Colombia’s path to growth and opportunity through cooperation with the United States
Bottom lines up front
- After Colombia’s closest-ever presidential elections, Abelardo de la Espriella will take office August 7 amid fiscal pressures and weaker investor confidence.
- Trade and investment cooperation with the United States will be key to unlocking regional growth opportunities, expanding strategic sectors, and creating jobs.
- Both countries should build on the US–Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement to reduce trade and investment barriers and advance projects in key sectors.
Abelardo de la Espriella will become Colombia’s next president on August 7 after a campaign in which security and the economy were among voters’ main concerns. Since being elected, de la Espriella has called for unity and said his government would work to deliver opportunity to all Colombians. Given Colombia’s fiscal deficit of 6.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2025, elevated borrowing costs, and weaker market confidence reflected in recent sovereign rating downgrades, the incoming government will need to send early and sustained signals to attract new trade and investment and create broader economic opportunities. The incoming government began those steps during the mid-July visit to Washington, where the vice president-elect—José Manuel Restrepo, who served as Colombia’s minister of finance and public credit from 2021 to 2022 and is a former Atlantic Council fellow—and ministers-designate met with US government agencies, members of Congress, multilateral institutions, and business leaders to discuss early priorities for growth and investment. Speaking July 14 at the Atlantic Council, Restrepo underscored the government’s early focus on expanding economic ties, saying, “Here we are in this city, in this country, to send the message that we want to expand bilateral trade, also to attract more investment from the world.” The incoming administration’s agenda is also rightfully focused on insecurity, as armed-group violence, extortion, and weak state presence deter investment in regions with significant economic potential.
Trade and investment cooperation have generated significant mutual benefits for the United States and Colombia, especially since the US–Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (CTPA) entered into force in 2012. The agreement has become a cornerstone of the bilateral economic relationship, supporting more than $50 billion in annual trade and helping attract foreign direct investment into Colombia, with US firms operating in sectors such as energy, agriculture, manufacturing, finance, technology, and tourism.
However, recent US trade policies have created new pressures for several Colombian export sectors. Since April 2025, the Trump administration’s reciprocal tariff policy and Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum have impacted trade with partners across the region, including Colombia. Some agricultural products were later exempted from the reciprocal tariffs, but the long-term impact on bilateral trade remains uncertain. Additionally, the recent Section 301 investigation relating to trade in forced labor goods added uncertainty. The investigation is pending the US trade representative’s final action.
At a meeting on the future of US–Colombia trade and investment cooperation, the Atlantic Council’s US–Colombia Strategic Alignment Coalition examined how the de la Espriella government and the Trump administration can strengthen economic cooperation as Washington implements a new commercial strategy. As Colombia’s president-elect and his team design an economic agenda to address fiscal pressures, sustain investment in social services and infrastructure, strengthen the energy sector, and restore investor confidence, international partners—especially the United States—will be key collaborators. For Washington, renewed commercial and investment engagement with Colombia can advance US interests by reinforcing the United States as the partner of choice, supporting stability, generating employment, and expanding licit economic opportunities in territories affected by violence.
How trade and investment have supported shared prosperity
The CTPA has helped deepen a commercial relationship that benefits both countries by expanding two-way trade, creating opportunities for Colombian and US producers and businesses, and modernizing trade rules and regulatory practices.
The United States is Colombia’s top trade and investment partner, and Colombia is the United States’ third-largest trading partner in the region. In 2025, bilateral trade in goods totaled approximately $37.2 billion, up from $35.87 billion in 2024. US exports to Colombia include petroleum products, corn, soybeans, chemicals, and other agricultural products, while US imports from Colombia include crude oil, coffee, cut flowers, and gold. Since the agreement entered into force, the US goods trade balance with Colombia has shifted from a pre-CTPA deficit to a surplus in most years since 2013.
For Colombia, the CTPA has helped expand export-oriented sectors that create benefits beyond the country’s largest cities, particularly in agribusiness. Greater access to the US market, investment, and technical assistance has supported the growth of crops such as coffee, flowers, cacao, avocado, bananas, and other fresh fruit. In 2024, agricultural goods accounted for $4.4 billion, or nearly one-quarter, of Colombia’s goods exports to the United States, with coffee and cut flowers making up the largest shares. This is especially important in rural and conflict-affected regions, as helping producers meet export standards and reach international markets can create rural employment and strengthen legal livelihoods.
Colombia’s avocado sector offers one example of this dynamic. Since the US Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service authorized Colombian Hass avocado exports to the United States in 2017, the sector’s global exports grew from 28,500 tons that year to more than 138,000 tons in 2024, generating nearly $309 million. Exports to the United States grew quickly, reaching 30,207 tons in 2024. The sector is now present in 250 municipalities across seventeen departments in Colombia, including around 65 municipalities classified as ZOMAC (zonas mas afectadas por el conflicto armado), the areas most affected by Colombia’s armed conflict. It generates close to 79,000 formal rural jobs, making it one of the country’s largest sources of formal employment in rural territories.
The CTPA has also expanded opportunities for US exporters, farmers, ranchers, service providers, and investors by eliminating tariffs on most US goods, improving access for agricultural exports, and reducing barriers to trade in services. In 2024, US agricultural exports to Colombia hit a record $4.5 billion, making Colombia the fifth-largest export market for US agricultural goods worldwide.
The agreement has also helped strengthen the bilateral investment climate by reducing barriers, increasing legal certainty, and establishing clearer rules for companies in both markets. US firms are the top source of foreign direct investment in Colombia, with an annual average of $2.5 billion and operating across fourteen sectors including energy, healthcare, pharmaceuticals, manufacturing, finance, and technology. More than six hundred US companies have established operations in Colombia, supporting more than 107,000 jobs, and contributing approximately $25.7 billion between 2012 and 2022.
This relationship has created a more predictable environment for US companies by strengthening investor protections and establishing transparent mechanisms to resolve disputes. The incoming de la Espriella government is focused on building on this foundation by improving investor confidence and attracting new investment to sectors that can generate jobs, strengthen infrastructure, and expand opportunities in regions where formal employment and access to markets remain limited.
Opportunities for strengthening US-Colombia trade and investment ties
Building on the economic gains achieved under the CTPA, both countries have an opportunity to deepen commercial ties and expand investment in mutually beneficial ways. For Colombia, the priority is to attract capital, expand exports and generate employment. During the incoming cabinet’s Washington visit, at the Council the vice president-elect emphasized the potential of Colombia’s regions to become engines of economic growth. Trade and investment policy should support that goal by expanding opportunities beyond the largest cities and ensuring that more communities benefit.
For the United States, Colombia is a market in which US businesses and farmers already have a strong position. Deeper engagement would support the National Security Strategy’s emphasis on commercial diplomacy by expanding opportunities for US companies, strengthening supply chains in the hemisphere, and limiting the influence of unfriendly actors in strategic sectors.
Following the visit to Washington, the incoming government announced that formal working groups with US counterparts will begin on July 28 to advance cooperation in areas including investment, trade, energy, and social development. The following recommendations identify areas that these working groups and other cooperation channels can explore to drive shared prosperity.
Recommendations
1. Launch a US–Colombia Commercial and Investment Dialogue to strengthen the CTPA and expand trade
While bilateral trade and investment continued to grow under the CTPA, formal commercial engagement between both governments became less regular during the Petro administration. Meetings under the CTPA were less frequent and important trade and investment issues were not addressed through traditional diplomatic channels. Policy differences over counternarcotics and security strategies reduced the space for commercial dialogue. During this period, the private sector in both countries played an important role in de-escalating tensions and preventing broader consequences.
To give the economic relationship a more regular structure, both governments should consider launching a US–Colombia Commercial Dialogue modeled on similar platforms the United States has used with other countries, including Brazil. This dialogue would complement rather than replace the CTPA Free Trade Commission and the US–Colombia Business Council. Its purpose would be to connect government authorities and private-sector actors from both countries around practical ways to reduce trade barriers, address investment concerns, and advance opportunities in priority sectors.
The dialogue could be co-chaired by the US Department of Commerce and Colombia’s Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism (MinCIT), with regular participation from the US trade representative, the US Department of Agriculture, and Colombian counterparts including ProColombia. It should also include structured private-sector participation from binational business associations. Following the Brazil model, the dialogue should be organized around sectoral working groups tasked with defining agendas and timelines for cooperation. These could focus on agribusiness, infrastructure and logistics, energy, critical minerals, health, professional services, and technology, among others, with each working group identifying priority barriers and opportunities, assigning responsible agencies to advance them, and reporting progress annually.
As an initial priority, the dialogue can help advance negotiations to seek exemptions from or reductions in US tariffs. Rather than pursuing a reciprocal trade deal, Colombia should use the CTPA as the starting point for negotiations. Specifically, the new government should make the case that goods that comply with the CTPA’s rules of origin should continue to receive preferential treatment.
To support this position, the MinCIT must identify which Colombian exports are affected by new tariffs, which qualify as originating goods under the CTPA, and where those exports benefit US economic interests through inputs, suppliers, or investment. Colombia should also come to negotiations with a list of non-tariff barriers that it is prepared to address in the short term, including responsible agencies and timelines.
The dialogue could also address the Section 301 process on forced labor goods. Colombia should highlight the labor protections and enforcement measures it already has in place, including the International Labour Organization’s Conventions it has ratified and implemented and constitutional and criminal prohibitions on forced labor. The discussions should also consider how Colombia’s trade and labor authorities could establish mechanisms to enforce trade sanctions towards imports from countries suspected of allowing forced labor in their supply chains.
2. Build an agribusiness pipeline for US trade and investment
The incoming government would benefit from identifying which agribusiness sectors are best positioned to grow in the US market and what is needed to get them there. Within the first year, the MinCIT should work with ProColombia, the Colombian Agricultural Institute, the National Institute for Food and Drug (INVIMA), governors, and regional chambers of commerce to select a list of priority products and regions.
The review should target sectors with export potential and strong links to rural employment, such as specialty coffee, cacao, tropical fruits, and flowers. For each product, the group can assess US demand, pending sanitary or phytosanitary requirements, certification needs, packing and processing capacity, and buyer relationships. It should also map producer formality, access to credit, and technical-assistance needs across each value chain, particularly for small farmers and producer associations. The results would provide a roadmap for each sector, with steps required to enter or expand into the US market, including actions to connect small producers with financing and technical support.
Colombia can then use the roadmap to engage US and multilateral institutions around specific opportunities. The US Development Finance Corporation (DFC), Export-Import (EXIM) Bank, and multilateral organizations could support commercially viable investments in cold-chain logistics, packing houses, processing facilities, and equipment including individual quick freezing (IQF) facilities, especially where projects also create opportunities for US technology and inputs.
Attention must be given to conflict-affected regions, where export-oriented agriculture can generate employment, strengthen legal economies, and reduce dependence on illicit activities. Initiatives such as the specialty coffee and agritourism project in Cauca demonstrate how targeted investment can expand market access, support rural livelihoods, and contribute to long-term stability while delivering attractive commercial returns.
3. Advance infrastructure projects that expand exports and jobs in disconnected regions
The incoming government has reinforced its focus on regional growth by holding transition meetings across Colombia with governors, mayors, and other stakeholders to identify projects that could move forward early. A key priority will be advancing road, rail, port, airport, energy infrastructure that reduces logistics costs, creates employment, and connects producers with domestic and international markets. Given the country’s fiscal constraints, public-private partnerships (PPPs) will be essential to move these projects forward without relying only on public spending. Projects already underway, including the La Dorada–Chiriguaná corridor, Puerto Antioquia, and the Buga–Buenaventura road corridor, among others, should remain priorities. For Buenaventura, the incoming government has the opportunity to pair the completion of the road corridor with a port-efficiency agenda that addresses access, congestion, and processing bottlenecks. Regional assessments, including the Red Pro and the Private Competitiveness Council proposal, could help identify other key road, rail, port, airport, energy, and communications projects with the greatest potential.
One of the main bottlenecks for PPPs is the lack of predictability of environmental licensing and prior consultation processes, which are essential to protect the environment and guarantee the rights of ethnic communities. As part of the incoming government’s efforts to reduce red tape and improve state efficiency through the Plan Destrabe, Colombia could consider adopting measures that make these processes more predictable without weakening their role or constitutional requirements. These may include earlier identification of environmental licensing and prior consultation needs, clearer expected timelines, and standardized assessment criteria. These improvements would also be key to unlocking investment in other sectors, including critical minerals and hydrocarbons.
One specific measure could be to allow prior consultation processes and technical and environmental studies required for environmental licensing to start at the same time, while recognizing that a final environmental license cannot be granted until consultation requirements are completed. The Ministry of Interior should also streamline the National Directorate of Prior Consultation’s (DANCP) processes by digitizing information on the presence of ethnic communities across the country, allowing interested parties to determine earlier whether a proposed project requires prior consultation.
In parallel, Colombia’s Ministry of Transportation, through the Intersectoral Commission for Transportation and Infrastructure Projects, can work with the National Planning Department, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Environment, the National Infrastructure Agency, the National Road Institute (INVIAS), and the National Environmental Authority (ANLA) to identify the bottlenecks delaying progress for a short list of priority projects that could be advanced during the new government’s first two years. This should include an action plan and deadlines for moving forward on pending permits, prior consultation processes, environmental licensing, and PPP tender timelines. The US Commercial Service can support this process by identifying barriers to US companies’ participation in PPP and public tender opportunities and helping connect Colombian authorities and private partners involved in these projects with US firms that can participate as bidders or providers of engineering or construction expertise.
The United States is well positioned to support this agenda where projects are aligned with US interests and create opportunities, including reinforcing supply chains and providing alternatives to Chinese-backed infrastructure projects. Through DFC, EXIM Bank, and private-sector partnerships, Washington can help de-risk private investment, support the purchase of US equipment, and mobilize financing.
4. Advance critical minerals development with community and environmental safeguards
Colombia should advance the development of its critical minerals sector while protecting communities in mining regions. The country has underexplored potential in copper, nickel, and other rare earth elements needed for clean energy technologies and advanced manufacturing. Mining represented about 25 percent of Colombia’s exports in 2024 and about 1.1 percent of its GDP, but many mineral-rich areas—including parts of Antioquia, Chocó, Cauca, Nariño, and Norte de Santander—are also affected by illegal armed groups’ control, illicit mining, and weak state presence. Any strategy to develop underexplored opportunities must account for these risks so new projects do not deepen violence and environmental harm, especially in rural and ethnic territories.
Within the first six months, the Ministry of Mines and Energy should start a sector-wide review with the National Mining Agency (ANM), the Colombian Geological Service (SGC), and the Mining and Energy Planning Unit (UPME) to define the country’s critical minerals priorities. For areas already in active selection process—including the ANM’s fourteen strategic mining areas in Antioquia, Cesar, La Guajira, and Tolima—the new government should provide a clear timeline for the remaining steps.
For areas with unexplored or underdeveloped potential, the SGC could work with the United States Geological Survey and the United States Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) to complete mapping and technical assessments. The process should also include the Ministry of Interior’s DANCP, the ANLA, and regional environmental authorities, as applicable, from the earliest stages so that prior consultation, environmental licensing, and community benefit considerations are factored into the design and timelines of new investment opportunities.
Broader US support could then help turn this mapping exercise into an investment-ready pipeline through a critical minerals memorandum of understanding (MOU) focused on project preparation and financing. USTDA could support feasibility studies and access to technologies that reduce environmental risks; DFC could provide de-risking tools for projects and related transport or processing infrastructure; and EXIM Bank could support the acquisition of US equipment. The MOU should also include a research and development track that allows Colombia to improve traceability, environmental monitoring, and commercialization protocols, making it harder for illegally mined minerals to enter formal markets and reducing the revenues armed groups draw from the sector.
The national strategy should also include plans targeted to the formalization of small and traditional miners, an area identified as a priority by the incoming president. Specifically, the Ministry of Mines and Energy and ANM should strengthen support to help miners navigate formalization requirements, provide technical assistance to comply with commercialization rules, and connect them with registered buyers. The United States should support this effort through State Department funding, ensuring that cooperation also contributes to reducing the space for illegal mining networks.
5. Reopen oil and gas exploration while addressing short-term gas needs
The president-elect has made revitalizing the hydrocarbon sector and reopening oil and natural gas exploration contracts a priority of its energy agenda. As it moves to implement this commitment, the administration has the opportunity to licensing rounds in priority areas such as the Sinú-San Jacinto basin, the Caribbean offshore blocks, and the Middle and Upper Magdalena Valley. Over the past decade, the sector has contributed an average of 2 percent of GDP and 13 percent of national government revenue through taxes, dividends, and royalties. New licensing rounds would create opportunities for US companies while also helping Colombia strengthen a source of fiscal revenue to sustain public investment in health, education, security, and infrastructure.
Within the first year, the Ministry of Mines and Energy and the National Hydrocarbons Agency should announce the first areas to be opened or reactivated for exploration, with a clear timeline for bidding and contract decisions. At the same time, the government should present decision plans for delayed projects that have the shortest path to production, including deadlines for resolution of remaining bottlenecks. As with infrastructure and critical minerals, this agenda should respect prior consultation and environmental procedures while benefiting from clearer timelines.
Because Colombia’s gas needs are immediate, with only around 5.9 years of natural gas reserves, the incoming government should pair new exploration opportunities with short-term measures to optimize recovery in existing fields.
6. Mobilize multisectoral support for community-led economic activity
The presidency’s Regions Office (Gerencia de las Regiones), which will work with governors and mayors across Colombia’s thirty-two departments to identify strategic regional priorities, may leverage the National Competitiveness and Innovation System and its Regional Competitiveness and Innovation Commissions (CRCIs) to mobilize multisectoral support needed to implement them. This agenda should include support for initiatives that can create formal jobs, strengthen local value chains, and support entrepreneurship.
The CRCIs already bring together territorial authorities, chambers of commerce, investment promotion agencies, universities, and producer organizations. Because of this, they could serve as platforms to advance the priorities identified by the Regions Office with governors and mayors and develop implementation roadmaps. For each priority initiative, the roadmap should outline the financing and technical support required and identify implementation partners. The Regions Office could then work with MinCIT and the Colombian Confederation of Chambers of Commerce (Confecámaras), which cooperate to coordinate the CRCIs, to mobilize companies, foundations, multilateral institutions and other international partners that can help finance and implement these projects. Support can include technical assistance, capacity building, and market expertise, building on the experience of companies and foundations already working to expand local economic development.
Advancing community-led tourism projects could be an initial priority, given the sector’s importance to Colombia’s economy and the president-elect’s call to position the country as a global reference for biodiversity, culture, and adventure tourism. The Regions Office and the CRCIs should identify rural areas where ecotourism, agrotourism, and community-based tourism projects could strengthen existing economic activity. Projects such as coffee tourism in Cauca and ecotourism in Caquetá demonstrate how tourism investment can advance economic development, strengthen local livelihoods, and contribute to long-term stability.
For each project, the CRICs will need to determine the support needed to strengthen and formalize local initiatives, promote them, and connect them with tour operators, digital platforms and other potential partners. The Regions Office, MinCIT and Confecámaras could then mobilize support from different relevant parties, including the National Tourism Fund, ProColombia, companies, multilaterals, and Colombian and international foundations. The same model could be applied to community-led production and local processing of food and natural products, as well as handicrafts and cultural goods. Private sector and international partners could work with producers to meet sanitary, certification, packaging, and other market requirements and connect their products with domestic and international buyers. These coordination efforts will be especially important to advance projects led by women, indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, and those in municipalities with Territorially Focused Development Programs (PDET), as they can help generate formal income, close gaps, and diversify rural economies.
Conclusion
Abelardo de la Espriella’ s incoming government has opened opportunities for early economic cooperation with the United States and multilateral institutions. During their visit to Washington, the vice president-elect and ministers-designate emphasized their interest in expanding bilateral trade, attracting investment, and supporting growth across Colombia’s regions. The US-Colombia working groups announced following the visit have set an initial path to build on this momentum and identify additional areas for cooperation. Moving forward, sustained engagement to address barriers to trade and expand investment on shared priorities can deliver benefits for both countries. Cooperation on infrastructure, agribusiness, energy, critical minerals, and other strategic sectors, can create opportunities for US companies, advance US commercial interests, and bring investment and growth to more regions of Colombia.
About the US-Colombia Strategic Alignment Coalition
At a moment of renewed US focus on the Western Hemisphere and Colombia’s ongoing electoral cycle, the Atlantic Council launched the US–Colombia Strategic Alignment Coalition to help update and modernize the bilateral agenda and put forward recommendations for renewed for cooperation across security, economic, and governance priorities. This coalition is the successor of the Atlantic Council’s US–Colombia Task Force originally established in 2017 under bipartisan US Senate leadership.
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The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.
Image: View of the container terminal at the seaport of Buenaventura, Colombia, on September 12, 2025. Photo via Shutterstock.
