PRISTINA—Since July, the Pentagon has been conducting a broad review of US force posture in Europe and is reportedly considering withdrawing around a third of US forces from the continent. A set of options is expected to be presented to President Donald Trump in early November, with the bulk of any withdrawal likely affecting Spain, Italy, and Germany, but not Eastern Europe—where the Pentagon might even move more resources.
The US allocation of forces in Europe has been a source of anxiety and security dilemmas for a while, but concerns have increased in recent months due to the uptick in Russia’s hybrid warfare throughout Europe and US resources being stretched thin by the war with Iran. The US force posture in Europe is of particular concern in the Western Balkans, where an arms race has long been underway and where NATO plays a key role as a deterrent against the resurgence of 1990s-era conflicts.
Questions over the future of the US contribution to NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) have also surfaced as part of this broader debate. The United States currently contributes approximately 590 troops to the roughly 4,650-strong KFOR mission in Kosovo, making it the only significant permanent US military presence in the Western Balkans. Although no US withdrawal from KFOR has been announced, the possibility has allegedly circulated in discussions over how Washington might reduce its European commitments. Considering the changing global security environment and the administration’s unpredictability, this issue could resurface and merits an informed debate.
Why the US matters to Kosovo and the Balkans
The US contingent in KFOR represents a small share of the US presence in Europe, but it has an outsized impact in the Balkans. It is the second largest national contingent in KFOR, after Italy, and it is centered at Camp Bondsteel in central Kosovo—an important American-led command, logistics, and operational hub embedded in the multinational KFOR architecture. US troops serving with KFOR also operate in Kosovo’s north, which only a few years ago was the site of an attack by an organized armed group of ethnic Serbs on Kosovo’s police.
One of the key US contributions to KFOR is intelligence and information sharing, which is critical to the mission’s situational awareness. This was most notably proven during the 2023 attack, where rapid US identification of the threat provided critical assistance to Kosovo police in repelling the attack and preventing a wider escalation with regional implications.
Another key area of US contribution is secure communications and interoperability. The United States helps other national contingents operate as part of a common NATO force and connects them to Kosovo’s developing defense institutions, including through US-led military exercises. It is important to note that Kosovo’s forces do not have formal relations with NATO because four member states (Spain, Slovakia, Greece, and Romania) do not recognize Kosovo as a state. Kosovo thus relies on bilateral relations with individual NATO members—with the United States foremost among them—as a link to NATO.
The five-thousand-strong Kosovo Security Force (KSF) is in the final stretch of a decade-long US-supported transformation plan (2019–2028) that has moved it from a fledgling institution toward NATO-capable standards. US assistance is critical in this path toward self-reliance, through training and by helping with weapons-system purchases, including an approved $75 million package of Javelin missiles, as well as intelligence sharing and advanced technology access.
The wrong US signal could destabilize the Balkans
With US military resources overstretched, the Trump administration may look at the strategic landscape and be tempted to think that European troops could easily replace the US contingent with their own forces, and that KSF capacity-building could be done without a major US presence—both of which may be true in narrow operational terms. It may also be tempted to think that the current security situation is stable enough to merit a withdrawal. NATO did in fact announce in June 2026 that it would gradually adjust KFOR’s posture over the following year in response to an “improved security environment.”
Yet these arguments overlook a critical point: The improved security environment very much relies on the deterrence and political signaling created by the US flag in the mission. A withdrawal would be read as strategic US disengagement from Kosovo and the Western Balkans and, with it, from the regional security architecture that the United States itself shaped.
Such a move could prompt Kosovo and Serbia to accelerate weapons purchases and draw other NATO members—especially Albania and Croatia—into a dangerous spiral while also weakening US political leverage. Russia, which rejects Kosovo’s statehood, would likely interpret the US departure as a vulnerability that could be tested, viewing Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina (both non-NATO members) as ideal venues both to test NATO’s resolve through its gray-zone operations and to leverage its influence in Serbia in a more aggressive direction.
At a recent congressional hearing on the Western Balkans, US Representative Keith Self (R-TX) rightfully warned that “the considered withdrawal of US troops is the most immediate threat to peace between [Kosovo and Serbia].” But the risks do not stop there.
US officials may be frustrated by Europe’s inability to take on a greater share of the burden for defending the continent and regions like the Western Balkans. Yet decision makers in Washington should note that Western Balkans countries themselves share a similar frustration with Europe. The European Union’s skepticism toward enlargement over the past decade has helped to keep the region vulnerable to malign actors such as Russia and China by failing to create the conditions in which countries could resolve their bilateral disputes.
Any decision by the United States to leave the region before it is more integrated into NATO and European Union infrastructure risks undermining decades of investments and creating an unnecessary vulnerability at a critical juncture. The Western Balkans—and Kosovo in particular—merit this continued direct US military attention because the KFOR mission is not, as some claim, just one of the United States’ many “open ended commitments.” Peace in the region falls firmly within NATO’s core tasks of Euro-Atlantic defense and deterrence, and the US role in KFOR cannot be replicated.