Ambassador Fred Hof Address to the Harvard National & International Security Program on Syria

After months of tentative dates, preliminary conferences, and backroom wrangling, the Geneva II peace talks are now penciled in for January 22. Considering the track record of delays, it is fair to wonder if this new date will stick. But the larger question facing the Geneva process is whether a diplomatic solution to the Syrian crisis is even possible in the near term.

In a speech delivered this week to the Harvard National and International Security Program, Ambassador Frederic C. Hof addressed this larger question, defining the near term—for the sake of argument—as 2014.

Pace Samantha Power, Amb. Hof views the crisis in Syria as “a problem from Hell.” It is “one of those high-profile episodes of mass murder in faraway places whose challenges bedeviled American presidents in the 20^th century… a problem for which no easy answers exist.” Given the prevailing American appetite for foreign intervention, it is tempting to see the complex crisis as “someone else’s civil war.”

Yet the temptation to put Syria in the too hard to do box must be resisted. Syria may well turn out to be a fifteen or twenty year calamity. Yet if the international community regarded the crisis that gripped Lebanon starting in 1975 as terribly regrettable but ultimately containable, there is nothing containable about what is happening in Syria. Even if gazes can be averted from a humanitarian nightmare that is now affecting upwards of half of Syria’s population, how can one safely ignore the deleterious effects on American allies and friends in the neighborhood? How can one find tolerable the perpetuation of a ruling crime family whose sectarian survival strategy has brought Syria and its neighborhood to their current state? How can one deem acceptable the rise of Al Qaeda in the eastern part of the country? Syria cannot be quarantined. Diplomatic efforts may well fail. But a hands-off, let nature take its course approach is simply to pour kerosene on the fire. Indeed, to do nothing is a course of action. It is a choice; one that will inevitably produce unintended and unwelcome consequences. Many argue it already has.

So what is the prospect of addressing this calamity through the Geneva process? As Amb. Hof argues, “in order for there to be a Geneva conference worth having, it must be preceded by a noticeable and meaningful reduction in violence.”

To date, however, the Assad regime’s key backers have shown no interest in taking steps to tamp down the violence. The Assad regime derives the preponderance of its support from Iran and Russia, thus the road to peace must pass through Moscow and Tehran.

Are Tehran and Moscow content to permit their client to proceed with mass terror business as usual in the run-up to Geneva? If they are, then at least any confusion about with whom we are dealing in those two places should be cleared up. If, on the other hand, they are troubled by war crimes and crimes against humanity and wish to see their client’s engagement in this behavior stop in advance of Geneva, do they have the requisite leverage to force a change? We will not know until they are put to the test or, more precisely, they put themselves to the test. Together they have armed the Assad regime to the teeth. Russia, with the support of China, has shielded the regime in the UN Security Council. Iran – which incredibly denies playing a role in Syria – has raised militias for the regime in Lebanon and Iraq and has stationed its own Quds Force personnel in Syria. Surely Iran and Russia can, if they wish, at least try to persuade their client to refrain from human rights worst practices. If the practices continue they will continue to attract counter-measures from Islamist opposition factions whose appetite for the blood of innocents is easily as great as the regime’s. If they continue one has to ask what would be the point of trying to convene Syrians to meet in Geneva.

So how can the international community work to change the stance of Assad’s backers? Are there diplomatic avenues, perhaps in parallel outside or parallel to the Geneva process that might affect the wider calculus of interests? Amb. Hof views Tehran as the key lynchpin, and situates the Syria crisis within Tehran’s broader strategic thinking, not an end in itself. Iran perpetuates the status quo in Syria, not out of any particular affection for the Assad regime, but as an important aspect of its national self-defense vis-à-vis Israel. When one adopts this bird’s eye view, Amb. Hof sees a possible opening in Syria through the ongoing nuclear discussions.

If there is one party that may have something approaching decisive leverage over the Assad regime it is Iran. Although Russia has been important to the survival of the Assad regime, Tehran has been vital. Indeed, the introduction of Lebanese Hezbollah light infantry at the behest of Iran last spring turned the tide of battle and gave Assad’s reliable military units much needed rest. Iran has also recruited Iraqi militiamen to fight in Syria and has helped the regime raise a so-called popular militia. … At present Iran needs the Assad regime for one thing: that regime’s absolute willingness to subordinate itself and Syria to Iran’s desire to sustain Hezbollah in Lebanon. So long as there is a threat of Israeli air strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities Hezbollah will be Iran ‘s first line of defense: its Lebanon-based deterrent and retaliatory force. When Israel contemplates military action in the skies over Iran it must take into account missiles landing on Tel Aviv from launchers in southern Lebanon. Tehran understands fully that any replacement of the Assad regime resulting from a negotiation or an opposition military victory would change Syria’s relationship with Hezbollah in ways Iran would not welcome. Just as Bashar Al Assad’s father saw Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah as a subordinate worthy of an occasional spanking, so would a successor Syrian government very likely put Syria first and end, among other things, the practice of handing over advanced weaponry from the Syrian military inventory. If the threat from Israel goes away by virtue of a solid, negotiated nuclear settlement, it is possible that Tehran would reevaluate the extent of its investment in a regime for which it seems to have little respect or regard.

The above is just a digest of the longer speech, well worth reading in full. To download the text, please click the icon below.

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Ambassador Fred Hof Address to the Harvard National & International Security Program on Syria