A path towards sustainable security in Colombia

Colombia has confronted armed conflict since the 1950s, involving a shifting landscape of guerrilla organizations, paramilitary groups, and drug trafficking organizations competing for territorial and economic control. On November 30, 2016, the Colombian government signed a peace agreement with the largest armed group in Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP). Almost ten years later, there continues to be significant challenges in its implementation, and the violence from the conflict continues to affect Colombians’ safety and security. According to the Peace Accords Matrix of the University of Notre Dame, the official technical verification and monitoring entity for the accord, 70 percent of the security and protection guarantees for neglected rural regions made in the original agreement are still in a state of initiation or minimal implementation. The lack of progress in the implementation of these policies has jeopardized Colombia’s road toward sustainable peace. The slowed implementation of the 2016 accords disproportionately impacts ethnic minorities in Colombia, especially those who are human rights activists in conflict-afflicted regions. The Ombudsman’s Office documented 1,569 homicides of community leaders and human rights defenders between 2016 and May 2025.

This issue brief was researched and prepared for publication before the August 10 earthquake in Colombia, which caused extensive damage across Valle del Cauca, Chocó, Caldas, Risaralda, and other parts of western Colombia. The earthquake is the first major challenge for President Abelardo de la Espriella’s new administration, which has pledged a stronger presence in rural regions affected by the conflict.

From the 2016 peace process to Paz Total

Several factors have contributed to the stagnation of the 2016 peace agreement. An October 2016 national referendum showed the Colombian public sharply divided over the agreement, with 50.2 percent voting against it and 49.8 percent in favor. When President Iván Duque (2018-2022) took office, his administration argued that several articles in the constitutional mandate of the peace accords granted impunity to perpetrators and was insufficient in reparations to victims. Duque then attempted several constitutional reforms to limit the implementation of the agreement, which Congress ultimately rejected. Yet, from 2022-2023 coca bush cultivation in Colombia increased by 50 percent, with the departments of Nariño, Cauca, and Norte de Santander continuing to be at the center of coca cultivation.

Further, after the 2016 peace process, several mid-range FARC combatants refused to lay down arms and formed splinter groups known as FARC dissidences, encompassing diverse regions in the southwest of the country (Valle del Cauca, Cauca, Huila, Nariño), and departments along the Venezuelan border (Arauca, Norte de Santander). As these groups clashed over drug trafficking routes and contested territory with each other and other armed groups like the National Liberation Army (ELN), the conflict’s center of gravity moved away from confronting the state to controlling civilian populations and local economies for profit.

Amid the challenges facing implementation of the Havana accords, President Gustavo Petro took office in August 2022 and institutionalized his administration’s flagship security and conflict resolution strategy dubbed Paz Total (Total Peace). Total Peace was premised on the idea that the Colombian state could carry out parallel peace talks with different armed groups simultaneously, employing a national strategy that sought to implement the 2016 peace agreement, seek negotiations with other armed groups, and attempt to demobilize criminal organizations. Paz Total was intended as a nationwide strategy that would adapt to local contexts for specific negotiating tables. However, the results ended up bringing the opposite outcome. FARC dissident factions like the Estado Mayor de Bloques y Frente (EMBF), Estado Mayor Central (EMC), and the Clan del Golfo (Gulf Clan) benefited from ongoing dialogues and strengthened their military capacity, expanded their territorial presence, and embedded themselves politically in their regions of operation.

Petro’s administration argued that if the state could not fill territorial spaces as quickly as armed criminal groups could, negotiating with all groups at the same time could prevent others from taking over licit and illicit economic activity and prevent power vacuums. However, by 2025, it was clear that Paz Total had been a failure. Armed groups like the ELN and the Gulf Clan have regrouped under ceasefires and expanded their grip on the Colombian periphery, especially in areas near the Venezuelan border like the Catatumbo region and the departments of Córdoba and Chocó in the northwestern part of the country. Infighting continued, and military and police officers complained about unclear rules of engagement and mixed enforcement. As of June 2026, there were eight active negotiating tables between armed groups and Petro’s government, none of which had active ceasefires ¹Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC) EGC, Estado Mayor de Bloques y Frente (EMBF), Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB), Comuneros del Sur (CDS), (Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada (ACSN), Oficina de Envigado (ESJ MED), ESJBuenaventura (Shottas, Espartanos, Locos Yam, Mexicanos, RPS (ESJ Quibdó).

Security proved to be a hot-button issue for the millions of Colombians who elected political outsider and security hardliner Abelardo de la Espriella in the runoff for the presidential election on June 21, 2026. President de la Espriella based his campaign on the promise of destroying illegal economies, dismantling armed groups, and returning territorial control of the country to the Colombian state, which resonated with a Colombian population increasingly worried about the deteriorating security situation. Between January and April 2026, forty-eight massacres have been registered in Colombia, with at least 229 casualties. De la Espriella won in some heavily conflict-affected regions like Catatumbo and Arauca.

It is worth noting that since 1985, every Colombian administration has engaged in some kind of talks with armed groups, including the governments of Duque and Álvaro Uribe (2002–2010). At the same time, military offensives have proven effective in reducing armed groups’ territorial control in selected areas. For example, during Uribe’s presidential terms, his administration invested heavily in the military’s aerial capacity, severely weaking guerrillas through airstrikes, allowing the Colombian state to take back territory in the center of the country, and securing Colombia’s main highways and key infrastructure.

Going forward, the shortcomings of Total Peace should inform any future approach to peace and security policy in Colombia.

Five maps that show where things stand

Petro’s Paz Total strategy rested largely on the fact that the Pacto Histórico, his coalition, was built on years of activism against Duque’s security policies and positioned his government as ideologically aligned with a negotiation-first approach with armed groups. Instead, armed groups hedged their bets and continued to expand operations while negotiations were underway, taking advantage of ceasefires established with the government and a reprieve from attacks endured during the previous administrations. As the maps above indicate, there are so many fragmented conflict nodes that the Colombian government struggles to identify and prioritize where kinetic action would degrade a certain armed groups’ operating capacity.

Armed groups in Colombia are increasingly focused on controlling territories that connect them to illegal economies, honing in more on local influence than on seeking the overthrow of the Colombian state for political power, making it harder to establish off-ramps for demobilization. In recent years, these armed groups have also fragmented and atomized. In November 2024, Luciano Marín Arango (alias Iván Márquez), top commander of the Segunda Marquetalia FARC dissident faction, stated that the group was not compromised by ongoing talks with the government as part of Total Peace. This resulted in the creation of the Coordinadora Nacional del Éjercito Bolivariano, composed of dissidents from the original FARC dissident groups, who did want to engage in negotiations with the government.

A similar breakdown in command structures that came after the 2004 and 2006 demobilization of the defunct Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) resulted in the birth of the Urabeños, who later became the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, and have morphed into one of the most infamous groups in Colombia today, most commonly known as the Gulf Clan. The Urabeños were one of dozens of groups who emerged from the vacuum left behind by the AUC demobilization, with many earning the government’s “criminal bands” designation, most frequently referred to as the BACRIM, short for bandas criminales.

 Disagreements over negotiating tactics, power vacuums waiting to be filled after demobilizations, and disputes over key areas for coca crops and trafficking routes have created the perfect storm for a conflict that takes an increasing toll on civilians. Traditional counterinsurgency strategies like pursuing high value targets have diminishing returns against fragmented criminalized organizations that no longer operate in a highly vertical and hierarchical structure. Additionally, a lack of coordination within Colombian state institutions presents a roadblock in having a unified peace strategy or legal, formalized framework for demobilization.

While Colombia has legal mechanisms for peace talks, the lack of a clear and politically viable legislative pathway for negotiating with certain armed and criminal groups (specifically, those that do not have overt ideological aims) has complicated efforts to formalize discussions. There are also limitations on the government’s ability to incentivize demobilization. In a 2023 ruling, Colombia’s Constitutional Court placed limits on the government’s ability to offer groups specific terms under which they can disarm. Combined with the absence of Colombian state control in much of Colombia’s rural regions, challenges in eradicating cocaine production and demobilizing armed groups are increasingly difficult to counter without a comprehensive security strategy.

Recommendations for the way forward

The Colombian government can address the complex and overlapping factors that fuel the conflict in several ways to guarantee peace and security for the Colombian people. The following recommendations are based on suggestions made by twenty-five peace and security experts in Colombia who participated in an Atlantic Council convening held under Chatham House rule.

1. A comprehensive new security strategy could benefit from a broad array of tools. A security-first strategy that prioritizes sustained military pressure against armed groups would benefit from a clear legal framework that standardizes demobilization pathways for local criminal factions of armed groups such as the FARC dissident factions, ELN, and Gulf Clan. The shortcomings of the Paz Total policy illustrate that undifferentiated approaches do not work. A differentiated security strategy that tailors coercive military actions to each armed group’s structure and vulnerabilities could, where tactically advantageous, incorporate limited dialogue to complement sustained pressure, as shown in previous administrations such as Uribe’s. Clear legal frameworks governing accountability and incentive structures would support both military operations and other demobilization pathways. For many of the combatants themselves, especially forcibly recruited minors and very young adults, reintegration alternatives grounded in restorative justice could reduce recruitment pools and weaken armed group capacity. Command-level actors should face more punitive accountability. This framework would enable more effective security operations through legal clarity about consequences and off-ramps.
   
   
2. Military action must be coupled with building state presence in conflict areas. Armed groups exploit Colombia’s geography and their de facto authority in rural areas where the state is absent. An effective strategy requires three coordinated elements: first, restored military operational capacity to conduct complex operations; second, improved intelligence coordination between agencies to ensure consistent strategies and avoid conflicting narratives; and third, targeted state re-institutionalization in the country’s most neglected regions to reestablish state presence in areas controlled by criminal groups, supported by strengthened police and military forces. For example, Colombian intelligence agencies should share information and engage in cycles of verification of information to avoid conflicting narratives and strategies when coordinating operations against armed groups. Tactical units would also benefit from specialized intelligence training. Further, the purging of high-level military officers during Petro’s administration has overstretched the armed forces and made it difficult to carry out complex operations. The Colombian Ministry of Defense should restore force capacity, prioritize investment in force brigades, and invest in logistical infrastructure. The Colombian Air Force weaponry stockpile needs thorough updating, as equipment shortages and outdated planes severely hinder its capability to strike targets and carry out humanitarian rescue operations.
   
   
3. Specific peace accord programs could complement the new government’s security priorities.
   Promoting cross-institutional coordination could support existing bodies that ensure different points of the agreement focused on security priorities are being implemented. For example, the Directorate for the Substitution of Crops Used for Illicit Purposes (DSCI) can strengthen accountability by monitoring funds spent to incentivize farmers to transition out of growing coca. Programs established for territorial control like the Territorial Renewal Agency (ART) need to reflect specific communities’ needs and be part of a coordinated implementation of security policies to make Colombia safer. Overall, the priorities for implementation call for a governmental strategy that takes advantage of existing legal bodies to carry out these programs. Crop substitution initiatives under the DSCI and territorial control mechanisms through the ART have practical value in reducing armed groups’ economic capacity and strengthening state presence in conflict zones, objectives that align with security priorities. These programs are functional tools for addressing the conditions that enable armed group operations.
   
   
4. Communicating the government’s security strategy and military objectives to the public is essential. In his inauguration speech, President de la Espriella made it clear that his administration would ensure that no Colombian “feels left out by [his] government.” On the issue of security, communicating clearly, to citizens what they stand to gain from an approach that either chooses to engage or not engage with armed groups, is of utmost importance. Grounding security policy in the need for peace for Colombians in conflict-ridden zones and centering the goal of rebuilding Colombia’s social fabric is more likely to get Colombians’ buy-in than opaque strategies.
    
   Public confidence in security operations requires clear communication about goals and progress. The complexity of campaigns to counter criminal actors means they can be easily politicized, with military operations often misunderstood or their rationale obscured. Grounding security efforts in specific, achievable objectives, such as reducing coca production, eliminating key criminal leadership, restoring state presence in conflict zones, and regularly communicating progress to citizens will augment public buy-in. Transparency about military operations and their intended effects is likely to further gain Colombians’ support.

Conclusion

Colombia’s road to addressing armed conflict has been complex and both the 2016 peace agreements and the Paz Total policy have revealed important lessons about effective and ineffective approaches. Moving forward, effective security strategy requires sustained military pressure coupled with deliberate state rebuilding, differentiated approaches that account for the varied structures of armed groups, and preservation of practical institutional mechanisms that serve security objectives. These proposals recognize the failures of past negotiation-centered approaches and instead seek to advance a coherent, security-focused strategy grounded in clear institutional coordination and legal frameworks.

Fellow

Geoff Ramsey

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Civil Society Colombia

Staff

Ilona Barrero

Program Assistant

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Colombia English

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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Image: Colombian Armed Forces members take part in a candlelight vigil in honor of victims of a cargo vehicle bomb attack near the Colombia Aerospace base, attributed to FARC dissident groups, that caused multiple casualties, in Cali, Colombia, August 24, 2025. REUTERS/Jair F. Coll