Bottom lines up front
- In fragile post-Assad Syria, prioritizing unity at any cost in the short term could undermine cohesion in the long term.
- To build a better model, Syria must avoid the mistake made in Iraq and Lebanon: allocating government positions based on sectarian quotas.
- Strengthening local governance and allowing members of local communities from all religious and ethnic groups to participate in decision-making offer the most promising avenues towards inclusion.
Emerging from fifty-four years of dictatorship and thirteen years of war, Syria is in a transition phase during which the interim authorities face a series of daunting tasks: rebuilding state institutions, establishing a new political model, and redefining citizenship. Political inclusivity and a representation system that Syrian citizens consider fair are essential to guarantee durable peace and stability.
Former President Bashar al-Assad maintained power by instrumentalizing sectarian divisions. Doing the opposite by integrating all groups of the Syrian society into a new political project would strengthen the new state and the interim authorities. It would also fulfill the Syrian revolutionary slogan “the people are one.”
In the first phase of the transition, the interim authorities—who belong to the Sunni majority—have focused on stabilizing the state. Rather than integration, they have prioritized a unitary political model with a unifying narrative over a genuinely inclusive mode of governance. Seeking to move on from civil war and avoid divisions, the interim authorities have avoided establishing policies centered on specific communities and have tended to downplay the diversity of Syrian society.
In the first key steps of the transition, the ruling authorities have resorted to strong executive power, relying on majoritarian rule and keeping decision-making to a tight inner circle of loyalists. As a result, many Syrians who do not belong to their core constituency have reproached them for monopolizing power. While the authorities’ approach risks excluding members of some communities and concentrating power, potentially leading to an outburst of violence, this transition period still offers a unique opportunity to establish a new political model in Syria.
However, in developing a new, inclusive political model, authorities should not replicate the models of neighboring Iraq and Lebanon. Both countries adopted power-sharing agreements granting top government positions based on sectarian and ethnic affiliation. This mechanism ensured the representation of all communities but fueled poor governance, political deadlock, and violence.
While a power-sharing system based on religious and ethnic quotas might seem to be a straightforward way to guarantee participation by members of all groups, it will likely result in the same failure in Syria as that seen in neighboring countries. In addition, such a system does not offer guarantees against monopolization of power. Therefore, Syria should refrain from developing a political system centered on religious or ethnic identities but instead develop a new model of political inclusivity.
To build a new and inclusive political system that overcomes religious and ethnic affiliations, and to foster long-term stability, the authorities should develop mechanisms guaranteeing open and competitive political processes and rely on strengthened local governance—building an inclusive state from the bottom up.
This issue brief seeks to explore how the Syrian authorities have approached decision-making and power sharing in the early stage of the transition and how they can develop a system that guarantees inclusivity.
A unitary state to avoid division
Lessons from the Iraqi power-sharing system
In December 2024, Syria found itself facing a similar dilemma to the one Iraqi and US transitional authorities faced in 2003: deciding what political model to adopt after decades of dictatorship and rule by a minority group, as members of the majority group took power in a country with diverse religious and ethnic groups.
The United States and the Iraqi opposition-in-exile imposed a governance system, called muhasasa ta’ifiya, or “consociationalism,” without a consensus among Iraqis inside the country. This system establishes power sharing through the allocation of government and administration positions along ethnic and sectarian lines.1Toby Dodge, “Muhasasa Ta’ifiya and its Others: Domination and Contestation in Iraq’s Political Field,” Project on Middle East Political Science, George Washington University, October 2019, https://pomeps.org/muhasasa-taifiya-and-its-others-domination-and-contestation-in-iraqs-political-field With ethno-sectarian quotas and de-Ba’athification, the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 formalized ethno-sectarian identities as a defining feature of the institutional and electoral system.2De-Ba’athification was a policy initiated by the US provisional authority that consisted of outlawing Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party and dismissing senior members from their government positions, as well as dissolving the military and the intelligence services. As a result, hundreds of thousands of men—overwhelmingly Sunnis—were excluded from state institutions According to this political arrangement, the prime minister is a member of the Shia Muslim majority (about 54 percent of the population), the speaker of the parliament is a Sunni, and the president is a Kurd. Ministries and senior positions in the administration are also divided, with each political party (which represent different communities) claiming positions.
The 2005 constitution and its attendant system of liberal consociationalism aimed to foster consensus and ensure the fair representation and participation of all communities while preventing one group from dominating the political sphere. However, in practice, this system led to a Shia domination of the state apparatus and fueled discrimination against Sunni Arabs (about 22 percent of the population). The muhasasa ta’ifiya system has had damaging consequences for both political life—with harmful effects on social cohesion—and institutions. First, it has structured Iraqi politics along religious and ethnic identities, empowering political parties on the basis of identity rather than ideology.3IbidTherefore, politicians have focused on mobilizing their narrow social base to secure its vote, instead of working with other communities and pursuing the national interest. This has contributed to weakening Iraqi national identity and the concept of citizenship.
Second, once party members are awarded government or administrative positions, they gain access to state resources that they exploit to their own benefit and to maintain their power, creating a patronage network within their community. This system has nurtured nepotism and corruption—which, in turn, has undermined institutions, placing political parties as intermediaries between the population and state institutions. These detrimental practices have weakened good governance and diminished the state’s capacity to deliver public goods. Last, inequalities and discrimination produced in the muhasasa ta’ifiya system have led to a violent conflict pitting communities against each other. Sectarian violence engulfed the country in a civil war that culminated between 2006 and 2008 and resulted in the death of tens of thousands of Iraqis, displacement of several millions, and segregation of Shia and Sunni areas.4The Iraqi Ministry of Health recorded 87,215 violent deaths between January 1, 2005, and February 28, 2009. “Secret Tally Has 87,215 Iraqis Dead,” Associated Press, April 24, 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20090428153259/http:/hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/M/ML_IRAQ_DEATH_TOLL?SITE=AP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT; “Iraq: Latest Return Survey Shows Few Intending to Go Home Soon,” United Nations High Commission for Refugees,” April 29, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20080905005407/http:/www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/iraq?page=briefing&id=4816ef534In the following years, heightened sectarianism in Iraq, marginalization of Sunnis, state failure, and political violence paved the way for the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).
The Iraqi case illustrates the danger of identity politics and how structuring a political system around ethno-sectarian lines can be harmful for state institutions and governance, as well as for social cohesion and stability. The Iraqi example demonstrates why Syria should not adopt a quota system but should instead seek to unify the country and the population.
The imperative of unifying post-conflict Syria
Learning the lessons from Iraq, the interim authorities in Syria have taken opposite stances. Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, who was a member of al-Qaeda in Iraq in the early years of the transition after Saddam Hussein’s toppling, has refused to introduce religious or ethnic quotas in the new Syrian institutions. He believes that such quotas were responsible for the violence that engulfed Iraq during its transition.
Since the first days of the Syrian transition, Sharaa has prioritized unification of territory and the reduction of divisions between geographic areas, communities, and armed factions.
The first challenge was to unify the four de facto partitioned areas: the area that was under Assad’s control, the northern area under pro-Turkish opposition groups’ control, Idlib province, and the northeast. Article 1 of the Constitutional Declaration, released on March 13, 2025, emphasizes the unity of the Syria state as an “indivisible geographical and political unit.” In parallel, the new authorities have carefully adopted an inclusive narrative in their speeches, denouncing Assad’s sectarian approach and stressing the unity of the country. For example, during his visit to the United States in November 2025, Sharaa told TheWashington Post: “There are individual interests of certain groups that want to have independence or autonomy. Some of those parties, they want to find justification for their interests, so they use their denomination or their faith as an umbrella … In Syria, we have been living in coexistence with different groups, different religious groups, for 1,400 years. We’re still existing, and we still have that diversity.”5Susannah George and Tobi Raji, “Syrian President Details Plans to Work with the Americans He Once Fought,” Washington Post, November 11, 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/11/11/ahmed-al-sharaa-syria-us/
When appointing the transitional government in March 2025, Sharaa included members beyond the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) affiliates to whom he was closest politically. Fewer than half of the ministers were members of or linked to HTS. The rest of the ministers belong to civil society and included a Christian, an Alawite, a Kurd, and a Druze—yet Sharaa appointed them as individuals rather than as representatives of their respective communities. In the meantime, Sharaa assigned HTS members to key positions: as advisers in ministries, as district directors in charge of security, and in the Directorate of Political Affairs. This parallel structure of power has allowed Sharaa to tightly control the state, resulting in a monopolization of power by Sharaa and HTS affiliates.
In defense and security, Sharaa has unified the security forces, restructuring the army and reining in factions. The interim authorities have disarmed rival factions and incorporated them into the Ministry of Defense, diluting potential competing forces. The authorities have appliedthe same process to the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) after the integration agreement of January 29, 2026, integrating Kurdish fighters into the Ministry of Defense on an individual basis rather than importing existing fighting units whole.
More broadly, unlike the previous regime’s manipulation of sectarianism, the new authorities have not used identities to structure the Syrian state or society. In their commitment to overcoming the fragmentation and sectarianism that characterized the past decade, the interim authorities have avoided creating policies for specific communities, even if that has sometimes overlooked the needs of these communities.
Yet as the authorities have sought to unify the country and consolidate their power, they have monopolized the state and institutions, leaving little space for competing views and for genuinely including actors with different backgrounds in decision-making.
The Syrian model: Majoritarian rule and no power sharing
Syrian authorities’ efforts to avoid sectarian policies and unify the country could have been the first step toward sharing power. Instead, their practice of power has been dominated by majoritarian rule against a backdrop of increased assertiveness by Sunni revolutionaries.6Marie Forestier, “In a sectarian Syria, the winners should refrain from taking all,” Atlantic Council, July 24, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/in-a-sectarian-syria-the-winners-should-refrain-from-taking-all/ This approach has undermined inclusivity and has exacerbated mistrust among some communities, triggering episodes of sectarian mobilization and violence. In response to these episodes, the authorities have tightened control over their constituency through state institutions and have sought to bring other communities under a security architecture. This approach has ensured overall stability but has failed to develop a pluralistic national political project.
The risks of majoritarian rule and the assertiveness of Sunni revolutionaries
In post-Assad Syria, the moderate to conservative Sunni lower and middle classes, which formed the backbone of the revolution, have become increasingly assertive in the public space. After years of marginalization of the Sunni community, its political and social mobilization has become a defining feature of post-Assad Syria in a “winner takes all” approach. At the political level, Sunnis make up the majority of the new ruling elite, filling most of the government and high-level administration positions as well as the ranks of the new army.
While armed jihadist radicalism has gradually been contained, a new form of radicalism has emerged. It is rooted within the Sunni majority that forms the authorities’ own social base and now constitutes one of the main pillars of the new political order.
This new radicalism is ideological and social. It manifests in several ways and is reinforced by weak state institutions. It is driven partly by a desire for revenge inherited from the civil war, both directed against minorities and driven by intra-Sunni rivalries. As revenge attacks, protests, and mobilizations against those perceived to be part of or allied with the old regime have increased, the government has faced the difficult task of balancing revolutionary expectations with the requirements of institutional continuity and political stability.
This new radicalism has led to collective mobilization targeting other communities in the first year of the transition. Violence that erupted in Alawite-majority areas in the Syrian coast in March 2025 and in a Druze majority area in Suwayda in July 2025 illustrates this dynamic. Although the authorities appeared to occasionally encourage local mobilization—especially tribal mobilization in Suwayda—they also risked losing control over the local forces they mobilized, resulting in massacres and revenge killings. These episodes reveal the ambiguities of a government seeking to mobilize its social base while preventing escalation. Collective mobilization and its potential destabilizing effects became particularly visible during the wave of protests against the reintegration of ex-regime figures into public life in June 2026. Therefore, the authorities face a structural governance dilemma. While HTS’s governance model in Idlib relied on negotiation, compromise, and gradual deradicalization, replicating this approach at the national level has proven far more difficult as segments of the Sunni majority experience what can be described as an “identity overheating.”7Patrick Haenni and Jerome Drevon, “From Jihadism to ‘Sunni Supremacism’: How State Capture Is Redefining Radicalism in Syria,” Middle East Review (Revue Moyen-Orient) 68; “Syria: Year Zero,” IISMM, 2025This overheating consists of intensifying communal demands for revenge, expectations of justice that are really a desire for retribution, and assertion of the majority’s dominance.8Forestier, “In a sectarian Syria”
This new form of radicalism has prevented any progress on inclusion and might threaten the country’s stabilization. From a security perspective, authorities fear that radicalized constituencies—in addition to violence within Syria—could undertake unauthorized military actions, particularly against Israel, exposing Syria to retaliatory escalation that could endanger the survival of the new political order.
Containing the downward spiral
Facing the risk of instability, the authorities have prioritized controlling their constituency to avoid outbursts of violence. To preserve what they describe as civil peace and social cohesion, Syria’s new authorities have sought to rebuild political consensus among the Sunni majority, leaving little space for other communities. This approach has combined discreet reforms and the strengthening of social and institutional oversight, in order to contain radical Sunni identity-based discourses and instill stability as a new political order is being consolidated (as HTS did in Idlib after 2016). Several state institutions have played central roles in this process. First, building a national army has been a way to depoliticize former combatants and limit the influence of more radical members. The challenge of integrating them is particularly significant when it comes to the approximately five thousand foreign fighters (muhajirun) present in Syria, many of whom have been integrated into the Ministry of Defense. Incorporation into state institutions is a mechanism of control, surveillance, and political normalization. Still, aside from the integration of former SDF troops mandated by the January 2026 agreement, recruits for the new army have come almost exclusively from the Sunni community, raising concerns about the possibility of a Sunni-only army.9Mohammed Hassan, “Building Syria’s New Army: Future Plans and the Challenges Ahead,” Middle East Institute, June 12, 2025, https://mei.edu/publication/building-syrias-new-army-future-plans-and-challenges-ahead/
Authorities have also focused on placing religion under state supervision. By doing so, they have sought to prevent the spread of doctrinal radicalism (particularly takfiri practices used to legitimize exclusion, coercion, or violence against those designated as unbelievers), limit the instrumentalization of religion, and ultimately ensure coexistence between religious communities. In the absence of a new constitution, the relationship between state and religion remains largely undefined and is being shaped through everyday governance.
In addition, following communal violence in Homs, Hama, the coastal region, and Suwayda, the authorities realized the risks posed by autonomous tribal mobilization. The creation of a Bureau of Tribes and Clans in September 2025 reflects an attempt to integrate tribal elites into the new order while controlling independent armed mobilization and granting a mediation and stabilization role to existing tribal structures and leaders.
The challenge of integrating all communities in the new Syria
In this context, the approach of Syria’s new authorities toward different communities has not been shaped by an inclusive political vision but through a security and stability lens. The leadership is aware that an overtly majoritarian or identitarian posture would risk encouraging ethnic and religious groups to adopt self-defense strategies or rely on external actors. It would also undermine diplomatic normalization efforts, reducing prospects for reconstruction assistance. For example, the Druze community’s growing tactical alignment with Israel amid regional insecurity illustrates the type of outcome Damascus seeks to avoid, as authorities fear being dragged into a fresh conflict that creates a pretext for further Israeli operations.
Since the fall of the Assad regime, ethnic and religious groups have attempted to negotiate new guarantees for representation, protection, and autonomy. The ruling authorities, however, have rejected substantial forms of political autonomy, opting instead for limited mechanisms of incorporation of individual members of groups into existing institutions.
Meanwhile, the marginalization of diverse religious and ethnic groups is due partly to the new ruling elite originating mainly from former revolutionary and insurgent networks. Access to influence has been shaped less by communal identity alone than by previous participation in the revolutionary struggle—a sort of revolutionary social and political capital—and by the capacity of actors to access and negotiate with the central authorities. Groups possessing military or territorial leverage have generally secured better outcomes than others. The Kurdish case illustrates this dynamic. Since 2025, Kurdish actors gradually shifted from demands for broad autonomy toward a more pragmatic strategy focused on negotiated integration into state institutions. This shift was dramatically—and somewhat unwillingly—accelerated in January 2026 under pressure from both Damascus’s military offensive and the uprising of the Arab population in the northeast. Negotiations with the government have focused on administrative representation, integration into the state security forces, and the incorporation of northeastern Syria into national governance structures.10Four Kurdish brigades are being established, each comprising approximately 1,300 fighters, while several thousand Asayish personnel are expected to be incorporated into Syria’s General Security DirectorateThe agreement concluded with the SDF in January 2026 represents a significant milestone in this process, guaranteeing the abovementioned incorporation as well as Kurdish language and citizenship rights.
However, the situation remains more fragile in coastal areas. Violence against the Alawite community in March 2025 undermined the credibility of the government’s narrative about social cohesion and exposed the limits of state protection. The authorities have since relied on local mediation networks, security measures, and limited reintegration initiatives, including facilitating returns of displaced populations and restoring access to public-sector employment that was stripped in the immediate aftermath of the Assad regime’s fall. Yet the absence of a clear framework for Alawite political inclusion has limited these efforts significantly.
Still, in many areas with diverse ethnic and religious groups the main immediate challenge is social and economic rather than political. Impoverishment, weak public services, and limited economic opportunities continue to fuel insecurity and local tensions. In the absence of necessary resources for large-scale reconstruction and integration policies, the government has often overlooked these issues while pursuing a security-focused approach. While some forms of violence have decreased, a new pattern of economic predation, property disputes, and marginalization in informal redistribution of resources has emerged.
Similar shortcomings have affected the relationship between the authorities and the Druze. Following the violence in Suwayda in July 2025, Damascus has prioritized local security deals rather than a broader political settlement. Elsewhere—including in Shia localities and mixed areas such as Homs province and the al-Ghab plain (Hama province)—desire for revenge, land disputes, displacement, and economic competition continue to fuel post-conflict tensions.
Overall, the authorities have sought to manage relations with ethnic and religious groups through stabilization and security rather than through meaningful political and socioeconomic integration. While this approach might contain the short-term risk of destabilization, it has politically and economically marginalized many members of ethnic and religious groups, limiting prospects for the long-term social cohesion and inclusion necessary for enduring national stability.
Overcoming identity affiliation and strengthening local governance
For the transition to lead to durable peace, it is necessary to build a political system that can represent the interests of all Syrians, with legitimacy and resilience rooted in inclusivity instead of majoritarian rule, and to share power at both the national and local levels. Limiting inclusivity to quotas or appointments of members of diverse groups in high-level positions is unlikely to achieve this goal.
Institutions and representation mechanisms
First, it is essential to develop a shared concept of citizenship in the new Syria and a social contract that brings Syrian society and the authorities together. While this process will take years and require significant collective effort and commitment, defining Syrian citizenship is necessary to genuinely unite individuals nationwide. Imposing unity from the top risks exacerbating tensions between religious and ethnic groups. In order to reach a consensus as large as possible, the definition of citizenship should be reached through dialogue and consultation.
Second, institutions and representation mechanisms—if carefully designed—can contribute to broad inclusion beyond narrow religious or ethnic categories, encompassing political affiliation and diverse social groups. As voting is an essential step to designate representatives in post-conflict settings, the design of the electoral system can foster inclusivity. While there is no consensus among experts on the most suitable electoral systems and they are context dependent, systems encouraging coalition building and broad appeals to voters usually foster inclusion of various groups. Incentivizing candidates to obtain votes beyond their community and to defend broader interests will help overcome the danger of entrenching a politics structured along sectarian lines.11Sumit Bisarya, et al., “Inclusive Peacebuilding in Conflict-Affected States: Designing for Democracy’s Resilience” in “The Global State of Democracy 2017: Exploring Democracy’s Resilience,” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2017, https://www.idea.int/gsod-2017/files/IDEA-GSOD-2017-CHAPTER-8-EN.pdf Depending on the context, proportional representation can be a useful tool to allow representation of various groups.12Andrew Reynolds, “Electoral system and the protection and participation of minorities”, Minority Rights Group International, 2006, https://minorityrights.org/resources/electoral-systems-and-the-protection-and-participation-of-minorities/ Nawar Najma, the spokesperson of the High Electoral Committee, argued that adopting small electoral districts should foster representation of religious and ethnic groups because, in Syria, most of them (except Christians) are concentrated in specific geographic areas.13Alaraby Plus / Syria TV, “Surya Ta7ki,” YouTube, April, 8, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/live/K2F6pwnuqOU Because the stakes are high, the design of the new Syrian electoral system requires thinking, expertise, and consultation.
Questions remain about how the Syrian authorities are moving gradually from the current phase of the transition—characterized by informal decision-making processes—to a second phase of consolidation during which formal institutions are supposed to drive inclusive policies. The composition of the parliament, which results from a nomination process, does not suggest an attempt to hand HTS a parliamentary majority, to genuinely share power, or to create a parliament that reflects Syria’s ethnic, religious, and political diversity. Instead, the composition of the parliament appears to balance the constituencies that make up the coalition that ousted Assad and the main political, military, and social networks that emerged from the revolution. Members of various religious and ethnic communities who have been appointed by Sharaa are closely aligned with the government and some members of their communities do not consider them representative. As the parliament has started to convene, it must produce a vast body of legislation because the legal framework needs a comprehensive overhaul. Political parties will be instrumental in monitoring legislative work and legal reform efforts. Their positioning on key issues, as debated in the parliament, will structure the post-Assad political life. However, parties cannot currently register because the parliament needs to adopt a new law on political parties to replace the law of 2011. Adopted under Assad, the 2011 law prohibited parties established on “religious, sectarian, tribal or regional basis.”14“The Party not being founded on religious, sectarian, tribal or regional grounds, or on the grounds of discrimination based on race, sex, or color.” Art 5.4, Legislative Decree No. 100 of 2011, Political Parties Law, https://urbanlex.unhabitat.org/laws/syria/establishing-political-parties-73606 The interim authorities are wary that political parties might reflect religious and ethnic interests, as Iraqi political parties have done in Iraq, destabilizing the transition. It is therefore crucial that future political parties represent all Syrians and are structured around national issues. In this regard, incentives such as the electoral system would be more appropriate than adopting restrictive language in the future law. Meanwhile, alliances that will develop in the People’s Assembly during votes on new laws will give some indications of which alliances could be the basis for political parties.
Local governance: An opportunity for inclusion and representativity
Strengthening local governance constitutes a critical dimension of Syria’s political transition. It provides one of the main channels through which local communities can participate in decision-making and therefore represents an important mechanism for the political inclusion of diverse religious and ethnic groups. In a country deeply fractured by years of conflict, establishing representative local institutions and developing consultative decision-making processes is essential to rebuild trust between the state and a diverse society. Although the new authorities have consistently emphasized the importance of national unity, they have struggled to translate this objective into genuinely inclusive local governance. Political participation has remained constrained by highly centralized decision-making, while effective local representation mechanisms are still being built.
As the new authorities have adopted majoritarian rule and concentrated power at the national level, this has been reflected at the local level, where officials appointed by the government have concentrated power. Supported by political affairs offices, governors consult local notables, tribal leaders, and community representatives before appointing local officials. Most appointees so far belong to the government’s constituencies and are aligned with them. In areas where other religious and ethnic groups make up the majority of the population, some of these groups’ members have been appointed, but they are often considered unrepresentative of their community and have limited influence. As a result, members of religious and ethnic groups have felt excluded from local decision-making.
This is a missed opportunity in terms of inclusion. As noted earlier, most religious and ethnic groups in Syria (except Christians) are concentrated in specific geographic areas. Therefore, selecting members of local bodies in a way that allows all local communities to be represented would allow members of all religious and ethnic groups to join local governance institutions and participate in decision-making.
To enhance local political participation, authorities should gradually hold local elections or, at a minimum, use broader and more transparent consultation mechanisms when forming local councils. Organizing local elections requires reforming Law No. 107 (2011) on Local Administration, which should be a priority for the new parliament. Local elections would not only enhance the legitimacy of local institutions but help address the persistent lack of trust expressed by some communities.
In addition to building trust between the new authorities and local communities, granting effective power to members of local councils and other local bodies is a necessary condition for genuine inclusion in local governance structures. Currently, these bodies’ limited ability to influence local public policies discourages meaningful participation. To gain the support of their constituencies, they must be able to shape local decisions and obtain results. Local power sharing would not only be a virtuous governance practice but would improve various ethnic and religious groups’ trust toward the government and eventually foster support for it.
Including members of religious and ethnic groups in local decision-making would also link their political participation to local issues—such as public services, infrastructure, reconstruction, and economic development—which would allow the emergence of a public debate centered on those shared issues that transcends sectarian identities. Local governance therefore offers one of the most promising avenues for transforming Syria’s transition from a predominantly security-driven process into a genuinely inclusive political settlement.
Conclusion
Syria’s transition illustrates the complexity of rebuilding a state after prolonged authoritarian rule and a devastating civil war. Rather than adopting the sectarian power-sharing arrangements implemented in neighboring Iraq and Lebanon, the new authorities have sought to restore national unity through a unitary model of governance that rejects formal ethnic and religious quotas. This choice has enabled the reconstitution of state institutions and has prevented the institutionalization of communal divisions. This unifying approach has been combined with a concentration of power within a narrow circle of HTS affiliates and revolutionary elites, limiting meaningful political participation and undermining perceptions of inclusivity.
The Syrian experience therefore highlights the limits of both consociationalism and majoritarian rule. While identity-based power sharing risks entrenching sectarian politics, leading to patronage and institutional paralysis, an excessively centralized system relying on the legitimacy of a victorious majority might result in new forms of exclusion and deepen mistrust among communities. The challenge facing Syria is not to choose between these two imperfect models but to develop institutions capable of representing political, social, and territorial diversity without reducing citizens to their religious or ethnic affiliations.
Achieving this objective requires moving beyond the current transition phase, which has been dominated largely by security imperatives and informal decision-making. The gradual establishment of representative institutions, competitive political parties with a national agenda, an inclusive electoral framework, and stronger local governance practice will be essential to transform state consolidation into sustainable political legitimacy and durable peace. Equally important will be the state’s ability to deliver public services, reduce socioeconomic inequalities, and rebuild citizens’ confidence in public institutions.
Ultimately, the success of the Syrian transition will depend less on its capacity to maintain security than on its ability to construct a new social contract founded on citizenship, accountability, and equal political participation. Whether governance can evolve from a model centered on territorial control and revolutionary legitimacy toward one based on meaningful inclusion, political pluralism, and participative governance will determine both the success of the transition and the long-term prospects for national reconciliation and stability. The inclusion of diverse religious and ethnic groups will remain one of the most decisive tests of this evolution, as it encapsulates the broader challenge of building a state that is simultaneously unified, representative, and resilient.
About the authors
Marie Forestier is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She is also a senior adviser for the European Institute of Peace, where she provides strategic policy advice to diplomats and international stakeholders on the Syrian transition, peace building, and conflict resolution.
Arthur Quesnay is a doctor in political sciences and affiliated to Panthéon-Sorbonne University (Paris 1, CESSP). He is an expert on Syria and Iraq. His publications include The Iraqi Civil War: Partisan Factions and Identity Politics in Kirkuk (2003–2020) (Karthala, 2021) and Civil War in Syria : Mobilization and Competing Social Orders (Cambridge University Press, 2018) with Adam Baczko and Gilles Dorronsoro.
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Image: A Syrian Kurdish child holds a sign reading "From the heart of Jabal al-Arab beats the voice of freedom" during a protest in solidarity with people in Sweida, after scores of people have been killed this week in violence in and around the predominantly Druze city of Sweida, pitting fighters from the Druze minority against government security forces and members of Bedouin tribes, in Qamishli, Syria July 17, 2025. REUTERS/Orhan Qereman