In the wake of June’s Twelve Day War between Israel, Iran and the United States, the role of ethnicity in shaping political mobilization and activism in Iran remains a particularly important issue.
In recent years, the ethnic question has emerged as a saliently significant—though often under-examined—dimension of Iran’s domestic politics. While ethnicity has long played a role in Iran’s political landscape, in recent years— from the 2017 demonstrations against rising food prices, the 2019 fuel price protests, the 2021 “uprising of the thirsty” and the 2022 demonstrations sparked by the death of Mahsa Jina Amini —the main axis of anti-regime activism has increasingly shifted from Persian-majority or ethnically mixed metro areas of central Iran to the country’s ethnic periphery.
The term “ethnic periphery” here refers to both the geographic concentration of non-Persian ethnic groups along Iran’s borders—from the northwest to the southeast and up north—and the structural inequality in power and resource distribution between these regions and the central parts of the country. This shift has placed ethnic identity and long-standing ethnic grievances at the heart of domestic political contention, reshaping significantly both the geography and logic of protest.
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The growing prominence of the ethnic factor in Iranian politics demands recognition from analysts and policymakers. Much prevailing discourse and debate about Iran remains Tehran-centric, overlooking the voices and grievances of marginalized ethnic communities in the periphery. Yet any future political transformation, whether through protest, reform, or conflict, must reckon with the centrality of ethnic demands. Rooted in decades of structural exclusion and cultural repression these demands have now coalesced into a potent political force.
This has effectively created a bifurcation of political activism in recent years into two distinct geographies: the Persian-majority center and the ethnic periphery. Unlike earlier protest movements—such as the 1999 student protests or the 2009 Green Movement, which were primarily centered in Tehran and other Persian-majority cities—protests since 2017 have either originated from, or derived their strength and longevity in, the non-Persian periphery, typically provoking harsher government violence in these regions.
Therefore, for policymakers inside and outside Iran, analysts, and activists alike, a Tehran-centric view of Iran is no longer sufficient. The ethnic factor is not a fringe issue but a defining element of Iran’s contemporary political landscape. Activists in these regions are not only challenging the government or the regime—they are also challenging the meaning of citizenship and national identity in Iran, with implications that extend beyond the current political system.
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Ethnic mobilization and the new geography of protest
There is no precise breakdown of ethnic groups in Iran, as the state does not include ethnicity in its population censuses. Estimates vary considerably: for example, the US Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) World Factbook editions of 2010 and 2016 placed Persians at 51 percent and 61 percent respectively, Azeris at 16–24 percent, Kurds at 7–10 percent, Arabs at 2–3 percent, and Baloch at around 2 percent.
Decades of systemic discrimination has given rise to a deepening sense of ethnic political consciousness among Kurdish, Baluch, Arab, and Azeri Turkish communities in Iran. While in many cases this has led to the emergence of numerous (and technically outlawed) ethnic-nationalist political parties, the Kurdish case illustrates the prevailing demand among ethnic communities is generally for some form of recognized status and local governance within the borders of present-day Iran.
Apart from socio-economic factors discussed below, the distinct ethnic-nationalist consciousness unfolds against a state-promoted national identity constructed around two primary poles: Persian language and culture, and Shia Islam. The manifestations of this systematic exclusion are multifaceted. For instance, while Article Fifteen of Iran’s Constitution permits non-Persian languages in schools, the state suppresses this right even in private settings—as seen in the sentencing of Kurdish activist Zahra Mohammadi to five years in prison for teaching Kurdish in a non-official capacity, (though she was released one year later).
Additionally, ethnic groups have historically suffered from disproportionate state violence. According to the Oslo-based Iran Human Rights organization, From 2010 to 2024, 97 percent of those executed on political charges (participation in political and armed groups) were Kurds, Baluch, or Arabs. The Baluch, only 2–6 percent of the population, accounted for 17 percent of execution on narcotics charges in 2024 and nearly half in 2022 and 2021. Human rights organizations say these trials lacked due process and often coincided with the aftermath of major political unrest. Economic disparities mirror this repression. In the Iranian calender year 1402 (March 2023–March 2024), ethnic-majority provinces like Sistan-Baluchistan, Kurdistan, Kermanshah, Ardebil, and Khuzestan ranked among the highest in poverty and unemployment in Iran.
The marginalization outlined above has been met with growing political awareness, particularly since the late 1990s. Satellite television, the internet, and social media have enabled ethnic political activists—mostly based outside Iran due to state repression—to connect with their communities, and raise awareness about structural discrimination. At times, using these communication technologies, political activists and groups from outside have successfully mobilized collective action inside the country, such as strikes.
This expanded media ecosystem has fostered a deeper understanding in the non-Persian periphery of how ethnic identity intersects with broader forms of religious, economic, and gender-based exclusion, shaping the relationship between these regions and the central state. As a result, demands emerging from Iran’s ethnic periphery are increasingly framed through a discourse of identity-driven rights and justice—often infused with ethno-nationalist undertones, especially among diaspora-based groups and individuals—in response to long-standing perceptions of ethnically driven exclusion and marginalization. These demands, directed at the central state, often include cultural and linguistic recognition, fair distribution of economic resources, religious freedom—since many in these communities are non-Shi’a (the official religion of the state) or non-Muslim—and freedom for political activity and representation.
Ultimately, due to the confluence of persistent multifaceted discrimination and rising political awareness, the center of gravity of anti-government activism in Iran has increasingly shifted to the country’s ethnic periphery. This trend is evident in several waves of large-scale protests in recent years. For example, the Arab-majority province of Khuzestan, with a sizeable ethnic Lur population, became a focal point of unrest and state violence during the 2019 protests over rising fuel prices and again in 2021 due to water scarcity. Iranian security forces reportedly killed around 1,500 protestors in Khuzestan in 2019.
While the death of Amini, a young Kurdish woman, in Tehran was not the first case of state violence against women, it was the large funeral and subsequent gatherings in her Kurdish hometown of Saqqez that provided the sparks for what became the most enduring protests and serious threat to the Islamic Republic in recent memory. This early reaction in Kurdish areas gave Amini’s death a powerful resonance across Iran, fueling growing protests elsewhere in the country and prompting widespread international outrage and condemnation.
Data from various sources indicated that during the ensuing 2022–2023 Women, Life, Freedom protests, the bulk of those killed came from the ethnic periphery—particularly the Baluch and Kurdish regions. Human rights organizations focused on Iran estimated that fatalities in these areas accounted for between 40 and over 50 percent of the roughly five-hundred civilians killed during the protests. A study presented at an Iranian scientific conference in 2022, and cited in both domestic and foreign-based media, listed Kurdistan and Sistan-Baluchestan—alongside the capital Tehran—among the three provinces that witnessed the “most extensive and severe” protests of the movement. Overall, the various waves of protests from 2017 through 2022 point to an evolving geography of dissent, signaling a shift in the dynamics of political resistance in Iran: ethnic peripheries—historically sites of securitization and neglect—have emerged as the primary arenas of anti-regime mobilization.
A spectrum of political mobilization
However, not all non-Persian ethnic communities in Iran exhibit the same degree of political mobilization or motivation to challenge state policies, as they are not all subjected to the same levels of exclusion or persecution. Kurds—estimated to comprise 10 percent of the population—stand out as the most politically active and organized, due in part to their longstanding tradition of ethno-national activism going back to the turn of the twentieth century. Stronger trends of activism have begun to emerge among the Baluch and Arab communities. In contrast, various Turkic groups like the Azeris tend to engage less in overt political activism. This can largely be attributed to their Shia identity and long-standing integration into Iran’s ruling structures—most notably through the legacy of Turkic dynasties such as the Safavids, who institutionalized Shiism, and later the Qajars. Today, both Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Masoud Pezeshkian are of Azeri Turkish background, reflecting that legacy of incorporation into the state.
Shared experiences of systemic marginalization and state repression have fostered inter-ethnic solidarity, notably during the 2022–2023 protests where Kurdish and Baluchi demonstrators expressed mutual support. Outside Iran, this sentiment is reflected in the Congress of Nationalities for a Federal Iran—an alliance of ethnic-oriented political groups formed in 2005. Yet, internal tensions complicate sustained cooperation, as seen in disputes between Azeri Turks and Kurds in West Azerbaijan over territory, and between Arabs and Lurs in Khuzestan over local power and resources. Neighboring states, particularly Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan, add further complexity by promoting Azeri nationalism within Iran. Tehran exploits these ethnic tensions to cement its control over ethnic regions.
Policy implications and future outlook
The shift in Iranian protest movements from the Persian center to the ethnic periphery carries a number of major implications. First, there is a growing divide between how people in the center and those in the periphery imagine political action and change. Second, the success of any future protests movement will hinge on bridging the gap between the center and the periphery and bolstering intra-communal solidarity. Third, the ethnic periphery has moved from being a passive recipient of state policy to an assertive and influential actor in shaping Iran’s political future.
As a relic of numerous empires, the geography of the modern state of Iran is a rich tapestry of various ethnic and religious groups and cultures. The emergence of a unitary and centralized state in early twentieth-century Iran—and the imposition of a singular national identity, with power and resources distributed based on conformity to that identity—is a departure in the broader historical trajectory of this pluralistic political geography.
While ethnic activists, whether peaceful or armed, are often accused of separatism, the reality is that most ethnic political movements and communities in Iran are calling for a more equitable distribution of authority—increasingly through decentralized arrangements—and a fairer allocation of resources, irrespective of ethnicity or religion. Framing these demands as separatist not only distorts their intent but also enables the state’s violent suppression of ethnic activism, as accusations of “separatism” and “partition” remain the primary legal grounds for imprisoning—and in many cases executing—ethnic activists.
Against this backdrop, there appears to be growing recognition of ethnic agency at the political level inside Iran, as reflected particularly in the 2024 presidential elections. The victory of Pezeshkian, an Azeri Turk, and his strong reliance on Azeri Turkish votes underscored how ethnic solidarity can significantly influence national outcomes. While the state has typically framed ethnic activism as a threat to national security and stability, Pezeshkian—and reformists more broadly—appear to recognize the political value of engaging non-Persian constituencies. Under Pezeshkian, for the first time in the Islamic Republic’s history, the government has appointed Sunni Kurdish and Baluch governors and a Sunni Kurdish vice president, in an attempt to win over hearts and minds within these communities. However, despite promises in past election cycles, reformists have failed to deliver on core ethnic demands such as recognizing linguistic rights in the education system, redistributing economic resources, and ending securitization. This failure has cast doubt on reformists’ willingness or ability to address broader injustices against ethnic communities and has underscored the structural limits of the political system. Yet, as protest remains a dangerous and heavily repressed avenue for ethnic expression, the electoral arena may increasingly become a key venue for ethnic mobilization and leverage—but the question remains whether this will yield meaningful representation or merely co-opt elite figures.
Mohammed A. Salih is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s National Security Program. He has two decades of experiences writing on Middle Eastern regional affairs, including Kurdish affairs and ethnic and sectarian relations, in various capacities as a journalist, analyst, and scholar. He is available on X @MohammedASalih
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