert pressure on Ukrainian leadership to make major concessions to Russia to advance his “peace” initiative. So many Ukrainians perceive his election as posing a risk to continuing US support for Ukraine.
However, there is also a general understanding that Ukraine has no other choice but to work with the president chosen by American voters. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy indeed congratulated Trump for his election victory soon after it was called. He referred to Trump’s “peace through strength” approach as being able to contribute to a “just” peace in Ukraine.
It remains to be seen if Putin’s aggression and intransigence will have a sobering effect on Trump and lead him to reconsider his stance on the Russia-Ukraine war.
—Oleh Shamshur is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former Ukrainian ambassador to the United States.
The second Trump presidency will be a “leap into the unknown” for Ukraine in its fight against Russia
KYIV—There was an unmistakable sense of foreboding in Kyiv on the morning when Ukrainians woke to news of Trump’s election victory. The US president-elect has long been viewed by many in Ukraine as a somewhat unpredictable ally with a record of both backing Ukraine and publicly questioning US support for the country. There are now widespread concerns that once he returns to the White House, Trump may reduce or end military aid to Ukraine entirely. Some also fear that he could pressure the country’s leaders into an unfavorable peace deal that would reward Russia while leaving Ukraine in a perilous position.
Not all Ukrainians share this pessimistic perspective, with a significant number expressing hopes that Trump can reinvigorate international efforts to counter the Kremlin. Frustration has been mounting for some time over what is widely perceived as the Biden administration’s excessive caution in relation to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has translated into slow weapons deliveries and restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. Some believe Trump will adopt a bolder stance toward Russia as he prepares to negotiate with Putin from a position of strength. They recognize that a second Trump presidency is a leap into the unknown and a huge gamble, but see this as preferable to slowly bleeding out as a result of the inadequate aid Ukraine has been receiving from the Biden White House.
—Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.
Is this an opportunity for Europe to “grow up” and be more independent?
BRUSSELS—Here, the “man on the street” and mainstream media are surprised but not shocked. However, many are clearly puzzled and somewhat worried about the return of the former president. There is almost zero understanding of the US political system and how the two-party system works, and all they know about Vice President Kamala Harris is that she is not Trump.
The political world (the European Commission, Council, and Parliament) is a totally different animal, and there was a barrage of “internal” meetings on the subject on Wednesday. On a lower level of the Brussels bureaucracy, Harris was the clear favorite. However, the higher up the ranks officials were, the more cautious they became. Officials I spoke with and who have European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s ear made it very clear: We might have had our personal preferences, but that doesn’t matter. They took a pragmatic, wait-and-see approach. Surprisingly enough, many were expecting a Harris defeat. There was no sign of taking sides publicly. The tone of von der Leyen’s friendly message of congratulations is indicative of this thinking: Europe has no choice but to work closely with the Trump administration. “We will not repeat Angela Merkel’s disastrous attitude toward Trump,” one official told me.
The issues that stand out in my conversations are Trump’s stance on support for Ukraine, the US relationship with Russia, US policy toward China, and transatlantic trade. Some said Trump’s return may be an opportunity for Europe to “grow up” and be a stronger, less dependent, and better ally to the United States. Finally, they know Trump is “transactional” and are trying to figure out what this actually means for the relationship.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is an outlier: He took sides publicly and is now running victory laps, enjoying the probable windfalls of the gamble he took early on in support of Trump. The man on the street in Budapest and the remaining few independent or semi-independent media in the country are asking: We know what’s in it for Orbán, but what’s in it for Hungary?
—András Simonyi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center. He is a former Hungarian ambassador to the United States and NATO.
Israeli politicians celebrate Trump’s victory, but should be careful what they wish for
JERUSALEM—The reactions of Israeli government officials after Trump’s election represent a sigh of relief.
Throughout the election campaign, it was clear that cabinet ministers, members of the coalition, and the prime minister himself supported Trump and hoped that he would “liberate” Israel from the constant pressure exerted on it by the current Democratic administration, a pressure that in their view was expected to continue if Harris were elected.
Now, in addition to the hope that US President Joe Biden’s time as a “lame duck” will pass without dramatic steps against Israel, it seems that the various parties in the coalition hope that the beginning of Trump’s term will allow them to fulfill their long-held desires. Mainly, that means the annexation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and Israeli action against nuclear facilities in Iran.
But from the statements of Trump and those surrounding him, a completely different picture emerges. Trump strives to end the war and prioritizes the political—rather than military—path to tackle Iran’s nuclear program, while it seems that he is more committed to the Muslim population in the United States that supported him in the election campaign.
In light of this reality, and despite the hopes of ministers and maybe the prime minister, these gaps may lead to friction between the administrations in Jerusalem and Washington sooner than expected.
—Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project working group. He previously served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in the Israel Defense Intelligence.
Poland hopes to be recognized, at last, as an anchor of European defense
WARSAW—Prior to the election, polling in Poland showed that about 30 percent of Poles preferred Trump as president of the United States while the rest went for Harris. Despite the high levels of political polarization, the country’s main political rivals largely agree on the importance of supporting NATO, backing Ukraine, and resisting the threat from Russia.
The Polish national-conservative political movement (still strong despite the 2023 election loss) may agree with the Trump agenda on issues of culture and values, but some of its supporters are nervous about a possible US abandonment of Ukraine. There is a sense here that Trump may appreciate how Poland spending more than 4 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense makes it a leading example of what a NATO member state should look like. However, that won’t amount to much if Ukraine is overrun by Russia and if the United States, either frustrated over lack of progress with countries such as Germany or due to rising “Asia first” voices in the incoming administration, decides to turn away from Europe. Likewise, both political sides in Poland worry about the possibility of US-EU trade wars and tariffs that will hurt the Polish economy, Trump’s positive views of Poles notwithstanding. Supporters of the current centrist government also worry that Trump’s triumph will give a boost to populist movements all over Europe.
Optimists point out that Polish President Andrzej Duda enjoys a positive relationship with Trump that dates back to the 2016-2020 period. Duda will conclude his second term in the spring of 2025, though, and he cannot run again. The current Polish government, despite its strong anti-populist rhetoric, also has people, such as Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski, who have good contacts with the American right. “The American people have made a decision that we respect,” Sikorski said Wednesday. “The correctness of Poland’s foreign policy, which consisted of maintaining contact with both Democrats and Republicans, has also been affirmed.”
Some especially optimistic voices here point out that whereas Poland and the United States were good wartime allies under US President Joe Biden, the Democratic foreign policy establishment always saw Poland as a second-class partner and ran Europe policy mainly through a Berlin-Paris-London model. This approach did not fully appreciate how much Poland is now an anchor of European defense and not a mere security consumer. Such commentators hope that Trump’s inclination toward dumping conventional thinking may make the United States finally break away from seeing Western Europe as the only Europe that counts.
—Aaron Korewa is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Warsaw Office, which is part of the Europe Center.
The US-Australia alliance and AUKUS agreement have enduring support—no matter the heated rhetoric
CANBERRA—Like Americans, Australians were glued to television news and social media watching the outcome of the US elections. At the same time, the machinery of government in Australia ground on. As the results solidified around a second Trump term in the United States, the Australian Senate was holding defense estimates, capturing some of the first official responses to the US election results. At one point David Shoebridge, a far-left Greens Party senator, asked the Australian secretary of defense, Greg Moriarty, about ending the Australia-New Zealand-United States alliance and canceling the Australia-United Kingdom-United States partnership (AUKUS) now that Trump was guaranteed to win. Moriarty replied that strong support for the alliance and AUKUS in Australia will continue, as it has in the past, on a bipartisan basis. Soon after, a senior Labor Party source noted that the “Albanese government would focus on maintaining public support for the US-Australia relationship and keeping the alliance strong.”
These initial exchanges are reflective of how Trump 1.0 was dealt with in Australia, and they are a forerunner of things to come with Trump 2.0. Many of these exchanges will generate heat (especially in the media) but little light. The far left’s opposition to Trump does not reflect Australian government policy or public opinion on key policy issues. The alliance and AUKUS are strongly bipartisan, and they command deep public support.
Without a doubt, Harris was the preferred candidate among Australians. While public support for the US-Australia alliance was generally a bit lower during Trump’s first term than during the presidents who preceded and succeeded him, it still was at 78 percent approval when Trump left office. The focus once again will quickly turn to playing each issue or event on its own merits, rather than reacting exhaustively to Trump’s rhetoric. Former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull advised Prime Minister Anthony Albanese not to “suck up” to Trump: “If you actually want to get good outcomes . . . you’ve got to be able to stand your ground and make your case.”
A key issue in Australia will be the future of AUKUS. While I believe that a new Trump administration will support AUKUS, opinion polling shows that only 18 percent of Australians are confident that AUKUS would not be canceled by a second Trump administration. Along with AUKUS, Ukraine, the war in Gaza, China policy, climate policy, and tariffs are dominating the Australian public debate in response to the election outcome.
But there’s a domestic political lesson too. Inflation and cost of living pressures have been fatal to incumbent democratically elected governments around the world. Australian politicians ignore this lesson of the US election at their peril.
—Peter J. Dean is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and director of foreign policy and defense at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney.
Amid their own turmoil, Germans’ fears are rising about the future of NATO
BERLIN—Fears about the United States stepping out of NATO have been renewed. Trump has long threatened to leave NATO if European nations do not pay their agreed share of defense spending. Although as of July, twenty-three out of the thirty-two NATO members are expected to meet NATO’s guideline of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense, Trump has continued to suggest that NATO membership is perhaps not in the United States’ future.
This has concerned Germans and the German government, whose increasingly fractious coalition has been rapidly preparing its budget for 2025. The constraints of the debt brake are looming over spending considerations. Last year some sixty billion euros evaporated from the federal budget, as concern over meeting existing welfare demands and pressure to increase defense spending have placed the governing coalition in a near-impossible position. Trump has long represented the threat of instability—a deep fear for Germans who prize stability above many other priorities. (And yet, despite this fear of instability, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz kicked Finance Minister Christian Lindner out of government on Wednesday, collapsing the governing coalition.)
The US election was seen around the world as a referendum on immigration and economic policy—issues that have also plagued Germany in the past year since the budget crisis. Germany will soon be reevaluating where it can turn for stability at a time when its own politics are in turmoil.
—Carol Schaeffer is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a journalism fellow with the Jain Family Institute.
Serbia’s president basks in Trump’s victory
BELGRADE—“I was the first, or among the first in the world, who congratulated Donald Trump on his victory. By around 6:00 a.m., I was already talking to people from his closest circle,” stated Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. He also said that Trump’s victory brings hope, at least with regard to Serbia, and that it will have a beneficial effect on global affairs. “In Europe, most people were hoping for Kamala Harris’s victory, while in Serbia, 90 percent of citizens were hoping for Donald Trump to win,” he said during his address.
One of the most widely read Serbian tabloids, Informer, under the control of the ruling regime, announced the placement of fifty billboards in Belgrade, the Serbian capital, featuring a photograph of Trump after the July assassination attempt against him, with the message: “Congratulations, Trump, you are Serbian!”
In the few independent media outlets in the country and among pro-European citizens of Serbia, reactions were far more restrained, with a significant number greeting the news of Trump’s victory with apprehension due to the unpredictability of his policies, assessing that the world is entering a period of heightened uncertainty.
—Maja Piscevic is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and representative of the center in the Western Balkans.
Iraqi Kurdistan worries about rising US-Iran tensions
SULAYMANIYAH—Iraqi Kurdistan government officials and party leaders congratulated and supported Trump’s victory. However, public reactions in the Kurdistan region and Iraq as a whole were mixed, especially since peace between Israel and Hamas is not on the horizon. The reactions primarily centered around two key concerns.
First, the potential impact on US-Iran relations could affect the region both politically and economically. The stability of currency exchange rates between US dollars and Iraqi dinars is of particular concern, directly impacting residents’ daily lives.
Second, there are widespread security concerns. Many worry that given the current tensions between Israel and Iran, Trump’s victory could escalate the situation into a regional conflict. This poses particular risks for the Kurdistan region and Iraq as a whole. Any US military action against Iran could trigger retaliatory strikes by Iran and its allies, potentially targeting US interests in Kurdistan. Some analysts predict the region could become a proxy battleground between US-aligned forces and Iran.
Despite these concerns, there is also optimism among some Kurdish people. They hope Trump will support Kurdish interests in Syria and facilitate peace negotiations with Turkey, particularly given his promises to end conflicts and promote stability in the Middle East.
—Sarkawt Shamsulddin is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He served as a member of the Iraqi Parliament from 2018 to 2021.
Questions around support for Ukraine and trade weigh heavily in Sweden
STOCKHOLM—In Sweden, media outlets are often accused of being obsessed with US elections. Indisputably, the news coverage of US elections by far outweighs that of European Union elections or elections in major nearby countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.
Another key feature is that overall, Swedes leans toward the Democrats. If Swedes could have voted in the US election, 90 percent would have voted for Harris. Among all of Sweden’s political parties—from the right to the left—only voters from the right-wing extremist Sweden Democrats prefer Trump, spurred by his tough stance on immigration.
Against this background, the official reactions in Stockholm on Wednesday were polite but somewhat cautious. On one hand, Sweden depends on the United States both for trade and security. It will need to cooperate well with the incoming president. Therefore, Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson and Foreign Minister Maria M. Stenergard quickly congratulated Trump and Vice President-elect JD Vance on the social media platform X, expressing their wish for friendly and close collaboration with the new administration.
On the other hand, a second Trump administration is perceived as carrying risks, which the Swedish government openly addressed on Wednesday, naming economic protectionism, a lack of measures to combat climate change, and a lack of support to Ukraine as top concerns. “No other question has the same existential importance to countries in our part of the world than Ukraine,” Kristersson underlined.
Opposition leaders from the Green, Left, and Centre parties expressed concern for the climate and for women’s rights under a Trump administration, while former Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson of the Social Democrats urged the government to immediately connect with key people in the incoming administration and try to persuade them of the importance of NATO, free trade, and support to Ukraine.
In the transactional world of Trump, Sweden would come to the table with a solid case for negotiations. As NATO’s newest ally, Sweden already spends 2.2 percent of GDP on defense and will reach 2.6 percent in 2028. On support for Ukraine, Sweden spends more than 0.83 percent of its GDP. In the United States, Sweden directly supports 379,000 jobs and indirectly an additional 620,000. Sweden is also the tenth-largest foreign investor in the United States, while its population is only the eighty-seventh largest in the world. Thus, together with NATO and European Union allies, Sweden should be well positioned to negotiate with the Trump administration on crucial issues.
—Anna Wieslander, PhD, is director for Northern Europe and head of the Atlantic Council Northern Europe Office in Stockholm, Sweden.
Southeast Asia sees continuity in the US-China relationship, with fears of escalation
SINGAPORE—In Southeast Asia, governments and local media did not express much shock or surprise at Trump’s election victory. Pragmatism prevailed, and Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy does not worry the region’s leaders. With the possible exception of the Philippines’ security needs, there is no Southeast Asian dependence on the United States as that which exists in Europe or the Arabian Peninsula. For most of the countries in the region, the biggest foreign policy issue remains the evolution of US-China relations and their ability to keep good ties with both sides. During the campaign, there was a sentiment across most of Southeast Asia that there were no fundamental differences between Trump and Harris on the topic of China. At a policy level, there will be expectations for greater US military engagement, in particular among countries such as Thailand and the Philippines, whose relations with China have grown more contentious. But none of the ten countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is comfortable with the idea of an open confrontation, so the martial tone of Trump when he talks about China is still cause for concern.
Putting rhetoric aside, Southeast Asian countries will carefully monitor the policies of the new Trump administration on Taiwan, as any escalation there would have direct implications for Southeast Asian security interests. Developments in the Korean Peninsula are also likely to impact the region: Vietnam and Singapore previously hosted summits between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Since then, the situation between Seoul and Pyongyang has worsened, though it is unclear how Trump would respond to an escalation.
—Jean-Loup Samaan is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.
India sees uncertainty but also opportunities for trade
NEW DELHI—India’s reaction to the Trump victory has been largely positive and optimistic.
The US-India relationship deepened during Trump’s first term, like it has over the last three decades and through many administrations in New Delhi and Washington. Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi developed a strong rapport, which enabled productive engagements. Both sides were also able to navigate occasional tensions such as Washington revoking India’s designation as a beneficiary of the Generalized Scheme of Preferences, which enabled duty-free imports into the United States.
Some of Trump’s priorities—especially involving trade and protectionism—are sources of uncertainty. But these uncertainties are also seen as presenting opportunities for mutually beneficial deals, particularly in the context of a likely ramp-up of tensions between the United States and China. New Delhi and Washington were reportedly even close to finalizing a mini trade deal during the first Trump presidency.
—Gopal Nadadur is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and vice president for South Asia at The Asia Group.
Ankara views Trump’s election as an opportunity to enhance US-Turkish ties
ANKARA—Many Turks feel a connection with the United States, and the talking points of the Trump campaign resonated with many in Turkey, particularly among supporters of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and supporters of the pro-Kurdish DEM party. Trump’s rhetoric highlighting a fight against the “establishment” aligns with pro-government sentiments in Turkey, as Erdoğan’s AK Party and its close allies assert that they carried out a struggle against a military establishment to take power. Turkey hosts millions of refugees and has successfully reduced their influx by building a wall along its borders. Therefore, Trump’s stances on migration resonate with many Turks.
Still, Turks are divided on the future of Turkish-American relations. Some critics highlight the turbulence in the first Trump administration and suggest that the new Trump administration will pose similar risks. Additionally, the Turkish opposition is concerned about a potential decline in US support for its political agenda.
On the pro-government side, expectations are high. The previously established working relationship between Erdoğan and Trump is seen as a potential avenue for addressing various bilateral issues. Many people in Ankara are hoping for a significant deal with Washington to resolve their disagreement over the US partnership with the People’s Defense Units (YPG), the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The PKK has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization by both Turkey and the United States, and has become Ankara’s top security concern.
Ankara views Trump’s election as an opportunity to enhance the F-16 fighter jet sales finalized during the Biden administration and to explore ways for Turkey to rejoin the F-35 program. Turks anticipate increased defense cooperation, but there are concerns regarding geopolitical risks. Turkey appears to support Trump’s anti-Iran stance, but a second Trump administration’s strong backing of Israel might upset Ankara, which has expressed strong disapproval of Israeli actions following the Hamas terrorist attack on October 7, 2023.
—Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is an Ankara-based analyst of Turkish foreign policy, counterterrorism, and military affairs.
Trump and Erdogan will get along, but unpredictability is a concern
ISTANBUL—After Trump’s election, Erdoğan was among the first leaders to congratulate the president-elect, and he expressed hope that global crises like “the war in Palestine and Russia-Ukraine war” would end. While Trump’s election was mainly seen by Turkish media as potentially easing leader-to-leader relations, his unpredictability causes concern within both pro-government and opposition circles.
Regarding ongoing wars in the region, many commentators agree that Turkey will probably offer to be a mediator as part of Trump’s efforts to end the war in Ukraine. But what’s received less attention is the security threat that a peace deal favoring Russia and allowing it to keep Crimea would pose in the Black and Mediterranean seas. Meanwhile, due to Turkey’s strong pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel stance, Trump’s expected robust support for Israel could create tension in US-Turkish relations.
When it comes to existing US-Turkish disputes, given the Republican majority in the US Senate and perhaps the US House, some Turkish media reports have suggested that Trump will have more leeway on issues such as the lifting of sanctions against Turkey, the delivery of US F-16 fighter jets, and the renewal of the F-35 deal, potentially strengthening his position in dealings with Turkey.
Perhaps the most important issue in US-Turkish relations is Syria, particularly US support for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which are led by the YPG, a group associated with the PKK terrorist group. While Trump could not fully implement his 2019 decision to withdraw US forces from Syria, there is an expectation in Turkish circles that under his administration, a withdrawal similar to the pullout from Iraq might be easier. On the other hand, many commentators argue that the escalation of violence in the Middle East, especially in Lebanon and Syria, and the risk of an all-out Israel-Iran war may push the United States to remain in Syria and to continue its support for the SDF. Some experts believe that Turkey has read this situation well in advance and that the governing coalition’s new “Kurdish opening,” which seems focused on domestic politics, is actually an effort both to prevent PKK violence within the country and to negotiate with the SDF, thus strengthening Turkey’s position in negotiations over Syria with other actors.
When it comes to bilateral economic relations, Trump’s protectionist policies, including the steel tariffs imposed during his first term, have already caused significant damage to Turkey. New tariffs, along with a potential trade war with China, could create tensions with Turkey, especially since Turkey seeks to diversify its markets and strengthen relations with South Asia and Southeast Asia through the Asia Anew Initiative, as well as its attempts to become a member of the BRICS economic grouping that includes China, Russia, India, and others.
While there is considerable discussion in Europe and the United States about Trump’s possible disengagement from NATO and the security of the West, this is not as widely debated in Turkey. However, due to the potential risks of such disengagement, we started to see a softening of relations between Turkey and Europe ahead of the US elections. For example, Germany approved large-scale arms exports to Turkey for the first time in years and Scholz met with Erdoğan in Turkey, where the sale of Eurofighter Typhoon jets to Turkey was one of the main topics of discussion. This could lead to stronger defense and security cooperation with European countries both bilaterally and within the NATO framework.
—Pinar Dost is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Turkey Programs.
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Image: The front covers of today's newspapers covering Donald Trumps election win, on November 7, 2024, in France. Photo by Lionel Urman/ABACAPRESS.COM