Four leaders, three countries, and one busy secretary of state. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio wrapped up a swing through Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru yesterday as the Trump administration looks to turn political alignment with new governments in Latin America into regional cooperation on security, counternarcotics, and trade concessions. Already, there are asks and offers on the table, from requests for tariff relief by the two new administrations in Bogotá and Lima to new US security assistance and terrorist designations for regional gangs.
After the visits, we asked Atlantic Council experts to weigh in on whether the emerging political alignment can turn into something lasting.
Click to jump to an expert analysis:
Jason Marczak: US–Colombia ties are back on track. What next?
María Sonsoles García León: Ecuador has become Washington’s anchor in the Eastern Pacific
Martin Cassinelli: Can deeper US–Peru ties loosen China’s economic grip?
Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.
US–Colombia ties are back on track. What next?
In his fifth trip to the region as secretary of state, Rubio’s first stop in Barranquilla, Colombia, was about advancing shared priorities and sending a clear signal that the US-Colombia relationship is back on track after years of backsliding under the previous Colombian government. Visiting the country just over one month after Abelardo de la Espriella’s inauguration, Rubio carried the message that US President Donald Trump is a “big fan” of the new Colombian president, who has made rebooting bilateral ties a cornerstone of his foreign policy.
The visit highlighted some of the early priorities, with security at the top of the list. As de la Espriella makes good on his campaign pledge to fight the narcos and improve security across Colombia, cooperation with the United States on intelligence and military equipment will be essential. One of the first tangible signs of this alignment was Colombia’s decision to sign on to the Shield of the Americas and the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition within days of the inauguration.
But Rubio’s visit also signaled that the two countries are looking beyond restoring their once-deep security ties. Agreements were signed to expand work on critical minerals and associated supply chains, with a timeline of six months for initial progress, as well as on capacity building and partnerships to develop Colombia’s civil nuclear energy sector. Critical minerals, in particular, dovetail with the broader US agenda across the hemisphere to prioritize access to components essential to economic security.
What will be important now is how expanded security and strategic ties translate into greater economic opportunities for Colombians, especially in the wake of the August 10 earthquake. De la Espriella has been pushing for US relief from the additional 12.5 percent tariffs imposed under the previous presidency, with added urgency from Colombia’s fiscal challenges and earthquake recovery needs. Trade negotiations do not fall under Rubio’s purview, but he left Colombian officials with hope that an agreement will be concluded in the near future. For Colombia, relief could not come soon enough.
María Sonsoles García León is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. She previously served as Ecuador’s minister of production, foreign trade, investment, and fisheries.
Ecuador has become Washington’s anchor in the Eastern Pacific
Rubio’s September 9 stop in Quito was his second as secretary of state in barely twelve months. For a country of Ecuador’s size, that cadence is itself the message. Since Rubio is the administration’s principal interlocutor for Latin America, his travels signal where Washington is placing its bets, and it’s moving its chips toward Ecuador.
In Ecuador, Rubio pledged to seek $45 million in new security funding and a $10 million initiative against illegal gold mining, gang recruitment, and illicit finance; promised a Coast Guard cutter and five interceptor vessels for Ecuador’s navy, on top of seven already delivered this year; designated Los Tiguerones, an Ecuador-based gang, a foreign terrorist organization; and sanctioned seven former officials accused of bribery.
The exchange of support therefore appears real on both sides. Should the pledges turn into deliverables, Washington would gain a foothold on the hemisphere’s most active trafficking corridor, on-the-ground intelligence, and a government willing to act—scarcer here than money or hardware. Ecuador would gain capabilities it otherwise cannot finance alone and an ally whose backing is legible to markets.
Moreover, the gesture matters as much as the package. With Ecuadorians voting in local elections on November 29, Rubio’s presence in Carondelet amounts to a public endorsement of President Daniel Noboa’s security strategy at the moment voters are judging it.
In my view, that is the visit’s most consequential effect. It tells Ecuadorians that the fight against organized crime is not a solitary national gamble but a shared undertaking with the world’s largest economy, and it does something a campaign cannot: restore confidence among citizens who need to believe Ecuador can again be a country at peace and among investors who read political risk before spreadsheets.
From here, the logical step is a deeper US operational presence alongside Ecuadorian forces, matched by investment in strategic sectors. But the $45 million is a request to Congress, not appropriated funding, and the trade agreement signed in March has yet to enter into force. Delivery, not signaling, will be what turns an ally into an anchor.
Martin Cassinelli is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center
Can deeper US-Peru ties loosen China’s economic grip?
In his final stop, Rubio arrived in Peru to meet with the country’s new right-wing president, Keiko Fujimori. There, he announced that Peru will now join the Shield of the Americas, the US anti-drug coalition in Latin America, and he reiterated that the US will send a hospital ship to Peru as the country manages the consequences of the “El Niño” phenomenon, which is expected to hit later this year.
Both announcements align with Fujimori’s biggest domestic priorities. Her ability to combat organized crime and manage the damage caused by the “super El Niño” will likely shape how Peruvian voters judge her first hundred days in office. US support on both fronts therefore gives Fujimori an important political boost and creates goodwill with her government.
For Washington, that goodwill matters because the United States is also encouraging Peru to reconsider its economic ties with China. In an op-ed published in Peruvian media ahead of his trip, Rubio accused China of “entering the Western Hemisphere with predatory practices,” referring in particular to Peru’s Chinese-built Port of Chancay mega-project.
The question, however, is whether this display of bilateral strength will actually alter Peru’s long-standing balancing act between the United States and China. Peru has sought to deepen its political and military ties with Washington while simultaneously expanding its economic relationship with Beijing. China is now Peru’s largest trading partner, importing 2.5 times more Peruvian exports than the United States does. Chinese products, from BYD cars to Huawei phones, are also increasingly ubiquitous in the daily lives of Peruvians.
That economic relationship will be difficult for Washington to displace through security cooperation alone. If the United States wants Peru to scrutinize or curb its economic ties with China, it will need to offer a credible alternative in trade and investment. Rubio’s trip strengthened the security pillar of the US-Peru relationship. But unless Washington can match that engagement with equally meaningful economic partnerships, Peru is unlikely to abandon its balancing act between the two powers.
