This article is part of a series on US-Gulf security cooperation. Read more here.
Global conflict is expanding faster than the United States’ capacity to manufacture weapons. But even if US industry can expedite production output, outdated defense sales processes are impeding efforts to get equipment to US allies and partners to protect shared interests and defend themselves.
The arms delivery crisis became evident after the outbreak of Russia’s war on Ukraine in 2022. It escalated to new levels this year as Iran fired barrages of missiles and drones on US partners in the Gulf, in response to US and Israeli attacks on Iran. Consumption of advanced munitions during Operation Epic Fury fully exposed the vulnerability in such an extreme burn rate. Further, the threat of conflict in the Indo-Pacific serves as a stark reminder that the worst has yet to occur. It is imperative that Washington take steps now to mitigate this arms crisis.
A full solution to replenishing the US arms supply, sustainment, and delivery crisis will take years. But there are immediate steps the US can take, under existing law and policy, to speed up defense sales. Defense articles are only made-to-order, regardless of whether they are for domestic or foreign sales. New orders from partner countries do not take away from US stocks and only help the efficacy of the domestic defense industrial base.
This is especially important as Gulf partners on the front lines of the war with Iran struggle to replenish air defense munitions while preparing for the risk of prolonged Iranian attacks. By accelerating arms sales, Washington can also further demonstrate its role as security “integrator” in the Gulf, helping reinforce US-Gulf security partnerships at a critical time.
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Understanding the foreign military sales process
The decades-old Arms Export Control Act (AECA) governs sales of US defense equipment, services, and training. Those sales must also be compliant with the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and US policy related to the Missile Technology Control Regime. More advanced weapons and those involving sensitive technology are processed through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process, while less sensitive equipment is sold directly from US companies to foreign customers via the Direct Commercial Sales process. The State Department is responsible for approving sales under FMS, while the Defense Security Cooperation Agency administers the process.
This process is intended to ensure that all arms sales are consistent with US foreign policy and can be leveraged to advance US national security objectives. In practice, however, complex stakeholder coordination, multiple compliance requirements, interagency policy review and coordination, congressional notifications, pricing and delivery delays on the production side, and contracting processes mean it takes years for a foreign government’s formal request to result in a contract—on top of the several years it can take for production and delivery of equipment. This makes it exceedingly difficult for the United States and its partners to respond to escalating and evolving threats.
Near-term solutions
To speed up this process, without making changes to the AECA or other associated laws and policies, the Trump administration first must continue to leverage the emergency authority provision in the act to help replenish Gulf air defense stocks. As deftly applied in 1979, 1984, 1990, and 2019 to respond to Iranian threats and provide Gulf partners a political signal of reassurance and deterrence, this emergency authority allows the administration to waive the congressional review period when an emergency exists. Second, the administration should explore opportunities to expand co-production of certain defense equipment with Gulf partners, which can provide a long-term solution to the supply and delivery crisis. Finally, the administration should expand reclassification of items from FMS to direct commercial sales, recognizing that many of the original criteria that warranted classification as “advanced” or “sensitive” no longer apply.
The executive branch can move desired reforms with alacrity under existing law and policy. Some decisions will require interagency cooperation, and some reform can be achieved via executive action. President Donald Trump put much of this in motion last year when he issued the executive orders “Reforming Foreign Defense Sales” and “Establishing an America First Arms Transfer Strategy,” to prioritize US strategic partnerships, identify key countries and defense articles to receive expedited consideration, streamline and consolidate the approval process to reduce delays, facilitate joint operations, and improve burden-sharing with allies and partners.
Under the current AECA, with the authorities delegated to the secretary of state, and the executive orders’ emphasis on consultation and maintaining shared authority with the secretary of war, the US can sustain emergency replenishment, expand co-production and sustainment through existent channels, and reclassify FMS-only items to Direct Commercial Sales eligible where criteria no longer apply. The Trump administration can leverage the policy changes in the two executive orders to drive cases through the current arms-transfer overhaul. To encourage greater efficiency, the administration could also publish Ukraine-specific and Gulf-specific FMS performance metrics.
Additionally, the administration could designate priority partners who should be eligible for relief from some of the controls around unmanned aerial systems and missile technology. Finally, the administration should apply the Defense Technology Security Administration “release in principle” determination for all recurring replenishment of Gulf air defense needs. This determination provides conceptual approval for a sale that can significantly expedite the FMS process and provide partners with greater clarity on which sales are viable.
Bolstering Gulf partnerships
The 2024-2026 confrontations with Iran revealed the limits of US security assistance and defense sales to partners in the Gulf, but the conflicts also proved the value of an integrated partnership under the US Central Command–led regional air and missile defense concept. Years before the current Iran war, Central Command sought to move from a “security guarantor” role to a “security integrator” role, building an integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) for the region linking US, Israeli, and Gulf states’ sensors and interceptors.
Today, IAMD has only grown stronger thanks to Ukrainian and Gulf innovation and cooperation on countering drones. The success Gulf countries had in intercepting thousands of Iranian drones and missiles—with over 90 percent interception rates across the Gulf—was in large part due to US IAMD efforts and US equipment and training. These successes will help preserve the United States as the Gulf partner of choice, but Gulf capitals need to be confident that the United States can continue to supply the appropriate equipment at the rate necessary to counter an escalating and rapidly evolving threat.
Addressing concerns about FMS reforms
In 2024 the Defense Security Cooperation Agency commissioned a study on FMS, which asserted that the Department of State and Department of Defense needed to further identify, clarify, and codify additional responsibilities for managing FMS requirements. This finding could be interpreted as a sincere call for improving interagency functions of security assistance and security cooperation. It also illustrated the historic tension between the two leading national security cabinet agencies. But the tools to optimize FMS roles now exist via the application of the AECA and recent Trump executive orders.
Some members of Congress may be concerned about expediting the pace of FMS transfers to American allies and partners, but within the committees of jurisdiction there is well-documented support for bolstering Ukrainian defenses against Russian aggression and enabling Israel and the Gulf states to better combat Iranian threats. As talk grows of US disengagement or troop withdrawals from the Middle East, and elsewhere, ramping up arms sales can ensure the US sustains access and influence.
In the short term, inaction on FMS reform exacerbates the production and delivery capacity challenges of the defense industrial base. In the long term, inaction on FMS reform favors the enemies of the US and its allies and partners. By getting arms more quickly to the partners that need them most, the US can help revitalize the defense industrial base and better extinguish the flames of global conflicts.
R. Clarke Cooper is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, an American service fellow at Harvard University, and the former assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the US Department of State.
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Image: A worker manufactures 155 mm artillery projectiles at the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant in Scranton, Pennsylvania on April 16, 2024. The plant is one of the U.S. government's own production facilities for 155mm artillery projectile. ( The Yomiuri Shimbun )