CALI, Colombia—Abelardo de la Espriella takes office as Colombia’s president today with a clear aim: to strengthen ties with Washington around trade, investment, and security.
That push marks a sharp break from the turbulent relationship under outgoing President Gustavo Petro, with whom US President Donald Trump repeatedly clashed. It also gives both administrations an opportunity to advance the agenda they have started to build during the transition—one that can expand opportunities for US business, boost Colombian production, and create safer conditions for economic activity.
The two administrations have already begun laying the groundwork. In July, Vice President-elect José Manuel Restrepo and several ministers-designate traveled to Washington to meet with US lawmakers, policymakers, and business leaders. The visit led to plans for formal working groups, which began meeting in Barranquilla last week. That is an unusual level of engagement before inauguration day—and a clear signal that both sides see the other as an important partner.
From our work on regional policy and across Colombia’s public and private sectors, we see the economic agenda as one of the clearest opportunities to start turning this political opening into results. The United States remains Colombia’s leading trade and investment partner, while Colombia ranks as the third largest US trading partner in Latin America and the Caribbean. Bilateral goods trade reached over $37 billion in 2025. More than six hundred US companies operate in Colombia, supporting over 107,000 jobs.
The De la Espriella and Trump administrations can build on this foundation by creating pathways for Colombian companies to participate in US-linked value chains and giving US capital and technology clearer routes into Colombia’s energy, infrastructure, manufacturing, and agricultural sectors. An agenda to simplify trade and investment would support the 2025 US National Security Strategy’s push to bring critical supply chains into the hemisphere. It would also reinforce De la Espriella’s territorial-control agenda by expanding the formal economy in regions where economic and institutional vacuums have allowed criminal groups to deepen their control.
The first test: Resolve the tariff dispute
There will be challenges for the two sides. Foremost among them will be addressing the Trump administration’s latest round of tariffs. The United States imposed a 12.5 percent Section 301 tariff on goods not covered by specific exclusions after investigating economies that had not imposed or enforced bans on imports produced with forced labor. Products potentially exposed to the measure represented nearly 30 percent of Colombia’s exports to the United States in 2025.
Colombia already prohibits forced labor domestically. It has ratified the International Labour Organization’s core conventions on forced labor, and Article 188A of its Criminal Code prohibits exploitation through forced labor or services, slavery-like practices, and servitude. Moreover, the US–Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement already includes labor commitments that reinforce both countries’ support for internationally recognized labor rights.
In light of the US investigation, the De la Espriella government could build on Colombia’s existing commitments by adopting stronger import controls, improving customs traceability and enforcement, and agreeing with the Office of the US Trade Representative on measurable implementation benchmarks. Washington, in turn, should establish a clear timetable for reviewing and lifting the tariff once Colombia meets those benchmarks, along with mechanisms to support those controls.
Four areas for early US–Colombia wins
Resolving the tariff issue would provide an early demonstration that the renewed relationship can produce opportunities for both countries. But the partnership should also include rebuilding the historically bipartisan congressional relationship and should go further in four areas:
Energy security
In June, Colombia’s National Hydrocarbons Agency reported that the country had 5.9 years of proven natural gas reserves at current production levels. The decline in recent years has added to concerns about energy security, particularly as projections indicate that demand could begin to exceed available supply as early as next year.
At the same time, Colombia has more than 10.5 trillion cubic feet in contingent gas resources that could support future supply, alongside additional potential in offshore areas near La Guajira and Magdalena. Bringing those resources to market will require investment in exploration and drilling, expanded pipeline and processing infrastructure, more predictable regulatory and permitting processes, and access to long-term financing. Here, US companies already bring experience and capabilities to the table. The De la Espriella government can facilitate their participation by establishing clearer permitting timelines, making regulatory processes more predictable, and strengthening coordination among national energy and environment agencies.
Agroindustrial value chains
Agribusiness can extend the benefits of the bilateral agenda into rural Colombia. US agricultural exports to Colombia reached a record $4.5 billion in 2024, while Colombian agricultural exports to the United States hit nearly the same number. Coffee, flowers, and fresh produce have driven Colombian sales, while US farmers supply Colombia with products like corn, soybean meal, wheat, pork, and dairy goods.
To expand this trade, Colombia can identify corridors where investments in cold storage, processing facilities, transportation, and export certification would allow farmers to reach new buyers. US agencies and companies can support projects that create demand for American technology and strengthen regional food supply chains.
The strategy can produce an additional win if it focuses on municipalities affected by armed conflict. Export-oriented agribusiness can help sustain security gains if productive investment is accompanied by infrastructure, road access, land formalization plans, and protection for producers and businesses. Together, these measures can give farmers alternatives to economies controlled by illegal actors.
Venezuela’s recovery
Venezuela’s stabilization and democratic opening create another area for US-Colombia cooperation. As Venezuela’s interim authorities and representatives of the democratically elected 2015 National Assembly pursue formal talks, Colombia’s proximity, commercial ties, transportation connections, and private-sector experience position it as a natural partner for US efforts to support economic recovery.
Washington and Bogotá have an opportunity to establish a working mechanism focused on immediate recovery needs and the conditions required for longer-term investment. Initial cooperation could include humanitarian logistics following the June earthquakes, infrastructure assessments, transparent procurement standards, and the development of projects in energy and transportation.
Working with business associations, the two governments could identify Colombian engineering, logistics, food-processing, and professional-services firms capable of participating in recovery projects alongside US companies.
Regional security
Security cooperation will determine how far the broader agenda can reach. Illegal armed groups have expanded across more than half of Colombia’s municipalities. Extortion, illicit mining, trafficking, and weak state presence raise costs for businesses and communities while discouraging investment in regions with significant economic potential.
US support should help Colombia strengthen intelligence capabilities, improve border controls, protect infrastructure, and reinforce the judicial institutions needed to dismantle the financial networks that sustain criminal organizations.
The Colombia-Venezuela border requires particular attention. Partnerships on Venezuela’s economic recovery need to be matched by measures to root out criminal groups that use Venezuelan territory as a safe haven. Better intelligence sharing, coordinated border protocols, stronger customs enforcement, and action against armed groups would protect legal commerce and reduce the risks facing humanitarian and reconstruction projects.