WASHINGTON—Daniel Ortega’s declaration on July 19 that Nicaragua will hold no more elections is a message to three audiences: to the Nicaraguan opposition, that resistance is futile; to his own political and security apparatus, that the ruling family intends to remain in control; and to Washington, that he believes the United States will condemn but ultimately tolerate the permanent closure of Nicaragua’s political system.
The statement is meant to project confidence, but it betrays anxiety. Ortega’s attempt to show strength and discourage defections instead exposes the family’s fear of succession, fracture, and an organized democratic alternative. Autocrats do not outlaw what they do not fear.
Now, as Nicaragua’s National Assembly moves to formalize Ortega’s declaration law, the United States should act. Specifically, Washington should move beyond statements and turn US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s recent call for international action into a regional strategy that protects Nicaragua’s democratic forces, counters transnational repression, raises the costs of authoritarian consolidation, and prepares for a political opening in the country.
In context: Ortega’s statement is an escalation
Ortega’s latest statement matters even though he has spent years weakening Nicaragua’s democratic institutions, and the country’s most recent election, in 2021, was neither free nor credible. The latest statement epitomizes how far the regime has moved, from manipulating but holding elections to unabashedly repudiating the very principle that political power can change hands through a vote.
The eighty-year-old autocrat made the declaration during the anniversary of the Sandinista Revolution. In the same speech, he framed opposition parties as instruments of US interests. He was speaking simultaneously to domestic loyalists, democratic opponents, and Washington, testing whether the response would extend beyond condemnation.
Rubio’s call for international action two days later was brief but significant. It underscored that Ortega and Rosario Murillo, his wife and co-dictator, have abandoned even the appearance of popular consent, and it called for collective international action. As the Trump administration carries this call for action forward, it should focus on three connected goals:
- raise the costs of further repression and authoritarian consolidation,
- protect and support democratic actors inside Nicaragua and in exile, and
- prepare for an opening that could arrive through succession (unlikely), an internal fracture, an economic shock, or popular mobilization.
Continue to apply economic pressure, but with a purpose
Ortega must be displaced from the comfort zone that allows him to act in the way he did this past Sunday. He and his family must understand that planning to abolish elections carries steep economic costs.
Economic pressure can create tangible incentives for negotiation. Nicaragua maintains a trade surplus with the United States, which remains Managua’s most important trade and export partner despite Ortega’s anti-American rhetoric. In December 2025, the US completed a Section 301 investigation against Nicaragua concerning accusations of labor and human rights abuses and harmful treatment of US investors. The Trump administration decided to gradually phase in tariffs that start from zero this year, rising to 10 percent next year and up to 15 percent by 2028 for goods that do not qualify for preferential treatment under the Dominican Republic-Central America-US Free Trade Agreement.
This was a lenient but calculated approach, particularly compared to many other countries the US has targeted with tariffs. But following Ortega’s latest statements, along with documented confiscations of US investor properties—not to mention the regime’s growing closeness to Iran, Russia, and China—the moment calls for more decisive and coordinated trade sanctions. The European Parliament recently recommended the suspension of the EU–Nicaragua Association Agreement as long as the repression continues. While this is politically significant, a declaration by the European Parliament is not a suspension of the agreement. In this sense, coordinated US and European trade pressure could force Ortega’s hand. The message to Ortega should be start negotiations and make concessions or face economic costs. But, to be a policy success, these measures must hurt the regime with as little collateral damage on ordinary Nicaraguans as possible.
Energy illustrates the risks of a poorly targeted pressure strategy. Nicaragua depends heavily on imported petroleum products. The United States was its largest supplier of non-crude petroleum products by volume in 2024, and it also supplied almost all of Nicaragua’s propane. A blanket cutoff from Washington would push the regime to look for alternative suppliers while increasing costs for transportation, electricity, and food distribution. This would hit ordinary Nicaraguans hardest.
Instead, Washington should focus on several narrower efforts: It should systematically target regime-controlled energy companies and intermediaries. It should restrict financing, insurance, or shipping services connected to sanctioned entities. It should preserve explicit humanitarian and civilian-energy licenses, such as the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control 2024 general license, which was granted to authorize specific exports of liquefied petroleum gas, including propane, to Venezuela. And it should coordinate more closely with suppliers, before considering broader restrictions.
Avoid military intervention
A US military intervention in Nicaragua would be strategically disproportionate. It would risk civilian casualties, new migration flows, nationalist backlash, regional opposition, and a prolonged post-regime stabilization problem. It would also provide fodder to Ortega’s unsubstantiated claims that the Nicaraguan opposition is a malicious instrument of foreign governments. But short of military intervention, the United States still holds real leverage, which it should now tie to a robust regional political strategy. Rubio should convene leaders in Costa Rica, Canada, Guatemala, Panama, Argentina, and other willing democracies around a practical compact with defined responsibilities.
The compact need not include the entire hemisphere. Enough governments will agree that abolishing elections, exporting repression, and stripping political opponents of citizenship cannot be normalized, and the US can encourage these governments to coordinate their diplomatic and targeted economic pressure on Ortega. The compact should take additional steps as well. In the short term, that would mean protecting threatened Nicaraguan exiles, investigating transnational repression and crimes against humanity, and preserving what’s left of Nicaragua’s independent media. In the longer term, it would mean providing support for technical plans for credible elections, economic stabilization, and reconstruction.
Support a Nicaraguan-led transition framework
The Nicaraguan opposition is composed of multiple actors and organizations—many of which are in exile now—but is showing encouraging signs of union and coordination. Many of the various actors and organizations have worked on a transition plan to restore the constitutional order in Nicaragua. It seeks to restore the rule of law and democracy through an orderly and peaceful process that guarantees human rights, the separation of powers, independent institutions, and free elections. Ortega’s latest actions are aimed at foreclosing precisely the kind of democratic transition envisioned in this proposal.
In response, the United States should support a Nicaraguan-led framework as the basis for the return of democracy in the Central American country. Even more so than in Cuba and Venezuela, where the ruling parties built institutions around the state apparatus, Nicaragua is ruled by a single despotic family. This personalization makes the Nicaraguan system extremely fragile. From a US perspective, this fragility can be the basis of a relatively low-cost effort that may prove the administration’s commitment to securing US national interests.
In that context, the United States should aim to strengthen the credibility of the Nicaraguan dissident-led process, while using targeted sanctions and other instruments of diplomatic monitoring to enforce compliance with democratic commitments. The Organization of American States and other international partners could support institutional strengthening and reconstruction and electoral system reorganization. It could also help to develop cooperation mechanisms aimed at consolidating the restoration of democratic governance, especially during the complex democratic transition, during which a temporary transitional entity would exercise power until elected authorities take office.