A renewed security and cooperation agenda for Colombia’s next government

Colombia, for many years a top recipient of US security assistance, is facing a renewed and intense wave of violence driven by fragmented and increasingly adaptable illegal armed groups. This deteriorating security environment has shaped the country’s electoral debate, with insecurity emerging as voters’ top concern ahead of the May 31 first round presidential election.

The threats driving Colombian insecurity now extend beyond drug trafficking. Illegal armed groups are financed by diversified illicit revenue streams, including illegal mining, land grabbing and human smuggling, and have secured extensive territorial control in areas with limited state presence. In several regions, these groups regulate economic activity and movement, acting as de facto governing authorities.  

With Abelardo de la Espriella and Iván Cepeda advancing to the runoff on June 21, the question of how to confront illegal armed groups is central to the final weeks of the campaign, as the two candidates have offered sharply different approaches. Regardless of who wins, the next government will need to build the state capacity to contain criminal governance and consolidate control in affected territories. Combined with the Trump administration’s heightened emphasis on hemispheric security, this will make it critical for Colombia and the United States to modernize their security partnership to better confront evolving transnational threats in the region.

At a meeting on the future of US-Colombia security cooperation, the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Strategic Alignment Coalition explored avenues to modernize bilateral security cooperation. The coalition and additional experts noted that security cooperation must move beyond a counternarcotics-centered framework and support the implementation of a territorially differentiated security strategy. This approach should focus on dismantling the criminal governance structures that sustain illegal armed groups by rebuilding security-force operational capacity, disrupting illicit financial ecosystems, strengthening border security cooperation, and advancing economic and institutional recovery in affected areas.

Why US-Colombia security cooperation must be restructured

Colombia has experienced the most violent start to a year since the signing of the 2016 Peace Agreement. According to Indepaz, forty-eight massacres and 229 fatalities were recorded from January to April 2026. Colombia’s Ministry of Defense’s Security Indicators and Operational Results Monitoring Report also shows that since 2024, homicides, massacres, kidnappings, and extorsions have increased on a year-to-year basis. The most recent wave of thirty-one attacks are attributed to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissident groups in Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño, in which dozens of civilians were injured and killed, underscores the scale of the escalation.

As recorded by Fundación Ideas para la Paz, criminal groups grew their ranks by 23.5 percent in 2025. According to Human Rights Watch, they expanded territorial control to more than half of Colombia’s 1,103 municipalities. This expansion has taken place even as public force operations against these groups have increased, including aerial bombardments in departments such as Catatumbo and Arauca. In 2025, security forces carried out 234 actions against these groups, up from 100 in 2024 and surpassing the previous administration’s peak of 215 in 2020. This points to the resilience of these organizations and their capacity to adapt operationally.

Against this backdrop, more than thirty percent of Colombians identified insecurity and crime as their primary concern going into the ongoing electoral period; two-thirds believe that the Armed Forces have lost control over territories dominated by illegal armed groups; and more than half believe President Gustavo Petro’s “Paz Total” policy has been ineffective in reducing violence. Thus, a central question in the electoral debate has been whether negotiations with illegal armed groups should continue and how they should be coordinated with a broader security strategy.

The “Paz Total” policy is widely regarded by experts as having enabled illegal armed groups to expand their territorial control, as several organizations exploited ceasefire arrangements to rearm and recruit additional members. However, the gaps in Paz Total do not fully explain the security deterioration. Other dynamics, including increased financial strength and stronger operational capabilities resulting from technological adaptation, have also enabled the growth of these organizations.

Illegal armed groups have diversified their revenue streams. Cocaine production reached an estimated 3,700 metric tons in 2023, up 37 percent from 2,700 metric tons in 2022. While the Petro government has reported record interdiction figures, seizures have not kept pace with the rate of production growth. As of September 2025, public forces had seized nearly 694 metric tons of cocaine, an 8 percent increase from the previous year, but still equivalent to less than one-fifth of estimated annual cocaine production. These groups profit not only from direct involvement in drug trafficking, but also from charging fees for drug transportation across territories under their control.

Beyond cocaine-related operations, illegal mining has become a primary revenue source for these organizations. Colombia’s illegal gold mining sector is estimated to be between 65 percent and 85 percent, and with international prices surpassing $5,000 per ounce in 2026, these groups have the incentive to continue deepening their involvement in this sector. Reported extorsion cases have also risen 68 percent since 2022 and affect businesses, rural communities, and local governments across the country. These sources of income allow groups to purchase military equipment, pay high salaries to their members, and fund recruitment.

New forms of territorial control have also strengthened illegal armed groups. Technological adaptation, in particular, has expanded their operational capabilities as they increasingly leverage encrypted messaging applications for coordination, social media platforms for recruitment , and commercially available drones for surveillance and attacks against security forces.

Additionally, limited investment in reinforcing military capabilities and equipment has constrained the Armed Force’s ability to respond to these evolving threats. During the Petro government, leadership changes and the turnover among senior officers have added to these challenges by disrupting the military’s ability to plan and sustain operations.  

As Colombia moves into the second round, candidates’ security proposals are likely to remain front and center in the national debate. De la Espriella, who led the vote with 10.36 million ballots, or 43.7 percent, has campaigned on a hardline approach that emphasizes ending Paz Total negotiations with illegal armed groups, advancing aerial fumigation to coca crops, targeting criminal assets and criminal economies, and building maximum-security prisons. Cepeda, who advanced to the runoff with approximately 9.69 million votes, or 40.9 percent, has proposed  a security model centered on addressing the social drivers of violence. His plans include continuing current negotiation-based efforts with illegal armed groups and pairing public-force presence with dialogue with communities and social leaders. He also wants to reinforce crop substitution efforts and the implementation of Development Programs with a Territorial Focus in areas affected by violence.

The challenge for both campaigns is to expand their electoral base beyond their first-round supporters, and their security proposals have become one of the factors shaping whether candidates who did not make it to the runoff choose to back either finalist or remain neutral. Paloma Valencia, who finished third with roughly 7 percent of the vote, has endorsed De La Espriella, adding support from a candidate who also campaigned on taking a tougher approach to illegal armed groups. Sergio Fajardo, who came next with about one million votes, has not endorsed either candidate and instead published the “Decálogo del Millon de Votos”, outlining the ten priorities he believes the next president should advance. These include a shift from Paz Total to a clearer negotiation framework and the strengthening of the armed forces to regain control of territories currently dominated by illegal armed groups. Other political figures and campaigns that did not advance to the runoff, including Claudia López, Juan Daniel Oviedo, Mauricio Lizcano, and the Nuevo Liberalismo Juan Manuel Galán, have so far declined to endorse either candidate with some calling on both campaigns to debate their proposals and move away from polarization.

Regardless of who ultimately wins in the second round, Colombia’s next president will face illegal armed groups that are more resilient, adaptable, and financially sophisticated than in previous security cycles. US support will be critical to addressing those challenges.

Priorities for the next Colombian government and US-Colombia cooperation

The next Colombian administration will inherit a renewed security crisis that cannot be addressed through counternarcotics policy alone. At the same time, the US decertification of Colombia’s counternarcotics efforts in September 2025 and the Fiscal Year 2027 National Security, Department of State and Related Programs Bill made clear that counternarcotics results will remain central to the future of US assistance. The bill conditions 30 percent of State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) assistance on certification that Colombia has curbed coca cultivation and trafficking, while also requiring continued cooperation with the United States on counternarcotics operations and extradition.

Any effective security strategy will need to address both counternarcotics priorities and the broader criminal governance structures that have allowed armed groups to expand. This will require investment in new capabilities and stronger coordination across security, financial, judicial and civilian institutions. It should also respond to different territorial threats, address the operational gaps that have limited the security force’s ability to respond to them and strengthen state credibility in communities where armed groups have filled governance gaps. The following strategies should be prioritized:

1. Adopt a regionally differentiated security strategy

Illegal armed groups in Colombia have evolved into decentralized, fragmented, and financially driven networks embedded in local illicit economies. This makes them increasingly difficult to combat through a uniform national strategy or traditional counterinsurgency approaches. Along the Venezuelan border, violence in Arauca and Catatumbo is shaped by the National Liberation Army’s (ELN) presence and competition with FARC dissident factions over control of coca economies and trafficking routes. In Chocó, the ELN and the Gulf Clan compete over illegal mining, extortion, and drug trafficking, whereas in Urabá and parts of Antioquia the Gulf Clan operates as a more consolidated criminal governance structure. The country’s southwest corridor from Valle del Cauca through Cauca to Nariño also requires special attention because it links coca-producing zones, Pacific maritime routes, and borders Ecuador. There, FARC dissident groups, ELN units and transnational trafficking networks compete over production and transit zones.

The next Colombian government should therefore adopt a regionally differentiated security strategy that responds to the specific threats in each territory. In disputed areas, the priority should be to protect civilians and social leaders, contain violence, and secure roads to prevent illegal armed groups from consolidating control. In territories where criminal governance is more entrenched, the response should also weaken the groups’ ability to regulate local economies, control communities, and replace local institutions. The Armed Forces should lead operations against armed groups and sustain territorial control, while the National Police and its Directorate of Criminal Investigation and Interpol (DIJIN), the Ministry of Finance’s Financial Intelligence Unit (UIAF), the National Tax and Customs Directorate (DIAN) should be responsible for dismantling financial and corruption networks that  allow armed groups to govern. Governors, mayors, and ethnic authorities should identify priority roads, schools, health centers and other services that need to be restored as security conditions improve. Chambers of commerce and investment promotion agencies can help identify opportunities where private investment can follow improved security conditions. This sequence, especially when coordinated with local authorities, will be key to turning security gains into sustained state presence and greater trust in the state.

2. Strengthen security-force readiness

Most of Colombia’s defense budget goes to operational expenses, including payroll and pensions. In 2025, only about 4 percent of the total defense budget was allocated to the acquisition or maintenance of equipment and systems, limiting resources for transport assets, communication upgrades, intelligence capabilities and logistics. These constraints have affected the Armed Force’s readiness and the National Police’s ability to support counternarcotics, territorial-control, and criminal investigations. Given Colombia’s fiscal constraints, the next administration should rebuild readiness through targeted investment aligned with the regionally differentiated security strategy. The Ministry of Defense should use the Integrated National Defense System (SIDEN), the framework used to plan defense investments, to assess the most urgent personnel, equipment, technology, and intelligence needs and guide reinvestment across four key areas:

• Restore force capacity and strengthen territorial brigades: The threats posed by illegal armed groups have become increasingly decentralized and geographically dispersed, while the Colombian Armed Forces have faced a significant reduction of personnel due to resignations and reduced recruitment. The decline has been most notable in the Army, where personnel fell from 246,226 in 2021 to 180,232 in 2025, limiting its ability to sustain presence across contested territories.
  
  The Ministry of Defense should restore force capacity and, with US support, prioritize investment in territorial brigades deployed in high-risk areas including Cauca, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Arauca, and Bajo Cauca. These units require additional personnel, specialized training in intelligence, explosive ordnance disposal, and greater access to air mobility and tactical communications equipment to sustain territorial presence, respond quickly to attacks, and better protect civilian populations. Improving troop and officer welfare through better base conditions, housing, uniforms, and food quality is also essential to strengthen morale, readiness, and combat performance.
  
• Reallocate budget toward equipment maintenance and acquisitions: The Colombian Armed Forces currently face a readiness crisis, with nearly 75 percent of aerial assets grounded or out of service due to shortages of spare parts, limited budget for maintenance services, and the suspension or disruption of contracts with key suppliers including companies in Israel and the United States. The most urgent maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) needs are concentrated in aviation assets used by the Armed Forces or National Police, including Black Hawk, Huey, and Mi-17 helicopters. Other Armed Forces needs include other combat and transport aircraft, tactical armored vehicles, maritime and riverine patrol assets, and communications systems.
  
  The next administration should also restore US military purchases and sustainment programs, which have been critical to the modernization and operational capacity of the Armed Forces, particularly in aviation, weapons and ammunition, and logistics infrastructure. Given fiscal constraints, the assets should be prioritized according to the regionally differentiated security strategy, with resources directed toward the assets most needed to respond to the critical threats of each territory. Restoring these capabilities is not only essential for combat readiness but also for improving access to isolated communities and sustaining state presence in areas where illegal armed groups restrict movement and access to services.
  
• Strengthen capabilities to counter illegal armed groups’ technological and organizational adaptation: Drone attacks by illegal armed groups against security forces  have increased, undermining operational capabilities in rural areas, exposing military fixed positions, increasing operational costs, and placing troops under constant psychological pressure. However, drones are only one way in which illegal armed groups have been able to adapt their operations, as they are also leveraging encrypted communications, social media, and decentralized command structures to exert territorial control.
  
  Although Petro’s government launched the National Anti-Drone Shield Project in January 2026 and the Colombian National Army has tested its first passive unmanned aircraft system (UAS) neutralization system in Catatumbo.  The next government should acquire specialized equipment, including signal jammers and counter-drone systems, while also strengthening training and intelligence analysis needed to identify how armed groups are changing their tactics and command structures. SOUTHCOM assistance could support the armed forces with counter-drone training, while INL and Department of Justice could support the National Police, DIJIN and the Attorney General’s Office with digital forensics to analyze information recovered during operations, and open-source monitoring to track recruitment and threats against civilians and social leaders.
  
• Increase intelligence funding: The intelligence needs of the Colombian Armed Forces increasingly extend beyond traditional counterinsurgency, but efforts to strengthen these capabilities have been slowed by competing budgetary priorities and disrupted assistance contracts. With US assistance, the Ministry of Defense should strengthen integrated human, signals, aerial, and cyber intelligence capabilities to track, infiltrate, and disrupt illegal armed groups. This should include restoring maintenance and upgrading contracts for secure communications and intelligence systems, as recent gaps have reportedly forced personnel to rely on unofficial tools for coordination, compromising sensitive information and putting operations at risk.
  
  The next government should also improve how intelligence moves across the main intelligence and counterintelligence bodies, including the National Intelligence Directorate (DNI), the respective intelligence and counterintelligence directorates of the Army, Navy and Aerospace Force, and the Police Intelligence Directorate (DIPOL). As part of its first-year agenda, the Ministry of Defense should work through the Joint Intelligence Board to review and update existing information-sharing protocols, with particular attention to cybersecurity safeguards.

3. Disrupt illicit financial and criminal ecosystems

Drug trafficking, illegal gold mining, rare mineral extraction, extortion, arms trafficking, and human smuggling are  key sources of income for illegal armed groups in Colombia. These activities are often connected through the same roads, ports, and financial networks used for legal economic activity. The next government should therefore target the broader criminal ecosystem that links legal and illegal markets.

To do this, the incoming administration should establish an interagency task force to centralize financial intelligence and joint investigations. The task force should bring together the UIAF, the National Police, the Attorney General’s Office, the DIAN, and relevant intelligence units within the Armed Forces and National Police. It should be supported by clear and permanent protocols that allow participating agencies to share corporate ownership information, customs declarations, export data, and any suspicious transaction reports and records related to front companies and assets linked to illegal armed groups. It should also include a formal liaison mechanism with banks to flag unusual transactions and help investigators trace funds tied to criminal activities. This would help authorities identify and target the routes, assets, and financial channels that allow illegal armed groups to move goods and money.

US assistance, including through SOUTHCOM and INL, should support capacity building on investigative protocols that enable Colombian authorities to dismantle criminal financial structures, including money-flow analysis, invoice mispricing, beneficial ownership analysis, and digital payment flows. This should include scaling case-based financial investigation training, such as recent courses offered through the US Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program and the Internal Revenue Service’s Criminal Investigation Division, by making them more frequent and expanding participation to regional prosecutors, police investigators, customs officials, and UIAF analysts. US support can also help develop a strategy for experienced Colombian officials to lead future courses for colleagues across the country.

4. Strengthen border-security cooperation with neighboring countries

Colombian illegal armed groups operate fluidly across the Venezuelan, Ecuadorian, Peruvian, and Brazilian borders, moving illicit goods and financial assets. They also exploit these areas for territorial control given limited state presence and uneven security capacity across countries. These conditions allow groups to regulate movement of goods and people, charge fees, and seek refuge when facing pressure from security forces.

Recent agreements toward Colombia-Venezuela cooperation on border security, including the April 2026 agreement to create a joint border-security plan, strengthen police and military coordination, and build closer intelligence cooperation, provide an important starting point, particularly because reducing armed-group control along the border is necessary for legal commerce, investment and Venezuela’s economic recovery. However, the next government should expand this effort to include Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador, given the transnational nature of illegal mining, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, and human smuggling networks. This cooperation should focus on shared mapping of trafficking and illegal mining routes, intelligence sharing on illegal armed group structures and movements, and customs and financial-intelligence cooperation.

At the hemispheric level, the United States should leverage the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition to support this effort with technical assistance, funding for cross-border investigations, and secure communication tools.

5. Pair counternarcotics efforts with territorial development and legal economic alternatives

Reducing coca cultivation, increasing interdiction, and disrupting trafficking networks will remain priorities for Colombia and benchmarks for continued US-Colombia cooperation. Because of this, forced eradication and crop substitution should remain part of Colombia’s counternarcotics tool kit, but they should be sequenced with security-force deployments, judicial action against illegal armed groups, and immediate support for legal economic activities in priority coca-growing municipalities.  

These efforts should be part of a territorial development strategy that includes investment in public goods, access to roads and markets, land formalization and stronger local institutions. Without these conditions, eradication and substitution are likely to produce only temporary improvements as communities may fall back under criminal control Progress should therefore be measured not only by hectares eradicated, but also by reductions in recultivation, the number of families enrolled in viable crop substitution programs, increases in legal crop production and market access, and lower levels of violence, coercion, and forced recruitment.

Conclusion

The next phase of US-Colombia security cooperation will not be a Plan Colombia-style framework. Instead, a recalibrated effort must address a fragmented criminal landscape financed by illicit economies and groups operating within and beyond Colombia’s borders. For Colombia’s next government, the priority should be to strengthen a public force capacity and direct it toward differentiated territorial threats, with clear objectives to protect civilians, disrupt armed groups and the networks that sustain them, and establish governance in priority territories. For the United States, cooperation should provide intelligence, equipment, technical assistance and capacity building to help Colombia combat transnational organized crime and respond to emerging threats. The next Colombian government, alongside a willing US partner, has the opportunity to modernize the bilateral security relationship around today’s threats and shared security priorities.

At a moment of renewed US focus on the Western Hemisphere and Colombia’s ongoing electoral cycle, the Atlantic Council launched the US-Colombia Strategic Alignment Coalition to help update and modernize the bilateral agenda and put forward recommendations for renewed cooperation across security, economic, and governance priorities. This coalition is the successor of the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force originally established in 2017 under bipartisan US Senate leadership.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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Image: A truck labled with the FARC-EP guerrilla name with red paint is seen after an attack by alleged former FARC-EP members on the Pan-American highway in Cajibio, Cauca, Colombia on April 25, 2026, leaving 14 dead and more than 30 injured. Photo by: Martin Steven Angel/Long Visual Press/StringersHub/Sipa USA