Tom Friedman’s column in The New York Times on December 7 supports an argument—that liberal forces in Egypt did less well than Islamists in the first round of elections because their anti-military protests had alienated “some more traditional-minded Egyptian voters, who still cling to the army as a source of stability”—that is emerging as part of the conventional wisdom. That is certainly a story that the SCAF would like to have told, but my conversations in Egypt last week paint a different picture. Most Egyptians with whom I spoke did not see supporting Tahrir demonstrators and voting in elections as two opposite choices; in fact, many did both, seeing electing a legislature as a necessary first step in dislodging the military from power. I think it would be misleading to suggest that the votes that the FJP and Salafis got were protest votes against liberals rather than votes deliberately for the Islamists.
Where Friedman is correct is that the Tahrir protests “hampered the secular reformists in preparing to compete in the first round of elections.” And there is a specific reason for that. My observations last week in Port Said suggested that many, perhaps most, voters headed to the polls without knowing for whom they would vote. Therefore, the last-minute campaigning by parties and individual candidates, however illegal, was absolutely critical. Having a small army of volunteers deployed around polling places handing out small cards and pamphlets—as well as strategically-placed stations where voters could look up their specific polling place—probably made all the difference to voters befuddled by ballots full of unfamiliar names.
Let me give an example of how Tahrir factored in. George Ishak, one of the founders of Kefaya, was competing for a seat in Port Said with FJP member Ahram al-Shaer. This was expected to be a hard-fought race and to go to a runoff. It did not; al-Shaer was one of only a handful of candidates who won outright. The reason became clear in a conversation I had with one of the principal organizers of Ishak’s campaign, when I noted that in two days of visiting polls I had not come across a single volunteer or candidate agent for Ishak. The campaign had indeed organized a pool of such volunteers and even obtained official permits for candidate agents. But when the Tahrir protests broke out a week before elections, they all got on busses and went to Cairo to participate. Although the Tahrir protests were fizzling by the time the voting started on November 28, the Ishak campaign could not reconvene their volunteers in time. And so Ishak lost the race.
Thus, I suspect Tahrir’s negative impact on liberal candidates was due more to the fact that they took their eye off the ball and less that public sentiment turned against them. And it is unlikely that liberals would have been able to rival the Islamists in terms of numbers of volunteers in any case. Let’s see if they figure that out in time for next week’s second round.
The other point from Friedman’s column that needs discussion is his concern that Islamist parties have no idea how to “generate economic growth at a time when the Egyptian economy is sinking.” Certainly I share his concern about the economy, which is headed straight downhill and might be ripe for a crisis in as little as two months from now. And he is correct to worry that an Islamist-dominated parliament will scare foreign investors away, as well as many Egyptians.
What Friedman fails to mention, however, is that the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party has by far the most well developed economic platform of any Egyptian political party, and that it is generally market-oriented and business-friendly. To lump the Brotherhood in with the Salafis and say that both “have been living underground, focused largely on what they were both against and confined in their ideology to platitudes like ‘Islam is the answer,’” is quite unfair. Unlike the Salafis, the Brotherhood has decades of experience in electoral politics (admittedly not free politics) and has worked harder than any other existing party on its platform, including the economic aspects. Having met recently with businessmen from the Brotherhood who worked on the platform, I can tell you that they care deeply about the economy and are realistic in their ideas about the need for foreign investment, tourism, etc.
All that said, I still have concerns that the Brotherhood will make poor economic policy decisions or resist good ones, but not because they don’t know any better. My concern is that they will be buffeted by demands from the population (for public employment and continued fuel subsidies, for example) and will not be as investment and tourism-friendly as they might otherwise be due to pressure from the Salafists. Those are pressures that any political party coming to power in this environment would face; the question is whether the Brotherhood will be better or worse at handling them than others would have been.
Photo Credit: New York Times
The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party claims to have won 34 of the 52 individual seats that were contested in the runoff round on December 5-6, raising the FJP's projected share of parliamentary seats to nearly two thirds. Meanwhile, the SCAF issued a decree on December 7 delegating presidential powers to Prime Minister Kamal Ganzouri, although the decree preserves the council's executive authority over the armed forces and judiciary.
In retrospect, it’s almost a miracle that last week’s elections went forward as planned with massive turnout and relatively few irregularities, despite predictions of violence and calls for postponing elections after a week of lethal clashes in downtown Cairo and other parts of the country. While Egyptians are relieved that elections were conducted relatively fairly and peacefully, the sweeping victory of Islamists – whose candidates won a 61 percent majority in the first round – raises new concerns about the policies and ideological positions that will emerge from the next elected parliament.
Egyptians in 9 governorates went out en masse on November 28, not to protest, but rather to cast their votes in the first round of elections since ousting Hosni Mubarak in February. Although the first stage of voting went relatively smoothly, it’s important to recall the broader context of unrest and insecurity in which the electoral process is unfolding. The last 10 days before voting witnessed extreme violence The army and police used excessive force (tear gas, rubber bullets and live rounds) against civilians protesting in Cairo’s Tahrir square and other governorates against the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and a set of draft constitutional principles that would preserve and possibly enhance the military’s political and economic privileges in the future political system. The ensuing clashes between protesters and security forces resulted in over 40 deaths and more than 2,000 injured, according to the Ministry of Health. As a concession, the SCAF convened a series of emergency meetings with party leaders and presidential candidates and issued the long awaited anti-graft law, accepted the government’s resignation and announced a new timetable for a transfer of power to civilians by the end of June 2012. In addition, the SCAF urged all Egyptians to stand united, confirmed that elections would take place on time and extended the voting period by an extra day to encourage turnout and "avoid overcrowding and security issues."
The two-day polling process on November 28-29 went peacefully with minimal violence, although the process was marred by several irregularities and procedural violations, such as polling stations opening late, insufficient ballot papers and boxes, judges arriving late and party representatives campaigning inside polling centers in violation of a ban on campaigning 48 hours prior to the start of voting. These violations were widely documented by voters and NGOs observing the elections, although the High Electoral Commission has tried to downplay the impact of irregularities on the voting process, which saw a record turnout of 52 percent of the eligible voters.
First is regarding the sincerity of the Islamist parties to abiding by democratic principles. The FJP has said that its priorities are ending corruption, reviving the economy and establishing a true democracy in Egypt. Mohamed Badie, the Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide, said the party will work to build an inclusive government and prefers a semi-presidential system based on the French model. Badie also denied making any deals with SCAF. Such statements imply that the FJP will be looking to create a wider coalition in the Parliament and will try to distance itself from the hardline Nour Party. On the other hand, the Salafis have been advocating for stricter moral codes and restrictions on personal freedoms reminiscent of policies backed by Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi establishment. They are among the newcomers to the game in Egyptian politics, and it is unclear exactly how they will play. Having once shunned democracy as inappropriately elevating man-made laws and institutions over Shari’a, Salafis are now choosing to participate in the formal political arena, and their parliamentarians could seek to enshrine conservative Islamist principles in new legislation.
Second, is the SCAF genuinely committed to transferring power to the parliament and a civilian president by end of June 2012? So far the ruling military council has been torn between the desire to preserve its political and economic privileges for as long as possible and the challenge of supervising a successful transition to democracy within a limited time frame. Under Article 56 of the Constitutional Declaration, the SCAF will hold the authority of the President and Parliament until elections are held. But on December 7, the SCAF issued a degree delegating presidential authority to newly appointed Prime Minister Kamal Ganzouri, while still retaining power over the armed forces and judiciary. Whether this decision signifies an actual loosening of the SCAF's grip on power remains to be seen, and there are signs that the military is already maneuvering to curb the authority of the next parliament. in his most recent video interview, SCAF member Major General Mamdouh Shahin stated that the party winning the majority in the Parliament will not have the power to form the government. The statement was perceived as a power-grab by the Islamists, particularly the FJP, whose parliamentarians will likely demand the right to form a coalition government. Even before election results revealed an Islamist majority, the FJP’s head, Mohamed Morsi, stated on November 29 that the new parliament should be empowered to form a government representative of the political forces in the People’s Assembly, rather than a technocratic cabinet appointed by the prime minister. However, the generals’ appointment of Dr. Kamal al-Ganzouri as new Prime Minister confirms the speculation that the SCAF’s preferred scenario is for a technocratic government to hold power at least until the presidential election next summer. In addition, the inevitability of Islamist majority in parliament may make the SCAF even more reluctant to relinquish power, despite assurances that the military will respect the people’s choice.
Ahmed Morsy is a Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. He previously worked on political party development with the National Democratic Institute’s Cairo office and has also worked for the U.S. Embassy in Cairo.
Photo Credit: Al Arabiya
As Egyptian liberals and U.S. policy-makers nervously eye the prospect of an Islamist-dominated parliament, the Muslim Brotherhood’s leaders are trying to assuage fears that the group aspires to hold a monopoly on political power. In a televised interview on December 6, Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie reiterated his previous pledge that the Brotherhood will not field a candidate in the presidential election, expected to take place by the end of June 2012. Some had speculated that the Brotherhood would back down from this promise, after dropping earlier assurances that it would not seek more than 50 percent of the seats in the People's Assembly.
In confirming that the Brotherhood will not seek to control the excutive branch, Badie said the group “prefers a semi-presidential system” with a strengthened parliament. It’s not surprising that the Brotherhood would advocate enhanced powers for the legislature, in light of early election results suggesting that Islamists could occupy more than 65 percent of the seats in the People’s Assembly.
With liberal parties winning less than 15 percent of the vote under the banner of the Egyptian bloc coalition, an Islamist majority is statistically inevitably. But rather than gloat about their landslide victory, the Brotherhood is trying to play nice with the losers. In his interview with al-Mehwar TV, Badie flatly denied speculation that the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) intends to dominate parliament as part of an Islamist bloc formed with the Salafis (who won a surprising 24.4 percent of the first round vote). At the same time, Badie stressed that the party is keen on coalition-building, saying that “progress in Egypt is not possible without agreement among all political forces.”
Badie also expressed support for the SCAF, stating that “the armed forces have our sincerest appreciation and respect for protecting the Egyptian people and their revolution, despite the fact that the Brothers were among those most damaged by the military [under Mubarak’s rule].” At the same time, Badie stressed that the Brotherhood would “will push [the SCAF] to meet all of the demands of the Egyptian people” if the military attempts to stall the transition.
While Badie indicated that the Brotherhood will push back if the SCAF refuses to relinquish power as promised by the end of June, his statements suggest that the alliance of convenience between the SCAF and the Brotherhood – forged in the earliest days of the transition – is still fundamentally intact. A major flashpoint and source of tension between the two – a controversial set of constitutional principles proposed by Deputy Prime Minister Ali al-Selmi in November – is now moot, following the cabinet’s resignation last week. Satisfied that the principles – which would have restricted the parliament’s influence over the drafting of the next constitution – are now dead in the water, the Brotherhood’s secretary general warned this week that anyone who tries to revive the principles “would die with them.” Armed with a powerful mandate and popular legitimacy, the Brotherhood will likely continue its cautious maneuvers to consolidate political power, by insisting that the majority in the People’s Assembly has the right to determine the composition of the constituent assembly and cabinet, while avoiding an overt confrontation with the SCAF.
Photo Credit: IkwhanOnline
For decades, Egyptians knew only fraudulent elections under the harsh constraints of Mubarak’s authoritarian rule. Faced with pervasive ballot fraud, violence and intimidation by the repressive security forces, they largely withdrew from the political process, choosing to boycott rather than casts ballots that had no hope of bringing about meaningful change. But in last week's elections, Egyptians participated in unprecedented numbers, with 52 percent of eligible voters turning out at the polls on November 28-29.
The massive level of turnout proved that the political consciousness of Egyptians has been fundamentally transformed by the revolution. This newfound enthusiasm for political participation and pluralism has produced a spectrum of parties and movements unprecedented in their diversity. But ideological diversity inevitably gives rise to extremes, including the hardline fringe of the Islamist movement, whose Salafi candidates swept an unexpected 20 percent of the votes this week.
Looking at the Egyptian street today, the familiar image of the smiling well-dressed Egyptian man wearing a suit and that of the Egyptian woman wearing her hair down and dressed in a short skirt have been replaced by less modern styles that reflect conservative Wahhabi influence. Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood, which failed to win a single seat during the semi-liberal era before 1952, is leading election returns and poised to claim at least 40 percent of the parliamentary seats. While the Brotherhood has long been a powerful fixture in Egypt’s political scene, the rise of the hardline Salafis is a new phenomenon and begs the question: Where did this new surge in religious conservatism originate?
Before the 1952 military coup, Egyptian society was becoming increasingly modern and liberal in its character, beginning to resemble contemporary Tunisian society in its demographic and ideological makeup. But six decades of authoritarian rule took a serious toll on voter attitudes and reversed the liberalizing trend seen before 1952.
Authoritarianism supported the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and accelerated its project – Islamizing Egypt – which has now been in progress for 83 years. Some analysts have suggested that the strong military establishment that assumed power after the 1952 coup had the effect of curbing the influence of Islamists. In my opinion, however, the period of military rule was actually an “enabling phase” that catalyzed the growth of Islamic movements. This shift in the public discourse and mood -- from moderation and liberalism toward Islamism -- revealed itself fully in the results of this week’s elections.
The stunning success of the Brotherhood and Salafi parties at the polls suggests that Islamic values that had previously been confided to the private, personal realm in Egyptian society are now dominating debates in the formal political arena. In Islamic jurisprudence, there is the concept of a “phase of vulnerability,” during which Muslims were a minority in Mecca. This period was characterized by tolerance of other religious groups, as Muslims lacked the political authority and demographic weight to impose their views on society. However, this framework changed dramatically during the “enabling phase,” after the Prophet Mohammad emigrated from Mecca to Medina, where Muslims represented the dominant religion. No longer constrained by their minority status, Muslims became increasingly assertive in reengineering their societies in conformity with Islamic moral and legal principles, even in liberal cosmopolitan cities like Cairo.
In 2003, I spoke with Essam al-Erian, deputy head of the FJP, during my work at Cairo Times magazine, about a draft bill presented by the Brotherhood’s parliamentary bloc that made alcohol consumption a crime punishable by whipping, in accordance with Islamic Shari'a. At the time, al-Arian insisted that the Brotherhood “was not in a hurry to implement the Shari'a.” “Our primary goal is to construct the individual and Muslim society, and then the fruit will fall on its own,” He said. Looking at this week’s election results, it looks like the fruit is finally hitting the ground.
With the FJP poised to capture a plurality and possibly a majority of seats in parliament, the Brotherhood will undoubtedly reconsider its pre-revolutionary slogan, “participation not competition,” which reflect the restraint and pragmatism that become hallmarks of the group’s political strategy under Mubarak’s rule. At the beginning of the revolution, the Brotherhood announced that they would preserve the same slogan and would not compete for more than 30% of the parliamentary seats. Additionally, the Freedom and Justice Party stated that it would not nominate candidates for the presidential election. However, in recent months, the Brotherhood’s position has shifted gradually, reflecting heightened political ambitions, with the FJP announcing that it would field candidates for 50% of the parliamentary seats, a 10% increase over the previously announced threshold. What led to this strategic shift?
The electoral success of the Islamic movement in Egypt can be partially attributed to regional dynamics. Saudi Arabia and other conservative Gulf monarchies would welcome an Islamist majority in Egypt’s next parliament, and there is evidence that these countries have provided significant funding to support Egyptian Salafi NGOs and political parties in recent months. Statements by US officials pledging to work with Islamist parties represented in the next parliament may have emboldened the FJP to go public with its rising political ambitions. Meanwhile, the electoral victory of Islamist parties in Tunisia and Morocco may have whetted the Brotherhood’s appetite for power. On the same day that Morocco’s Justice and Development party won the elections, a Brotherhood spokesman issued a statement saying that the ruling military council "must task the party with a [parliamentary] majority to form the next government."
Judging by the results of the first round, Islamists are on their way to winning an absolute majority in the next parliament that would enable them to impose their religious ideology on the new political system by drafting the country’s new constitution – a task that was delegated to a constituent assembly selected by the People’s Assembly under the interim constitution issued in March. If Islamists gain control of parliament, it would alter the balance of power for the remainder of the transitional phase scheduled to end with a presidential election by the end of June 2012.
Ironically, the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) may view the Brotherhood’s political victory as a solution to its current legitimacy crisis, rather than a threat to its power. So far, the SCAF has steadfastly refused to task Mohamed ElBaradei or any other political figure associated with the revolution to form the national salvation government demanded by protesters. But if the Brotherhood gains significant power in the new political system, it could represent a power-sharing compromise, striking a balance between the expectations of revolutionary forces and the interests of the military establishment and former regime. The SCAF will be able to point to a democratically elected parliament as proof that it is advancing the transition, while still keeping power out of the hands of the revolutionaries themselves.
An Islamist majority in parliament is likely to inspire new alliances and coalitions between secular and liberal parties, which will need to cooperate in a united bloc if they want to have their voices heard. If the Islamist majority in parliament succeeds in imposing its vision on Egypt’s next constitution, the country could be headed for a theocratic system that contains some of the institutional trappings of democracy but not its core values.
Photo Credit: AP
Voting for the 52 individual seats that were not decided in the first round continued for a second day on December 6. The second round of voting has brought out sharp divisions between rival Islamist parties, which are trading accusations of campaign violations. Twenty-four of the runoff races are between candidates from the Freedom and Justice Party and the Salafi Nour Party.
Despite anecdotal reports of massive female turnout in Cairo and other governorates, women may very well be the biggest losers of Egypt’s first free and fair elections. Although 376 female candidates are running for parliament, not a single woman was elected in the first stage of voting on November 28-29. And there is good reason to believe that women will fare just as poorly in subsequent rounds of voting. The second and third stages of elections will include Egypt’s most rural and conservative districts where gender biases are more deeply ingrained than the urban centers – Cairo, Alexandria, and Port Said – that voted this week. Faced with the very real possibility of an exclusively male parliament, many Egyptians are wondering: Were women left behind by the Revolution?
Female candidates already face an uphill battle in overcoming sexist attitudes on the campaign trail, but to make matters worse, structural features of the new electoral system have stacked the odds against women. Amendments to the electoral law introduced in October replaced the 64-seat quota for female parliamentary representatives – enacted by the former regime – with the requirement that each party’s candidate list include at least one woman. At face value, this condition looks like a step toward leveling the playing field. But in reality, forcing parties to nominate women has done no favors for female candidates. Parties have dealt with the gender requirement by relegating women to the least desirable slots at the bottom of their candidate lists. As one female candidate, Suheir al-Matanin described the problem, “Women are just there for decoration.” Under the proportional representation system, seats are allocated to candidates according to their relative position on a party’s list. In most cases, only the first two or three names on a list have a reasonable chance of winning seats, so if every party places its female candidates near the bottom, Egypt’s next parliament is virtually guaranteed to be free of women.
The SCAF could of course remedy the blatant gender imbalance in a backhanded way, by packing the ten seats reserved for government appointees with women and Coptic Christians, a favorite tactic of the former regime to artificially inflate the parliamentary representation of minorities.
In light of the landslide victory by Islamist parties this week, some Egyptians are concerned that a parliament dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis could reverse progress on women’s rights. Farkhonda Hassan, secretary-general of the National Council for Women (NCW), warned that the underrepresentation of women in the next parliament could set Egypt “a dozen steps back.” “If Islamists come to power, I expect that they will strip women of the achievements they made throughout the previous years,” Hassan predicted. When Salafi parties were required to include women on their candidate lists, they made sure that the candidates’ faces were replaced with flowers on campaign propaganda, because displaying photos of women in public was deemed inappropriate. If the Salafis are already censoring posters, their parliamentarians aren’t likely to look favorably on the participation of women in public and political life.
Photo Credit: AFP
Run-off voting is in progress today, as candidates compete for 52 seats that were not decided in the initial round of voting on December 28-29, in which only 4 candidates won decisive victories. Prime Minister Kamal Ganzouri reportedly reconsidered some of his cabinet nominees over the weekend, after several proposed appointments were rejected by the public over their ties to the former regime.
1) The High Electoral Commission announced official results for the first round of voting on December 4. The Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) led the polls with 36.6 percent of the vote; the Salafi Nour Party came in second with 24.4 percent of the vote, followed by the Egyptian Bloc with 13.4 percent. The liberal Wafd Party won 7.1 percent and the moderate Islamist Wasat Party won 4.3 percent. Figures for the 28 largest parties competing in the elections are available here. [al-Masry al-Youm, English, 12/5/2011] [Haaertz, English, 12/5/2011]
2) Run-off voting is in progress today for races in which no candidate won at least 50 percent of the vote, or voters failed to elect a farmer or a worker in the first round. The Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) announced that it has 46 candidates competing in the runoff round, compared to 56 in the first round. FJP candidates are competing directly with rivals from the Salafi Nour Party, and tensions between the two leading Islamist parties have escalated dramatically in the days leading up to the run-off round. On December 4, al-Nour leader Emad Abdel-Ghafour ruled out cooperation with the FJP, saying that the Salafi party had no intention of becoming a “follower to any other political force. “We have nothing to do with the Brotherhood, we have our own view,” Abdel-Ghafour said. During voting on December 5, altercations broke out between candidate representatives of the two parties who accused one another of distributing campaign propaganda inside polling stations in Matreya and other districts. [al-Ahram, English, 12/5/2011] [al-Ahram, English, 12/5/2011] [al-Ahram, English, 12/5/2011] [al-Masry al-Youm, Arabic, 12/5/2011]
3) An Egyptian human rights group, One World Foundation, reported lower-than-expected turnout and a range of violations, including harassment of monitors and exclusion from polling stations by military personnel, delays in the opening of polling stations, and unlawful campaign activities by party representatives. [al-Masry al-Youm, English, 12/5/2011] [al-Masry al-Youm, Arabic, 12/5/2011]
4) Candidates from the liberal-oriented Egyptian Bloc are resorting to using religious campaign propaganda to compete with opponents from the Freedom and Justice Party. Egyptian Bloc candidates were distributing leaflets citing their piety and support for religious activities such as building mosques. [al-Masry al-Youm, English, 12/5/2011]
5) Mohamed ElBaradei said that Egypt’s liberal revolutionary youth had been “decimated” in the first round of parliamentary elections and expressed concern about the rise of hardline Islamist elements. “The youth feel let down. They don't feel that any of the revolution's goals have been achieved,” ElBaradei said, noting that activist movements failed to unify in “one essential critical mass.” [AP, English, 11/4/2011]
6) Prime Minister Kamal Ganzouri reportedly reconsidered some of his cabinet nominees over the weekend, after several proposed appointments were rejected by the public over their ties to the former regime. Ganzouri is expected to retain at least ten ministers from Sharaf’s government, including two holdovers from the Mubarak regime, International Cooperation Minister Fayza Abu El-Naga and Electricity Minister Hassan Younis. On December 5, Ganzouri announced that he had filled crucial post of Interior Minister, after several nominees declined the position, but said he would not announce the minister’s name until shortly before the swearing in ceremony, “for reasons of public interst.” The SCAF is expected to swear in the new cabinet by the end of this week. [al-Ahram, English, 12/5/2011] [al-Shorouk, Arabic, 12/5/2011]
7) SCAF Chief of Staff Sami Anan met with on December 4 with representatives of political forces to discuss the framework of the recently proposed Cabinet advisory board, which will include political leaders, presidential candidates, and public figures. The 30-member advisory board would assist the SCAF in administering the remainder of the interim period and facilitate communication between the military, the cabinet, and the public. The SCAF is expected to form the advisory board shortly after the run-off round of voting on December 5. [al-Ahram, English, 12/5/2011]
8) The government will soon amend Article 56 of the Interim Constitution, which relates to the SCAF's powers, according to Prime Minister Kamal al-Ganzouri. Paragraph 10 of the Article 56 states that the military council has the "other powers and jurisdictions accorded to the president in conformance with the law and regulations." This article also grants the SCAF the authority to issue or reject laws, appoint or dismiss ministers, and appoint MPs. The amendments are expected to include language delegating presidential powers to the prime minister, with the exception of authority over the judiciary and the armed forces. Ganzouri said that the constitutional revisions would be made before the swearing in of his new cabinet, postponed until the end of this week. [al-Masry al-Youm, English, 12/5/2011]
9) Following the Islamist victory in the first round of elections, the Muslim Brotherhood’s secretary general Mahmoud Hussein pronounced the supra-constitutional principles proposed in November by Deputy Prime Minister Ali al-Selmy to have “died” with the resignation of Essam Sharaf’s government, warning that anyone who tries to revive the draft document “would die with them.” [al-Ahram, English, 12/5/2011]
Photo Credit: Christian Science Monitor
"If I see another protester, I swear I'd spit on him," said the exasperated taxi driver, observing a rally to commemorate the martyrs of the revolution in Tahrir Square on December 2.
"Would you spit on someone whose brother, sister, or father died while fighting for your rights?" replied my brother, as he rode to Tahrir Square.
The sentiment on the streets of Cairo has increasingly turned against the revolutionaries in Tahrir square. Faced with a lack of public support, depleting personal funds, and smaller turnouts since the start of the election period, protesters have suffered a slow and steady decline in morale. Today's "million man march" hoped to revive the enthusiasm for the protesters' demands, including the immediate transfer of executive authority to a civilian body and accountability for those responsible for the deaths of demonstrators in this latest round of public upheaval.
At the Mostafa Mahmoud mosque in the Mohandeseen neighborhood of Cairo, two hundred protesters gathered after Friday prayers carrying 15 coffins draped in the Egyptian flag with names and pictures of those who had died since the beginning of the second wave of the revolution. They chanted slogans against the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and tore down campaign posters as they marched through the streets. By the time they reached Tahrir, their numbers exceeded a thousand. The march joined other protests taking place in the square before continuing to the parliament building where the coffins were laid at the gates.
Despite the excitement it stirred, the symbolic funeral procession did not attract as many protesters to Tahrir as it may have done in previous weeks. With the focus of the country on the results of the current election round and the announcement of a new salvation government, fewer Egyptians feel the need to protest and hope elected officials will solve their problems. One weary April 6th Movement organizer expressed dismay at the public's indifference to basic demands such as a rejection of the super constitutional exceptions for the military. He expected a meeting of organizers to discuss whether or not to continue the sit-in in Tahrir.
Although this second uprising appears to be taking its final breath, the SCAF and the new government cannot ignore the ability of the people to mobilize once again should an outbreak of violence or blatant violations of human rights recur. The protesters, clearly tired from their three week ordeal, have all reiterated their readiness to return if the need arises. It seems, at least for the moment, the battle will continue in the political arena.
Tarek Radwan is an Egyptian human rights activist specializing in international law and conflict resolution. He has worked for Human Rights Watch's MENA division and the United Nations mission (UNAMID) in Darfur as a Human Rights Officer. He currently provides consulting services on civilian protection and Middle East issues.
Photo Credit: Tarek Radwan
The High Electoral Commission released official results for the first stage of elections on December 4. The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) led the polls with 40 percent of the vote and the Salafi Nour Party came in second with 20 percent, followed by the Egyptian Bloc with 15 percent. The Wafd Party won 6 percent, while the moderate Islamist Wasat Party won 4 percent.
Results for the 28 largest parties competing in the elections are listed below: