The Group of Seven (G7) is returning to where it began. Leaders from the world’s advanced economies are set to convene in Évian-les-Bains, France, from June 15 to 17, as France hosts the G7 in a year marked by geopolitical fragmentation, economic insecurity, and renewed questions about the role of the forum itself.
The setting is fitting. In 1975, France hosted the first meeting of what was then the Group of Six, created in the aftermath of oil shocks, inflation, and the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary order. More than fifty years later, many of the same structural anxieties are back in sharper form: energy insecurity, trade tensions, sovereign debt stress, industrial competition, and doubts about whether advanced economies can coordinate in a more divided global economy.
France has framed its presidency around restoring the G7’s original purpose as a forum for dialogue among major economic powers and reducing global imbalances.
Here’s a look inside the numbers that will frame the summit.
1.
Bilateral trade data will never provide a comprehensive picture. But the striking shifts in G7-China imports and exports, over a period of only one year, help explain why the thinking within the G7 is shifting so fast. A consensus is building that what makes Chinese industrial overcapacity harmful is that the surge in Chinese exports is accompanied by a drop in China’s imports. This is visible across all G7 economies apart from Canada’s, which is also the smallest. Europe and Japan have all noticed imports from China increasing substantially and quickly.
France and some other countries have tried to impose surcharges on parcels, but this has led distributors to reroute deliveries through neighboring markets, which may explain the spike in Italy’s Chinese imports. Finally, while the United States stands out with falling exports and imports to and from China, this is where bilateral trade data ceases to be pertinent. The well-documented phenomenon of transshipments through third countries will give the EU pause as it considers its own version of Section 301 tariffs to stem the flood of Chinese goods.
—Charles Lichfield is the director of economic foresight and analysis at Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center
2.
One of the most talked-about attendees at the G7 Leaders’ Summit will be OpenAI CEO Sam Altman, who was invited by French President Emmanuel Macron earlier this month. The invitation is part of Macron’s broader effort to court global tech leaders and position France as a serious player in the artificial intelligence (AI) race.
AI is high on the G7 agenda, but AI development remains highly uneven across member countries. In 2025, nearly 79 percent of newly funded AI companies across the G7 were based in the United States, while France accounted for just 3.4 percent. France is trying to change that equation. Macron has sought to bolster the country’s AI infrastructure, with SoftBank recently announcing plans to invest €45 billion over five years to build AI infrastructure in France. The annual Choose France summit also resulted in several major investment commitments from tech and data center companies.
Still, infrastructure alone does not close the competitiveness gap. Europe may be building more AI capacity, but the United States continues to dominate the companies, capital, and commercial momentum behind the sector. Through the G7 process, Paris is aiming to set shared standards and outline opportunities for common learning and collaboration across borders. Do not expect the Leaders’ Summit to deliver a major AI breakthrough, but it could still produce a shared commitment to developing trusted AI capacity across allied economies.
—Alisha Chhangani is the associate director for future of money at the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center
3.
France, this year’s G7 host, put macroeconomic imbalances front and center on the agenda and put its money where its mouth is. It is the only G7 country with a balanced current account, giving some credibility to its call for a collective approach.
The issue used to be awkward for the G7. In previous years, the United States and the United Kingdom have tended to exhibit fiscal and trade deficits, while Germany and Japan had large trade surpluses and would use some of their excess cash to invest in sovereign debt. Some of this is still at play, as is clear in the chart, but surpluses exhibited by some G7 countries are now dwarfed by China’s. This creates more space for G7 coordination ahead of the US-led Group of Twenty (G20) leaders’ summit in Miami by the end of the year.
Every side will need to make an effort to tackle the key drivers of imbalances. The European Union’s Capital Markets and Savings Union could, in theory, allow Europe to invest more and make itself less reliant on US demand for goods and capital. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has signaled that it knows its fiscal deficit cannot be ignored forever. As the next section notes, however, the key driver is China’s overreliance on exports.
—Bart Piasecki is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center
4.
The Iran war and the subsequent energy crisis have dominated headlines since March, with many economists—the GeoEconomics Center included—once more grappling with how oil prices seep into every facet of the global economy. Outside of direct energy consumption, petrochemicals are needed in products ranging from fertilizers to active pharmaceutical ingredients. And as the chart above shows, despite climate transition efforts, G7 countries still depend heavily upon oil and gas for energy use.
Beyond the immediate energy crisis, there are a few things to look out for in G7 energy dependence and geoeconomic tensions. As oil and gas prices rise, the input costs for manufacturing will rise as well, forcing more tough industry choices in countries trying to incentivize reindustrialization. The vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz has also reinvigorated certain discussions around renewable energy. But with China’s dominance in advanced green technology, it is important that G7 countries not trade one geoeconomic vulnerability for another. Finally, the AI boom, which has helped cushion some of the impacts of US tariffs, will continue to drive demand for energy and electric grid connectivity faster than many countries can supply it. The dynamics of energy sources and energy transition will ultimately shape the supply chains of the future, and the G7 advanced economies must plan strategically to balance climate transition goals with long-term economic growth.
—Jessie Yin is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center
5.
For the second year running, critical minerals sit atop the G7 agenda. Canada’s presidency last year delivered the Critical Minerals Action Plan and created the Critical Minerals Production Alliance. But an expanded set of Chinese export controls on rare earth elements in October signaled that China was willing to weaponize its monopoly on refining, leaving the G7 with “no time to lose”—even after the restrictions were paused following the meeting between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Busan on October 31.
The stakes are stark. Europe sources all of its heavy rare earth elements (REEs), 85 percent of its light REEs, and 98 percent of its rare-earth magnets from China; when licenses tightened, magnet exports fell by three-quarters, carmakers reduced production, and Europe and the United States each faced $1.5 trillion in direct economic losses. France will push even harder in Évian, reportedly considering a permanent secretariat to steward the critical minerals agenda across presidencies. It has also set lofty domestic goals, aiming to cover all of Europe’s heavy rare-earth demand by 2030, but breaking free from Chinese dependence will come at a cost: roughly $60 billion over the next decade to meet projected demand outside of China.
—Jack Muldoon is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center
6.
When Trump unveiled his “Liberation Day” tariff proposal in April 2025, several of the United States’ closest partners were headed for a sharp increase in rates, causing geoeconomic anxiety and testing allyship.
That outcome never materialized. Over the following year, every G7 economy reached a framework agreement or trade arrangement with the United States. While tariffs still increased substantially compared to 2024, the final rates remained well below the initially proposed levels.
The chart above illustrates how the tariff story of 2025 evolved from one of broad-based escalation to one of negotiation. The threat of higher duties proved powerful, but in the end, the administration relied less on imposing its maximum tariffs and more on using them as leverage. US tariffs aren’t water under the bridge yet, however, and will no doubt be a source of tension in Évian.
—Madeline Chalecki is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center
7.
This year’s G7 will be chaired by France, in a presidency set to be centered around seven tracks: foreign affairs, development, trade, finance, the digital sector, the environment, and home affairs. In a world of cuts to development and humanitarian aid, this second track presents a welcome opportunity to bring development finance to the forefront of a global agenda increasingly shifting toward trade protectionism and defense spending.
From the 1970s until 2024, official development assistance (ODA) by G7 countries trended upward. However, this past year was a dark one for development. In 2025, all G7 countries cut their development assistance, including the five largest providers globally (the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Japan). These five countries accounted for 95.7 percent of the total drop in ODA globally in 2025—Washington slashing its budget by 56.9 percent, Berlin by 17.4 percent, Paris by 10.9 percent, London by 10.8 percent, and Tokyo by 5.6 percent, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The drop-off is depicted above.
Amid these cuts, G7 countries have emphasized a shift from traditional aid to a focus on public-private financing, specifically in Africa—making the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and its specific private-sector focus a prime mechanism for this transition. All G7 members are owners of the EBRD, meaning they hold equity shares in the bank’s capital stock. And the EBRD has recently expanded its footprint in Africa, beginning with Benin, Nigeria, and Cote d’Ivoire in July 2025. However, many entrepreneurs from the continent argue that the traditional risk frameworks of the EBRD could struggle in settings characterized by informal employment and infrastructure gaps. As we follow France’s presidency, keep an eye on the role of the EBRD on the African continent and whether it can adjust to the realities of development finance for the modern world.
—Juliet Lancey is a contributor to the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center