2025 will be a decisive year for Iran’s nuclear program
Since the United States’ withdrawal from the multilateral nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, Iran’s nuclear program has progressed almost unimpeded. Although Tehran is careful not to cross the line of military-grade enrichment (90 percent), the program has progressed without interruption. While Iran is suffering from sanctions imposed on it following the US withdrawal, it hasn’t paid an additional price for its flagrant violation of the JCPOA. However, after a long period of stagnation that accompanied the international community vis-à-vis Tehran’s nuclear program, it seems that there is a new diplomatic movement regarding this issue.
Next year is going to be decisive for the Iranian nuclear program for a variety of reasons, some of which are related to the JCPOA and some of which are associated with tensions in Iran and even regionally and internationally as a direct result of the campaign between Israel and members of the Axis of Resistance (specifically Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the Shia militias in Iraq) that began on October 7, 2023. These events and developments will bring the Iranian nuclear program to a strategic junction in the coming year, affecting not only the nuclear file but also the Islamic Republic’s broad security strategy and its relations with the international community and the region. Iran will be forced to make a historic decision.
Since Tehran departed from the JCPOA limit of 3.67 percent uranium enrichment, Iran has learned to develop advanced centrifuges and enrich at 60 percent. In addition, Iran has expanded its enrichment facilities in Natanz and Fordow, is preparing for the operation of another enrichment facility near Natanz, and is continuing to return significant amounts of enriched material to the stockpiles at various levels. Despite this, Iran continues its relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—but it still needs to implement the action plan established with the agency.
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In the military context, according to the latest assessment published by the US intelligence community, Tehran has not yet made a strategic decision to move toward nuclear weapons. But even if Iran’s leadership doesn’t indicate a desire to obtain a nuclear weapon, technological work is underway that goes beyond the lines of a civilian program. With no accord in place, the international community seems to be in a deep freeze in the face of these updates. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi’s recent visit to Tehran highlights these problems. Tehran appears willing to cooperate with the IAEA only to prevent any harsh decision against by the organization’s Board of Governors—it has no real intention of working with the IAEA.
However, recent Board of Governors meetings have seen a hardening of the statements issued by the E3—Britain, France, and Germany—and the United States regarding progress of Iran’s nuclear program, especially about its unwillingness to cooperate with the IAEA’s road map. But at the same time, the Board of Governors—who are meeting this week in Vienna—have not taken a dramatic step against Iran, apparently due to the fear of pushing it into a corner, leaving Tehran no choice but to carry out threatened actions that cannot be rolled back. And so, an equilibrium was created in which Iran continues to expand its program without going beyond the red lines of enrichment and weapons. On the other hand, the West—led by the E3 and the United States—maintains the sanctions regime but does not take any dramatic steps against Iran for its progress in this program. In general, it seems that the Western powers, especially with Tehran’s involvement in Russia’s war in Ukraine, have preferred to focus on other issues and practically abandoned dealing with the country’s nuclear program.
But this reality will inevitably change in the coming year. First and foremost, the snapback issue forces the parties to the original deal to formulate a strategy regarding whether or not to activate it. Any decision will have far-reaching consequences for Iran’s conduct in regard to its nuclear program. October 18, 2025 will be the last opportunity for world powers to initiate the snapback mechanism, returning all the sanctions that were lifted in the JCPOA agreement (except those already expired). Iran is already threatening that activating the exact mechanism will inevitably lead Tehran to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), making this decision crucial for the future of the Iranian nuclear program. But even if the world powers give up the option to activate the snapback mechanism, this will have profound consequences for Iran and send a message that it has an open ticket to move forward with its program without any real limits.
That raises the question of returning to the JCPOA or drafting a new nuclear agreement. It seems that the current Iranian leadership, especially after the election of President Masoud Pezeshkian, understands that the path to economic relief in Iran lies only in reaching an agreement with the West that will limit the nuclear program. On the other hand, those Western countries, including the United States (soon to be led by President-elect Donald Trump), will also want to move forward in principle.
The international community and Iran are converging on a crossroads. Either they can reach a new nuclear agreement or return to the JCPOA (which would lead to the rolling back of the nuclear program in exchange for significant economic relief) or Western countries could activate the snapback mechanism (which would lead to unprecedented moves on the part of Iran, and a clash between the powers—and probably Israel—and Iran). It is important to note that rolling back the Iranian nuclear program does not erase the Iranian scientists’ extensive knowledge. In addition, the United States left the JCPOA, making it very hard to reach an agreement that will significantly roll back the Iranian nuclear program.
Furthermore, the probability of keeping the current enrichment level below the 90 percent threshold is eroded, as evidenced by the fact that Iran, by mistake or not, has already enriched very close to the 90 percent threshold. Given the vast number of centrifuges and the high level of enrichment, plus the progress of Iranian scientists in weapons research, the likelihood that red lines will be crossed simply due to the nature of the nuclear program increases with every day that passes without an agreement—regardless of whether the leadership has made an affirmative decision to seek nuclear weapons.
This reality is also related to the Israel-Iran conflict, specifically Israel’s fear of attacking Iran. In the past, the thinking was that Israel would be conscientious not to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities without US backing for fear of a regional war in which Hezbollah could cause severe damage to Israel. The developments since October 7, 2023—specifically Hezbollah’s military setbacks and the severe damage caused to Iran’s air-defense capability as a result of the most recent attack by Israel—may increase Israel’s appetite.
These regional changes have led to many statements from officials in Iran that mention the possibility of Iran changing its nuclear strategy and moving toward the construction of a nuclear bomb. Now that Iran is more exposed to Israeli and even US attacks (as a result of damage to Iranian air-defense systems), and in light of Iran’s difficulties in expanding its ballistic missile stockpile, the likelihood of Iran making a strategic reexamination rises dramatically. The Iranian temptation to use the program as a deterrent to Israel and perhaps the United States following the election of Trump is increasing significantly, and the relative proximity to military enrichment and maybe even a bomb allows—and will spur—the leadership in Iran to advance to that stage of development after years of no change in Tehran’s nuclear strategy.
The constraints and opportunities that push Tehran, the connection of proven Israeli military capability in Iran, and the growing suspicion that Tehran will not hesitate to move in this direction also increase the likelihood of an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities.
After years of stagnation with the nuclear program and Iran’s creeping progress in its program without overstepping lines, regional and international developments—but especially the snapback deadline issue—are leading Iran’s nuclear program to an unavoidable junction. The decision point of deal or no deal—with the accompanying ripple effects in either direction—is approaching, but it is already clear that in 2025, Iran’s nuclear program will be on a different path.
Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project working group. He previously served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence.
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