Updating the Democratic Transition Framework to chart a way forward in Venezuela

Any successful transition in Venezuela is unlikely to occur overnight. It will need to be gradual, with negotiated guarantees for all parties. US President Donald Trump has demonstrated a consistent understanding of this reality, even well before the current administration laid out a three-phase plan (“stabilization, recovery, and transition”). In the first Trump administration, in March 2020, the White House sought to breathe new life into stalled negotiations between the government and the opposition by issuing a fifteen-point road map for restoring the country’s democratic institutions, known as the Democratic Transition Framework for Venezuela.

The central premise of the framework was that the Venezuelan government could not be trusted to oversee competitive elections and should be replaced by a power-sharing transitional authority that could oversee a free and fair presidential and legislative vote. It proposed a five-member Council of State, with two representatives each from the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) and the opposition, who together would elect a fifth member to join them in serving as the country’s interim president. Under this arrangement the Council of State would assume all executive authority and would lead the country through a transitional period culminating in new presidential and National Assembly elections within six to twelve months.

Before those elections could be held, however, the framework stipulated that a series of reforms, a transitional justice mechanism, and economic incentives were necessary so that the results of the eventual elections would be respected. The framework offered a sequenced process of sanctions relief, with the lifting of individual and sectoral sanctions tied to concrete progress toward a transition. The plan laid out specific benchmarks for this progress, including the release of all political prisoners, the naming of a new National Electoral Council (CNE) and Supreme Court (TSJ), the departure of foreign security forces, and the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to identify those responsible for the perpetration of violence and repression since 1999.

Ultimately, the Democratic Transition Framework project lost momentum and was overtaken by shifting priorities in Washington ahead of the 2020 US election, and the plan stayed on paper. Inside Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro entrenched himself, and the opposition coalition led by Juan Guaidó ultimately lost popular support. But Maduro’s January 2026 capture, and the fast-changing relationship between Washington and Delcy Rodríguez’s interim government in Caracas, have created a new and unprecedented opportunity for US policymakers to help advance a genuine democratic transition in Venezuela.

Preserving and adapting the framework for 2026

Framework elements to preserve

Much of the Democratic Transition Framework is relevant to Venezuela today, even though the political, social, and economic reality has changed significantly since it was first presented. A new road map for a democratic transition should consider preserving the following components of the framework:

• Elections are necessary but not sufficient to solve the political crisis. The 2020 framework was right to place competitive elections as the end goal of a broader transition process, rather than as the first step in that process. Ultimately, an election by itself is unlikely to resolve Venezuela’s crisis, especially if it occurs in the absence of a prior set of reforms and political agreements that can guarantee that the results of those elections will be respected by the losing party. This was made clear in the stolen July 2024 Venezuelan presidential election, with the PSUV agreeing to hold elections but refusing to recognize the results. A genuine, sustainable transition will require a political accord between the heirs of Hugo Chávez’s Chavismo movement and the opposition to ensure that a transfer of power is not perceived as an existential threat by incumbents and that the opposition has credible guarantees that results will be respected.
• An agreement should reduce the costs of leaving power and create shared equity in a transition. The framework’s emphasis on the creation of a Council of State made up of representatives of both the ruling party and the opposition is an innovative approach to transition that merits another look. A transitional government could reduce incentives for spoilers on either side to derail a transition by giving all parties a stake in its development. Even if establishing a joint transitional government is not possible, a series of stepwise agreements to name agreed-upon representatives to key institutions such as the CNE, TSJ, and other entities, can help ensure buy-in from all parties.
• The armed forces are a key powerbroker—and a potential spoiler. The framework’s emphasis on the military as a central player (spelling out a clear role for the military high command and keeping it in place during the length of the transitional government) in Venezuela’s transition remains valid today. Given how Venezuela’s military has steadily gained political influence in the last twenty-five years, any attempt to exclude or marginalize the armed forces carries serious risks of destabilization. Senior officers will seek a role for themselves in a post-transition Venezuela, and they may pose a threat to a transition if their buy-in is not secured. At the same time, accountability and anticorruption efforts cannot take a back seat to stability concerns.

Framework elements to adapt

While much of the Democratic Transition Framework remains relevant six years after it was proposed, the Venezuela of 2026 is not Venezuela of 2020. A realistic road map for a democratic transition should be updated to adapt to changes in the country’s democratic opposition, changes in US policy, and the changing US-Venezuela relationship after the January 2026 capture of Maduro. A new transition road map should recognize:

• The US government retains significant leverage and can use it. An updated framework should incorporate the ways in which the United States continues to retain significant leverage over the Rodríguez government’s policy decisions. The reality is that the White House has not dismantled its sanctions regime against Venezuela but tweaked it by using general and specific licenses issued by the Treasury Department. While the US administration is interested in spurring investment in the Venezuelan oil and mining sectors, it has kept in place the basic architecture of its pressure campaign on Caracas. This leverage should be used to incentivize and exert pressure to accelerate democratization. An entrenched authoritarian government in Venezuela is not in the US national interest.
• María Corina Machado’s leadership has reshaped the opposition. One of the main differences between 2020 and 2026 is the popularity of the opposition movement. After winning the opposition primary in 2023 and using her popularity to campaign for and ensure an opposition victory in the 2024 presidential election, María Corina Machado today has emerged as the most popular political figure in the country. Machado herself has recognized the need for political negotiations, calling for a “grand national agreement,” making clear that she will need a seat at any negotiation table and in any transition planning.
• The White House is now talking to all parties. The institutional landscape has also changed considerably since 2020. In January 2026, a new National Assembly was sworn in, and although it emerged from elections that were neither free nor fair, and it remains dominated by the PSUV, it is nonetheless legislating on issues of direct importance to US interests. In officially recognizing the Rodríguez government as the country’s “sole authority,” the US government has effectively changed its previous position: that the opposition-controlled National Assembly elected in 2015 was the country’s sole legitimate government. In contrast, the Trump administration is signaling that it is encouraged by the current National Assembly’s recent legislation on energy and mining. The administration should use its communication with different actors across the broader opposition and among the ruling party to build trust and set the terms of a common agenda.
• Victims will need to be centered in broader reconciliation efforts. The fact that the 2020 framework mentioned the creation of a Truth Commission is important, but the framework only tasks it with “report[ing] to the nation on the responsibilities of perpetrators” without specifying the referral of crimes to independent investigation. Given the well-documented pattern of repression, torture, extrajudicial killings, and other crimes against humanity committed in Venezuela in recent years, any transition will require not only that these incidents are laid bare to the country, but that the cases are handled in such a way that prioritizes victims’ rights to justice, reparations, and guarantees of nonrepetition. This will require not only thorough investigations and prosecution at every level of the chain of command but also an overhaul of Venezuela’s judicial system, which has demonstrated systemic corruption and a lack of impartiality. There is an urgent need for oversight and reforms of the justice system, as well as of the police and other security forces.

Policy recommendations

To advance the US objective of a securing a prosperous, US-aligned, and democratic Venezuela, the United States should:

• Consult with all parties to release a 2026 Democratic Transition Framework for Venezuela. The Trump administration should put forward an updated framework that preserves the strengths of the 2020 proposal (laid out above) while adapting it to Venezuela’s 2026 reality. This would help flesh out the administration’s three-step approach by showing how Venezuela is meant to move from stabilization and recovery to a democratic transition. Doing so would also send a strong signal of certainty to US allies, partners, and potential investors about the progress that Washington would like to see in the near term.
• Clearly articulate to the Venezuelan government what progress it expects and how the US is prepared to incentivize this progress. Washington can and should construct a list of costly concessions that it expects to see from Caracas, and pair each of them with aspects of either sanctions relief or snapbacks to ensure a range of positive or negative incentives for compliance. The hard “asks” should be made up front.
• Use Treasury licenses and revenue oversight to enforce progress. In its sticks-and-carrots approach, Washington should use licenses, access to oil revenue and frozen funds, and other forms of economic relief to reward improvement in governance and concrete steps toward a transition—while making clear (and demonstrating, if need be) that licenses can be narrowed or revoked and sanctions can be reimposed in the event of noncompliance. The United States still has the tools necessary to shape elite incentives, and it should use that leverage to secure verifiable progress toward the end goal of an economically prosperous, US-aligned, democratic Venezuela.
• Engage more directly in facilitating lasting political agreements between the Venezuelan parties. For more than a decade, the international community has tried to organize dialogue and negotiation efforts. A reason (among others) for the failure in meaningful advancement is the lack of direct, coordinated US engagement with all parties around these talks. With the Trump administration now in close contact with all parties, it is in a privileged position to ensure negotiations can proceed on meaningful and durable reforms. Washington should lean into this advantage and shape the basis for a new agreement for economic improvement and democratic governance in Venezuela.

This paper is the result of a monthslong consultation process with a diverse array of US, Venezuelan, and international experts, civil-society representatives, private-sector stakeholders, and political actors. It seeks to inform the US policy debate on democratization, reconciliation, and the conditions for a peaceful and democratic transition in Venezuela. Rather than offering a definitive road map, the working paper is intended to spark conversation, surface areas of consensus and disagreement, and contribute to a more informed discussion among policymakers and stakeholders engaged in shaping Venezuela’s future.

Geoff Ramsey is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. Ramsey is a leading expert on US policy towards Latin America and has lived in and traveled regularly to the region for the last 15 years. His work focuses on monitoring geopolitical risk, security dynamics, democratization, and human rights trends across the hemisphere.

The author would like to thank Eugenio Martinez, Feliciano Reyna, Claudia Nikken, James Story, and Miguel Pizarro for their insights in preparing this document.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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Image: Opposition party supporters attend the "Encuentro Unitario por la Libertad y la Democracia" (United Gathering for Freedom and Democracy) rally, calling for free elections, in Valencia, Venezuela, on June 13, 2026. Photo by Juan Carlos Hernandez/Reuters.