The Defense Journal of the Atlantic Council in Turkey recently interviewed former US Undersecretary of Defense Dov Zakheim, a longtime observer of US foreign and national security policy, regarding recent tensions between US allies Israel and Turkey. Those tensions have received extensive media coverage, including the remarks of both President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during the latter’s April 7 visit to the White House—which featured Trump expressing optimism that tensions were manageable and that he might play a mediating role.
This interview has been lightly edited for style.
DJ: Thank you for your time in speaking with us. Israel and Turkey have had alternating close and tense relations for decades but maintained discrete contacts throughout the cyclical ups and downs. Are they still talking?
Zakheim: It’s hard to know because if they are talking it’s probably through intelligence channels, which get reported the least. My guess is that they probably are, if only to deconflict over Syria. There was a report commissioned by Prime Minister Netanyahu that said tensions over Syria could create a dangerous situation. Regional press reported a conclusion that the countries “could go to war,” but that’s not what the report said—just that the tensions were potentially quite serious. Turkish hard-right commentators from MHP [Milli Hareket Partisi, the National Movement Party, of Turkish nationalist] and HUDA PAR [Hür Dava Partisi, the Independent Cause Party, of Kurdish Islamist] have pretty much said the same thing; even President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has said similar things. The tensions are worse than what happened after the Mavi Marmara incident in some ways1The Mavi Marmara incident involved Israeli Navy interdiction of civilian ships trying to break a blockade of Gaza, which resulted in the death of nine Turkish activists and ended with a 2013 apology by Netanyahu.. The military and security establishments in both countries tend to be more realists and to seek de-escalation, though; so, they are probably still talking.
DJ: After the very tense period between 2009–2014, President Barack Obama and later Trump worked to ameliorate Turkey-Israel tensions, leading to a rapprochement of sorts. This contributed to a softening of tensions over time. Without US involvement, the two countries pursued a diplomatic reconciliation in 2023 that was interrupted by the Hamas attacks of October 7 and the Israeli response. Do the two countries need the United States as a mediator or are they better off together proceeding at their own pace and modalities?
Zakheim: Trump has offered to mediate between Israel and Turkey so as to improve their relationship. But Washington might be too distracted by the president’s other priorities. President Trump has focused on de-escalating the situation in Gaza, which could indirectly benefit Israel-Turkish tensions stemming in part from the conflict there. In addition, the Trump administration also has Ukraine, tariffs and trade, and a lot of things competing for the attention of the president and his key advisers. It is not surprising that Netanyahu raised Syria with President Trump, because Israelis take a different view of what’s going on there and are concerned about the Turkish role: They are not comfortable with what they see as growth in Turkish influence there. Discontent in Jerusalem can’t be ignored, though it appears that President Trump’s initial response was balanced and that Netanyahu didn’t get the backing for his position that he might have wanted.
DJ: Syria is a unique challenge between Israel and Turkey now because it essentially makes them neighbors—tense and distrustful neighbors—not just countries in the same region. How do both countries meet their minimum interests in Syria?
Zakheim: It shouldn’t be zero-sum between these two, because there are other players in the equation. The Iranians are still present in Syria to a degree, and the Russians of course hope to keep air and naval bases [there]. Israelis are divided as to whether it is good or bad for Russia to stay or go. It appears Netanyahu thinks it may not be a bad thing to use the Russians to balance Turkish influence. Then there is the question of Damascus, the transitional government, itself. Some think they haven’t really evolved from their roots in al-Qaeda, while others say Damascus—especially transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa—have been signaling moderation and reaching out to the West because they know that they need Western support. Where there are many players, a modus vivendi is possible, especially if Sharaa wants to move toward the West more than the Assad regime did. There is great fluidity in Syria now. The Kurdish factor still has to play out as well and the success or degree of their reintegration affects Ankara’s positioning. Abdullah Öcalan may want to disarm the movement he founded, the PKK [Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan, or Kurdish Workers’ Party], but it is possible that parts of the movement in Iraq or Syria do not2On May 12th 2025, following a congress of PKK leadership, the organization announced a decision to disarm and dissolve organizationally. The impacts of this decision on the ground in Iraq and Syria remain to be seen, as noted in the interview.. With so many possibilities, Jerusalem and Ankara both would do well to show flexibility.
DJ: Is Syria without Assad better for Israel than Syria with Assad?
Zakheim: I think it will very much depend on where the Syrian government goes. We haven’t heard the same sort of vitriol out of Damascus as under Assad, despite Israel taking more territory and conducting air attacks. It may be that the Israel-Syria border becomes a quiet border like it was under Hafez al-Assad as opposed to the more dangerous border that became the norm under Bashar and his backers, Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Bashar was a slimy figure to the Turks as well: He lied to Ankara and was problematic for Israel. It may well be that a government that proceeds the way al-Sharaa says he wants to go could be a plus for both Israel and Turkey.
DJ: How much of the current Turkey-Israel tension do you see as structural or systemic, and how much personal (i.e., a product of the combative Netanyahu-Erdoğan relationship)?
Zakheim: There is no doubt that the personalities don’t line up very well. For comparison, though, we can look at the relationship between Netanyahu and former President Joe Biden—they were not fond of one another, but the two countries remained close. It was Erdoğan who patched things up gradually with Netanyahu over a decade. Erdoğan is a realist, and he knows very well that Israel has a number of things to offer and is an important market. Remember that Turkey is developing a very high-tech military and other industries, and there are many areas where they might partner with Israel. There was over $1 billion in bilateral trade that has now been cut off—though some still comes through third countries. The fact remains that Erdoğan is a pragmatist. If Gaza is somehow settled, that is a way for trade relations to be restored, and these two countries are potentially very important partners for trade and security cooperation.
Overall, despite the ups and downs there is a degree of complementarity. Both leaders are survivors and have pragmatist streaks. Gaza is a place where the United States can clearly play a major role in reconciling interests. If there is reconstruction, Turkish companies, especially in infrastructure, can have a role. A Turkish constructive role in stabilizing Gaza could be a new pivot point. It is true that Erdoğan plays to his base, but both he and Netanyahu remain less vitriolic about “the other” country in the equation than the hardliners in their own coalitions.
Dov S. Zakheim is a member of the Atlantic Council Board of Directors. He was US undersecretary of defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer from 2001-04. He is a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and senior fellow at the CNA Corporation.
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Image: Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Dov S. Zakheim responds to a reporter's question during a Pentagon press briefing on May 31, 200l. Zakheim discussed the Fiscal Year 2001 Department of Defense budget supplemental request.