TEL AVIV—Any American who traveled to Israel just before the October 27 election, as I did, cannot help but notice the parallels between the Israeli election and the US midterms seven days later. Both countries are deeply divided. Both sides in both elections see the other not simply as the loyal opposition, but as a force ready to take their country down a dangerous road that will jeopardize its security and even the core values on which the nation was founded. Many voters cannot imagine the other side taking power. Reports of plans for renewed strikes on Iran after the elections have citizens on edge. Gridlock is highly likely. Many voters in both countries are deeply fearful, and few expect either election to settle their differences in a way that allows the country to heal and move forward.
Even so, one thought after a week in Israel was this: the time to buy futures is when the market hits bottom. An investment of spare cash, against all emotions, in the S&P 500 during the darkest hours of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020 would have tripled by now. I wouldn’t mortgage the farm to buy “Middle East futures” right now, but there is more reason to hope for a turnaround than many think. Israel’s election may deepen the political gridlock, but the end of the campaign—regardless of the outcome—could also create a chance for political compromise and regional diplomacy that has thus far been out of reach.
First, the Israeli system could create a forcing mechanism for compromise. Elections here are notoriously difficult to predict because Israel’s electoral system—single-district proportional representation—means that political parties that receive less than 3.25 percent get no seats in the Knesset. And because many parties with well-known leaders run on separate lists, several small parties could fail to clear that threshold. Benny Gantz, once seen as an opposition leader, dropped out of the election on October 19 because he realized his party was not likely to make it into the Knesset. If the parties of controversial, far-right ministers Bezalel Smotrich or Itamar Ben-Gvir don’t get enough votes, they could lose the extraordinary influence they have wielded in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s current government.
Israel’s system also has a campaign after the campaign, as the different parties and blocs align to try to form a governing majority in the Knesset. Conversations that are politically impossible before the vote are sometimes possible afterward.
Second, settler violence in the West Bank is likely to be reined in after the election. Leading Israeli opposition figures are signaling they understand the need to crack down on unprovoked attacks by violent Israeli settlers against Palestinian farmers. Some have expressly condemned the violence. These attacks are having a deeply corrosive effect on Israel’s standing in the United States and in Europe, and it is inconceivable that there could be progress toward normalization with other Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, while settler violence continues. I suspect that even Netanyahu understands this, but he is unwilling to risk even a partial breach with his coalition partners before the election.
Third, Board of Peace officials are speaking confidently about prospects for progress on US President Donald Trump’s twenty-point plan after the Israeli election. Several Board of Peace officials have explained away Israel’s refusal to go along with the board’s phased disarmament plan and the deployment of the International Stabilization Force into Gaza by saying that the Israeli election campaign is preventing the government from agreeing to measures that would implement the Sharm El-Sheikh agreement. It’s not clear whether that assumption is based on anything the Netanyahu government has said privately, or whether it’s wishful thinking. Still, their optimism is a data point worth acknowledging. Progress in implementing the twenty-point plan would help lower tensions throughout the Middle East.
Fourth, even if there is gridlock, the Israeli and US presidents will likely try to break it, perhaps in creative ways. The US election seems poised to produce a divided government with Democrats gaining control of at least one chamber of Congress, which could lead to gridlock. But many Israelis fear a comparable scenario that could be even worse: if no one can form a government with a majority of sixty-one seats in the Knesset, Israel could be forced into another election in six months, perhaps with Netanyahu hanging on but with no mandate from the people to resolve Israel’s political crises. Beyond a host of external security challenges from Iran, Lebanon, Gaza, and the West Bank, Israel also has severe internal challenges over military conscription for ultra-Orthodox men, the role of courts in politically charged cases, and Netanyahu’s ongoing corruption trial.
A power-sharing agreement in which the two leading candidates rotate in the prime minister’s office might have been one solution, but no opposition leader is likely to trust Netanyahu to go first. In 2020, Netanyahu blew up a similar deal with Gantz by forcing a new election that denied Gantz his turn as prime minister. The opposition parties want to prevent Netanyahu from being prime minister, but Netanyahu has a strong incentive to stay in office: unlike an ordinary cabinet minister, a prime minister is not required to resign when criminally indicted, and Netanyahu’s official duties have repeatedly delayed his ongoing corruption trial.
It is possible that Israeli President Isaac Herzog and Trump could force a compromise over who gets to be prime minister. Given the opposition’s lack of trust that Netanyahu would live up to any deal and the stakes of Netanyahu’s ongoing corruption trial, one solution suggested to me by a former senior Israeli official is this: if the leading candidates all fail to put together a governing coalition, Gadi Eisenkot could become prime minister, while Herzog pardons Netanyahu—as Trump has been urging since October 2025—and Netanyahu receives a ministerial portfolio.