It’s clear how the president feels. On Sunday night, US President Donald Trump announced that he was “not happy” with the start of annual US-South Korea military exercises, which had been scheduled to run through August 27. Noting his “very good relationship” with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, Trump said that he had instructed the Pentagon to cut the planned exercises short. How is Trump’s decision being received in South Korea? What does it mean for North Korea? Below, three Seoul-based Atlantic Council fellows share their views.
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Bee Yun Jo: Diplomacy is worth pursuing. But readiness is not a bargaining chip.
Dokyoung Koo: Reducing combined training hurts both countries
Sungmin Cho: The surprise was linking the exercises to the Iran war
Bee Yun Jo, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a research fellow in the Security Strategy Division at the Sejong Institute.
Diplomacy is worth pursuing. But readiness is not a bargaining chip.
Trump’s order to scale back Ulchi Freedom Shield is already reshaping the exercise. The allies are reportedly set to end the drill after its defensive phase on August 21, canceling the counteroffensive phase and most combined field training. This is not symbolic. It is a strategic mistake—for five reasons.
First, military exercises are the foundation of alliance readiness. Deterrence rests not simply on weapons and troop numbers, but on whether the alliance can fight together. That requires practice. For a president who emphasizes costs, cutting an exercise after the alliance has already spent money planning and mobilizing is a peculiar way to lower the bill. It does not eliminate costs; it reduces the return on money already spent.
Second, reducing exercises now wastes diplomatic leverage. If exercises are scaled back to facilitate diplomacy, they should be exchanged for meaningful North Korean restraint—not offered in advance merely to create the possibility of talks. The collapse of diplomacy after the Trump-Kim summit in 2018 should have made that clear.
Third, there is little reason to expect reciprocity from Pyongyang. North Korea is already eyeing the trilateral US-South Korea-Japan exercises. What comes next when Kim Jong Un demands an end to those exercises too?
Fourth, the timing is troubling. While the alliance trains less, North Korea is gaining something more valuable: battlefield experience in Russia’s war against Ukraine. This is hardly the moment for the alliance to ease up.
Finally, unilateral reductions carry a cost in South Korea. They strengthen those who question the reliability—or necessity—of the alliance. Washington wants Seoul to assume greater responsibility for conventional defense and contribute more to regional security. Why weaken confidence in one of the United States’ most capable conventional allies?
Diplomacy is worth pursuing. But readiness is not a free concession. It should not be on the negotiating table.
Dokyoung Koo is a nonresident fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She is also a major in the Republic of Korea Army with more than twenty-two years of military service.
Reducing combined training hurts both countries
From a South Korean perspective, the most troubling aspect of Trump’s decision is not simply the reduction of combined military exercises, but the way the decision was made. Announcing such a major change on the very day the exercise began, without adequate prior consultation with Seoul, falls short of the respect allies should expect from one another. Other US allies may also wonder what this says about how Washington manages its alliances.
More importantly, combined exercises are not simply expensive military activities. They are one of the most valuable assets the South Korea–US alliance has built over decades. Two enormous military organizations do not automatically know how to fight together. Command relationships, procedures, communications, and mutual trust must be practiced repeatedly. The interoperability built through decades of combined training translates directly into combat effectiveness in a crisis—and may be impossible to improvise once a war begins. South Korea has developed a far more capable military through this process, while the United States has gained a stronger and more reliable ally. Weakening this asset therefore hurts both countries.
The decision may also deepen South Korea’s domestic political polarization. Conservatives may portray Trump’s criticism—particularly his linkage of the reduction in exercises to Seoul’s position on Iran—as evidence that the Lee Jae-myung government is undermining the alliance. More centrist South Koreans, however, may draw the opposite conclusion: if Washington can unilaterally alter core alliance activities, South Korea needs greater control over its own defense. This could strengthen support for transfer of wartime operational control to South Korea and a more independent response to North Korea’s nuclear threat.
There is also an immediate military cost. For servicemembers currently participating in one of the year’s most important exercises, public discussion about dramatically reducing that very exercise inevitably distracts from its purpose and can undermine morale.
Finally, North Korea will welcome the decision, but there is little reason to assume that Pyongyang will reciprocate. If this is intended to prepare the ground for renewed Trump-Kim diplomacy, Washington should ask what it expects to receive in return.
The danger is that Washington may spend one of the alliance’s most valuable assets without knowing what it is purchasing in return.
Sungmin Cho is a nonresident senior fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Sungkyunkwan University in Seoul, South Korea.
The surprise was linking the exercises to the Iran war
Trump’s decision to scale back US-South Korea combined military exercises is hardly surprising in itself. Trump’s longstanding dissatisfaction with the costs associated with the US military presence in South Korea is well known. So is his desire to revive summit diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. From Trump’s perspective, therefore, reducing military activities that Pyongyang regards as hostile may be a logical step toward reopening diplomacy. His recent Truth Social message reflects this logic.
Nor is it surprising that Trump’s decision has generated divided reactions in South Korea. Conservatives worry that reducing combined exercises could weaken deterrence and signal declining US commitment to the alliance. South Korean progressives, however, have long argued that scaling back military exercises can help reduce tensions and create space for inter-Korean and US-North Korean dialogue. In this respect, Trump’s approach overlaps considerably with perspectives long advanced by South Korean progressives.
The truly surprising element of Trump’s message is his linkage of the decision with South Korea’s position on the US war with Iran. Many South Koreans may not have realized the extent of Trump’s dissatisfaction with the Lee Jae-myung administration over this issue. They have seen Trump criticize Japan, Germany, and other US allies for their reluctance to become directly involved in the Iran conflict. However, this is the first time Trump has singled out South Korea for criticism.
While reducing military exercises with North Korea in mind fits within a familiar political debate in Seoul, linking the US-South Korea alliance to Seoul’s position on a distant war with Iran does not. That linkage—not the exercise reduction itself—may therefore prove to be the most consequential aspect of Trump’s announcement.