On August 30, representatives of Libya’s rival political and security blocs signed a UN-facilitated agreement aimed at resolving disputes over the rules and constitutional basis for national elections that have blocked a vote since 2021. The agreement now faces two deadlines in quick succession: Libya’s House of Representatives (HOR) and High State Council (HSC) have until the end of September to endorse the agreement. One month later, the mandate of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) expires.
US Senior Advisor Massad Boulos and other international partners quickly welcomed the UN agreement and urged Libyan institutions to implement it. The United States has insisted that its bilateral diplomacy supports UNSMIL, telling the Security Council in August that its “efforts are fully complementary to UNSMIL’s roadmap.” The next two months will test that claim.
Declared support for UN-facilitated political processes has been among the most consistent features of international policy toward Libya over the past decade. Aligning bilateral diplomacy behind those processes has proven more difficult. Over the past year, US bilateral engagements with Libyan stakeholders in the east and west have included support for a unified national budget, joint training aimed at promoting military unification, and mediation between the Dbeibah and Haftar factions over power-sharing arrangements. These efforts have drawn skepticism, including concerns that direct talks with rival power centers would undermine incentives to compromise through the UN-led process.
US action before the end of October could help move the agreement toward implementation and give UNSMIL the political backing it needs to carry out the agreement and advance toward national elections.
SIGN UP FOR THIS WEEK IN THE MIDEAST NEWSLETTER
The 4+4 agreement
Libya has not held national elections since 2014. A presidential and parliamentary vote planned for December 2021 collapsed amid disputes over the constitutional basis for the elections, who could run for office, and whether the two elections would be held together.
The agreement emerged from what UNSMIL calls the Smaller Convening, or 4+4, which brought together two representatives from the Government of National Unity (GNU), Khalifa Haftar’s General Command, the HOR, and the HSC. Talks began in Rome on April 29 and continued through seven rounds in Tunisia before the parties signed the agreement in Tripoli on August 30.
The agreement addresses the first two milestones of UNSMIL’s roadmap, reconstituting the board of the High National Elections Commission (HNEC) and resolving outstanding disputes over the legal and constitutional framework for elections. It uses Libya’s existing electoral laws as a basis while amending several disputed provisions. Military personnel would be permitted to vote and run for president, while dual nationals could stand provided that a successful candidate renounces any non-Libyan nationality before taking the constitutional oath. The agreement also separates presidential and parliamentary results and removes the requirement for a runoff if a presidential candidate wins more than 50 percent of the vote.
The agreement commits the parties to holding presidential and parliamentary elections within twenty-four months under a single executive authority and unified national institutions. It does not, however, provide a mechanism for forming that unified authority. The HOR and HSC have one month left to approve the agreement. If they do not, the signatories commit to pursuing its adoption through a broadly representative national mechanism and seeking international backing through the UN Security Council.
Initial reactions highlight the challenge ahead. Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah welcomed the agreement as an important step toward ending Libya’s transitional phases and moving toward elections, while Haftar similarly backed its outcome. HOR Speaker Aguila Saleh conditioned his support on the agreement’s consistency with Libya’s existing constitutional and legal framework, including the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement. HSC President Mohammed Takala declined to attend the signing and, two days later, the HSC warned against “the imposition of arrangements from outside Libya’s institutional framework.” Presidential Council President Mohammed Menfi, who had criticized the talks for their secrecy and foreign involvement, also issued a decree the same day naming a competing HNEC board.
The next two months
Neither the HOR nor the HSC has to reject the 4+4 agreement outright to derail the process before the end-of-September deadline laid out in the UN agreement. Either could decline to convene, fail to reach quorum, refer the text for further consideration, or condition its endorsement in ways that reopen issues the 4+4 sought to settle. Libya has seen similar tactics before. The 2015 Libyan Political Agreement required the HOR to endorse the Government of National Accord. Sessions in Tobruk were repeatedly blocked, and in August 2016 the chamber delivered a vote of no confidence. In April 2024, then-UN special envoy Abdoulaye Bathily blamed Libya’s political impasse in part on leaders seeking to maintain the status quo through “delaying tactics and maneuvers.”
The second deadline comes on October 31, when UNSMIL’s current mandate expires. A twelve-month renewal would keep the mission operating, but duration alone would not make the renewed mandate fit for purpose. The agreement assigns UNSMIL specific work. Under Article 6, the mission is to help build the follow-up framework; under Article 4, to help design an alternative if elections prove impossible; and under Article 7, to convene the parties when they disagree. UNSMIL already has the authority to do this work, since mediation and good offices are its core functions. What it lacks is explicit Security Council backing for this particular agreement and reporting that tracks its implementation.
The timing connects the two deadlines. If the HOR and HSC fail to endorse the agreement, its fallback provisions could push the issue to the Security Council just as its members begin negotiating UNSMIL’s next mandate.
Three moves Washington should make now
The US mission in New York, the Treasury Department, and the State Department can take three steps to turn Washington’s stated support into demonstrated alignment with the UN-led process:
- Build consensus among international partners: As the deadline for the HOR and HSC to endorse the agreement approaches, attention will shift to New York for the UN General Assembly’s high-level week. The United States has convened a Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) on Libya on the margins of the General Assembly in each of the past two years. The SOM brings together key European and regional partners to build consensus around international policy toward Libya.
Countries that participated in the 2025 SOM included Turkey, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The State Department should organize the SOM again this year but set the bar higher. Instead of another statement from the chair, Washington should seek a joint statement from participants endorsing the 4+4 agreement and committing participants to support its implementation. A common position from these governments would carry weight with Libyan stakeholders across the divide. - Secure a mandate that backs implementation: The US mission in New York should work with the United Kingdom, the penholder on Libya, and other Security Council members to ensure that the October renewal endorses the roadmap and the agreement rather than simply welcoming them. Last October, Council members softened the language on the UN’s new Libya roadmap from “endorses” to “welcomes.” The renewal should also spell out what the agreement asks of UNSMIL, including developing the follow-up framework and convening the parties when they disagree. It should require the secretary-general to report on progress against the deadlines the parties set for themselves, so that a missed milestone appears in the record rather than being absorbed into a narrative about continued divisions.
- Prepare targeted sanctions: A 2016 executive order permits the designation of individuals responsible for actions or policies that “obstruct, undermine, delay, or impede” Libya’s political transition, and President Donald Trump continued the national emergency underpinning that authority in February 2026. There is precedent: In 2016 the United States and the European Union each designated Libyan officials for obstructing a previous UN-brokered agreement. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control should work with the State Department to decide now what conduct would constitute sanctionable obstruction and prepare designation packages accordingly so that Washington can act in weeks rather than months.
The 4+4 agreement does not guarantee that Libya will hold national elections, nor does it erase concerns about Washington’s bilateral diplomacy over the past year. It does, however, create an opportunity for Washington’s bilateral diplomacy and UNSMIL’s roadmap to reinforce one another rather than compete. Washington says its efforts are “fully complementary” to the UN process. By the end of October, it should be clear whether those are simply words of support or something more.
Frank Talbot is a nonresident senior fellow with the North Africa Program at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs. Previously, he served in the Department of State supporting stabilization initiatives in the Middle East and North Africa.
Further reading
Wed, Jul 1, 2026
Libya doesn’t need another elite bargain
MENASource By Karim Mezran
The US blessing of a power-sharing arrangement for Libya preserves a fragile stability today while increasing the risk of a much larger crisis tomorrow.
Fri, May 15, 2026
The problem with the US power-sharing plan for Libya
MENASource By Karim Mezran, Dario Cristiani
The nascent US initiative may succeed in reducing tensions and creating a slightly more predictable environment for foreign businesses, but a structural transformation remains out of reach.
Thu, Jan 15, 2026
The US is reengaging with Libya—and it’s the right call
AfricaSource By Rose Keravuori, Maureen Farrell
If the United States seeks stability in the Mediterranean and credible alternatives to Russian energy, now is the time to make coordinated security and economic investments in Libya.
Image: August 18, 2026, New York, New York, United States: Hanna Serwaa Tetteh, special representative of the secretary-general for Libya and head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), appears on screen as she briefs the UN Security Council on the situation in Libya. Tetteh addressed the UN-facilitated political roadmap towards elections and unified institutions, as well as recent political, economic, security, humanitarian and climate-related developments. (Credit Image: © Bianca Otero/ZUMA Press Wire)