NORMAL, Illinois—An event in New Delhi earlier this month is threatening to disrupt efforts to patch up ties between India and Bangladesh. On August 5, deposed Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina addressed an online press conference from India, where she has lived in exile since 2024. The political fallout from that appearance is the latest test in a bilateral relationship that has experienced ebbs and flows in recent years.
The event and the responses of the Indian government have engendered intense debate in Bangladesh about the future trajectory of the relationship.
Ties were tense under the interim Bangladeshi government headed by Muhammad Yunus between August 2024 and February 2026. But they appeared to ease after the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) came to power following the election of Prime Minister Tarique Rahman in February. At the time, there was talk of a reset and a potential high-level meeting between Rahman and his Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Narendra Modi. But Hasina, who in November 2025 was convicted in absentia by a Bangladeshi tribunal of crimes against humanity, seems to have put that reset into question. The expected Rahman–Modi meeting has now become uncertain.
What happened
August 5 marked the second anniversary of Hasina’s downfall and flight from Bangladesh, and she commemorated the occasion by virtually attending a press conference in New Delhi organized by the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of South Asia. In her comments, made via audio only, Hasina called for the lifting of the ban on her party (imposed by the interim government and retained by the current administration) and reiterated an earlier pledge to return to Bangladesh in December 2026 to present herself in court. She dismissed her convictions as politically motivated and questioned the legitimacy of the February election.
Bangladesh first requested Hasina’s extradition in December 2024 and has renewed that request several times since the November 2025 verdict by Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal sentencing her to death. The Indian government has replied that it is examining the formal legal and judicial aspects of the request. Meanwhile, Hasina, from her new base in India, has been using social media to reach out to her loyalists in Bangladesh—activity that Bangladeshi authorities say is “aimed at creating instability.” However, the Indian government told the Indian Parliament on July 31 that Hasina has not been permitted to use Indian territory for any political activity.
Two days before Hasina spoke at the conference, Bangladesh urged Indian authorities not to allow her to use Indian soil to engage in political activities intended to destabilize Bangladesh. The next day, an Indian government spokesman denied any role in organizing the August 5 event and stated that “it does not endorse any views that may be expressed at the forum.” Several leaders of Hasina’s Awami League (AL) party, including her son, Sajeeb Wazed Joy, also spoke at the press conference. They continued to deny that security forces and AL loyalists killed as many as 1,400 people—most of them protesters—over a three-week period in the summer of 2024, as a United Nations report has documented.
Bangladesh’s foreign ministry expressed its “outrage” at the comments and described Hasina’s address on the anniversary of the July Revolution as “an affront to the sovereignty of Bangladesh and a grievous insult to the martyrs” of the movement. While it underscored that Bangladesh seeks a “constructive, mutually beneficial and forward-looking” relationship with India, the ministry also said the country would never again become a “client state,” an apparent reference to Bangladesh’s relationship with India under Hasina.
A possible trip by Rahman to India next month to attend an outreach session at the BRICS summit of emerging economies is now uncertain, even after a meeting between the Indian envoy and the Bangladeshi prime minister on August 10. Indeed, on August 20, a Bangladeshi official said that Rahman would not rush to visit India and called for a shift in the “mindset or perspective” of India’s current leadership toward Bangladesh.
Estranged relationship
The Bangladesh–India relationship under the interim government was tense for several reasons. First, India had a warm relationship with the Hasina regime. New Delhi supported her through three elections widely viewed by independent observers as fraudulent (2014, 2018, and 2024). Moreover, many Bangladeshis viewed the India–Bangladesh relationship as unequal, with the Hasina regime meeting India’s demands without securing reciprocal concessions. According to this argument, Bangladesh’s demands for a fair water-sharing treaty and an end to border killings, for example, were not adequately addressed in New Delhi, even while India secured transit to its restive northeast region, access to Bangladesh’s seaports, and a coastline surveillance system. Additionally, many Indian businesses received preferential treatment in Bangladesh, including in the power sector.
Second, India’s decision to provide refuge to Hasina was seen by many in Dhaka as a denunciation of the popular uprising against Hasina. In her August 5 comments, she called India a “great friend” and her son thanked Modi’s government for treating her with “utmost respect.”
Third, some Indian media outlets sensationalized the 2024 uprising as an Islamist upsurge orchestrated by external powers, including the United States and Pakistan. The alarmist and partisan tone of the reports, which often portrayed Bangladesh’s interim government as weak and unstable, exasperated many Bangladeshis who welcomed the new political process.
Fourth, the Indian government appeared to give the cold shoulder to the interim government. New Delhi instead insisted that it was ready to work with an elected government, which was viewed in Bangladesh as a tacit indication that it was unwilling to accept the Yunus government as representative of the people. And even when Yunus and Modi did eventually meet on the sidelines of a BIMSTEC summit of South and Southeast Asian countries in Bangkok in April 2025, it yielded few positive results, with India again declining to grant Bangladesh’s request to extradite Hasina.
India’s cautious steps and concerns
Earlier this year, as it became evident that the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) was likely to come to power with Rahman at the helm, India’s genuine readiness to embrace the BNP government came into question. After all, the BNP and India have had a fraught history. When the BNP was in power between 2001 and 2006, the relationship was marked by mutual distrust. At that time, India alleged that the government of Khaleda Zia (Rahman’s mother), which had an alliance with the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami, had provided sanctuary to insurgents from northeastern India.
However, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s trip to Dhaka to deliver a personal condolence letter from Modi after Zia passed away in December 2025 sent a positive message. So did Modi’s personal congratulatory call to Rahman after his election victory, and Lok Sabha Speaker Om Birla’s attendance at Rahman’s swearing-in ceremony. In late July, Modi invited Rahman to an outreach session of the BRICS summit in New Delhi in September. And even while Bangladesh was considering that invitation, the Indian envoy in Dhaka, Dinesh Trivedi, met Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman on July 29, underscoring the need for a “reset.”
But even before Hasina’s August speech, there were indications that a reset wouldn’t come easily. Discussions about implementing the Teesta River project with Chinese assistance, close to a highly strategic patch of Indian real estate known as the Chicken’s Neck, have caused unease in New Delhi. Indian officials’ concerns grew further after Rahman’s visit to China in late June, which raised the prospect of closer Bangladesh-China ties, including an upgrade in their relationship to a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership and consideration of a Bangladesh-China-Myanmar economic corridor.
There are also disagreements over alleged illegal immigration, border killings, and trade. Bangladesh is yet to receive a response to its request to start negotiations on the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, which is set to expire in December 2026. Meanwhile, Bangladesh’s relations with Pakistan, which have been improving since Hasina’s ouster, as well as the possibility of an expanded trade relationship with the United States, may provide Dhaka with greater room to pursue a foreign policy that is less focused on India.
In fact, there’s reason to believe India’s continued accommodation of Hasina could also serve as a hedge against a Bangladeshi foreign policy that moves further away from India. India officially maintains that it keeps its distance from Hasina, and a decision to host her does not itself prove that it is using her as leverage. Yet allowing her to make political statements from Indian territory, despite Dhaka’s warnings that they could create domestic instability and strain the bilateral relationship, may pressure the Bangladeshi government not to move away from New Delhi. In the context of Bangladesh’s recent maneuverings to strengthen ties with China and Pakistan, Dhaka may question whether New Delhi sees Hasina as a potential source of leverage.
The path forward
Geographical proximity, long historical ties, and the potential for shared economic growth necessitate that the two countries develop a cooperative relationship. Moving in that direction requires a recalibration of India’s policy toward Bangladesh. Indian policymakers need to recognize that a policy built around one party and one leader no longer holds. It is time for New Delhi to acknowledge its past mistakes and build a state-to-state relationship based on mutual trust and respect. The approach must address the full range of unresolved issues. As for Hasina’s continued presence in India, New Delhi must provide greater policy clarity. It cannot claim a hands-off policy while providing her with refuge and allowing her to make statements from Indian territory.