WASHINGTON—The United States faces a growing number of disparate biological threats. Russia and North Korea are known to possess active offensive biological weapons programs, and other countries and terrorist groups may be developing their own in secret. The potential for smaller-scale biological crimes abounds both domestically and abroad. Naturally occurring diseases, too, have the potential to affect national security, as do accidental releases from laboratories and other facilities that may or may not be conducting legitimate business. The rise of artificial intelligence (AI) increases the danger, as it could be used to design and create entirely new pathogens. And the danger compounds when federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments are unprepared.
A recent article in The Washington Post expressed concern about personnel cuts and reorganization affecting biodefense staffing in the White House. While these reductions are cause for concern, administrations have structured responsibility for addressing biological threats differently over time, going at least as far back as the Wilson administration’s response to the 1918 influenza pandemic. A reorganization from one administration to the next should not immediately be interpreted as evidence of decreasing preparedness.
It is important to look at the facts. The Trump administration, for example, moved pandemic preparedness functions into the National Security Council (NSC), where other biodefense responsibilities are housed. Keeping the Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy separate had divided pandemic preparedness from other biodefense work. However, the administration’s determination to reduce the number of NSC staff and federal personnel dedicated to protecting the country against biological threats has left the White House with fewer officials to address biological events that could affect the national and economic security of the United States and its interests overseas. By the end of the Biden administration, as many as thirty White House staffers focused on biological security. Following the staffing cuts, the Post reports, at times, no official was dedicated solely to biosecurity. This does not serve President Donald Trump well, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic.
It is essential that this and all administrations be prepared for biological threats, including those that could be created or driven by AI. Organizational preparedness is just as important for the White House as it is for the nation as a whole.
To increase US preparedness, the administration should take the following steps immediately:
- Put the national security advisor in charge of biodefense. This would elevate biodefense to a level commensurate with the threat posed to the nation.
- Increase the number of NSC staff addressing biodefense. This would help the White House stay on top of the increasing number of biological threats with which it must contend.
- Update and implement the National Biodefense Strategy. The first Trump administration issued the inaugural strategy in 2018, and the Biden administration released an updated plan in 2022. The White House should now revise the strategy to reflect changes in the biological threat environment and help guide defense of the country against biological threats before, during, and after incidents occur.
- Direct the Pentagon to update its 2023 Biological Posture Review. An updated assessment could account for changes in threats from biological warfare and terrorism. That review should pay particular attention to threats posed by Russia in Europe and China in the Indo-Pacific.
- Strengthen the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)’s capacity to investigate and attribute biological incidents at home and abroad. This would help the FBI identify and apprehend criminals and other bad actors looking to use biological agents.
- Elevate biological threats as a White House national security priority. Prioritization by the president and the NSC would help the US intelligence community devote additional resources to the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence on biological threats.