The news has set off a reaction. On Tuesday evening, The Wall Street Journal reported that US President Donald Trump had approved a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia. The 123 agreement—named after Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act—would allow the US to transfer civilian nuclear material, technology, and equipment to Saudi Arabia. While dozens of countries have 123 agreements with the United States, the new deal with Riyadh reportedly might allow for uranium enrichment in Saudi Arabia—which could be used to make nuclear weapons, raising the issue of nonproliferation. Below, Atlantic Council experts share their atomic insights.
Click to jump to an expert analysis:
Jennifer T. Gordon: A win for the United States over Russia and China
Matthew Kroenig: It would be a mistake to allow Saudi Arabia the capability for enrichment
Allison Minor: The Iran war increased the political urgency for this deal
A win for the United States over Russia and China
A 123 agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia is not only a win for the US nuclear energy industry. It is also a victory for the US-led global nonproliferation regime. Saudi Arabia has made it clear that it will purchase nuclear energy technologies and begin a civil nuclear program; the only question has been whether the kingdom would choose to work with the US and its allies, or whether it would turn to Russia or China. According to reports, this agreement would preclude Saudi Arabia from sourcing nuclear energy technologies from any entities except “American companies with potentially a secondary role for some of those companies’ foreign suppliers.” US involvement ensures nonproliferation cooperation, and The Wall Street Journal’s report notes that close cooperation with the US nuclear energy industry and government would “give the U.S. influence over the Saudi nuclear program.”
The Wall Street Journal states that the agreement contains a provision that could allow for a “black box” uranium enrichment facility, which would be located in the kingdom but run by US companies. But the need for this type of facility would be determined after a two-year study conducted by the US and Saudi Arabia. Discussions between Washington and Riyadh over a 123 agreement began during the first Trump administration and continued throughout the Biden administration. The current Trump administration has demonstrated continuity by carrying the agreement forward.
—Jennifer T. Gordon is the director of the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative and the Daniel B. Poneman chair for nuclear energy policy at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.
It would be a mistake to allow Saudi Arabia the capability for enrichment
Washington is right to strengthen its relationship with Riyadh, but it should not do so at the expense of its effective nuclear weapons nonproliferation standards.
Since the dawn of the nuclear age, scientists have understood that uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing are dual-use technologies. The same technology used to make fuel for nuclear reactors can make fuel for nuclear weapons. Accordingly, Washington’s strategy has been to encourage peaceful uses of nuclear technology, while restricting sensitive fuel-making technology. My first book, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, examined this topic.
Washington’s policy has been successful and imposed on friends and enemies alike. The Pentagon, for example, used military force to stop Iran’s enrichment program both this year and in 2025. And, over the years, the United States has used its influence to forestall the spread of sensitive fuel-making capabilities to allies and partners, including South Korea, Taiwan, and the United Arab Emirates.
It would be a mistake, therefore, to allow enrichment in Saudi Arabia as part of any deal.
Fortunately, a Saudi enrichment program is not guaranteed. It is reported that the parties will “carry out a two-year study to examine the value of enrichment for Saudi Arabia, including whether it would be commercially viable to enrich uranium on Saudi soil instead of relying on imported fuel.”
This study should conclude that Saudi Arabia can rely on imported fuel-cycle services like the many other countries around the world with truly peaceful nuclear programs. This would be a much better outcome than exporting a bomb-making capability to an additional country in an already volatile region.
—Matthew Kroenig is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served as vice president for geostrategy and fellows and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
The Iran war increased the political urgency for this deal
The Iran war is reshaping the balance of power in the Middle East in ways that will only become clear months and years from now. As I argued at the outset of the war, Saudi Arabia has long sought to become the dominant power in the Middle East, and Iran has consistently posed the greatest threat to this goal. The war has emboldened Tehran and threatened the Gulf in ways that are deeply counterproductive to this goal, but Saudi Arabia is intent on leveraging this dynamic moment to assert its regional leadership. The new Saudi-US nuclear deal this week, along with renewed confrontation between Riyadh and the Houthis and the shifting Saudi–United Arab Emirates rift, are all connected to this effort. By keeping the door open for uranium enrichment inside Saudi Arabia, the nuclear deal sends a powerful message to Tehran. By securing a 123 agreement that appears to have more preferable terms than the United Arab Emirates and dozens of other US partners have committed to, Riyadh also signals its role as a major global player, even if it is not among the ranks of nuclear-armed nations.
The nuclear deal has been in the works for months, long before the Iran war, and initial negotiations on the deal began even earlier, as part of a larger package that included Israeli normalization. But it is possible that the Iran war lent greater political urgency to the negotiations, as Washington has sought to reassure a partner that is increasingly wary of US security commitments and frustrated by the lack of consultation. And we should read the announcement as part of Riyadh’s broader strategy to managing the shockwaves of the Iran war.
—Allison Minor is the director of the Project for Middle East Integration with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs. She previously served as US deputy special envoy for Yemen and as director for Arabian Peninsula affairs at the National Security Council.