This summer, a US-backed campaign aimed at Iranian regime change seemed possible. While that is now unlikely, further covert operations by Israel remain probable, and future US involvement is not out of the question. Iran plays a significant role in Middle Eastern geopolitics, so even barring dramatic near-term action, policymakers should develop and maintain a sober, accurate mapping of the population.
To that end, some initial points ought to be registered: Iran is far from a monolithic country, a new Shah may not be a realistic or suitable solution, and efforts to reform or topple the current regime are as complex and diverse as Iran’s citizens and diaspora communities. What follows is a brief illustration of two key regions.
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Rojhelat
Rojhelat, which translates to ‘east’ in Kurdish, is commonly used to refer to Kurdish-inhabited areas in present-day Iran. While figures are inevitably estimates, Kurds assess the population as about twelve-million, and Kurdish discontent has been consistent for decades across Iranian government systems. Over the summer I spoke to several community activists and analysts living abroad; some wished to remain anonymous due to Iran’s history of transnational attacks.
Zhila Mostajer, spokesperson and co-founder of the Oslo-based Hengaw organization, told me, “American audiences and international institutions must understand discrimination and repression against nationalities and religious or cultural minorities in Iran. Human rights violations are not temporary trends but part of a structural and organized state policy.”
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The Jin, Jiyan, Azadi (Kurdish for women, life, freedom) movement began in Kurdish-majority areas in 2022 after Jina Amini was killed in Tehran by the morality police, sparking massive outcry. For Kurds, Jina’s ethnicity was paramount, and many bristle when she is called Mahsa (her Persian name). A European-based activist explained to me:
“During the Jina protests, when we highlighted the harsh violence in Kurdish areas, Persian anti-regime activists told us to stop causing disunity. We were criticized for saying that Jina was killed because she was Kurdish. But in Iran, it is Kurds being shot or handed death sentences, far more than those from Tehran. We are not granted space to own our narrative, so violence is made invisible. We have been against this regime from the start. But Kurds must be allowed to represent themselves. It is a monologue, not a dialogue.”
Kurdish activists and civil society representatives expressed, first and foremost, heightened frustration with Iran’s diaspora anti-regime voices. Samira Ghaderi, a Kurdish-American attorney, said that “many Iranian monarchists demand commitment to a ‘unified Iran’ as a prerequisite for cooperation, but Kurds see this as a continuation of the centralized, nationalist model that has historically repressed them.”
“Without recognizing the Kurdish people’s right to meaningful autonomy, federalism or even confederalism, calls for territorial integrity will be seen as a tool of domination rather than unity,” she added.
All of the activists and analysts I spoke with want anti-regime activists to validate their complaints regarding the regime’s targeting of Kurds rather than stress Iranian unity.
Some referred to the current Pahlavi restoration movement as the ultranationalist, threatening vestiges of a former dictatorship, and a European activist was alarmed that Pahlavi claims the support of prospective Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) defectors. Minority diaspora communities appear frustrated and surprised by the friendly reception the Shah’s son has received from Western media and the international community, given the family’s history of corruption and dictatorial tendencies.
One activist noted that during and immediately after the Iran-Israel conflict, Kurds were holding their breath. Hengaw’s documentation illustrates that regime pressure against minorities sharply intensified after the war, for example through increases in Kurdish arrests and violent raids of Baha’i homes. Three Kurds were executed on June 25, and five Kurds were handed death sentences on vague charges on July 10 amid fear of widespread crackdowns. Schilan Kurdpoor, a German-based activist, pointed out that during and shortly after the Iran-Israel conflict, the IRGC flooded into Kurdish regions to prevent an uprising and imprison Jin, Jiyan, Azadi protesters.
It is not clear whether policy-makers in Israel or the United States weighed the consequences of this conflict in terms of heightened human rights abuses on marginalized populations in Iran. A British-based analyst told me that “Kurds, whether in Iraq, Iran, or Syria, see themselves as US and Western allies … I think leaving this regime in power is a catastrophic mistake.”
“While it has been badly crippled, it will recover over the next five to ten years thanks mostly to its oil revenue, and the West and Israel will have to deal with another major escalation, most likely with someone who comes after Ayatollah Khamenei,” he said.
Balochistan
While the Jin, Jiyan, Azadi movement began in Rojhelat, it quickly spread throughout Iran. In Balochistan, this roughly coincided with a local issue. A week before Amini’s murder, a fifteen-year old Balochi girl was taken to an interview with Ebrahim Khouchakzai, IRGC Police Commander in Chahabar. There had been a murder in her neighborhood, and she was summoned as a potential witness. After the interview, she told her parents that she was raped by Khouchakzai, and the family then sought community support. At Friday prayers in Rask, Imam Naghshbandi referred publicly to the alleged violation. He later stated that it was his duty to break the silence. This incident, together with the Jin, Jiyan, Azadi movement, spurred protests throughout Balochistan. The IRGC responded by firing live rounds at protesters—Balochis refer to this as bloody Friday. A Balochi Human Rights Group (BHRG) spokesperson noted that the IRGC barred doctors and nurses from providing treatment to protesters, and many died due to lack of medical care.
Prominent Balochi activist, Rahim Bandoui, told me: “The American public needs to know that Iran is not one nation. We do not have one language, one culture, or even one history.”
Bandoui recounts the historical privilege of Persian elite and twelver Shia adherents over all others in Iran, particularly following the 1921 coup and furthered through the Pahlavi dynasty. He explains, “all Iranian citizens became insiders or outsiders—and in particular Balochi, Kurds, and Arabs became outsiders. Balochis do not trust Persian government rule, and Persian governments have never trusted Balochi people.”
Balochistan first fell under Tehran’s control in the early 1800s, and successive Iranian administrations have refrained from meaningful investment in Balochi regions.
Bandoui is skeptical of a new [Pahlavi] Shah as a solution. “The problem is that he is not accepting Iran as a multi-ethnic, multinational country. We seek a federation or a confederation, nothing short of that. We want decentralization, and we doubt any oppressed minority nationalities in Iran will support him.”
While some estimates put the Balochi population as low as 2 percent of Iran’s population, others put the figure as high as 4.8 million. A BHRG spokesperson told me that hundreds of thousands of Balochis in Iran are denied government identification, complicating population estimates and preventing many from getting jobs, opening bank accounts, or traveling. The undocumented are especially vulnerable to abuse by government authorities, who allegedly confiscate their property with impunity.
On July 1, Iranian security forces reportedly stormed the small village of Gunich, ostensibly to round up Israeli agents. Several villagers were shot, at least two women were killed, a pregnant mother lost her baby, and protesters were arrested. But according to Bandoui, the Israel-Iran conflict is not the Balochi’s fight.
“The regime is always after excuses to attack or kill. But the fight between Israel and the Iranian regime has nothing to do with Kurds or Balochis. The regime spent all Iran’s wealth on its military weapons and on proxies like Hezbollah and Hamas, and always said ‘death to Israel’. They wanted this fight, they wanted the Shia crescent, and October 7 was done with their support. For Balochis, we care about the people inside Iran. This is not between Iranian people and Israeli people or between Islam and Judaism. This is between Khamenei and Israel.”
According to the BHRG spokesperson, the Iran-Israel conflict has only intensified what was already happening: arrests, executions, extrajudicial killings of Balochi fuel carriers, and imprisonment of undocumented Balochis and Afghan refugees.
Bandoui added that “Washington should better understand what is happening throughout Iran, not only in the Farsi-speaking areas. Women in Tehran may be fighting against the mandatory hijab, but in minority areas, it is a daily fight for survival.”
She also said that the regime has been so humiliated in the Iran-Israel war that in the aftermath it is trying to create havoc, pain, and fear to maintain control. Bandoui says that “this regime is now like an injured snake. And the ones who will suffer from this will be Kurds, Arabs, and most certainly, Balochis.”
Considerations for US policy
While the future of US-Iran relations is difficult to chart, given the unpredictable nature of decision-making in both countries, simplified and rosy assessments can lead to unintended and disastrous consequences.
When the United States toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, policy visions–conjectures–proved poor substitutes for what was required: nuanced understanding of the political priorities of various and often competing ethnic and sectarian communities and tribes. Washington will benefit from exposure to voices representing different communities in Iran, with their distinctive goals and orientations. The Iranian nuclear program may currently be top of mind for many external observers, but it is far from the only or even the leading concern for many of Iran’s citizens and diaspora community members.
David Sklar is a consultant specializing in the rights of minority communities in the Middle East and North Africa. He advises the Free Yezidi Foundation and worked at the National Democratic Institute.
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Image: An Iranian-Kurd woman wearing traditional dresses waits to perform in the Global Nowruz Celebration at Azadi Square in western Tehran, Iran, on March 14, 2025. March 21 is International Nowruz Day, proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in 2021. This festival, originating in Persia, is celebrated in countries with significant Persian cultural influence, including Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, India, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Turkey, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. (Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto)NO USE FRANCE
