The rivalry between Israel and Turkey is neither inevitable nor a consequence of a natural competition between two major regional powers. Instead, it is the byproduct of each country’s attempts at long-term self-preservation and maintaining strategic autonomy through greater regional influence. The West should not confuse Jerusalem’s and Ankara’s objectives to be incompatible and instead find ways of managing rather than entrenching both countries further into this competition.
The newfound rivalry has intensified with the recent upheaval in the Middle East. The outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas in 2023 and the fall of Syria’s longtime dictator Bashar al-Assad in late 2024 created new sources of friction. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan heavily criticized—and at times insulted—Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for his conduct in the war, routinely hosted bilateral meetings with Hamas leaders, and severed nearly all commercial and economic ties with Israel. Erdogan’s primary ideological stance centers on his support for both the Palestinian cause as well as Hamas members, which have caused heightened tensions with Netanyahu. Meanwhile, the Israeli prime minister reciprocated by, among other things, accusing Erdogan of antisemitism and of fueling an oppressive, authoritarian regime.
On the geopolitical front, these frictions have emerged predominately in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean, where both countries seek expanded military and commercial control through active military presence and competing zones of influence. Israel’s recent attack on the Abu Al-Duhur airbase in Syria—which was designed to push back against an anticipated Turkish troop deployment at the base—was perhaps the most dangerous and troubling sign of escalation. In the Eastern Mediterranean, a region where both countries seek to explore offshore energy and establish new and interconnected pipelines, tensions are increasing after Israel pushed ahead on a project to connect Greece and Cyprus’s grids to Israel’s through underground cables. Turkey views Israel’s actions as an attempt to isolate Ankara, which is in desperate need of energy and which claims sole exploration and drilling rights in large parts of Cyprus and Greece’s seabeds.
A history of collaboration
Some argue that the current tensions will become the main source of the region’s insecurities and that this enmity stems from a natural rivalry underpinning Ankara and Jerusalem’s relationship. Ideologically, the underlying tensions over the Palestinian issue will likely remain a challenge, albeit not an insurmountable one. Geopolitically, history teaches a different lesson. Despite Turkey voting against the UN’s partition plan establishing the State of Israel in 1948, it soon after recognized the nascent Jewish state, becoming the first Muslim-majority country to signal openness. Ankara’s decision placed it on a collision course with its Arab neighbors who viewed its strategy as too aligned with the West, creating resentment at a time when Arab nationalism was burgeoning through Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Pan-Arabist ideology. Ankara later joined the Baghdad Pact to close this gap, but its efforts were short-lived after Nasser actively sabotaged it and Iraq faced a military coup and change of leadership.
Meanwhile, David Ben Gurion’s Israel saw in Turkey a potential regional ally given the two countries’ similarities. Two non-Arab countries in an otherwise Arab-majority region, they both had multiparty parliamentary systems, needed Western support, and saw Soviet expansionism as threatening to their national security. As part of Ben Gurion’s “Periphery Doctrine,” which sought to build strategic ties with non-Arab states, Israel offered Turkey to join a secret intelligence-sharing alliance known as Trident. Recognizing the geopolitical leverage it could gain vis-a-vis its Arab neighbors, Turkey accepted the offer, formalizing a de-facto pro-Western bloc that defined the Middle East’s security architecture for decades to come.
Today, the need for self-preservation helps understand the drivers of this newfound rivalry. Both Turkey and Israel shared the common belief that external entities—whether non-state actors like the Kurds or countries like Iran—seek to interfere with their territorial integrity. For Ankara, Kurdish aspirations for autonomy represent a threat, and while the ongoing peace process—which seeks to transform the violent struggle waged by organizations like the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) into a political one—provides optimism, it is far from yielding certain outcomes. Israel, on its part, still operates without fully demarcated borders as disputes with the Palestinians, Syria, and Lebanon have yet to find internationally recognized settlements. In both cases, this profound sense of uncertainty has created a perpetual perception of encirclement, vulnerability, and isolation, leading both countries to undertake military actions in their respective neighborhoods before threats reach their borders.
For both countries, protecting national security also means acquiring greater freedom to act without depending on outside powers. They both share a need to pursue greater strategic autonomy recognizing that long-term dependency on the West is unrealistic. As Russia continues its war on Ukraine and China continues posing a threat in the Indo-Pacific, European and US policymakers will continue disentangling their militaries from the Middle East, pressuring the region to find self-sustained solutions to its endemic state of conflict. This strategy helps understand both countries’ decisions to drastically increase defense spending, particularly procurement, and reduce their reliance on foreign supply chains.
In addition to expanding domestic military capabilities, Turkey and Israel are also pursuing regional alliances, one through the Mecca Pact and the other through the Abraham Accords. Through the first, Ankara wants to expand its reach by creating a security architecture with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia independent of the West. Similarly, through the Abraham Accords, Israel seeks to ally itself with Western-friendly nations to contain the rise of Iran and remain the region’s sole nuclear-armed country. These blocs should help Ankara and Jerusalem become more autonomous by relying on a Middle East–led security architecture.
Points of tension
These overlapping objectives undoubtedly create friction, but they are not necessarily incompatible. Syria represents the most obvious test case of each country’s pursuit of these national interests. Turkey’s current support for the Ahmed al-Sharaa government stems from a carefully crafted, longstanding approach to become the country’s main security patron. Ankara’s objectives were aimed at neutralizing Kurdish aspirations for autonomy and preventing another mass flow of migrants, both of which Turkey has achieved. Concurrently, Israel aims to prevent Iran-backed militias from establishing a foothold along its northeastern border, fearing encirclement by hostile forces given Hezbollah’s presence to the north and the potential resurgence of Hamas in Gaza to the southwest. These objectives are not antithetical to each other and can be managed through informal negotiations and intelligence sharing mechanisms, which Turkey and Israel have already pursued. Managed coexistence in Syria is possible, and the West should mitigate the risk of confrontation by leaning in to previously established security frameworks such as those negotiating via Baku through a direct hotline and clearly demarcated operational areas.
Managing competition in the Eastern Mediterranean is more difficult but not impossible. Here, Ankara ultimately seeks to become less dependent on foreign oil and gas. This is an urgent need: current projections estimate that the country’s demand for oil will double by 2050, while its electricity needs will almost triple. Israel, on the other hand, is nearly energy independent when it comes to natural gas thanks to its access to the Leviathan and Tamar, massive hydrocarbon reserves beneath the deep waters of the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, Israel’s reason to ally itself with Greece and Cyprus on the grid project stems primarily from a desire to isolate Turkey for regional geostrategic interests rather than domestic energy needs. The recent three-billion-euro Israeli–Greek defense agreement underscores how far that alignment has gone. For Jerusalem, it may also serve a broader purpose: increasing pressure on Ankara at a time when the two countries are competing for influence in Syria.
However, should disputes over Syria find a resolution, Jerusalem would have less interest to deepen its ties to Cyprus and Greece as a means to isolate Turkey. Just as Israel is not a natural enemy of Turkey, it is not a natural ally of Greece: the Athens–Jerusalem partnership deepened only relatively recently, after decades in which Greece courted Arab states for support over Cyprus.
The ideological differences over Palestine pose a deeper hurdle to the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement. Erdogan has time and again made clear his support for the cause through threats, insults, and meetings with Hamas leaders. Netanyahu, in contrast, presents himself as the ultimate bulwark against a Palestinian state. Considering Israel’s decades-long war against Hamas—an internationally designated terrorist organization—and Erdogan’s desire to present himself as a key leader of the Muslim world, altering the ideological antagonism between Netanyahu and Erdogan may be too deep-seated for a resolution in the short-term. However, much of this dispute has to do with the personalities of the two leaders. Should other issues over Syria and the East Mediterranean be resolved, the ideological rivalry over Palestine can also go from zero–sum to manageable.
Ultimately, the Israeli-Turkish rivalry does not stem from a natural enmity over resources, territorial influence, or regional leverage. There is still reason for optimism that these two powers will, at a minimum, manage their competition rather than allow it to spiral into open competition.
Alissa Pavia is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.
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Image: Left: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Anthony Behar/Sipa USA). Right: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (Caitlin Ochs/REUTERS).