Was Trump’s strike on an alleged Venezuelan drug boat legal?
When Donald Trump announced a US airstrike on an alleged drug-running boat in the Caribbean on September 2, the US president offered plenty of information—and even a video of the strike. But it took some time for the administration’s legal justifications to take shape.
Trump’s initial social media post mentioned the designation of the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua (TDA) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. It also included the assertion that the TDA is under the control of Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro, allegations of the TDA’s responsibility for illegal acts, and the claim that the ship was headed toward the United States. (Yet US Secretary of State Marco Rubio later indicated that its destination was likely Trinidad or another Caribbean country, and it was reported on September 10 that the ship altered its course—seemingly turning around—before the strike.) Trump’s post also claimed that the individuals were “terrorists killed in action.” Rubio later said Trump intended to send a message to cartels by destroying the ship rather than interdicting it.
On September 4, Trump sent a letter to Charles Grassley, the president pro tempore of the Senate, informing the Senate of the “military action.” He made the report “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” and he said that the strike was made under his Article II constitutional authority. The letter indicated that “[e]xtraordinarily violent drug trafficking cartels” have “complex structures with […] financial means and paramilitary capabilities,” and that “some states in the region” are unable or unwilling to address the “continuing threat . . . emanating from their territories.” He therefore claimed that this was a use of military force in self-defense.
This strike comes after Trump signed a directive in July authorizing lethal force against certain Latin American drug cartels that his administration has designated as terrorist organizations, though the directive has not been made public. It is hardly the first time the US military has launched strikes on alleged members of a non-state armed group designated as a foreign terrorist organization. However, every attack by the US military outside US territory must be assessed individually under international law according to the legal frameworks that apply, the status of the targets, the means (e.g., weapons and military equipment) used to carry out the attack, the manner in which they are employed, and the context of and justifications for the attack, among other considerations.
Because there are several outstanding questions on the specifics of the attack—including whether there is proof that the boat was carrying drugs—a legal analysis is complicated and implicates a number of legal frameworks. Here are five areas of law that are relevant to consider in this case, and the accompanying questions that arise.
1. Maritime law: Although the United States is not a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), US policy is to act “in a manner consistent with its provisions relating to traditional uses of oceans.” Assuming the strike did occur in international waters, as Trump claimed, Article 88 of UNCLOS reserves the high seas for peaceful purposes. While maritime law does authorize certain enforcement operations, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has held that force is meant to be a last resort. Rubio said Trump had the option to interdict the ship and instead chose to destroy it. Rubio’s comments, and the September 10 report that the ship changed its course and was hit multiple times before it sank, suggest that US military personnel could have safely interdicted the ship. If so, force was not necessary. In that vein, Mark Nevitt, a retired commander with the Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps, has observed that the Coast Guard is the United States’ primary maritime law enforcement agency, and that it has the authority “to search, seize property, and arrest persons suspected of violating US law upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction.” For use of force, the Coast Guard follows “strict rules” relying on warning and disabling shots. Those rules do not appear to have been followed in this case.
2. Use of force (jus ad bellum): Article 2(4) of the UN Charter requires that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” The main exception to this prohibition falls under Article 51, which allows the exercise of the right of self-defense. Some states view Article 51 as allowing use of force against a non-state armed group on the territory of a second state if that second state is “unwilling or unable” to address the armed group. Trump’s September 4 letter invoked both self-defense and the “unwilling or unable” test. However, the targeted ship does not appear to have been flying under a state’s flag, nor did the attack occur in territorial waters of any state. Because this action apparently fell outside any state or territory and was against a non-state actor, it would seem to fall outside this particular legal framework. Nevertheless, while no country has claimed the individuals killed, the strike could (though not necessarily) be considered an armed attack on the country of which the individuals are nationals. In that case, the strike does not seem to have met the imminence, necessity, and proportionality requirements under Article 51. Notably, any use of force under Article 51 requires a report to the UN Security Council, which the United States does not appear to have issued so far.
3. International Humanitarian Law (IHL): IHL would only apply if the United States is in an armed conflict. Trump’s September 4 letter invoked the War Powers Resolution and used language seemingly indicating that the administration believes the United States is involved in an armed conflict against “[e]xtraordinarily violent drug cartels.” However, the existence of an armed conflict—triggering the relevance of IHL—is assessed under international law, based on the factual circumstances, according to specific criteria.
Under IHL, there are two types of armed conflicts. A non-international armed conflict involves one or more non-state armed groups and may additionally involve state forces. An international armed conflict involves at least two states. For the United States to be considered engaged in a non-international armed conflict with a non-state armed group, the armed group would have to be sufficiently organized and the violence sufficiently intense. In this case, it appears unlikely that the conditions have been met. If Venezuela had effective control over the TDA’s actions, then the United States and Venezuela could be in an international armed conflict. When invoking the Alien Enemies Act, Trump asserted that the TDA operated “at the direction, clandestine or otherwise, of the Maduro regime,” but a memo declassified in May indicated that US intelligence agencies do not believe the Venezuelan government is controlling the TDA. So it also appears highly unlikely that the conditions for an international armed conflict are present.
But given the administration’s rhetoric and the fact that subsequent US military operations could result in an armed conflict—if, for example, the United States uses force against the TDA in Venezuela without Venezuela’s consent, and/or if both the TDA evolves to meet the organizational requirement and the violence with the United States intensifies—it is still worth briefly assessing the September 2 strike under IHL to determine whether similar future strikes might be legal.
If there were an armed conflict between the United States and a non-state armed group and IHL applied, and if the US targeted a boat of individuals for the same reported reason—that is, the individuals were alleged to be involved in drug trafficking—it still would most likely be unlawful. Such individuals would likely not be lawful targets under international law, barring evidence that they were combatants or directly participating in hostilities. Likewise, if the boat does not have a military function, a strike would not be a militarily necessity nor would it be proportional to any military advantage anticipated. Indeed, even if the individuals were part of the non-state armed group party to the armed conflict, if they were not taking direct part in hostilities against the United States, a strike in this situation could be considered a war crime of murder under the US War Crimes Act and international law.
4. International Human Rights Law (IHRL): The United States is a signatory to human rights treaties including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 6 of the covenant establishes that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of their life, and Article 4 specifies that states cannot make derogations (that is, formal exemptions) related to this right, even in times of public emergency. As noted by former US State Department Attorney-Adviser Brian Finucane, the US Department of Defense Operational Law Handbook views the prohibition of murder under IHRL as a peremptory rule under customary international law, meaning a rule “so fundamental and universally accepted that [it does] not permit any derogation, even by treaty.” Assessed according to these criteria, this strike appears to have been an extrajudicial killing in violation of IHRL and Department of Defense provisions.
5. Domestic law: Finucane also notes that Executive Order 12333 prohibits assassinations by anyone employed by the US government or working on its behalf. Finucane cites executive branch legal doctrine as defining assassination as including “the targeted killing of individuals,” and notes potential exceptions for self-defense or for lethal force consistent with IHL. Rubio’s statement that Trump chose to destroy rather than interdict the ships, and the ship’s reported course reversal, imply that US military personnel could have safely interdicted the ship. Assuming that was the case, lethal force was not necessary for self-defense. The attack therefore appears to violate the US prohibition on assassinations, as well as other US laws.
Ultimately, the strike—and the language used by administration officials about the strike—paint a troubling picture regarding how the United States will approach the TDA and related groups. While it is of course important to hold transnational criminal organizations like the TDA accountable through judicial processes, lethal force is, according to guidance from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), meant to be “a measure of last resort.” Consider the case of former Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte, who presided over a policy of extrajudicial killings of drug suspects and now finds himself in International Criminal Court (ICC) custody subject to an arrest warrant for crimes against humanity.
Given the current facts, the ICC is unable to exercise jurisdiction over this strike. For it to have jurisdiction over any attacks going forward, there would need to be a confirmed armed conflict and/or widespread or systematic attacks against a civilian population—or evidence of other categories of crimes under the Rome Statute—among other requirements. For now, any legal accountability for the boat strike would most likely involve processes under domestic law—whether under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or in civilian courts. The domestic courts of the victims may also have jurisdiction.
As Nevitt noted, this “preemptive lethal strike against an alleged drug boat continues the White House’s effort to blur the lines between law enforcement and the U.S. military’s missions and authorities.” Going forward, certain situations—imminent threat of attack against the United States, UN Security Council authorization, or the consent of the state where US strikes would occur—could mean that US military force outside US territory would be lawful. In the context of an international armed conflict, military operations would be lawful so long as they complied with IHL.
However, absent these situations, from a legal perspective, the actions of the TDA and other transnational criminal organizations should be a matter of law enforcement. As such, lethal force is reserved only for when, as per the ICRC, it is “strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.”
Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.
Further reading
Wed, Sep 10, 2025
What to know about Trump’s war on drug trafficking from Venezuela
New Atlanticist By
The recent US strike on a suspected drug trafficking boat is best understood in the context of the Trump administration’s policies toward Venezuela and the wider Western Hemisphere.
Wed, Sep 10, 2025
Why the Pentagon had been reluctant to combat narco-trafficking in the Western Hemisphere
New Atlanticist By Kevin Whitaker
The recent US strike on a suspected drug-carrying vessel is a reminder that the US military had for years resisted getting more deeply involved in counternarcotics.
Fri, Aug 29, 2025
Why are US warships heading toward Venezuela?
New Atlanticist By
Three Aegis guided-missile destroyers and several other US warships are headed to the waters near Venezuela. Two Atlantic Council experts explain why and what to expect next.
Image: A vessel, which US President Donald Trump said was transporting illegal narcotics and heading to the US, is struck by the US military as it navigates in the southern Caribbean, in this still image obtained from video posted by US President Donald Trump on Truth Social and released September 2, 2025. DONALD TRUMP VIA TRUTH SOCIAL/Handout via REUTERS
