WASHINGTON—By September 30, US troops will have left Iraq, ending more than two decades of US military presence. Since the 2003 invasion, the US-Iraq relationship has been defined by this American troop presence. The departure of US troops represents an opportunity to turn the page on the United States’ complicated history in Iraq, but it should not lead to an end of American engagement with Iraq.
Although the Trump administration is implementing the agreement to depart, the timeline for the end of Operation Inherent Resolve, the international military coalition to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), was negotiated by the Biden administration and announced in September 2024. We were both part of the small US negotiating team that worked for nearly a year to reach an agreement with Baghdad that allowed for a phased drawdown of the operation and a transition to bilateral security cooperation. The administration took this approach in an effort to avoid a repeat of the 2011 withdrawal from Iraq and subsequent ISIS takeover of nearly a third of Iraqi territory. We believed that maintaining an ongoing US security presence was critical to American strategic interests and that the United States needed sustained security cooperation with or without Operation Inherent Resolve.
Why Iraq matters now
In the United States, Iraq fatigue has long set in after years of heavy US military engagement, billions of dollars spent, and thousands of American and Iraqi lives lost. For many Americans, Iraq is the one of the original “forever wars,” and the US withdrawal from Iraq aligns with President Donald Trump’s vision of reducing the overall US military footprint in the Middle East.
The milestone will be celebrated by many Iraqis and by the Iranians, who have long sought the departure of US troops from Iraq and the region. The US invasion that toppled Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein removed Tehran’s greatest regional nemesis and paved the way for Iran to increase its influence in Iraq economically, politically, and militarily. Iraq’s Iran-backed militias grew in strength and numbers in the years that followed, providing a potent tool for Iran’s asymmetric defense. Iraq’s current prime minister, Ali al-Zaidi, has pledged to disarm these rogue militias—a tall but not insurmountable task, if the United States and key regional powers are ready to play the long game in Iraq.
The argument for remaining engaged in Iraq is about more than the US “blood and treasure” already spent in Iraq; it’s about long-term US strategic interests. For more than a decade, each US president has attempted to pivot to Asia and reduce US focus on the Middle East. Each administration has found itself drawn back as a result of regional crises. Whether it was the return of US troops to defeat ISIS, regional escalation following Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attacks, or the US-Israel war with Iran, the United States has enduring interests in the Middle East that have kept and will continue to keep the US engaged in the region.
What the US should do next
That this withdrawal comes amid a protracted US conflict with Iran highlights the very reasons that the United States should not disengage from Iraq. Earlier this month, Iran-backed Iraqi militias attacked a Saudi pipeline, and they have launched numerous attacks on US personnel and bases in the region throughout this war. These attacks are an important reminder that what happens in Iraq does not stay in Iraq. Whether it was the first Gulf War, the Iraq War, or the fight against ISIS, Iraq’s stability has always had a broader regional impact. With its 45 million people and enormous oil and gas resources, Iraq will be a player in the region’s economy and can be a force for stability… or instability.
Some in Washington might argue that Iraq is already lost to Iran. They argue that continued US engagement will yield only limited gains. We don’t see it that way. Even as Iraq has faded from the American consciousness, the United States remains top of mind for Iraq’s political class, which views the United States as a pivotal counterweight to Iranian overreach and a critical economic lifeline. The United States does not need thousands of troops to shift the balance.
The US can advance its bilateral security cooperation with a small but capable team of security advisers, a robust US diplomatic presence—including a confirmed ambassador—and an active effort to expand US commercial ties in the country. The days of weekly calls between the American president and Iraqi prime minister are long over, but continued high-level touchpoints from senior US officials are sufficient to further US priorities. In an era when US policymakers are focused on more cautious accounting of risks and rewards, a modest investment of US time and attention can produce significant dividends for US interests.
We have both engaged extensively with Iraq’s most senior politicians—Shia, Sunni, and Kurd. There is broad support for the relationship with the United States across the political spectrum, even from those with the closest political and economic ties to Iran. Iraq’s Shia leaders may have religious and political linkages to Iran, but they also have their own distinct interests. While Iraq’s political leaders have not always acceded to US demands, they have made decisions that advanced Iraqi interests, even when those decisions are at the expense of Iranian interests.
