WASHINGTON and SAO PAULO—As Brazilians head to the polls on October 4, there is a lot more on the ballot than the choice of their next president. Left-wing President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is seeking reelection in a closely contested race, in which Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, the son of former President Jair Bolsonaro, is the leading right-wing challenger. If no presidential candidate wins a clear majority this weekend, then a runoff will take place on October 25. Recent polls show the two men are statistically tied in a potential runoff matchup.
Even if Brazilians must wait until the end of the month to know who their next president will be, the composition of Brazil’s National Congress will largely be settled on October 4. In fact, the Congress may prove just as consequential for the country’s governability as the presidential contest. Moreover, while the Supreme Federal Court (STF) is not formally on the ballot, an institutional crisis surrounding the Banco Master investigation, a multibillion-dollar fraud probe centered on the failed lender and its former chief executive, Daniel Vorcaro, has already become part of the campaign and intensified scrutiny of the country’s highest court.
Assessing the congressional map
On the ballot this weekend is the president, governors, two senators in each state and the federal district, all 513 members of the Chamber of Deputies, and state or district legislators. With fifty-four of the Senate’s eighty-one seats up for election, the congressional vote will be especially consequential for the balance of power facing the next administration.
Unlike the stark polarization that divides the contest for the presidency, parliamentary elections follow a more pragmatic and fragmented logic. Most seats are expected to remain under the control of five or six major parties, with a comfortable predominance of centrist and center-right figures. In the Chamber of Deputies, political inertia is likely to remain an important factor, with many incumbents favored to be reelected.
In the Senate, however, the outlook is more fluid. With two-thirds of the seats up for renewal, the chamber is more exposed to significant changes in its composition. Recent projections have pointed to the possibility of a stronger right and center-right bloc, which could reach up to 40 percent of the seats. This movement points to an Upper House that is significantly more conservative and ideologically polarized than the current chamber.
That relative stability in the Chamber of Deputies contrasts with a more competitive contest for the Senate’s leadership, where a stronger right could reshape coalition building and governability. Three names have already emerged in that contest: Senator Rogério Marinho, a leading figure in the Bolsonaro-aligned bloc; current Senate President Davi Alcolumbre, who is seeking to retain the post and has recently moved closer to Lula’s government, publicly promising to help advance its agenda; and Senator Tereza Cristina, seen as a moderate and independent alternative within the conservative spectrum who served as minister of agriculture in the Bolsonaro administration.
One consequence of this is that, regardless of who wins the presidency, the elected leader will likely not have a congressional majority of his own. The anticipated rightward shift in the Senate would be especially difficult for Lula. But even for Bolsonaro, it would not necessarily produce a governing majority. Moreover, the Chamber is expected to remain dominated by more pragmatic parties of the political center and center-right. Any governability project will thus require building a broad and heterogeneous coalition, whose success will necessarily depend on the presidencies of the Chamber and the Senate.
Congress will also shape the Supreme Court’s future
Another important factor is the increasingly important relationship between Congress and the STF. That tension has grown amid the Banco Master case. The investigation has exposed alleged ties involving officials, politicians from across the political spectrum, and members of the judiciary, while prompting an unusually public dispute within the Supreme Court itself. Flávio Bolsonaro is also under investigation for alleged corruption and money laundering tied to the case, including scrutiny of alleged Banco Master financing for Dark Horse, a film about his father. He has denied wrongdoing.
The controversy is unfolding as public confidence in the court has fallen. A September Datafolha survey found that 48 percent of Brazilians said they did not trust the STF, the highest level recorded since the survey series began in 2012.
The Senate’s role is particularly important because the next president will have the opportunity to nominate at least three new STF justices as sitting members reach mandatory retirement during the next presidential term. Each nominee will require confirmation by a simple majority of the Senate. This gives the composition and leadership of the next Senate even greater significance for Brazil’s institutional configuration.
The next Brazilian president will therefore take office facing a fragmented Congress, high public distrust of the political class and the STF, and the continuing institutional fallout from the Banco Master case.
Beyond Brasília
The consequences extend beyond Brazil’s domestic politics. Brazil’s elections may follow or buck the trend of recent conservative elections across Latin American politics, from Argentina and Chile, to Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, Honduras, and Colombia. As Washington deepens its partnerships across the region with ideologically aligned governments, the outcome of Brazil’s elections could affect how the bilateral relationship evolves and what role the country plays within the hemisphere.