WASHINGTON—On April 14, Israel and Lebanon held their highest-level talks in four decades and agreed to a temporary cease-fire (initially until April 26 and now extended for three weeks) to allow time for negotiations to run their course. The talks came only after US President Donald Trump pressured Israel to temporarily suspend attacks on Lebanon, in light of assertions by Iranian officials and Pakistani mediators that a cease-fire was necessary to continue US–Iran negotiations. Throughout the US–Iran conflict, Lebanon has repeatedly flashed in and out of the limelight as part of that broader puzzle.
Trump now faces a choice. He may choose to renew the pressure on Israel to suspend strikes on its northern neighbor, either because of Lebanon’s potential to serve as a spoiler to any grand bargain with Iran or because of his independent desire to achieve a Lebanon-Israel peace. With either rationale, if Trump keeps up the pressure, then a lasting cease-fire between Lebanon and Israel may be within reach. But only if both sides can arrive at a face-saving compromise that addresses the two core issues: Hezbollah’s disarmament and Israel’s buffer zone.
Neither issue will be easy to solve. Any movement toward disarmament, for example, would require the Lebanese state to take a far more direct stance against Hezbollah than it has been able or willing to sustain to date. For the first time in recent memory, though, Lebanon’s political establishment and its broader constituency, including fringes of Hezbollah’s own support base, are converging around a shared view on the imperative of disarmament.
Disarming Hezbollah
Hezbollah’s disarmament would be a historic opportunity for the Middle East. It would deal a significant blow to Iran’s ability to project power, given that Iran sends hundreds of millions of dollars to Hezbollah each year. And it would be a boon for Lebanese society, which has suffered under frequent cycles of violence between Hezbollah and Israel. Hezbollah has also stoked sectarian divides and tensions across Lebanon, contributing to political gridlock, economic decline, and institutional distrust in the country.
The push for disarmament across Lebanon has been coalescing for more than a year. The 2024 cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah, which followed over a year of hostilities tied to the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, set in motion the initial conditions for disarmament. Hezbollah was left militarily and politically weakened, particularly after the killing of its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and further compromised by the toppling of the Assad regime in Syria—a key ally and facilitator of arms transfers from Iran. With Hezbollah’s political influence waning, Lebanese politicians were able to bring the militia and its political base into a reluctant consensus to end a two-year period of political gridlock and support Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s election in January 2025. In his acceptance speech, Aoun affirmed the Lebanese government’s “right to monopolize the possession of weapons,” a pointed signal to Hezbollah and an indication that Lebanon may finally have leadership willing to pursue the group’s disarmament.
These political developments are reflected in public opinion across a majority of sects in Lebanon. In December 2025, Gallup published a poll in which 79 percent of Lebanese respondents said that only the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) should be permitted to bear arms in the country. Of those who opposed this view, the majority were unsurprisingly members of the Lebanese Shia population, Hezbollah’s key constituency.
The political will in Lebanon for disarmament is now receiving a powerful stimulus from the current US–Iran conflict, creating a window, even if narrow, for lasting political change. Since Hezbollah launched its first air strikes against Israel on March 2 in what it claimed was retaliation for the killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Lebanese government has increasingly condemned Iranian influence in domestic affairs and Hezbollah’s militant activities. On the same day as Hezbollah’s attack, the Amal Party, a Shia political party and the militia’s main political ally, joined the Lebanese government in banning Hezbollah’s military activities.
Withdrawing from the buffer zone
While the conditions for a deal may be promising, both sides will need to be able to claim victory—on Hezbollah’s disarmament and Israel’s buffer zone in southern Lebanon.
At present, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appears to view the campaign against Hezbollah as incomplete. Without sustained US and international pressure, as well as assurances from the Lebanese government of Hezbollah’s disarmament, any prospect of a deal will quickly unravel. There is a widely held feeling in Israel that its northern communities remain uninhabitable without a definitive removal of the Hezbollah threat. Indeed, the current cease-fire with Lebanon was met with dismay across Israel, with 56 percent of those polled believing the Israeli military should remain in southern Lebanon indefinitely. In the days before the cease-fire was announced on April 9, polls showed that a strong majority of Israelis (79 percent) supported continued strikes against their northern neighbor. Many saw Netanyahu as capitulating to Trump when the US president asserted that he had “prohibited” Israel from bombing Lebanon.
To sell any sort of peace deal domestically, Israel will need to credibly assert that it has achieved a significant military and strategic victory. Meanwhile, Lebanon must secure a full Israeli withdrawal from the 5–10 kilometer buffer zone in southern Lebanon to avoid domestic backlash for aligning with Israel and to prevent Hezbollah from recasting itself as the “national resistance” against occupation.
Seizing a once-in-a-generation opportunity
Even if both sides agree to these parameters, finalizing any arrangement will be a significant undertaking, particularly on the part of Lebanon. Aoun’s government has taken a measured approach to neutralizing Hezbollah. In part, this is out of a desire to assuage factionalization within the LAF and avoid plunging Lebanon into civil strife. It is also because the LAF’s diminished and outdated military stockpiles constrain its ability to mount a potential operation.
To avoid missing out on what may be a once-in-a-generation opportunity, the Lebanese government needs to figure out a way to act quickly and decisively. While some domestic backlash is inevitable, the conditions are ripe for generating greater buy-in. Many Lebanese did not want Hezbollah to pull the country into the conflict to begin with, and the prospect of restoring calm is urgently needed to enable Lebanon’s economic recovery and address the humanitarian fallout from recent attacks.
The international community can play a role in helping build Israeli confidence in the Lebanese government’s ability to effect long-term change, including by continuing to prioritize building the LAF’s capabilities and spurring economic growth. The United States and France can be expected to carry much of this load given that earlier conceptions reliant on Gulf investment will have been disrupted by those countries’ economic recalibration following Iran’s attacks on them, as well as competing obligations to help with reconstruction and investment in Syria and Gaza. In parallel, international oversight of both Hezbollah’s disarmament and an accompanying Israeli withdrawal from the buffer zone would go a long way in disrupting the self-reinforcing cycles of escalation that have taken place since the 2024 agreement.