WASHINGTON—Despite close coordination between US and Israeli leaders and their militaries from the earliest days of the Iran war, the two countries’ interests and objectives, and their leaders’ political priorities and constraints, have increasingly diverged. The once-modest gap between them has opened into a chasm that will not be easily bridged.
Moreover, the chasm is widening along several different fissures:
Whether to end the war
When the war began, each side undoubtedly harbored hope that the Iranian regime would collapse. But when it became clear that the regime could endure significant military blows and inflict painful retaliation against US military and Gulf state infrastructure targets, US President Donald Trump understood that enough was enough and has been searching for an off-ramp ever since. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, meanwhile, operates according to the post-October 7 Israeli ethos: threats to Israel must be dealt with proactively and cannot be allowed to fester. He continues to believe that additional military pressure on Iran could cause the regime to fall. And even short of that, continued military pressure will further degrade its nuclear and ballistic missile capability.
The Strait of Hormuz
When Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping, it gained massive leverage in the conflict. By disrupting global energy and other supply chains, it has caused economic havoc, including a significant spike in gasoline prices in the United States. Trump responded to the closure by imposing a blockade on Iranian ports, but that simply balanced the scale. In the negotiations that have followed, the strait has taken pride of place. As a result, nuclear issues are being punted to a second stage of negotiations, and many other important issues have been dropped altogether. What is widening this fissure is clear enough: Israel experiences the economic disruption of the strait’s closure far less than the United States does, and Israelis have a high tolerance for the disruption they do feel given the severity of the Iran threat. As Trump is increasingly consumed by the economic dimension of the conflict, and as Netanyahu remains overwhelmingly focused on security issues, US and Israeli priorities in these negotiations (in which Israel plays no role) are at odds.
Netanyahu has long marketed himself to Israelis as … Trump’s best friend and partner in reshaping the Middle East in Israel’s favor.
The elements of a deal
Reopening the strait is a low priority for Israel. A much higher priority is a deal that permanently dismantles Iran’s nuclear program by exporting all enriched uranium, permanently banning further enrichment, dismantling all nuclear facilities, and allowing constant, intrusive inspections. (Israel also wants limits on Iran’s ballistic missile program, but that issue is absent from the negotiations.) Trump is prepared to accept much less. The likely deal includes an Iranian pledge never to develop nuclear weapons (such a commitment has been made many times before), an agreement to negotiate on the terms of exporting or downblending highly enriched uranium, and a time-limited suspension of enrichment, with details to be determined. In return, Iran is demanding some measure of sanctions relief or release of frozen assets, which Trump is resisting providing up front but is open to in later stages. For Trump, the ability to claim success in negotiations is significantly contingent on whether he can describe it as tougher than the nuclear agreement reached by President Barack Obama in 2015. It may not clear that bar, and even if it can for an American audience, the entire structure of the deal will fall far short of Netanyahu’s expectations and demands. Such an agreement will essentially leave Iran capable of reconstituting its nuclear program if it cheats on the deal or when the deal expires, and it will ensure that Tehran has revenue to fund its military capabilities and terrorist proxies.
Lebanon
Hezbollah has attacked Israel since October 8, 2023, and there is a near consensus among Jewish Israelis that Israel must respond to eliminate the Hezbollah threat and restore security to northern communities, regardless of the impact on US negotiations with Iran. Trump, meanwhile, has essentially adopted the Iranian position that the two theaters cannot be decoupled and that a deal to end the broader war must include quiet in Lebanon. Recently, he urged Netanyahu not to strike against Hezbollah in Beirut, and when Israel did so anyway and Iran responded by firing missiles at northern Israel, Trump tried to restrain the Israeli response and demanded that the exchanges cease. The idea that Israel’s ability to defend itself against Hezbollah strikes would be limited so as not to upset the US-Iran negotiations, especially when the US priority in those negotiations increasingly deprioritizes Israeli security objectives, is extremely difficult for Israelis to swallow.
Domestic fallout for Trump
The US midterms are now less than five months away. Even a prompt opening of the strait is unlikely to markedly reduce gas prices before the election, which even before the war was already poised to hinge on affordability issues. The war is now opposed by some 60 percent of the public, as Americans recognize the direct hit it has landed on their pocketbooks. Trump and his Republican colleagues would like to be free of this albatross with time to recover before voters cast their ballots. Naturally, these concerns are of little relevance to Netanyahu.
Domestic fallout for Netanyahu
Netanyahu has long marketed himself to Israelis as the sole leader who can ensure their security and, drawing on Trump’s popularity in Israel, as Trump’s best friend and partner in reshaping the Middle East in Israel’s favor. But the prime minister heads into a difficult fall election campaign with both of those contentions in doubt, perhaps even in tension. Netanyahu’s opponents and supporters alike criticize him for accepting a reality in which Israel cannot make sovereign decisions to act in its own defense and must accept constraints imposed by a foreign leader (even a friendly one) who belittles Israel’s concerns. That makes his perilous path to political survival more challenging still. Trump has previously staunchly defended the prime minister, calling for Israeli President Isaac Herzog to issue Netanyahu a pardon to curtail his corruption trial. At one time, Netanyahu planned to invite Trump to Israel to present him with the Israel Prize and highlight their partnership. That move may no longer be possible, or even politically valuable to Netanyahu.