WASHINGTON—The United States and Europe have missed their deadline to choose Bosnia and Herzegovina’s next high representative, exposing a widening rift over the country’s future.
The permanent post has remained unfilled since German politician Christian Schmidt stepped down on July 1. Washington and Brussels had planned to name a successor by July 14, but have so far failed to agree on who that person should be.
The deadlock is about more than personnel. It reflects competing visions for Bosnia and Herzegovina and for the international community’s role in a country rapidly approaching national elections while trying to advance along its European Union (EU) accession path.
Why the succession impasse matters
The Office of the High Representative oversees the implementation of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its leader can impose laws and remove public officials who obstruct the agreement under authorities known as the “Bonn powers.” Those sweeping powers once earned high representatives the nickname of “Viceroy of Bosnia.”
While it has been more than thirty years since the agreement was signed, supporters of the office warn that Bosnia and Herzegovina still needs an international official to check efforts to weaken state institutions, deepen ethnic divisions, and block much-needed constitutional reform. Opponents of the office—including the Russian state and former Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik—have repeatedly called for the office to be shuttered.
Schmidt’s nearly five-year tenure as high representative underscores the importance of the role when political standoffs occur. His sharpest confrontation came in February 2025, when Dodik was indicted for passing legislation that defied decisions by the high representative. Schmidt’s resignation was reportedly due in part to pressure from Washington, and his departure now opens broader questions about the institution’s future and whether his successor should hold the same authority.
That question divides Washington and Brussels. The Trump administration has declared that the “U.S.-led nation-building era has passed” and is shifting its regional strategy from institution building toward economic cooperation. US officials have also said that the next high representative should have a more limited mandate. By contrast, the EU sees Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession to the bloc as the main issue. European officials argue that accession is central to regional advancement, and the next high representative must therefore continue to press for institutional reform to help move the country toward EU membership.
Where Washington and Brussels diverge
For decades, the office embodied transatlantic cooperation. By unwritten convention, the high representative hailed from Europe, while the principal deputy was typically American. Appointing the high representative was also collaborative: the task falls to the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), whose steering board includes American and European governments.
Now, what once reflected transatlantic consensus has become a source of friction. After the council failed to select a candidate in early June, the US Embassy in Sarajevo cited “European indecisiveness” and “the PIC’s abdication of its own duty” toward Bosnia and Herzegovina. It added that the impasse was “forcing the United States to reconsider our role in the current international presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
The council eventually reached consensus at a June 30 meeting to appoint current Principal Deputy High Representative Louis Crishock, an American diplomat, to lead the office temporarily. While he is the second American to serve in an acting capacity, he is the first to assume the office with its full mandate, including the Bonn powers.
According to reports, Washington had backed the Italian diplomat Antonio Zanardi Landi for the permanent role. Many EU member states and the United Kingdom reportedly favored René Troccaz, a French diplomat and the current special envoy to the Western Balkans, in part because of his commitment to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU accession. Italian diplomat Maurizio Massari and Danish diplomat Peter Sørensen were also rumored to be potential candidates who might satisfy both sides.
The disagreement reflects a US policy shift that has been visible for months. The administration’s decision to lift sanctions on Dodik in October 2025 broke with years of US policy. Before that, the United States had largely treated Dodik as a threat to the Dayton framework because of his separatist agenda and repeated challenges to state institutions and the high representative. The United States reportedly cited “constructive actions taken in recent weeks by the National Assembly of Republika Srpska” as contributing to the lifting of sanctions.
European countries have taken a different course. Germany and Austria have imposed entry bans on Dodik and other Republika Srpska leaders, while the United Kingdom also upholds sanctions against Dodik and Željka Cvijanović, the Serb member of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s tripartite presidency. The reversal leaves a fundamental question hanging over US policy: Is Washington pulling back from engagement in the country, and where, if at all, can the United States and EU find common ground in the region?
What the rift means for Bosnia and Herzegovina
Energy has become a major flashpoint. Current US engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina has focused on the development of a US-backed gas pipeline, the Southern Interconnection, which would connect the country to US natural gas via a liquefied natural gas terminal in Croatia. Some in the region have speculated that the United States expects the next high representative to help resolve the issue of the sale of state property in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an issue left unresolved since Dayton in 1995 and one of the conditions for closing the Office of the High Representative. The dispute remains a major barrier to the development of the gas pipeline project.
If authority over state property is transferred exclusively from the state to its entities—the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska—it could weaken state-level institutions’ ability to manage national assets and thus degrade the country’s territorial integrity and cohesion. The EU has already warned that if the special legislation adopted specifically for the gas pipeline project doesn’t align with EU accession standards, it could jeopardize the country’s access to the European energy market and EU funding.
For Brussels, EU accession remains the primary tool for reform. During a recent visit to Sarajevo, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas remarked that the “window of opportunity for accession may not be open forever,” and called for a European high representative capable of moving Bosnia and Herzegovina forward on its EU path. The country has already lost €108 million in EU funding, and it could lose an additional €370 million if it fails to implement required reforms. Those reforms include an overhaul of a constitutional structure that reserves several senior offices for members of the country’s three main ethnic groups—an arrangement the European Court of Human Rights ruled discriminatory in 2009.
The succession debacle has therefore broadcast a larger clash of priorities—and the timing raises the stakes. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s October 4 elections are fast approaching, and the Office of the High Representative retains an important role in election oversight.