NEW YORK—Ten months ago, the Trump administration released its National Security Strategy, which articulated the need for a US reassertion of diplomatic, economic, and security influence in the Western Hemisphere. It was evident this past week, as leaders from Latin America visited New York for the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), that this reassertion has begun moving from idea to reality. A common thread among the delegations shuttling from UN headquarters to meetings at nearby office buildings and hotels was the near-ubiquitous presence of the United States in economic and security announcements.
On the economic side, critical minerals and infrastructure investment took center stage. The United States and Argentina announced the Andes-Atlantic Corridor, an initiative designed to connect Argentina’s energy and critical minerals regions with Atlantic ports and Western markets. The US Export-Import Bank announced a framework for up to seven billion dollars in financing for energy, transportation, critical minerals mining and processing, and digital infrastructure projects through 2027.
At the same time, Colombian Vice President José Manuel Restrepo, who attended while President Abelardo de la Espriella focused on security operations back home, traversed the city promoting Misión Crecer, the administration’s strategy to accelerate investment and boost productivity. The government’s goal is to raise Colombia’s annual economic growth to 6 percent, up from 2.6 percent in 2025. Other new Latin American leaders, from Chilean President José Antonio Kast to Peruvian President Keiko Fujimori and Honduran President Nasry Asfura, underscored their countries’ openness to investment and the policy steps their governments are taking to attract capital.
Venezuela’s political future comes into focus
Of course, this year’s UNGA was notable for the markedly different reception of Venezuela’s interim government. Delcy Rodríguez held her first in-person meeting with Trump since strongman Nicolás Maduro’s removal in January. She also met separately with leaders from international financial institutions and multilateral development banks on Venezuela’s debt restructuring, earthquake recovery, and economic reconstruction. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who was present for the Trump-Rodríguez meeting, later confirmed that the conversation went beyond bilateral relations and included the steps needed to stabilize Venezuela, restructure its debt, rebuild its institutions, and eventually hold free and fair elections. “There’s a lot that needs to be fixed in order for Venezuela to be successful,” Rubio told reporters. Framing the issues as interconnected, he argued that an elected government would need functioning institutions and a more stable economy if Venezuela’s democratic transition is to endure.
For her part, Rodríguez told the UNGA that “there will be elections” and pointed to the dialogue between sectors of the opposition under what she described as equal conditions for all. But she offered no timetable, saying instead that Venezuelans would determine the “right moment.” A gap therefore remains between a public commitment to elections and the unresolved questions of timing, electoral conditions, and institutional reform.
Shield of the Americas moves from alignment to action
The UNGA also provided the setting for the region’s largest US-led security convening. Trump’s second Shield of the Americas meeting brought together leaders and senior officials from across the region, including recently joined Peru and Colombia. Fifteen governments, including the United States, signed a joint statement that broadened the coalition beyond counternarcotics cooperation into three pillars: economic cooperation, security, and multilateral coordination.
The meeting also produced the initiative’s first joint action. Members agreed to coordinate measures on twenty-four criminal and armed organizations across the hemisphere. These measures include asset freezes, visa and immigration restrictions, and potential penalties for knowingly providing material or logistical support, subject to each country’s laws. Members also plan to ask the Organization of American States to convene consultations under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or Rio Treaty, to consider broader collective action against select groups.
The list of targeted groups includes Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital and Comando Vermelho, and Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua and Cártel de los Soles. It also includes Colombia’s National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, also known as FARC. Both groups maintain a substantial presence in Venezuela, as well. Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela are not currently members of the Shield of the Americas. As a result, the coalition’s operational reach will depend partly on cooperation with governments outside the Shield where several of its principal targets operate.
Venezuela is the clearest example. The June US operation that killed Tren de Aragua leader Héctor “Niño” Guerrero was coordinated with Venezuelan authorities, according to both governments. Trump later cited that cooperation when he removed Venezuela from the narrower category of countries deemed to have “failed demonstrably” on drug control, though Venezuela remains on the broader US list of major drug transit or producing countries.
Shield members can share intelligence and coordinate measures against Tren de Aragua, the ELN, and FARC dissidents.
That makes the inclusion of Cártel de los Soles especially notable. Washington designated it a Foreign Terrorist Organization in November 2025, while describing it as a trafficking network led by Maduro and other senior figures in his government. Yet a revised US indictment earlier this year describes the name as referring to a patronage system in which Venezuelan officials allegedly protected and profited from drug trafficking, rather than a discrete organization. Cooperation with Venezuela may help address other armed groups operating there, but applying the Shield’s measures against a system allegedly involving current officials is more complicated.
The Shield statement also pledges to defend democratic governance and “popular will,” but makes no specific commitment on Venezuelan elections or political reform. That omission stands out because the Shield meeting took place alongside an increasingly visible debate about Venezuela’s political transition.
One of us, Jason, has spent nearly twenty years attending UNGA-related convenings, where the most consequential discussions often happen outside the general debate. This year reinforced that lesson. The Americas drew heightened economic interest and opened new avenues for security cooperation, from the Andes-Atlantic Corridor to the Shield’s first joint action.