WASHINGTON—Championed by late US Senator Lindsey Graham, the bipartisan Sanctioning Russia Act is gaining new momentum in Congress, where more than sixty US senators have cosponsored a newly revised version. The legislation aims to reduce the Kremlin’s oil revenues by placing tougher sanctions on Russia’s energy and financial sectors. It also imposes additional sanctions on Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian officials. But if passed, it would also affect several major countries that currently trade with Russia, and those effects should be factored into US planning.
Where the Sanctioning Russia Act stands now
The latest Senate bill includes several notable additions intended to give it more bite. To begin with, it incorporates the bipartisan Shadow Fleet Sanctions Act. This addition speaks to the Senate’s intention to address the wider mechanism by which Russian oil is transported. Equally important, however, the latest bill creates two new authorities: First, it permits the United States Trade Representative to impose up to 100 percent tariffs (down from the 500 percent previously proposed) on the top five importers of Russian oil and gas. Second, it gives the White House the authority to waive sanctions upon providing a national security justification and certification.
The bill’s new momentum honors Graham’s longstanding leadership on Russia sanctions while reflecting broad bipartisan support and closer alignment between Congress and the White House. It also comes as Russia faces mounting economic pressure amid sustained Ukrainian strikes on its energy infrastructure.
The bill’s new authority to impose tariffs on major purchasers of Russian oil and gas is a significant update, but its implementation will require careful calibration. Perhaps the greatest risk is that broad tariffs are followed by extensive waivers or reversals, undermining their credibility and effectiveness.
In its current form, the legislation would apply to the five largest importers of Russian oil and gas during the twelve-month period preceding the legislation’s enactment. While the final list would be determined at that time, China and India have consistently ranked as the two largest importers of Russian oil. Although media reports have identified Slovakia, Hungary, and Azerbaijan as the other three countries, data from intelligence sources such as S&P Global and the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air consistently rank Turkey as the third-largest importer. As a result, the methodology and data source that will be used to determine the five largest purchasers of Russian oil and gas require further clarification.
What the bill would mean for Russia
If passed, the Senate bill would require the US president to impose mandatory sanctions on certain financial institutions affiliated with the Russian government within thirty days of enactment. While many major Russian financial and energy entities are already subject to US sanctions, the bill’s primary impact would be to codify additional sanctions measures in statute, making them more difficult for future administrations to remove unilaterally.
Russia is already in a weakened position as oil revenues have declined and budget deficits have widened. Since May of this year, Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure have intensified, primarily targeting oil refineries and other processing facilities. The attacks have disrupted refining operations and contributed to a decline in Russia’s oil production. In response, Russia has accelerated crude shipments, but weaker demand has left growing volumes stranded at sea. By early July, an estimated 137 million barrels were floating in storage, with tankers concentrated near Egypt and Singapore.
Thus, it is an opportune time to solidify the sanctions regime against Russia by throwing congressional weight behind it. The bill’s effectiveness, however, will depend on stronger enforcement of sanctions and stable Middle Eastern energy supplies, which are critical for limiting demand for Russian crude in Asian markets.
India will need alternative crude oil suppliers
By most estimates, India is currently the second-largest buyer of Russian crude oil, and it would likely face higher US tariffs under the bill, unless it significantly reduces those imports. This would not be the first time Washington has used tariffs to pressure New Delhi over Russian oil imports. While the Trump administration’s April 2025 tariffs on India strained bilateral relations, it was the subsequent US sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil in October 2025 that prompted Indian refiners to secure alternative crude supplies from the Middle East.
In February of this year, US President Donald Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi agreed to reduce US tariffs on Indian imports from 50 percent to 18 percent, after India committed to curbing purchases of Russian oil. That diversification plan was disrupted just weeks later by the Iran conflict and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which constrained oil and gas exports from the Gulf. India subsequently increased purchases of Russian crude and sought US sanctions waivers, several of which were granted, allowing Russian oil to regain a significant share of the Indian market.
For Middle Eastern suppliers to regain lost market share in India and other Asian markets, they would need the Strait of Hormuz to reopen in the near term and, for additional resiliency, to develop alternative shipping routes over the longer term. Otherwise, India will face a trade-off between maintaining energy security and managing the risk of US tariffs, potentially prompting it to again seek waivers and exemptions.
Notably, recent reports suggest that India may be exporting refined products made from Russian crude back to Russia, which is experiencing fuel shortages, rising freight costs, and inflationary pressures. While meeting domestic energy needs and ensuring affordable fuel supplies could be an acceptable justification for India to obtain waivers, those arguments do not necessarily apply to re-exports supporting Russia’s market. These transactions and shipments warrant closer scrutiny, and any refined products not needed for India’s domestic requirements should be redirected to markets other than Russia’s. Washington should assess whether additional diplomatic engagement or sanctions measures are warranted.
China will likely respond to US tariff threats with countermeasures
China’s reaction to additional US tariffs will likely differ from India’s. Following Trump’s Liberation Day tariffs in April 2025, Beijing imposed export controls on seven heavy rare earth elements, sending shockwaves to defense and advanced-technology supply chains across the United States and Europe. On October 9, 2025, Beijing introduced a second round of restrictions on five additional rare earth elements and several related technologies and equipment. Washington responded with 100 percent tariffs on Chinese imports and additional export controls on sensitive technologies. While Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to a one-year trade truce by the end of October, many underlying trade tensions remain, making further Chinese retaliation likely if tariffs escalate again.
The current Russia sanctions bill would authorize the Trump administration to impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on Chinese imports on national security grounds if China continues purchasing Russian oil. This approach assumes that tariffs will compel China to reduce imports of Russian energy. Recent US-China trade disputes suggest a different outcome: Previous US tariff escalation prompted Chinese retaliation and ultimately negotiations rather than a clear change in Beijing’s behavior. The risk is that new measures on China raise expectations that Beijing will not meet—and will retaliate against—leaving the United States to either scale back the tariffs or absorb the costs of a trade confrontation.
The inclusion of Iran in the bill would have little practical effect
This past week, Trump called for including Iran in the Russia sanctions bill, and the Senate is reported to be moving forward with it. Because Iran has already been subject to extensive statutory US sanctions for decades, this addition would likely be more symbolic than substantive. Although the proposal’s details will likely emerge in the coming days, if it includes secondary tariffs on purchasers of Iranian oil, then it would face many of the same implementation challenges as measures targeting Russian oil, particularly given that China purchases the vast majority of Iran’s crude exports.
A more effective approach would be to strengthen enforcement of existing sanctions on Iran and continue targeting the shadow banking networks that help Tehran launder oil revenues through different jurisdictions, such as Hong Kong.